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THE USES OF ABSTRACTION: REMARKS ON
INTERDISCIPLINARY EFFORTS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
CATHERINE KEMP'
Legal scholars asking questions whose answers require careful work not
only in law but also in some other academic discipline have been issuing
warnings recently about the carelessness and/or hubris of legal academics who
appropriate the methods, insights, concerns, etc. of those other disciplines.'
Most of these warnings are directed at what we might call the intentional
wrongs of interdisciplinary research carried out by legal academics-self-con-
scious inquiries into subject matters which lie (at least in part) within the
bounds of some other discipline.' The efforts of the participants in this Sym-
posium, although they at times involve issues lying outside the conventional
bounds of legal scholarship, do not, however, fall squarely under this criti-
cism.?
The Symposium's brush with philosophy-as an instance of an interdisci-
plinary approach to law-is, I think, properly viewed as incidental. The group
decided to work on coercion, and found that Professor Wertheimer had written
a book on the subject.4 Although the focus of the discussion was primarily the
legal regulation of coercive relationships, in reading a philosopher,5 the partic-
ipants inevitably encountered obstacles peculiar to interdisciplinary scholar-
ship. This type of minor collision, although not the primary target of scholars
cataloging the afflictions and desiderata of interdisciplinary research, neverthe-
less raises a couple of important issues about such research, in particular about
the mutual perceptions and joint ventures of philosophers and legal academics.
In these Remarks I want to pursue two claims. First, from the vantage of one
discipline, the perceptual virtues6 do not necessarily grace investigations into
the researches of another discipline, so that subject matters, controversies, and
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Denver. B.A. 1987,
Earlham College; Ph.D. 1995, State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D. 1996, The
University of Texas School of Law. I wish to thank Elizabeth Chambliss, Mark Tanzer, and Nan-
cy Ehrenreich for their insight and conversation on the subject of these Remarks, and the members
of the University of Denver College of Law Symposium on Coercion for their kindness in inviting
me to participate.
1. See Francis J. Mootz m, Law and Philosophy, Philosophy and Law, 26 U. TOL. L. REv.
127 (1994); see, e.g., Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 79 (1992).
2. Mootz, supra note 1, at 128-136 (reviewing types of criticism levelled by philosophers at
legal scholars appropriating philosophical material).
3. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
4. ALAN WERTHEimER, CoERCION (1987).
5. Professor Wertheimer.
6. Perspective, proportion, depth, and relation.
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strands of theoretical development located in one discipline often appear out of
context to scholars trained in another. Second, degrees and types of abstraction
form a notable instance of this phenomenon, especially for interdisciplinary
work in law and philosophy.
The first part of these Remarks addresses this issue of context as it affects
interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. The second part begins with the
observation of several Symposium participants 7 that Professor Wertheimer's
theory about coercion is unexpectedly abstract, given his disdain for "concep-
tual analysis,"8 and then considers different types of abstraction and the ways
in which this variety can be misleading when viewed across boundaries of
academic disciplines. The third part reviews divisions among contemporary
moral theorists in the hope that this will help locate some of the differences
between Professor Wertheimer and some of the Symposium participants in
substantive controversies over the proper approach to questions of morality.
I.
"Mr. Tucker, let me introduce you to Dr. Bunney: he too is
passionately interested in phonetics." The Duchess gave a command-
ing nod at the ugly publisher, who instantly entered on a subject
about which he knew nothing at all ....
"And what," asked Tucker gravely, "do you think of this younger
German school?" The question was ninety-nine percent safe. Bunney
was enchanted. Conversation went smoothly and efficiently on.9
Critics of interdisciplinary legal scholarship argue that most of the schol-
ars with legal training who make forays into other disciplines do not have the
competence to read or pronounce on what they find, or to determine its perti-
nence to the aspect of the law which inspired the expedition in the first
place.' This criticism, as I have already suggested, is really directed at inten-
tional border crossings by scholars seeking insight or material from another
discipline. The Symposium discussions instead encountered a related but dif-
ferent obstacle in the remarks Professor Wertheimer makes about his approach
to the question of coercion and about the nature of his conclusions." Many
of these remarks come out of, and are directed at, traditions and controversies
which are peculiar to philosophy and which by themselves are uninformative
to people not trained in the discipline. 2 However, in this case and in other
7. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Conceptualism by Any Other Name... ,74 DENrv. U. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1997).
8. Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 889, 890
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks].
9. MICHAEL INNES, HAMLET, REVENGE! 28 (1962). Of course, most parties to interdisci-
plinary conversations are not as conscious or as specific as Mr. Tucker, yet his hunch relies on the
operation of the kind of seeming lingua franca I consider in this section.
10. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 1, at 90 (charging Jerry Frug with irresponsible appropriation
of Friedrich Nietzsche); Mootz, supra note 1, at 128-130.
11. See WERTHEIMER, ExpLOrrATION 8 (1996); Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 2;
infra Part H.
12. See infra Part B.
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similar situations,'3 the terms in which these kinds of remarks are expressed
often seem familiar to non-philosophers, either because they do not appear to
be terms of art or because they are technical terms in their own right in the
area in which the non-philosophers are trained. Such terms float, as it were,
like objects on a spatially indeterminate background, shorn of the proportions
and relations they bear to each other and to the traditions which form their
contexts. This effect troubles many interdisciplinary discussions, even those
we would consider otherwise modest and well-intentioned, 4 and is, I believe,
partly responsible for the dissatisfaction on both sides which sometimes at-
tends efforts at the appropriation of philosophical material by legal scholars. In
particular I would point out two types of confusion following on this effect
which are relevant to contemporary research in legal theory and philosophy.
First, in every academic discipline there are historical divisions and con-
troversies which come with labels by which practitioners can mark and know
them. These idiosyncratic features are invisible chasms to the non-specialist
who almost inevitably stumbles into them." This is no less true of philoso-
phy as it confronts the legal scholar than of any other academic discipline or
area of activity. 6 The contemporary relationship between law and philosophy,
13. Encounters between legal scholars and philosophers, as well as any interdisciplinary
discussion.
14. I would put the discussions of the Symposium in this category.
15. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563 (1984) (conflating phenomenology with deconstruction).
Deconstruction is fundamentally critical of the project of phenomenology and should never be
mistaken for it. See Joseph Margolis, Deferring to Derrida's Difference, in EUROPEAN PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 195-96 (Barry Smith ed., 1994). See also JACQUES DERRIDA,
SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HUSSERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS; (1979). Gabel's
mistake, however, is instructive for legal scholars working in and with the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) movement CLS is devoted, among other things, to a critical project whose aim is to reveal
the internal inconsistencies of law so as to expose the power relations the law conceals. That is,
for CLS, legal doctrine is an appearance behind which there is something real, something the law
needs to conceal in order to preserve itself and the status quo. See James Boyle, Introduction to
CRITICAL LEGAL. STUDIES xiv (James Boyle ed., 1992). See, e.g., David Trubek, Where the Action
Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984) (discussing CLS' notion
of truth). Deconstruction, properly understood, objects to this kind of relation between appearance
and reality and to the metaphysical assumptions required for the relation to be coherent. See
Margolis, supra, at 208-09.
16. The most important and long-standing division among professional philosophers in the
United States lies between the Anglo-American Analytic and Continental traditions. For a general
characterization of the division, see NICHOLAS RESCHER, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY, AND
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 18-19 (1994); see also David E. Cooper, The Presidential Ad-
dress: Analytic and Continental Philosophy, 94 PROC. ARISTOTEIJAN SOC'Y 1 (1994) (character-
izing the difference as, in part, a disagreement over the possibility of obtaining an impersonal,
explicit command of the 'rules' of language and other human practices). Many scholars view this
division as itself unphilosophical and ahistorical; it also ignores the non-Analytic tradition in
American philosophy, viz. American Pragmatism, Process and "systematic" philosophy. It is gen-
erally agreed that a rapprochement between the two traditions is in the offing. For a whimsical
characterization of this possibility, see JOSEPH MARGOLIS, HISTORIED THOuGHT, CONSTRUCTED
WORLD: CONCEITUAL PRIMER FOR THE TURN OF THE MILtENinm, 6 (1995).
I take sides and I don't take sides. I admire the sense of rigor in the "analytic" tradition,
and I admire the large spirit of the "continental." I deplore the intellectual stinginess of
the analytic, and I deplore the philosophical carelessness of the continental. I believe
they are literally the half-assed progeny of the halved stock of Aristophanes's joke in
Symposium. Those divided parts must surely be rejoined ....
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however, suffers under the additional burden of being the subject of a territori-
al dispute waged by different philosophical traditions over the right (or the
presumption) to define, delimit, interpret, and purvey philosophy for lawyers
and legal scholars.'7 Not content with invisibility, the chasms in this case are
magnetic. What is worse, the effects of this battle are exacerbated by what
appear to be its echoes in the various controversies internal to legal theory and
to legal academia, some of which are very heated indeed. 8 Technical terms
which surface in the middle of such conflicts and confusions are likely to be
misconstrued and to remain unclear.
Second, the historical development and series of distinctions which char-
acterize the intellectual life of every academic discipline are usually encoun-
tered piecemeal by non-specialists, and are thereby susceptible to misconstruc-
tion as instances of seemingly similar developments and distinctions in the
non-specialists' area of specialization. In teaching legal philosophy to philoso-
phy students, for example, one has to point out that legal positivism is not at
all the same thing as the logical positivism familiar to philosophers. Technical
terms which mark developments and distinctions in one area can also appear
or be understood as making reference to controversies no longer confined to a
17. See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 1, at 134 (noting that Martha Nussbaum's recommendation
that philosophers bring rigor to legal theory and adjudication is polemical).
[Martha Nussbaum] emphasizes that only genuine philosophers are competent to fulfill
the role that she envisions, as opposed to the "sophists" of continental literary theory
who currently attract so much attention among contemporary legal theorists. Given that
philosophy is a deeply contested discipline rather than a univocal practice of rigorous
reasoning, one is left with the impression that, at bottom, Nussbaum simply is advocat-
ing the colonization of legal theory by pragmatic-minded analytical philosophers.
Id. (citations omitted).
Mootz notes in this passage that "[i]t is plain from the context that Jacques Derrida is Nussbaum's
unnamed villain." Id. at 134 n. 32 (reviewing Martha Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philoso-
phy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1641-42 0993)); see infra note 18; see also
BRIAN LErrER, PHILOSOPHICAL GOURMEr REPORT 27 (1996) (ranking graduate programs in phi-
losophy in the United States). "Students interested in 'postmodemism' (e.g. Derrida, Lyotard, etc.)
would be better off applying to graduate programs in literary theory, since philosophers generally
do not (for good reason) take this stuff seriously." Id. In his ranking Leiter rates only Analytic
programs, characterizing Continental programs as members of "the 'Continental underground' in
the U.S.-i.e. those American philosophers who shun analytic philosophy and work mainly in
Continental traditions (e.g. phenomenology, critical theory, postmodernism)". Leiter claims that
"the best scholarly work on Continental philosophy is generally done at the predominantly analyt-
ic departments." Id.; cf. Leiter, supra note 1, at 101-102 n.77. This is not the place to evaluate
Leiter's characterization of graduate programs in philosophy, but note, as evidence of the depth of
the chasms and the intensity of the territorial dispute, that his view is not shared by research facul-
ties at Continental programs or by their professional organizations, and that people on both sides
are making forays into legal scholarship. It is inevitable that these Remarks are themselves a kind
of salvo in this conflict; it behooves legal scholars confronting helpful-seeming philosophers to
ascertain the intellectual persuasion of their interlocutors.
18. By this, I mean primarily the late and perhaps continuing unrest over the presence of
Critical Legal Studies scholars on law faculties. See, e.g., Peter D. Carrington, Of Law and the
River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). The flap over CLS in many ways resembles the reaction of
all mainstream philosophical traditions, including older Continental movements to Derrida and of
the Anglo-American Analytic tradition to Continental philosophy in general. See EUROPEAN PHI-
LOSOPHY AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY, supra note 15. See, e.g., LErrER, supra note 17, at 27.
This is not to say, however, that CLS and deconstruction are the same project, or that mainstream




single discipline (e.g., "materialism" or "formalism"). Encountered out of con-
text, such terms lend themselves to inaccurate parallelisms of movements and
controversies between disciplines, which mislead and confuse projects relying
on interdisciplinary study. I turn now to the cluster of terms and attendant
confusion emerging from the Symposium participants' discussion of Professor
Wertheimer's theory on coercion and exploitation.
II.
"I am not a lawyer."'9
"Professor Wertheimer is a political philosopher, I am an attor-
ney.2 0
The story behind these territorial claims, or rather disclaimers, forms an
excellent illustration of this thesis that technical terms appearing out of context
are troublesome for interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. In this
instance, a misunderstanding over a particular set of terms which are signifi-
cant in both disciplines has affected not only the substantive discussion of
coercion, but also the perception on all sides of the relevance of the inter-
disciplinary aspect of the Symposium. The terms at issue are abstract and its
cousins conceptual, formal, and analytic, each of which is frequently qualified
by the term merely. The misunderstanding has its source in the ways in which
these terms as they appeared in Professor Wertheimer's presentation were
understood by the Symposium participants. In this section I tell the story of
the misunderstanding, examine some of the uses of the term abstraction as
they are relevant to discussions between legal scholars and philosophers, and
recast the Symposium discussion in light of this examination.
In some of the remarks Professor Wertheimer makes about the nature of
his approach to the subject of coercion he rejects mere "conceptual analysis"
in favor of "moral argument informed by empirical investigation" as a means
of deciding whether to invalidate or prohibit certain kinds of transaction.2
These claims were understood in the Symposium's initial discussions to sug-
gest that Professor Wertheimer rejects the kind of apolitical or metaphysical
abstraction associated in legal theory with various species of doctrinalism or
formalism' and rely instead on an approach, generally associated by legal
theorists with Legal Realism and its heirs, which takes account of the social
and/or political context in which the agreements are embedded.' That is, the
Symposium's members set out to examine Professor Wertheimer's theory
about coercion thinking that he preferred a normative, empirically-informed
(political)24 approach to the question over a value-neutral, "abstract" (apoliti-
19. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 889.
20. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1291-92, n.41.
21. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890, see also id. at 892. "Mhe best account of
coercion is normative.... [t]he antinomy of normative is empirical or value-neutral . . . ." Id.
22. See Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1283-84; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A His-
TORY OF AMERICAN LAw 617 (1985); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1. 5 (1983).
23. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 15, at xiii, xx.
24. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1290 n.37.
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cal) one. Over the course of the discussions, however, the group found that
what Professor Wertheimer means by "normative" does not involve attention
to the social or political context of possibly coercive agreements,' that is,
having eschewed "conceptual analysis" as empty, he seems to rely anyway on
a very formalistic, abstract view of these transactions and of the parties to
them.26 Several participants wondered whether this penchant for abstraction
should be attributed to the fact that Professor Wertheimer is a philosopher and
not a lawyer.17 In her article for this Symposium, Professor Ehrenreich charg-
es Professor Wertheimer with engaging in an undesirable (if unintentional)
merger of a formalist approach with that of progressive legal theory.' Con-
fronted with these criticisms, Professor Wertheimer responds that his contribu-
tions to the Symposium are "philosophical, not legal."" What has happened
here?
The problem lies with the phrase "conceptual analysis,"" and with Pro-
fessor Wertheimer's remark that a normative approach is not "value-neutral",
implying that conceptual analysis is value-neutral.3' Compounding the prob-
lem, Professor Wertheimer also says that his normative, non-neutral approach
is "empirical,"32 which conceptual analysis is not.33 Two strands of the mis-
understanding begin at this point. First, to the untutored eye, Professor
Wertheimer appears to be rejecting non-empirical, value-neutral approaches in
general. Second, he seems to favor an approach to the question of coercive
transactions which is empirically-based and morally explicit. The first appear-
ance lends itself to the conclusion that Professor Wertheimer is going to avoid
formal, conceptual, merely analytic, or abstract methods. The second suggests
that his positive theory about coercion might involve claims about the justice
of the transactions he considers, that is, their social and political significance.
As the Symposium participants discovered, Professor Wertheimer explicitly
rejects the second34 and seems to renege on the first.3'
25. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 901, 905; see also WERTHEIMER, EX LOrTATION,
supra note 11, at 270, 298; Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1299; infra Part IL.
26. See Ehrenreich, supra note 7.
27. This came up during weekly discussions in Fall 1996. It was at this juncture that I felt
compelled to point out that the abstraction in Wertheimer's treatment of moral agents, which the
participants attributed to philosophers, was instead peculiar to some philosophers but not others. I
explained that I thought that Professor Wertheimer had been trained in the Anglo-American Ana-
lytic tradition in moral theory, and that the significant division among professional philosophers in
this country lay between the Analytic and Continental waditions. See supra note 16. The Sym-
posium participants were unfamiliar with this division, and it has been my experience that legal
scholars are generally unaware of it. This, of course, makes the territorial struggle among philoso-
phers peddling philosophy to lawyers even more perilous. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
28. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284; see also id. at 1290.
29. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 889.
30. Id. at 890.
31. Id. at 892.
32. Id. at 890.
33. Id.
34. See Wertheimer's discussion of "Background Injustice." Id. at 904.
35. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284.
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What does 'abstract' mean? Much of the controversy over the nature of
Professor Wertheimer's claims winds itself around the fact that there are sev-
eral only partially-explicit and partially-distinct meanings for this term at play
in the Symposium discussions. Some of these significations go to the sub-
stance of Professor Wertheimer's theory on coercion, others to methodological
differences between lawyers and philosophers. Still others are relevant to
historical developments in the intellectual life. of both disciplines. I pick it out,
in part, because it forms what seems to me to be the locus of the difficulty in
this particular conversation, but also because I believe this group of terms is
especially important for interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. This is
due to the fact that the number and variety of uses of the terms abstract, for-
mal, and conceptual are staggering in philosophy, substantial in legal theory,
and relevant in several pockets of interdisciplinary research already mapped
out by scholars working on philosophical approaches to law. Even inside phi-
losophy it is impossible' to formulate a grand theory of the abstract; a theory
explaining the variety of uses of the term in law and philosophy could only be
absurd. Nevertheless, there are a few simple distinctions between types of
abstraction which are worth pointing to for the sake of the process of inter-
disciplinary discussions.
First, it is important to ask what it is in relation to which something is
considered abstract: To a historical or political context?37 To the results of
empirical investigation?38 To a particular experience or instance? To a defi-
nite practical resolution?39 To something else? Second, as I have already sug-
36. Indeed it is undesirable.
37. Members of the Symposium rightly put Professor Wertheimer here, but not because he
rejects "conceptual analysis," but rather, because the normative theory he espouses prefers to focus
on the moral individual in isolation from his or her social and/or political context. See infra note
42. 56 and accompanying text, and Part III.
Notice that the legal formalism associated with Langdell sees law as abstract in relation to
its social and political context. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 614-17 (1985) (reviewing the
career of Christopher Columbus Langdell). Langdell was adamantly opposed to acknowledging the
social or political dimensions of American law, and intent on protecting the principles and formal
truths of law from the vicissitudes of political and legislative life. Id. at 614. Notice also, however,
that even though Professor Wertheimer's moral theory and Langdell's view of law may be abstract
in relation to the same thing, they are nonetheless abstract in very different ways. Professor
Wertheimer's moral theory, as we will see in a moment, is based on a certain way of looking at A
and B and at their transaction, rather than on an assumption, like Langdell's about law, that there
are essential-formal--truths about A and B. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
38. Older, pre-experimental notions of science relied on the elaboration of abstractions about
observed phenomena; modem science is founded on both the abstract expressions of mathematics
and on experimental method. See A. C. CROMBIE, THE HISrORY OF SCIENCE FROM AUGUSTINE
TO GALILEO, 145-50 (1995); cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 617 ("If law is at all the product of
society, then Langdell's science of law was a geology without rocks, an astronomy without
stars.").
39. Martha Nussbaum characterizes one of the difficulties besetting interdisciplinary discus-
sions in law and philosophy as the conflict between lawyer's desire for definite outcomes and the
philosopher's "concern for open-ended investigation and debate." Martha Nussbaum, Philosophy
in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1642 (1993). It is this version of the difference be-
tween legal and philosophical scholarship which inspired Professor Wertheimer's "preemptive
strike against those who will want to take me to task on one legal issue or another." Wertheimer,
Remarks, supra note 8, at 889. Professor Wertheimer received the Symposium's charge of formal-
19971
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gested, when a scholar on either side designates something as formal or con-
ceptual, it is important that non-specialists try to learn something about the
tradition and the controversy which (may) lie behind that designation. Third,
neither law nor philosophy is itself uniformly abstract or uniformly
particularistic; it is important to avoid stereotyping disciplines and movements
within them by simple distinctions between abstract and concrete, formal and
particular, conceptual and material. Finally, as I suggested a moment ago, ab-
straction or formalism is not itself a uniform phenomenon in either discipline,
and is properly an object of suspicion for non-specialists encountering it in an
interdisciplinary context.
So, on his own terms-in certain philosophical terms-Professor
Wertheimer is perfectly consistent.' In refusing to rely on "conceptual analy-
sis" he is rejecting a particular kind of philosophical method.4' In characteriz-
ing his own conclusions as moral and empirical he is placing himself in rela-
tion to various controversies in contemporary (philosophical) moral theory.42.
ism as a demand that he take account of particular court decisions and fact situations. This, of
course, is not that in relation to which some of the Symposium participants found his theory ab-
stract. See supra note 37. Indeed, had he obliged the Symposium in what he thought were its
demands, he might have come up with a Langdellian account of coercive transactions, which
would have been just as unsatisfying, although more familiar, to his critics.
40. Note that this in no way diminishes the misgivings Professor Ehrenreich has about the
"domestication" of CLS and related theoretical approaches. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note
7. Professor Ehrenreich worries about the effect of modes of argument like Professor
Wertheimer's on legal scholarship, an effect which is a consequence, not a cause, of the misun-
derstanding over terms of art.
41. "Conceptual analysis" refers to a method developed and championed by Anglo-American
Analytic philosophers in the twentieth century. It begins with the premise that traditional philo-
sophical problems (in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics) are not really problems but
rather confusions caused by mistakes in language. Philosophical analysis looks into the concepts
and logical relations raised in a particular problem and "dissolves" the problem by clearing up the
conceptual mistakes. Problems which survive this process are really scientific problems. The histo-
ry of philosophy under this method is a collection of linguistic mistakes made over centuries,
which, once dispelled, can be ignored. The goal of conceptual analysis in its most distinctive form
is the end of philosophy as a tradition and as a discipline. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 34 (1994).
Note that conceptual analysis is distinct from conceptualism, a theory in traditional metaphysics.
Reinhard Grossman, Conceptualism, 14 REv. OF METAPHYSICS 243 (1960).
42. The moral theory Professor Wertheimer relies on seems to be a kind of rule-utilitarian-
ism. Rule-utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism which relies on rules based on the principle of
utility rather than on the principle itself to judge the consequences of actions. JAMES E. WHITE,
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 17 (3d ed. 1991). The normative aspect of traditional Law
and Economics theory is a form of rule-utilitarianism familiar to legal scholars, wherein definite
norms for adjudication are founded on a principle of "wealth-maximization" similar to the 'plea-
sure-maximization' of traditional utilitarian theories. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Move-
ments of the 1980s, 50 OHO ST. U. 599, 605 (1989). Both approaches assume that the moral
subject is an independent rational agent who exercises maximizing choices in his actions. Id. at
611; see MARK PHILIP STRASSER, AGENCY, FREE WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBxrY 183 (1992)
(noting that for John Stuart Mill the moral subject is an autonomous choice-maker).
Professor Wertheimer's distinction between "micro-level" and "macro-level" injustice and
his preference for the former in his analyses of the potential harm of transactions suggests that he
is primarily concerned with individual actors and the quality of their choices. WERTHEIMER, EX-
PLOITATION, supra note 11, at 8-10; see also Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 902. See
generally, WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 247-277 (discussing the evaluation of
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Neither of these claims, however, says as much as it seems to: Professor
Wertheimer is rejecting a rather formalistic method in philosophy. He is not
thereby rejecting all kinds of formalism, conceptualism or abstraction. Addi-
tionally, he may not be rejecting "conceptual analysis" for its abstraction, but
for some other reason.' He is adopting a moral and empirical approach to
the question of coercive transactions. But, in philosophy, there are many kinds
of moral theory," and many kinds of empiricism, some of which are hospita-
ble to considerations of social justice, many of which are not. Further, some of
these moral or normative theories are very abstract,' and certain kinds of
empiricism can make Langdell look like a ethnographer. In this series of dis-
tinctions we can see that Professor Wertheimer's remarks about his methods
are couched in terms which are both familiar and differently significant to
legal scholars, so that what he says is (unintentionally) both misleading and
opaque for his interlocutors in the Symposium. The healthy suspicion I have
recommended about such terms would limit the damage they do to interdis-
ciplinary discussions between lawyers and philosophers.
mI.
The abstraction with which Professor Wertheimer treats the issue of coer-
cion places him firmly on one side of an important divide running through
contemporary moral theory. It is misleading, however, to characterize the
difference between positions staked out along this divide as a difference in
consent).
The aspiration to being 'informed empirically' refers to Professor Wertheimer's determina-
tion to make sure his claims are true to actually existing conditions of (individual) advantage and
harm which attend certain transactions. See, e.g., Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 893.
(asking moral questions about pressures on prisoners and whether these pressures for us actually
excuse their conduct). I discuss the context for Professor Wertheimer's theoretical positionings
below. See infra Part III.
43. These are legion, and they are held by people working in many different philosophical
traditions. See REScHER, supra note 16, at 35-39 (1994).
44. See CAHAL B. DALY, MORAL PH[LOSOPHY iN BRITAIN: FROM BRADLEY TO
Wr-rGENFEIN (1996); DWIGHT FuRRow, AGAINST THEORY: CONTINENTAL AND ANALYnC
CHALLENGES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1995); Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics:
Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115 (1992); see also infra Part ID.
45. Some ae even abstract about the onus of abstraction. See, for example, RESCHER, supra
note 16, at 114:
A quandary of concretization arises when a certain generic act is abstractly desirable but
yet this can be accomplished only in various particular ways each of which is concretely
undesirable. The person facing such a situation looks to the pursuit of an evident desid-
eratum, but is emplaced in the uncomfortable and unhappy position that there is no ac-
ceptable way to get there from here.
A schematic illustration of this phenomenon is readily produced. We have a
choice of performing A and not-A in circumstances where A can (only) be realized in
one or another of three versions (A,, A2, A3). And the situation we now confront stands
as follows: A is realizable only via the several concrete A, ....
The basic difficulty is that abstract desiderata have to be realized in concrete
circumstances.... The performance of what is, in and of itself, a perfectly proper act in
A may-in the existing circumstances-saddle us with collateral negativities, with the
result that there just is no acceptable concretization of an abstractly appropriate desider-
atum.
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degrees of abstraction. That is, the theories themselves on both sides are more
or less abstract, more or less formal. There are, however, differences between
these types of moral theory in certain kinds of abstraction. In this section I
make a couple of points about contemporary moral philosophy and indicate
three ways in which contemporary moral theories differ in degrees of abstrac-
tion.
Contemporary moral philosophy is, in part, a collection of responses to
traditional moral theory' and, in part, the collection of theories about moral
subjects that tag along with various contemporary logical, epistemological,
linguistic, and metaphysical positions.47 Traditional moral theory' is primar-
ily normative.' Responses to it fall into two very rough categories: those
which question the possibility and conditions of universal moral norms, 0 and
those which prefer a different account of the theoretical assumptions on which
a particular moral theory is founded." Scholars working in the first category
are usually identified with the Continental tradition," those in the second are
usually identified with a particular strand of Anglo-American Analytic philoso-
phy.53 Beyond this point generalizations about Analytic and Continental dif-
ferences in contemporary moral philosophy are unhelpful, but mention of a
few issues over which the two traditions part ways may help clarify the Sym-
posium discussions.
First, moral theories in the two traditions differ in the way they see the
relation between people and the moral questions and decisions people con-
front, on the one hand, and the context in experience, society, and history in
which these people are found, on the other. In one camp sit theorists who
46. See FURROw, supra note 44.
47. See Nicholas Capaldi, The Dogmatic Slumber of Hume Scholarship, 18 HUME STUD.
117, 120 (1992) (noting that for Analytic philosophy "theoretical knowledge is primary and prac-
tical 'knowledge' has a secondary status"). This view and its assumptions are at issue in contem-
porary Analytic circles. See Darwall et al., supra note 44, at 128-30 (distinguishing two trends in
contemporary moral philosophy, one which sees facts and values as discontinuous and thereby
possessed of merely different kinds of objectivity; a second which holds that moral judgments are
objective in the same way as scientific or theoretical judgments). Note, however, that both of these
trends are formed in response to the problem of '"placing ethics' in relation to "empirical science
as the paradigm of synthetic knowledge." Capaldi, supra, at 126.
48. Deontology (Immanuel Kant) and utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham and John Start Mill).
See WHITE, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS, supra note 42, at 1-4.
49. FuRRow, supra note 44, at 2-3.
Normative ethical theories typically offer the promise of applying principles supported
by a theory to particular cases of moral decision-making, thereby helping to discover
which of our moral beliefs are justified and which are not. ... The history of normative
ethical theory displays a preoccupation with universality, objectivity, and the autonomy
of ethical phenomena from other aspects of life ....
Id.
50. I owe this picture of contemporary moral theory to Dwight Furrow. He gives the term
"anti-theoretical" to moral philosophers who reject the possibility of universal moral norms. Id. at
xi-xii, 18.
51. Furrow terms these figures "non-foundationalists." By this he means philosophers work-
ing on alternative justifications for the kinds of claims made by normative moral theories who
share a commitment to the claims but not to the presuppositions of normative theories. Id. at 1, 3.
52. Richard Rorty is notable exception. See id. at 19.
53. See id. at 4; Darwall et al., supra note 44, at 115. For the distinction between Analytic
and Continental traditions in philosophy, see supra Part I.
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prefer to concentrate on individual actors in isolation from their contexts;5  in
the other camp are moral philosophers trying to work out the relevance of
those contexts to the moral status of individuals and individual actions." Pro-
fessor Wertheimer's view of parties to transactions which may or may not be
coercive places him with theorists who concentrate on individual moral actors
and who consider the context of actions and transactions irrelevant to judg-
ments about the moral status of these events.56 In one sense, those theorists
who think social, economic, and historical context is irrelevant to moral con-
siderations see moral situations as abstract from those contexts. Professor
Wertheimer certainly seems to fall into this category."
Second, theories in the two traditions often differ according to whether or
not they -maintain the possibility of formulating norms, imperatives, or other
moral claims which are general or universal in application." Many Continen-
tal moral philosophers reject such a possibility, 9 while scholars in the Ana-
54. See supra note 42.
55. FURROW, supra note 44, at xiii (1995).
The antitheory position is motivated by the perception that when moral agents think
about moral questions, they do so not in terms of abstract principles with an aim to
systematize some large chunk of moral experience, but in terms of concrete relationships
with other people within the context of their understanding of those relationships, histo-
ries, and the institutions in which they are embedded.... To the extent that we think
about principles and rules, they are viewed as emerging from the aforementioned con-
crete relationships.
Id.
Among the contemporary figures Furrow considers is Emmanuel Levinas, whose inquiry is driven
by concerns about the relation of moral theory to history, in particular to the Holocaust. Id. at 140.
56. See WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 8 (defining the "micro-level" of in-
dividual transactions as the "locus of exploitation" which is the proper object of moral concern);
id. at 268-271 (distinguishing features of social, economic, and/or historical context from morally
relevant features of individual consent).
I do not think that we should say that hard circumstances constitute a defect in con-
sent. ... [W]e should not elide the distinction between problems in one's objective
circumstances or background conditions in which choices are made and problems in the
quality of choice that one is making given those background conditions.
Id. at 270; see also Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 901 ("It is important to note that the
injustice of B's background conditions must be distinguished from B's 'moralized baseline' with
respect to A .... "). Wertheimer assigns features of the social, economic, and historical context to
a theory of justice, reserving for moral theory features of individual choice and action. See also
WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 298.
[There is a distinction between taking advantage of unfairness (or misfortune) and
taking unfair advantage of unfairness (or misfortune).... [W]hen B's suffering is root-
ed in social injustice, it may (reasonably) be treated as misfortune by A, if A bears no
special responsibility for causing or alleviating B's suffering.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
57. After the problem with technical terms, this aspect of Professor Wertheimer's theory is
probably the single most important source of confusion for the Symposium, for in it he most
resembles, albeit superficially, the classic doctrinalist who eschews consideration of the social,
historical, political, and economic aspects of legal culture. See supra note 37.
58. FURROw, supra note 44, at xiii-xiv (indicating that normative and non-foundationalist
moral theorists maintain the possibility of such claims while "anti-theorists" do not). See also
Darwall et al., supra note 44.
59. See FURROW, supra note 44, at 133 ("Moral obligation and responsibility are... char-
acterized in terms of local norms and concrete relations with familiar others, which must be articu-
lated in particularistic terms not widely shared across communities or traditions."). See also supra
note 55.
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lytic tradition generally do not. Professor Wertheimer's development of his
"characteristics of choice situations"w suggests that he thinks that there are
aspects of transactions which guide norms for declaring these transactions
coercive or non-coercive, norms which are general at least across American
legal culture, and certainly across differences in the justice of "background
conditions."' In this respect Professor Wertheimer's theory is more abstract
than those which see moral claims as irreducibly specific to a particular social
context.
Finally, this insistence by certain Continental theorists (as well as others)
that moral claims can only be particular and relative has produced problems
for the formulation of a notion of moral obligation which extends across con-
textual differences. That is, it becomes difficult to talk about how people in
different social and economic contexts register as proper objects of moral
concern.' This, in turn, has inspired some scholars to develop an account of
the relation between moral actors and other people which is "transcendent" or
unknowable but which nonetheless makes certain demands which function as
moral obligations.63 Such a moral theory is then both more and less abstract
than its Analytic contemporaries, including Professor Wertheimer's theory,
because while it rests on an assumption that moral claims cannot be abstracted
from social or historical contexts, its solution to the problems generated by
this assumption is so abstract it cannot be known or understood.
CONCLUSION
I hope that the variety in the uses of abstraction and among types of mor-
al theory I have pointed to in these remarks, together with the little map of
contemporary philosophical traditions, is of some help to interdisciplinary
discussions in law and philosophy. Would that there were a moral to this
story of the Symposium beyond the cautionaries "Watch out!" and "Take
care!", but at this point, I believe, there is not.
60. See Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 900.
61. See supra note 56.
62. FURROW, supra note 44, at 137 ("[I]t seems we are stuck with this parochialism if we
wish to preserve the basic tenets of the anti-theory position.").
63. Id. at 143.
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ALAN WERTHEIMER
INTRODUCrION
I am delighted to be participating in this Symposium on coercion and
exploitation'-topics that are near and dear to my heart.' In the interests of
launching a preemptive strike in self-defense against those who will want to
take me to task on one legal issue or another and also in the interests of full
disclosure, I want to make clear that I am a political philosopher. I am not a
lawyer. I have never attended a single class in law school. My oldest child is
now a third-year student at Michigan Law School, but that's as close as I
come.
So my offerings will be philosophical, not legal. In an effort to further
reduce your expectations, thus reducing the gap between what you expect and
what I offer, I want to say at the outset that my philosophical message will
itself be largely deflationary. It will be filled with more distinctions than argu-
ments. And the first distinction I shall make is to note that there are two ways
in which my remarks will be deflationary.
Roughly speaking, there are two philosophical questions about coercion
(let me bracket exploitation for the moment): (1) What counts as coercion?
and (2) When are individuals or the state justified in using coercion? The sec-
ond question is, of course, a central problems of political philosophy. These
are the issues that we discuss under rubrics such as liberty, paternalism, moral-
ism, and so forth. This is the topic of Mill's On Liberty' and Joel Feinberg's
four volume treatise on the scope of the criminal law." And this, I suspect, is
the issue at stake in the session on Coercion and Confinement.
Although I am happy to enter discussions of those issues, my first defla-
tionary point is that I shall have nothing to say here about the justification of
* John G. McCullough Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont. B.A.,
New York University, 1964; Ph.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1968.
1. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. (1997).
2. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). To the extent this paper draws heavily on
COERCION, that portion is protected by copyright 0 1987 Princeton University Press. See also
ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996); Alan Wertheimer, Coercion and Exploitative
Agreements, AM. PHIL. Ass'N NEWSL. ON PHIL. OF L., Fall, 1994; Alan Wertheimer, Consent and
Sexual Relations, 2 LEGAL THEORY 89 (1996); Alan Wertheimer, Coercive Offers (Dec. 1994)
(unpublished paper delivered at the 1994 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association in Boston) (on file with the author).
3. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1947).
4. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERs (1984); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986); JOEL
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988); JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985).
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coercion. Rather, I shall be interested in the first and seemingly less morally
charged issue-namely, what counts as coercion and exploitation. I suspect
that this is the question that is at stake in the sessions on coercive and ex-
ploitative bargaining and coerced confessions.
My second deflationary point is that I shall argue that the questions (and
their facsimiles)-what counts as coercion? What is valid or meaningful con-
sent? What is exploitation?-are much less important than they first seem. Let
me say a bit more about this at the outset. A standard picture about the role of
conceptual analysis with respect to topics such as coercion and consent goes
something like this: we start with a principle that agreements are valid and/or
should be permitted if they are consensual or voluntary.' By contrast, if an
agreement is the result of coercion or is made under duress or fraud, then the
agreement or decision is invalid, or we can justify prohibiting the formation of
the agreement, ex ante. It is then suggested that to determine which
agreements should be treated as invalid or prohibited, we should engage in an
analysis of the concept of coercion (and related concepts such as fraud and
consent). If such an analysis can, for example, tell us what counts as coercion,
we can then identify the agreements that should be treated as invalid or pro-
hibited.
I believe that this picture of conceptual analysis is mistaken. The concepts
of coercion and exploitation provide important templates by which we orga-
nize many of the moral issues in which we are interested, but they cannot do
much more than that. The questions as to what agreements should be treated
as invalid and what behaviors should be prohibited will be settled by moral
argument informed by empirical investigation rather than conceptual analysis.
Inquires into the essence of coercion or exploitation will prove to be of limited
help with respect to the substantive questions in which we are interested.
Consent as Morally Transformative
Let us begin by noting that the organizers of this Symposium are not, I
believe, interested in coercion and exploitation as free standing concepts. This
Symposium is not dedicated to conceptual analysis, per se. We are interested
in coercion and exploitation because consent is typically morally and legally
transformative-that is, it changes the moral and legal relationship between
parties to an agreement and between those parties and others-and because
coercion and exploitation may seem to threaten that moral transformation.6
Let us note a few ways in which consent is morally transformative: B's con-
sent may legitimate or render permissible an action by A that would not be
legitimate without B's consent, as when B's consent to surgery transforms A's
act from a battery to a permissible medical procedure. B's consent to transact
with A provides a reason for others not to interfere with that transaction, as
5. This principle is, of course, only prima facie. There may be good reasons not to uphold
or permit some uncontroversially voluntary agreements.
6. I borrow the phrase "morally transformative" from Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of
Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 124 (1996). In what follows, I will not distinguish between moral
and legal transformation.
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when B's consent to let A put a tatoo on her arm gives C a reason to leave
them be. And B's consent may give rise to an obligation to A. If B consents
to do X for A, B ordinarily acquires an obligation to do X for A.
To say that B's consent is morally transformative is not to say that B's
consent is either necessary or sufficient to change an "all things considered"
moral judgment about A's or B's action. It may be legitimate for A to perform
surgery on a delusional or unconscious B without B's consent. It may be
wrong for A to perform surgery on B even with B's consent if the procedure
is not medically indicated.7 Similarly, we may think that exchanging money
for sexual relations is wrong even if the prostitute consents to the exchange.8
But this does not show that the prostitute's consent is not morally
transformative. After all, the prostitute's consent to sexual relations with A
eliminates one very important reason for regarding A's behavior as wrong,
namely, that A had sexual relations with B without her consent. The
prostitute's consent may provide a strong although not dispositive moral rea-
son for not interfering with A's and B's behavior.
The Logic of Consent Arguments
To put the point of the previous section schematically, we are interested
in the following sort of argument:
Major Premise: If, in response to A's proposal, B voluntarily con-
sents to do X, then B's agreement to do X is binding or valid (or A
and B should be permitted to enter into such agreements).
Minor Premise: B has not voluntarily consented to do X because A's
proposal has coerced B to consent to do X.
Conclusion: B's agreement to do X is not binding or valid (or A and
B should not be permitted to enter into such agreements).
Given the major premise, it seems that we must determine when the minor
premise is true if we are going to know when the conclusion is warranted. For
that reason, we may be tempted to think that an analysis of the concept of
coercion will identify the criteria or necessary and sufficient conditions of
coercion, and that empirical investigation can then (in principle) determine if
those criteria are met. If the criteria are met, then the minor premise is true
and the conclusion follows. If not, then the minor premise is false and the
conclusion does not follow.
If things were only so simple. It is a mistake to think that we will be able
to make much progress towards resolving the substantive moral and legal
issues in which we are interested by philosophical resources internal to the
concept of coercion (or consent). In the final analysis, we are always going to
7. For example, it may be wrong for a physician to accede to a beggar's request to have his
leg amputated so that he can enhance his success as a beggar.
8. "It is a non sequitur, but a disturbingly common one, to argue from the premise that
some act is bad because it is nonconsensual, to the conclusion that the same act, ff consensual, is
therefore good .... Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 233,
247 (1996).
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have to ask: Given the facts that relate to issues of coercion, how should we
think about the moral and legal status of a transaction or relationship? In that
sense, I am squarely in the camp that maintains that the best account of coer-
cion is normative. To say that coercion is normative or moralized is not-as
some have thought--to say that it is vague or subjective or has no correct
application. The antinomy of normative is empirical or value-neutral, not ob-
jective or precise.
In suggesting that coercion is essentially normative, I do not deny that it
is possible to produce a morally neutral or empirical account of coercion that
would allow us to determine whether B is coerced by reference to specific
empirical criteria (such as B's state of mind). I do maintain that if we were to
operate with a morally neutral account of coercion, we would have to go on to
ask whether that sort of coercion renders B's agreement invalid and that we
will be unable to answer that question without introducing substantive moral
arguments. In the final analysis, it does not matter much whether we adopt a
thin morally neutral account of consent or a thick morally laden account of
consent. Either way, the point remains that we will not be able to go from a
morally neutral or empirical account of coercion to interesting moral or legal
conclusions without introducing substantive moral arguments. The only ques-
tion (to paraphrase a commercial for motor oil) is whether we want to pay the
moral price up front by including moral considerations within our account of
coercion or pay the moral price after we have determined that A's proposal
has coerced B but before we say that the agreement is invalid.
The Fallacy of Equivocation
Precisely because we can pack a lot or a little into our account of coer-
cion, it is all too easy for a "coercion argument" to commit the fallacy of
equivocation, where the meaning of coercion assumed by the major premise is
not identical to the meaning of coercion in the minor premise, and thus the
conclusion does not follow even though both the major premise and minor
premise may be true (given different meanings of a word).
Consider a classic problem" of political philosophy: Do citizens have a
general (prima facie) obligation to obey the laws of society? A standard argu-
ment goes like this:
Major Premise: One is obligated to obey the laws if one consents to
do so.
Minor Premise (Version-i): One who remains in his society rather
than leaves thereby gives his consent to that society (Plato).9
Minor Premise (Version-2): One who benefits from living in a soci-
9. Plato described the basis for this consent
You have never left the city, even to see a festival, nor for any other reason except
military service; you have never gone to stay in any other city, as people do; you have
had no desire to know another city or other laws; we and our city satisfied you. So
decisively did you choose us and agree to be a citizen under us.
PLATO, Crito, in THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES 52 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1975).
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ety gives his consent to that society (Locke). 0
Conclusion: One who does not leave his society or benefits from
living in a society has an obligation to obey its laws.
Is either version of the minor premise true? The problem is this: there may be
a linguistically plausible sense in which one who accepts the benefits of one's
government has consented to that government or in which one who remains in
one's society has consented to remain in that society. In that sense, both ver-
sions of the minor premise may be true. But, even if that were so, the conclu-
sion may not follow. We will have to determine if the type or strength of
consent that figures in the major premise has been met in the minor premise.
And it may not. Thus we could agree with Plato that there is a sense in which
one who does not leave his society gives his consent, while also agreeing with
Hume that it is not the sort of free consent that would justify the ascription of
a strong obligation to obey the law." We can make a similar point about
Locke's view.
A similar point can be made about the concept of harm. Suppose we start
from the Millian principle that the state can justifiably prohibit only that con-
duct that causes harm to others. The following questions arise: Does the psy-
chic distress caused by hate speech count as harmful? Does trespass that caus-
es no physical damage to one's property constitute a harm? Does a peeping-
tom harm his target? Clearly there is a sense in which psychic distress caused
by hate speech is harmful. As a matter of empirical psychology, it is simply
untrue that "sticks and stones will break your bones, but names will never hurt
you" (just as it is untrue that absence makes the heart grow fonder). And there
is clearly a sense in which one has not been harmed by trespass which causes
no physical damage, or by the peeping tom, particularly if the target is un-
aware of his voyeurism. But these observations will not tell us which activities
can be legitimately prohibited by the state under the Millian principle. 2
So we can opt for a morally neutral or moralized account of harm. We
can opt for a morally neutral or neurological account of harm, but we will
10. The benefits derived from society compel consent, according to Locke.
[Elvery man that hath any possessions, or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of
any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obe-
dience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment ... whether this his pos-
session be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT c. 8 § 119 (J.W. Gough ed., 3d ed. 1956).
11. Hume questions the consent to a society by one who remains in that society:
Can we seriously say, that a poor person or artisan has a free choice to leave his coun-
try, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the
small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a
vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board
while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her.
DAvID HuME, Of the Original Contract, in HtuME's MORAL AND POLxrCAL PHrLOsOPHY 363
(1948).
12. "The question is ... not what 'harm' really means, but what reasons of principle there
are for preferring one conception to another.. . the question is not simply which is the better
conception of harm, but which conception answers more adequately to the purposes for which the
concept is deployed." JEREMY WALDRON, LBERAL RIGHTS 119-20 (1993).
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then have to go on to ask whether harm so defied should be prohibited and
whether some acts excluded by that definition can be legitimately prohibited.
We can opt for a moralized account of harm, say one in which one is harmed
if one's rights or moral interests are violated. On this view, we could maintain
that the psychic distress caused by hate speech does not count as a harm be-
cause it does not violate one's rights, whereas trespassing and voyeurism do
count as harm because they violate one's rights to property and privacy. 3
A similar danger of equivocation arises with respect to coercion. Consider
Harry Frankfurt's example:
The courts may refuse to admit in evidence, on the grounds that it
was coerced, a confession which the police have obtained from a
prisoner by threatening to beat him. But the prisoner's accomplices,
who are compromised by his confession, are less likely to agree that
he was genuinely coerced into confession. 4
Was the prisoner's confession coerced? There is no reason to think that there
must be a single acceptable answer to this question. The answer to this ques-
tion will depend upon the sort of moral transformation that consent is meant to
trigger. We may think that the sort of pressure to which the prisoner was
subject may be sufficient to deprive his confession of legal validity. At the
same time, and if there is anything like honor among thieves, the very same
pressures may not be sufficient to excuse his betrayal of his accomplices. (We
need not assume the prisoners are thieves; they may be political prisoners in a
just cause). It will do no good to ask what appears to be a conceptual and
empirical question: Was his confession coerced or not? Rather, we need to
answer two moral questions: What sorts of pressures on prisoners to confess
are sufficient to bar the introduction of the confession as evidence? and What
sorts of pressures on prisoners are sufficient to excuse the ascription of blame
by those to whom the prisoner has obligations of silence? These are irreduc-
ibly moral questions, not questions about the concept of coercion.
I have said much more about coercion than exploitation to this point.
Whereas we are inclined to refer to some agreements as coerced, other agree-
ments are more naturally characterized as exploitative. And I shall try to say
something-about the character of exploitative agreements. It is worth noting
that whereas the moral force of coercion is relatively clear, as a coerced agree-
ment is not binding, the moral force of exploitation is not clear, for it is not
obvious what follows from characterizing an agreement as exploitative. But
before proceeding further with an analysis of both exploitation and coercion, it
will prove useful to get some more concrete examples in mind. So let me
introduce some cases in very simplistic or stylized form.
13. I am not maintaining that this is what we should say on a moralized account of harm,
only that such an account allows us to make these distinctions.
14. Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF AC-
TION 65 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973).
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Cases
1. Extortion: A proposes to break the windows on B's store unless B agrees
to hire A to collect B's garbage for an exorbitant fee. B agrees.
2. AZT: A owns the patent on AZT, a drug that offers some help to patients
with AIDS. A proposes to sell a year's supply of AZT to B, who has AIDS,
for $8,000. B agrees.
3. Enlistment: A proposes to offer B monetary compensation if B enlists in the
army. Because B lacks any decent civilian career opportunities, B enlists.
4. Stripper A proposes to hire B as a topless dancer. B, who has been admit-
ted to law school, accepts A's proposal because she expects to earn up to
$1,000 a night. 5
5. Surrogacy: A, whose wife is infertile, proposes to pay B $10,000 to become
impregnated with A's sperm through artificial insemination and waive custody
rights to the child upon birth. B, who is not affluent, agrees.
6. Automobile: A, a used car dealer, turns back the odometer on a car and
sells it to B for a price that B would not have paid if she had known the car's
true mileage.
7. Organs: A, who suffers from a kidney ailment, proposes to buy one of B's
kidneys for $25,000. B, a poor Egyptian with a wife and several children,
accepts A's proposal.'
6
8. Psychotherapy: A, a psychotherapist, proposes to B, his patient, that they
have sexual relations. Because B is in the grips of transference and is sexually
attracted to A, B agrees.
9. Unfair Rescue: A, a tug, encounters a ship (B) in distress and proposes to
take it in tow for a fee that greatly exceeds the normal market price for such
services. B agrees.
10. Fair Rescue: A, a tug, encounters a ship (B) in distress and proposes to
take it in tow for a fee that is no greater than the normal market price for such
services and from which A makes only a modest profit. B agrees.
11. Lumber: There has been a hurricane in Florida. A, a lumber retailer, triples
his price for lumber. B, who needs lumber to rebuild, pays A's price.
12. Drowning: A comes upon B, who is drowning. A proposes to rescue B if
B agrees to pay A $10,000. A and B know that there are no other potential
rescuers.
13. Lecherous Millionaire: B's child will die unless she receives expensive
surgery for which the state will not pay. A, a millionaire, proposes to pay for
the surgery if B will agree to become his mistress.
14. Experimentation with Prisoners: A (the state) offers B (a prisoner) various
benefits, such as a reduced work schedule, a color television, higher quality
food, or the likelihood of earlier parole, if B will allow a drug company to test
15. Nick Ravo, Topless Bars for a Crowd in Pinstripes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at C1.
16. Chris Hedges, Egypt's Desperate Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al.
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the safety of a drug on B. B agrees.
15. Attractive Offer: A, a prestigious Ivy League university offers B (a full
professor at a reputable state university) a large salary, a reduced teaching
load, and her own secretary, if B will join university A. B accepts.
16. Surgery: A proposes to amputate B's leg for a fair fee. Because B will die
unless she agrees to the amputation, B authorizes A to perform the surgery.
17. Plea Bargaining: A, a prosecutor, tells B that B can plead guilty to second
degree homicide, in which case, the maximum punishment is 30 years, or
stand trial for first degree homicide, conviction for which might result in exe-
cution. B pleads guilty to second degree homicide.
18. Norplant: A, a judge, tells B, who has been convicted of a drug offense,
that he will place her on probation if she allows a court designated doctor to
implant the contraceptive Norplant in her arm. B agrees.
19. Ticket Scalping: A buys a block of tickets to a rock concert for $50 and
proposes to sell tickets to B for $200. Because B has no viable alternatives, B
agrees.
20. Dance Studio: A, a dance instructor, gets B, a 60-year-old widow, to be-
lieve that she has talent for ball-room dancing, and proposes that B purchase
$50,000 in dance lessons. Although the payment would require B to sell her
home, B agrees.
21. POW: A, proposes to take B as a prisoner of war and provide benevolent
quarantine, if but only if B agrees to give up fighting his captors. If B does
not surrender, A will attempt to kill B as an enemy soldier. B accepts A's
proposal.
22. Part-Time Professors: A, a university, proposes to pay B, an unemployed
academic, $2,000 a section to teach a section (or sections) of basic writing, or
French, or whatever. B agrees.
23. Unprofitable Employer A, whose firm will go out of business unless he
can reduce his labor costs, proposes to continue to employ B if B agrees to a
reduction in her salary. B accepts.
Coercion and Exploitation: A First Cut
Which of these agreements are exploitative? Which of these agreements.
are coercive? Although I shall try to say something about both exploitation
and coercion, in the final analysis I do not believe that much turns on whether
we can legitimately say that one agreement or another is exploitative or co-
ercive on some linguistically plausible account of these terms. Rather, the
crucial questions concern the moral status of such agreements: Should they be
prohibited? Should they be enforceable? Or does the description of the agree-
ment as coercive or exploitative have some other moral force?
Let us begin with the two central concepts. Exploitation and coercion
appear to have different foci. Whereas coercion refers to the formation of an
agreement, exploitation seems to always include reference to the substance or
outcome of an agreement. A wrongfully exploits B when A takes unfair ad-
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vantage of B, but A can coerce B to agree to do X without exploiting B, as
when A paternalistically coerces B to make an agreement that will serve B's
interests but not A's.
Exploitation
Let us consider two dimensions of exploitative agreements: (1) the effect
of the agreement on B's interests; and (2) the voluntariness of B's agree-
ment. 7 If one considers the definitions of exploitation that have appeared in
the philosophical literature, one finds disagreement on both dimensions. On
some views, an agreement between A and B is exploitative only if it is harm-
ful to B. 8 On other views, exploitation can be beneficial to the exploitee.'9
On some views, exploitative agreements are always coerced or involuntary."
On other views, exploitation can occur "despite the exploitee's fully voluntary
consent to the exploitative behavior."'" I think it would be a mistake to tight-
en up the criteria of exploitation prematurely. Indeed, if agreements are ex-
ploitative only when they are also harmful or coerced, exploitation would be
of much less theoretical interest. We do not need to be moral rocket scientists
to argue that harmful exploitation may be legitimately prohibited by the state
or that coerced agreements are neither morally nor legally binding. By con-
trast, it is more interesting to consider whether we might be justified in pro-
hibiting or refusing to enforce an agreement that is beneficial to B, that is not
the result of a direct threat to B, and that B (rationally) wants to make.
For these reasons, I shall distinguish between harmful exploitation and
mutually advantageous exploitation.22 By harmful exploitation, I refer to
agreements that are beneficial to A but are harmful to B. By mutually advan-
tageous exploitation, I refer to agreements that are beneficial to the exploiter
(A) and are also beneficial to the exploitee (B). In the language of economics,
these agreements are Pareto superior They leave both parties better off. If we
reflect on the list of examples, it seems clear that whereas some allegedly ex-
ploitative agreements are harmful to the exploitee (as in Extortion), others
seem to be beneficial to B, at least as contrasted with the alternative of non-
agreement (Lumber). We say that the mutually advantageous agreements are
17. 1 believe that exploitative agreements must also be advantageous to A, but I shall ignore
that dimension of exploitation in this paper.
18. "Persons are exploited if (1) others secure a benefit by (2) using them as a tool or re-
source so as (3) to cause them serious harm." STEPHEN R. MuNzER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 171
(1990).
19. For example, Andrew Levine states:
An exploitative exchange is ... an exchange in which the exploited party gets less than
the exploiting party, who does better at the exploited party's expense..... mhe ex-
change must result from social relations of unequal power .... Exploitation can be
entered into voluntarily; and can even, in some sense, be advantageous to the exploited
party.
ANDREW LEvNE, ARGUING FOR SOCIALISM 66-70 (1988).
20. "It is the fact that the [capitalist's] income is derived through forced, unpaid, surplus
[wage] labor, the product of which the workers do not control, which makes [wage labor]
exploitive." Nancy Holmstrom, Exploitation, 7 CANADIAN J. OF PHiL. 353, 357 (1977).
21. JOEL FEINBERG, HARjmLEss WRONGDOING 176 (1988).
22. Id. at 176-87.
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exploitative because we think that the content of the agreement is unfair or
wrong. 3 Without prejudging whether our account of what makes a transac-
tion fair is correct, we may think that a transaction is exploitative because the
price that B must pay is too high (AZT, Rescue, Lumber) or perhaps because
the compensation that B receives is too low (Surrogacy). In other cases, we
may say that an agreement is exploitative because it involves the exchange of
a good or service that should not be exchanged for money (Enlistment,
Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionaire) or because we think that the ser-
vice is degrading (Stripper).
It will prove similarly useful to distinguish between consensual exploita-
tion and nonconsensual exploitation. By nonconsensual exploitation, I refer to
agreements in which A coerces B (as in Extortion) or in which A's action
inducing B's agreement suffers from a cognitive defect (as in Automobile,
Dance Studio, and Psychotherapy). By consensual exploitation, I refer to those
cases in which A does not threaten B with an adverse consequence should B
refuse to agree and in which B's agreement represents a reasonable, non-dis-
torted decision under the circumstances (as in Unfair Rescue). There will, of
course, be controversies as to whether an agreement is harmful or advanta-
geous to B or exploitative at all. Those judgments will require us to develop
and apply criteria for harm and fairness. In my view, we can say that the
agreement is harmful to B in Extortion and Automobile. And it is likely to be
harmful in Psychotherapy. In all the remaining cases, it is at least plausible to
argue that the agreements are beneficial to B, even if they are also exploit-
ative. Whether an agreement is actually harmful will depend on factual inqui:
ries, for example, the effects of surrogacy on surrogate mothers. It may also
depend on moral inquiries, for example, whether an activity is degrading,
whether degradation is a harm to the person who is degraded, and, if so,
whether the harm of degradation exceeds the benefits to B, all things consid-
ered.24 Moreover, whether an agreement that is mutually advantageous is also
exploitative will depend on whether it is a fair agreement, for "high prices"
are not necessarily "unfair prices." If A is demanding a fair price for AZT,
given the research, development, and production costs of producing the drug,
then there is no exploitation.'
Still, it might be argued that even to consider mutually advantageous and
consensual transactions as exploitative is to fundamentally misconceive the
nature of exploitation, that there can be no wrongful exploitation if both par-
ties gain from and consent to a transaction. I do not want to quarrel over
words or labels. If someone wishes to insist that exploitation must be harmful
and/or nonconsensual, then we can say that the cases of mutually advanta-
geous consensual but arguably unfair agreements are cases of "mexploitation"
or shmexploitation or whatever. I am interested in the moral character of cer-
23. A moral defect in the distribution of benefits is, I believe, a necessary condition of ex-
ploitation. It may not be sufficient.
24. For example, even if a stripper is degraded and therefore harmed by her stripping, it is
possible that the gains to her from the activity exceed the harm.
25. Of course, we may think that B should not have to pay A's price out of his pocket, even
if A is not exploiting B.
[Vol. 74:4
REMARKS ON COERCION AND EXPLOITATION
tain sorts of transactions and relationships, whatever we want to call them. I
believe, however, that we call at least some of these cases exploitative.
Coercion
There will be similar controversies as to whether B's agreement is
nonconsensual. The voluntariness of B's agreement is clearly defeated by
coercion in Extortion and fraud in Automobile. In Psychotherapy, the
voluntariness of B's agreement may be compromised by transference. In
Dance Studio, the voluntariness of B's agreement may be compromised by
manipulation of B's beliefs and desires. In many of the remaining cases (AZT,
Enlistment, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Unfair Rescue, and Lumber), it is
plausible to maintain that the transaction is consensual, at least in the sense
that it is plausible to maintain that A does not propose to violate B's rights if
B rejects A's proposal.
But that does not end things. There are consensual agreements and con-
sensual agreements. In many of these cases, B agrees to A's proposal because
B's situation is desperate or because B believes that she has no better alterna-
tive. And, it may be thought that at least some such agreements are rightly
regarded as coerced. Consider B's decision to serve as a surrogate mother.
Many commentators have argued that such decisions are coerced: "[A mone-
tary offer] may be difficult for a person of little financial means to refuse and
would, in that case, be coercive." '26 The opposing view maintains that surro-
gacy offers women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and
that additional options are never coercive.'
Which view is correct? Rather than try to answer that question directly, I
propose to take a different tack. I propose to temporarily put aside the ques-
tions as to what counts as coercion and exploitation. Instead, and with refer-
ence to the cases that I have described, I shall first enumerate several different
characteristics of such proposals and acceptances in which we might be inter-
ested. I will then distinguish among several possible moral judgments we
might make with respect to agreements and sketch some possible relations
between the characteristics of proposals and acceptances and the various moral
judgments. The crucial question, after all, is how certain specific character-
istics of proposals and acceptances are related to certain specific moral judg-
ments and not whether we call them coercive or exploitative.
26. Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood?, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 136, 146 (Larry Gostin ed. 1990). Rosemarie Tong adds "[tlo say that a woman
'chooses' to do this... is simply to say that when a woman is forced to choose between poverty
and exploitation, she sometimes chooses exploitation as the lesser of two evils." Rosemary Tong,
The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements, 21 J.
OF SOC. PHIL. 40, 45 (1990). Martha Field argues that "to portray surrogacy contracts as repre-
senting meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting surrogate mother,
rather than to see her as driven by circumstances ... [fails] to take account of realities." MARTHA
A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 27 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 247-48 (1995).
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Characteristics of Choice Situations
Status Quo
In some cases, such as Extortion, Unprofitable Employer, and Plea
Bargaining, A proposes to make B worse off than B's present status quo or
pre-proposal baseline if B rejects A's proposal. In other cases, A proposes to
leave B in B's present status quo if B rejects the proposal. Because we often
refer to the latter sorts of proposals as offers, most of the cases above can be
described as offers rather than threats. This would include, among others,
AZT, Enlistment, Stripper, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Attractive Offer, Sur-
gery, Part-time Professor.
Moralized Baseline
In some cases, A proposes to violate B's rights if B does not accept A's
proposal. In some cases, A proposes not to do what A has an obligation to B
to do if B does not accept A's proposal. Let us say that in both such cases, A
proposes to make B worse off relative to B's moralized baseline if B does not
accept A's proposal. In other cases, A does not propose to make B worse off
relative to B's moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal. From this per-
spective, we might say that Plea Bargaining and Unprofitable Employer are
cases in which A proposes to make B worse off than B's status quo but A
does not propose to make B worse off than B's moralized baseline if B refus-
es A's proposal. By contrast, if A has an obligation to rescue B for free in
Drowning, then A does propose to make B worse off than B's moralized
baseline if B rejects A's proposal, although A does not propose to make B
worse off than B's status quo if B rejects A's proposal. Setting B's moral
baseline is often controversial. We can disagree, for example, as to whether A
does have an obligation to rescue B for free in Drowning. Still, there is a
distinction between the claim that a proposal would make B worse off relative
to her status quo and the claim that a proposal would make B worse off than
her moralized baseline.
Rationality
In some cases, B's decision to accept A's proposal is arguably irrational
in terms of B's stable long-term preferences. This may occur when A employs
deception as in Automobile and Dance Studio or manipulates B's judgment as
in Psychotherapy. In addition, even if A does not intend to distort B's deci-
sion-making capacity, A's proposal may lead B to make a decision that cannot
reasonably be expected to serve B's long-term interests or aims, perhaps be-
cause B underestimates the long-term costs of accepting A's proposal. This
may or may not be true in Enlistment, Surrogacy, Organs, Experimentation,
Stripper, Norplant, and Lecherous Millionaire. In still other cases, however,
there is no reason to doubt the rationality of B's decision to accept A's pro-
posal, and this includes cases that fall on both sides of the first two distinc-
tions, for example, Extortion, AZT, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Drowning,
Attractive Offer, Surgery, Plea Bargaining, Part-time Professor, POW,
Unprofitable Employer, and Ticket Scalping. Just as there is no reason to
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doubt the rationality of B's decision in Attractive Offer and Fair Rescue, there
is no reason to doubt the rationality of B's decision in Extortion and Unfair
Rescue.
No Other Rational Choice
In some cases we may say not only that B is acting rationally or reason-
ably in accepting A's proposal, we may say that A has no other rational
choice but to accept A's proposal. This might be true in Extortion, AZT, Un-
fair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Lumber, Drowning, Surgery, POW, and Attractive
Offer. In other cases, we may think that while it might be reasonable for B to
accept A's proposal, it may also be reasonable for B to refuse. This might be
true of Enlistment, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionare, Experi-
mentation, Norplant, Part-time Professor.
Desperation
In some cases, B's status quo is arguably desperate, for example, AZT,
Organs, Unfair Rescue, Fair Rescue, Drowning, Surgery, POW, Lecherous
Millionare. In other cases, B's status quo is not desperate, but it is arguably
not good, for example, Enlistment, Surrogacy, Part-time Professor, Unprof-
itable Employer. In still other cases, there is no reason to think that B's status
quo is objectively unsatisfactory, for example, Stripper, Automobile, Attractive
Offer, and Ticket Scalping. Note that some cases in which B has no rational
choice but to accept A's proposal are ones in which B's present situation is
desperate, but not in all (as in Attractive Offer).
Unjust Background Conditions
In some cases, B's status quo is unjust; in other conditions, it is not.
Whether this is so will, of course, depend upon a theory of justice. In any
case, the injustice of B's status quo may be related to but is independent from
desperation. Thus, B's status quo is desperate but not obviously unjust in
Surgery, Drowning, Unfair Rescue, Plea Bargaining, POW, and Lecherous
Millionare. B's status quo in Enlistment and Surrogacy might be unjust, even
if it is not desperate, depending upon whether people would be in B's status
quo situation in a just society. It is important to note that the injustice of B's
background conditions must be distinguished from B's "moralized baseline"
with respect to A: Whereas justice may require that society place B in a better
status quo, it may not require A to do so.
Fair Terms
In some cases, the terms of the transaction may be fair on some plausible
criterion of fairness, for example, Stripper, Fair Rescue, Surgery, POW, Plea
Bargaining. In some cases, such as Unprofitable Employer, we may think that
A's proposal is not "fair" by some independent standard, but A may not be in
a position to make a better proposal (although here we may have to rethink
our conception of fairness). By contrast, in other cases, the terms of the
transaction may be unfair and A may well be in a position to make a better
proposal, as in, for example, Unfair Rescue, Drowning, Part-time Professor,
Ticket Scalping, and AZT. Let me note here that while "equal utility gain"
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might be advanced as a criterion of a fair transaction, I believe that this crite-
rion is mistaken. The exploitee typically gains more utility from a transaction
than the exploiter. Indeed, it is precisely because the exploiter stands to gain
relatively little from the transaction that he is able to drive what we may take
to be an exploitative bargain.
Incommensurability and Commodification
In some cases, A's proposal may ask B to choose between goods that
should not be treated as commensurable or treated as commodities, as in, for
example, Stripper, Surrogacy, Organs, Lecherous Millionare, Experimentation,
and Norplant. In saying that A's proposal gives rise to a problem of
incommensurability or commodification, I do not mean that B might not rea-
sonably regard herself as better off if B accepts A's proposal; I mean simply
that A's proposal requires B to exchange one good (e.g., money, better prison
conditions, probation) for another good (bodily exposure, procreational labor,
organs, sexual services, bodily risk, non procreation) that ought not to be
exchanged for that good.
Rationality and All the Others
Before going forward, I want to stress that the rationality of B's decision
is entirely separable from all of the other criteria (except the no other rational
choice criterion). That B will be worse off than B's status quo if B rejects A's
proposal, or that A proposes to violate B's rights (or to do less than A has an
obligation to do) if B rejects A's proposal, or that B chooses under consider-
ations of desperation, or that B chooses under unjust background conditions,
or that the terms of the proposal are unfair-none of these considerations
defeat the claim that B may rationally choose to accept A's proposal. I do not
deny, of course, that A's deception or manipulation or B's background condi-
tions themselves may lead B to irrationally accept A's proposal, nor do I deny
that such irrationalities compromise the voluntariness of B's decision and may
justify prohibiting such proposals or invalidating the acceptance of such pro-
posals. This would be most obviously true in cases such as Automobile, Dance
Studio, and Psychotherapy, and might also be true of cases such as Surrogacy,
Organs, Experimentation, and Norplant. I do want to claim that it is important
to distinguish between the cases in which A has acted wrongly because his
proposal distorts the rationality of B's choice and the cases in which A acts
wrongly because he creates a certain objective situation for B, but where B
acts perfectly rationally given that objective situation (as in Extortion). To
anticipate two topics that we will be discussing later on in this Symposium,
there is no reason to think that plea bargaining typically compromises the
rationality of B's decision to accept a plea, whatever else we may want to say
about it. By contrast, there may be reason to think that behavior that results in
allegedly coerced confessions does compromise the rationality of B's decision
to confess, putting aside other objections to such behavior.
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Moral Judgments
There are several different moral claims that we might want to advance
with respect to agreements that are described as coerced or exploitative. Here
are three or four:
Condemnation
It is wrong for A to make some proposals. This is certainly the case with
respect to those cases in which A proposes to render B worse off than B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal, as in Extortion and perhaps in
Drowning. But we might well regard A's proposal as wrong, even if A does
not propose to violate B's moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal. This
might be true when A proposes unfair terms (as in AZT, Unfair Rescue, Lum-
ber) or violates notions of incommensurability or commodification, as in Strip-
per, Lecherous Millionare, Organs, and Norplant.
Prohibition and Invalidation
In some cases, we think it justifiable to prohibit A from making proposals,
or we may regard the acceptance of the proposal as invalid or not binding on
B. This is most obviously so in the paradigmatic cases of coercion such as
Extortion, in which A proposes to render B worse off than B's moralized
baseline if B rejects A's proposal. The interesting question is whether there
are reasons to prohibit proposals which would not violate B's moralized base-
line if rejected, and to treat as invalid agreements that are advantageous to
B-if (for example) the terms are unfair or they are made under unjust or
desperate background conditions. It is worth emphasizing here that there may
be relatively little distance between prohibition and invalidation. It may be
thought that we can allow A to make a proposal but not treat B's acceptance
as binding. This suggestion is often made with respect to commercial surroga-
cy. 8 But that solution will generally prove to be unstable. For if A knows
that B's acceptance will not be treated as valid and binding, the transaction
will typically not occur, and bracketing whatever interests A may have in the
matter, the present point is that if the transaction does not occur, then B will
not obtain the benefit from the transaction that she sought.
There are at least three different sorts of reasons that might be offered for
the prohibition or invalidation of mutually advantageous consensual transac-
tions. First, it is possible that if we prohibit or refuse to enforce grossly unfair
transactions, then A will propose fair (or less unfair) terms rather than choose
not to transact with B. This will often occur when A is in a position to secure
monopoly rents as in AZT, Unfair Rescue, Lumber, and may even apply to
cases, such as Ticket Scalping, when B's position is neither unjust nor desper-
ate nor even unfortunate. We can refer to this as strategic intervention.
Second, we may consider prohibiting or refusing to enforce certain trans-
28. See supra note 26.
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actions not because of their effects on the parties to the transaction but be-
cause of their effects on third parties. It is, for example, argued that pornogra-
phy has harmful effects on virtually all women because it reduces their per-
ceived value as persons, even if pornography is not harmful, all things con-
sidered, for those women who are portrayed in pornography and who are
compensated for their services." Similarly, it may be argued that permitting
or enforcing transactions such as Surrogacy would have harmful effects on
women as a class, because such agreements reinforce inequalities of gender,
although those transactions might not be harmful, all things considered, to the
surrogates themselves, who are compensated for their services.'
Third, we may consider prohibiting or refusing to enforce certain transac-
tions not because it would be clearly better for B or for third parties, but be-
cause such transactions are immoral, for reasons involving commodification or
incommensurability. Such moralistic or perfectionist arguments for prohibition
are sometimes made with respect to case such as Stripper, Organs, Surrogacy,
Lecherous Millionare, Experimentation, and Norplant. Note that unlike strate-
gic intervention, which seeks to encourage a transaction between A and B on
fairer terms, moralistic arguments typically maintain that A and B should not
transact at all-even if B might reasonably regard herself as better off if the
transaction were to occur.
Background Injustice
In some cases, we may be less concerned with criticizing or prohibiting
A's proposal than with calling attention to the injustice or wrongness of the
conditions under which it is rational for B to accept A's proposal, and with
arguing for the repair of those conditions. It is, however, of capital importance
to distinguish arguments for the repair of background conditions from argu-
ments for prohibiting transactions given those background conditions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the way of summarizing and concluding these remarks, I want to make
three general points. The first general point is that the notions of coercion and
exploitation can be used to describe several quite distinct worries about pro-
posals and acceptances. For example, I have argued that there is an important
distinction between those proposals that distort the rationality of B's decision
and those in which B acts rationally and to her own benefit under the objec-
tive conditions in which she finds herself. I have also argued that there is an
important distinction between those cases in which the alleged coerciveness of
A's proposal turns on whether A proposes to make B worse off than B's
29. "The mass production of pornography universalizes the violation of the women in it,
spreading it to all women, who are then exploited, used, abused, and reduced as a result of men's
consumption of it" CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMNST THEORY OF THE STATE
247 (1989).
30. As Debra Satz puts it, "[Surrogacyl contracts will turn women's labor into something
that is used and controlled by others and will reinforce gender stereotypes that have been used to
justify the unequal treatment of women." Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21
PHuL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 123-24 (1992).
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moralized baseline (as in Extortion) and those in which A acts exploitatively
because he takes advantage of unjust or desperate background conditions (as
in Lumber), but where A does not propose to make B worse off than B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal and where A's proposal does not
distort B's decision-making capacity.
The second general point is that the moral upshots that stem from some
worries about transactions may well be different from the moral upshots that
stem from other worries. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the
phrase "coercive proposals" can legitimately be used to describe proposals to
violate B's moral baseline, such as Extortion and Drowning, but that it can
also be used to describe proposals and acceptances made under conditions of
desperation or injustice, such as Surgery, Organs, and Experimentation, but
where A would not violate B's moral baseline by making no proposal at all.
Still, it does not follow that we should prohibit proposals or invalidate accep-
tances on grounds of coercion in the latter cases, just because we should pro-
hibit proposals or invalidate acceptances on grounds of coercion in the former
cases. To press this point a bit further, consider the following argument:
1. If a proposal is coercive, then its acceptance is not binding.
2. Proposal X is coercive because A threatens to violate B's
moralized baseline if B rejects A's proposal.
3. Proposal Y is coercive because, say, its acceptance stems
from desperation or unjust background conditions.
4. Therefore, just as the acceptance of Proposal X is not bind-
ing on B, the acceptance of Proposal Y is not binding on B.
The problem with the argument is that the characteristics of the type of
proposal that underlies the coerciveness assumed by (1) and true in (2) may be
quite different than the characteristics that underlie the coerciveness of propos-
als assumed by (3). Thus (4) does not follow from these premises, even
though (2) and (3) are both true, given their different accounts of coercive
proposals. Such arguments run the risk of falling into the fallacy of equivoca-
tion.
My final general point relates to those proposals that are thought to be
coercive because they arise out of desperation or injustice. And here I wish to
make three points. First, our propensity to worry about certain transactions
may well be an important indicator that the background conditions that give
rise to those transactions should be repaired. Second, that B accepts A's pro-
posal under conditions of desperation or injustice signifies nothing with respect
to the moral quality of A's proposal and signifies nothing with respect to
whether A's acceptance of B's proposal should be regarded as valid or bind-
ing. Recall Fair Rescue, Surgery, and POW. In all of these cases it is arguable
that B's status quo is so desperate that B has no viable alternative but to ac-
cept A's proposal. But there is nothing obviously wrong with A's proposal in
any of these cases, and I can see no reason not to regard B as bound by his
acceptance of A's proposal. How to determine when agreements born of des-
peration or injustice should and should not be treated as valid is one of the
more important challenges presented by such agreements. Third, whatever our
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concerns about the unjust or desperate background conditions under which
transactions are made, we must still decide-as a matter of non-ideal theo-
ry-whether we want to prohibit or invalidate those transactions that do occur
under these conditions, as for example, in Organs. For when the day is done,
and on the assumption that A is not required to repair B's background condi-
tions, we must decide whether B should be permitted to engage in a transac-
tion with A that B reasonably regards as beneficial to B, particularly given
that B may reasonably regard efforts to prohibit or invalidate such transactions
as adding insult to the injury of her background conditions. We can call A's
offer coercive and/or exploitative, but such labels will not resolve that moral
problem.
Having said that, it does not follow that the best moral answer is always
to allow A to propose and B to accept any proposal that would be advanta-
geous to B and rational for B to accept. For reasons I have noted in my refer-
ence to strategic intervention, it would often be better for B, ex ante, if A
were not allowed to make certain proposals to B and if B were not bound by
any such acceptance. And that suggests one plausible approach to determining
when A should be permitted to make a proposal and when B's acceptance of
that proposal should be regarded as binding, namely, to ask whether, ex ante,
B would want A to be permitted to make such a proposal and would want to
be held to the terms of his acceptance, ex post. For example, I think that B
might well think that if he were to find himself a soldier in the position of
being killed or surrendering, he would like A to be able to take him as a
POW, and similar things could be said about the offer of life-saving surgery.
On the other hand, it is less clear what would be said about Norplant, or Or-
gans, or Experimentation, or Stripper. Again, to say it is less clear is to say it
is less clear. Some regard these as easy cases for prohibition. I do not. In any
case, if I am right, conceptual analysis of notions such as coercion and exploi-
tation will be of little help.
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There is an old story about a law professor, an appellate court judge and a
trial judge who go pheasant hunting together. The law professor is the first to
take aim at a bird he believes to be a pheasant. But he is not certain that it is,
indeed, a pheasant. As he trains his sight on the creature, he begins to question
whether his concept of pheasant-ness is really simply a false construction, a
manifestation of some mode of false legitimation, and proceeds to deconstruct
the concept of the pheasant to determine whether there really is such a thing
as a pheasant for, if there is not, then this bird could not possibly be one and
so ... And, before the law professor has lingered long on his hyper-Cartesian
self-indulgence, the bird takes wing.
Next, the appellate court judge spots the bird. As he takes aim, he too
questions the nature of the creature. Unlike the law professor, however, the
appellate judge has a far more pragmatic three-part test by which to determine
whether this bird is, in fact, a pheasant. He first notes its color, then its wing
markings, and finally its tail plumage, comparing these with the requisites of
the same three-part test. Again, however, before he has completed the analysis,
the bird flies off.
Finally, the trial judge spots a bird he believes may be a pheasant. Almost
instinctively, and with a celerity that leaves his two companions in hushed
embarrassment for his impetuousness, he takes aim and fires, downing the bird
instantly. Then, and only then, the trial judge asks himself, "I wonder if that
was a pheasant?"
The tale of coercion is. not unlike the story of the pheasant. While law
professors (and philosophers) struggle to understand the nature of, and justifi-
cation for, coercion, laymen (and trial court judges) appear to have a more or
less cohesive notion of coercion and duress. As with so many other legal
concepts, however, the terra firma of pre-analytic intuition appears to evapo-
rate into a miasma of self-referential skepticism the closer we examine the
nature and raison d'etre of coercion. Better to shoot from the hip than to go
small game hunting for some Deeper Understanding.
In his book, Coercion,' the political philosopher Alan Wertheimer under-
takes the most exhaustive overview of the legal and philosophical terrain rele-
vant to the issue of coercion of which I am aware. Roughly the first half of
the book examines the contours of the concept of coercion as it has developed
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University. J.D., 1988, Ph.D. in Philosophy,
1989, Georgetown University.
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in diverse substantive legal areas including contract law, criminal law, tort law
and constitutional law, among others.2 Throughout this portion of the book,
Wertheimer develops an account of the way in which the concept is employed
in these various doctrinal areas. Then, in the second half of the book, he seeks
to develop a philosophical defense for what he describes as a "moralized"
theory of coercion.'
While the following is an overview and critical analysis of Wertheimer's
moralized theory of coercion, many of the conclusions will be relevant to
moralized theories as a class. Furthermore, while Professor Wertheimer con-
trasts his "fully moralized" theory with partially moralized accounts, I will
discuss the latter as a prelude to the former by way of comparing moralized
accounts with the other prevailing theory of coercion, which views coercion as
the product of an overborne will. In sum, I hope that the analysis here will be
helpful in thinking about different species of moralized accounts of coercion
generally.
Part I of this Article briefly lays out the taxonomy of various theories of
coercion and then describes Wertheimer's theory. Part II of the piece analyzes
and critiques moralized accounts generally, with particular emphasis upon
Wertheimer's version of the moralized theory. Finally, Part ll sketches the
departure point for an alternative to both moralized theories and the more
traditional accounts which explain coercion as a function of the overborne
will.
PART I
There are two prevailing theories which seek to explain what coercion is
and why victims of coercion are permitted a defense for their acts. First, there
is what I will call the "traditional" theory of duress, which can be traced to the
writings of Aristotle,4 and which received further explication at common law
in Blackstone's Commentaries.5 The traditional theory views coercion as an
overcoming of the will of the victim such that the resulting action is viewed as
unfree, involuntary, or against one's will.6 Thus, defenders of the traditional
account tend to conceptualize coercion as a type of excuse, rather than as a
justification, because the underlying rationale for the defense is that the co-
erced actor is not responsible for her act.7 Though there is increasing skepti-
2. Id. at pt. 1, Law.
3. Id. at pt. 2, Philosophy.
4. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941).
5. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, bk. IV, ch. 2 (1765).
Blackstone summarized the rationale underlying all excuses, including duress, as "the want or
defect of will." Id. at 21.
6. See John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress (forthcoming 1998) (presenting
a discussion and critical analysis of the traditional theory).
7. The distinction between excuse and justification defenses has been the subject of consid-
erable scholarly analysis. The distinction has been cast in terms of the difference between con-
doning an act (justification) and holding that, while the act is otherwise morally or legally imper-
missible, the actor is not morally or legally responsible for its commission (excuse). See Kent
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications From Excuses, LAw & CONTEMip. PROBS., Summer
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cism as to the validity of the traditional theory of coercion among philoso-
phers and legal commentators,' it remains the prevalent explicit rationale
among contemporary judges in deciding actual cases.9
In contrast to the traditional theory, moralized accounts of coercion main-
tain that legal claims predicated upon duress are at least partially a function of
normative judgments about the nature of the situation and the right of the
victim to respond in a certain way. In other words, a claim of duress is not
simply a legal conclusion drawn from empirical premises concerning the psy-
chological state of the actor-i.e., that the actor did not act voluntarily-as
with the traditional theory. Rather, the determination that a particular case is
coercive may flow from antecedent moral convictions that the putatively co-
erced actor possessed a kind of moral privilege to yield to the threat, or that
no person should have to resist a similar threat. In sum, the defender of a
moralized theory of coercion need not maintain that coerced acts are qualita-
tively different, with respect to the standpoint of the psychological state of the
victim of coercion, from uncoerced acts. All that is absolutely necessary for
the moralized account is to maintain that the victim's predicament is morally
different from that of the uncoerced actor-that it would not be fair to hold
the victim of coercion responsible for his act irrespective of whether the co-
erced act is "voluntary."
We can further distinguish between partially and radically moralized theo-
ries of coercion. Partially moralized theories are those that persist in utilizing
some empirical criterion-typically the concept of voluntariness--to assess the
coerciveness of a situation, but use some normative criterion in drawing lines
that serve to distinguish the exculpatory from the non-exculpatory. Partially
moralized theories tend to conceptualize voluntariness either as a hybrid, half-
normative, half-empirical construct or, what might amount to the same thing,
as an empirical state that occurs in varying quantities, depending upon the
situation. Voluntariness might then be analogized to concepts such as quick-
ness or health, which permit qualitative comparisons on the basis of facts (e.g.,
the speed of a process or the physical condition of a subject, respectively) but
which employ a baseline normative criterion before a thing can be considered
quick, healthy, or voluntary.
1986, at 89 (discussing the distinction critically).
8. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, PRoMISEs, MORALS AND THE LAW 23 (1966); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 433 (2d ed., 1986); WERTHEIMER, supra note 1;
GLANvLL.E WILIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 755 (2d ed., 1961). But see GEORGE P. FLETcHER, RE-
THINKING CRIMINAL LAW 830-31 (1978) (arguing that the traditional model is an accurate way of
stating the basis for duress).
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962) (using the language of the traditional model,
albeit with an objective standard). The Code states that "[lit is an affirmative defense that the
actor engaged in the conduct... because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force... which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist." Id.
The emphasis upon exculpatory, rather than justificatory, analysis is clear in contemporary
case law. For example, one recurring issue is whether the threatened harm was imminent enough
to warrant a defense. See, e.g., State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (NJ. 1977) (permitting the defense
even where the threat is not imminent). This makes clear that modem courts continue to examine
the effects of a coercive threat upon the actor, rather than a "lesser evils" weighing of the relative
harms endemic of the threat and the offense, respectively.
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A recent example of a partially moralized theory is found in the work of
Professor Joshua Dressier, who argues that:
In short, duress is not like other excuses. The excusing basis is not
merely empirical, but primarily normative. Unlike insanity, infancy
and intoxication, the issue is not simply whether, as an empirically-
verifiable matter, the actor lacked volitional or cognitive capacity...
Duress excuses when the available choices are not only hard, but also
unfair1 °
He goes on to argue that duress excuses when the defendant "lacked a fair
opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully."" Fairness of opportunity is defined
by reference to an objective standard: the question to be asked is whether, "in
light of the nature of the demand and the expected repercussion from noncom-
pliance, we could fairly expect a person of nonsaintly moral strength to resist
the threat."'2
It might be objected here that Dressler's theory is entirely normative in
that he utilizes an objective standard that takes no account of the subjective
psychological state of the actor. Indeed, where an objective standard is inter-
preted as saying simply, "The law will not hold a person responsible for the
choices made under a certain range of choice options because we think this
would be unfair," the standard would be completely moralized. This is because
the prescriptive justification for the theory has to do with normative concerns
regarding the fairness of the options rather than factual concerns about the
volitional state of the actor.
For his part, Professor Dressler does not appear to go this far. He states
that the exculpatory nature of duress is not "merely empirical," implying that
it is partially empirical. 3 Moreover, the objective standard he proposes pos-
sesses an empirical component insofar as the test for coercion is measured by
asking how much pressure the ordinary person-the person of nonsaintly
moral strength-should be able to endure. To put it differently, while the
move to an objective standard, here as in other legal contexts, is made for
purposes of uniformity and because of inherent problems of proof in assessing
the validity of subjective accounts of a person's own mental states, the basis
for the objective standard in Dressler's theory is firmly rooted in psychological
facts regarding the ability of the actor to resist. In sum, Dressler's theory is
partially empirical: according to his view, coercion still has something to do
with the victim's capacity to resist a particular threat. It is also, however,
normative in that an objective standard is used to define the baseline by which
coercive situations are distinguished from the non-coercive.
In contrast to partially moralized theories, radically moralized theories of
coercion eschew any references to the voluntariness or freedom of particular
acts, at least where voluntariness is defined as an empirical state reflecting the
10. Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for
Its Proper Limits 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1365 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1367 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 1365.
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actor's psychological capacity to resist acting. 4 They view coercion not as a
function of the inner (moral-psychological) state of the actor, but as a norma-
tive assessment of the external options open to the actor-i.e., whether it is
fair to hold a person responsible for an act given the range of alternatives
available to him or her. As such, radically moralized theories focus upon such
explicitly moral questions as whether the putative victim had a privilege to
succumb to the alleged coercive proposal, whether the proposal itself was
immoral, or whether persons under similar circumstances should be excused
for acts committed under like conditions.
Wertheimer begins his analysis and defense of a radically moralized theo-
ry of coercion by examining the relationship between coercion and
voluntariness. 5 He draws a tripartite distinction between cases where there is
an absence of volition, as in instances of physical compulsion, cases of defec-
tive volition, such as where the actor is insane, and cases of "constrained voli-
tion" characteristic of duress.'6 While these are the three senses in which the
term "involuntariness" is used in common parlance, Wertheimer argues that
there are important moral differences among these cases. 7 Most particularly,
he suggests that the first two senses of the term represent empirical states of
affairs reflecting the psychological condition of the actor. 8 By contrast, in-
voluntariness, in the sense of constrained volition, is basically normative in na-
ture."' Moreover, the first two senses constitute exculpatory conditions, while
the constrained volition endemic to situations involving duress operates as a
type of justification."
Wertheimer's rejection of the traditional theory, which he calls the "moral
will theory" of duress,2' begins with the classification of duress as a type of
justification.22 Defenders of the traditional view of duress necessarily must
conceptualize duress as a type of excuse: where duress is characterized as the
overcoming of the victim's will by the coercive stimulus, the rationale for
duress is quintessentially exculpatory, rather than justificatory.
Wertheimer characterizes coercion as an agent-relative justification, there-
by distinguishing duress from necessity, a justification that he views to be
agent-neutral.23 This permits him to maintain that duress is a justification in
the face of the most convincing argument to the contrary-namely, that duress
is sometimes available in situations which are not normally viewed as justi-
fied. More specifically, acts are usually justified on the ground that the act
14. As we shall see, there are inherent ambiguities with respect to the use of the term "vol-
untary." See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing Wertheimer's "rationalized"
definition of voluntariness); see also infra Part [ (discussing two other senses of the word "vol-
untary").
15. WERThEIMER, supra note 1, at 3-5.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 9-10; see id. at 46-48 (discussing the implications of void and voidable contracts).
18. Id. at 164.
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 165-69.
21. Id. at 305.
22. See generally id. at 287-306 (discussing parallels of coercion in morality with coercion
in the law).
23. Id. at 168.
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
committed produces less harm than what would have occurred in the absence
of the act. Duress, however, is sometimes permitted even where the act leads
to greater harm than what would have otherwise resulted. 4 Wertheimer re-
sponds by arguing that the competing harms must be evaluated from the stand-
point of the actor, rather than from a morally neutral vantage point." It is in
this sense that he views duress as an agent-relative justification.
The heart of Wertheimer's theory consists of the observation that coercion
claims require that a two-part test be satisfied. Throughout his exegesis of
various areas of substantive law, Wertheimer argues that the same two-part
analysis underlies the law's treatment of coercion, which he dubs the "propos-
al prong" and the "choice prong," respectively.26 The proposal prong requires
that we ask whether the putatively coercive proposal, typically a threat, is
immoral. The choice prong requires that we examine the choice of options
with which the victim is faced to determine whether he should be held respon-
sible for the resulting choice. Each of these prongs must be "moralized" in the
sense that deciding whether the proposal is immoral and the choice is unfair
are overtly normative assessments. The proposal and choice prongs are indi-
vidually necessary and jointly sufficient to a determination that a particular act
was coerced: coercion requires that the proposal is immoral and that the
choice is an unfair one to expect someone to make.
To take what is perhaps the paradigmatic example of coercion--the case
of the gunman offering the pedestrian a "choice" between his money and his
life-the analysis would permit a finding of coercion based upon the antece-
dent convictions that such a threat (the "proposal") is immoral and that the
range of options from which the victim must choose (i.e., his money or his
life) is not a fair set of alternatives. Other cases raise a plethora of more subtle
questions which require normative answers. These include such hotly debated
questions as whether offers, in contrast to threats, can ever be immoral in the
sense that they may be said to be coercive.
The answers we give to questions such as these-and they are ultimately
normative answers, he argues-will shape the contours of our definition of
coercion. As Wertheimer notes, however, there is a sense in which our view
of coercion must precede the answers we give to these questions. In other
words, we must have reached a conclusion about whether a particular offer
can be "coercive" before we can decide that the proposal prong can be satis-
fied by an offer. Thus, the radically moralized theory does not afford us a
straightforward deductive proof for coercion claims without a kind of logical
circularity. Wertheimer acknowledges this, but argues that there simply are no
viable alternatives insofar as the traditional theory is unworkable.27
24. One example of this is the recent abrogation of the "no murder" rule. At common law,
duress was not permitted as a defense to murder. More recently, however, the Model Penal Code
and a number of state decisions have permitted the defense in cases of murder. See Dressier, su-
pra note 10, at 1370-74 (arguing that the recent elimination of this common law limitation in the
Model Penal Code evinces the exculpatory nature of duress).
25. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 168-69.
26. Id. at 30.
27. See id. at 8 (arguing that, if it is workable, an empirical theory would be more attrac-
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Throughout the work, Wertheimer maintains that coercion claims are
highly contextualized.' In the most obvious sense of the term "contextual,"
the idea that coercion may vary from context to context is an unremarkable
one. Where this is interpreted to mean simply that some contexts or situations
present coercive conditions while others do not, the statement is obviously
true. But Wertheimer means more than this. For example, he cites the example
of a prisoner who confesses to a crime after the police threaten to beat him.'
He argues that the courts may decide that the threat was coercive and, thus,
that the confession should be excluded from evidence, but that the prisoner's
accomplices may not reach the same conclusion.0 He then asks whether both
the courts and the accomplices can be correct, and answers:
Not if we assume that, barring some metaphorical uses of the term,
the truth conditions of a coercion claim are always the same. But if,
as I believe, the truth conditions of a coercion claim can vary with
context, then the courts and the prisoner's accomplices may both be
right.3
This response raises fundamental questions about whether Wertheimer's
theory is, in any sense, determinative or, to put it slightly differently, whether
it provides any prescriptive guidance in the sense that it tells us when a given
set of conditions is coercive and when it is not. Part of the difficulty stems
from the ambiguous use of the term "contextual." If by saying that "coercion
is contextual" we mean that each viewer may decide for himself whether a
particular situation is coercive, this will have profound implications for
whether the theory can be viewed to be determinative. We will have a good
deal to say about this in Part U. For now, it is worth noting that moralized
theories are not all necessarily "contextual," at least if this is what Wertheimer
means by the term.
Finally, a word is in order concerning Wertheimer's theory of the rela-
tionship between coercion and voluntariness. It might be surprising that
Wertheimer has-or thinks he needs-such a theory since the major thrust of
his book is to argue in opposition to the traditional theory of coercion. In other
words, since Wertheimer argues that coercion has little to do with the effect
upon the will of the actor, a discussion of coercion and voluntariness might
appear unnecessary at best, and might possibly be viewed to undermine his
central thesis.
Wertheimer's response to all this is to argue that questions of
voluntariness may indeed be relevant to the issue of coercion when
voluntariness is itself construed as a fundamentally normative concept.
Wertheimer explains the connection between voluntariness and coercion in the
following manner. "mhe argument will be that one acts voluntarily when one
tive).
28. See id. at 179-91.
29. Id. at 181.
30. Id. at 181-82.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 301.
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acts (or should act) from certain motives or that one acts voluntarily when the
factors that define one's choice situation stand in a certain relation to the
principles that one does (or should) accept."33 More specifically, one acts
voluntarily when she acts pursuant to a proposal and a range of alternative
options that are consistent with principles that she does (or should) affirm."'
For example, a person cannot be coerced if the proposal with which he is con-
fronted is permissible under the set of principles to which that person does (or
should) subscribe (proposal prong). Similarly, he cannot be said to be coerced
if the principles to which he adheres in defining the rules of distributive jus-
tice could generate the range of alternatives from which he has to choose in
the putatively coercive situation (choice prong.)
The distinctly deontological cast to this argument holds that "coerced
choices are not unwilled;" rather, they are "against one's will" in the sense
that they violate one's system of considered values and judgments." Impor-
tantly, it is not relevant that the person does not like the proposal and alterna-
tives with which he is confronted. As Wertheimer puts it, "reluctance and
voluntariness can well go hand in hand."' Instead, it is the fact that one is
forced to act in contravention of one's principles that is central to the ascrip-
tion of involuntariness.
It should be obvious that this use of the term "voluntary" does not com-
port with our everyday meaning of the concept. On Wertheimer's "rational-
ized" account,37 voluntariness becomes a function, not of our ability to resist
a choice option, but of whether, under the system of moral principles to which
we do (or should) adhere, we would hold a person responsible for the choice
made in that situation. Again, when voluntariness is defined in this manner,
coercion and voluntariness become normative proxies for one another. There
persists that same normative circularity such that one cannot decide the
voluntariness question without having pre-determined the coercion issue.
33. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 301. Wertheimer writes:
On this view, B acts voluntarily when B succumbs to a proposal that A has a right to
make, even if it is one which B finds unattractive and would prefer not to receive. Why?
Because B himself is committed to the principles which grant A the right to make the
proposal. On the other hand, B acts involuntarily when A makes an immoral proposal (a
moral baseline threat) because A's proposal attempts to get B to act contrary to his deep
preference that he not be made to act in response to immoral proposals.
Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Wertheimer appears to waffle here regarding whether the defining principles are those
which the victim does or should affirm. At one point, Wertheimer argues that it is the principles
to which the victim is committed which count. Id. at 302. His discussion of "wantons" and egoists
appears to confirm this. Id. at 303. On the other hand, he suggests that the defining principles are
those which the victims should accept. Id. at 301. Both positions have problems. See supra notes
62-63 and accompanying text.
35. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 302.
36. Id.
37. The theory of voluntariness is "rationalized" in the sense that it makes one's volitional
capacity a function of reasons or, more accurately, considered moral judgments. Rationalized
accounts can be distinguished from empiricist accounts of motivation, which hold generally that
reason has no role in the motivational mechanism of human behavior. On the latter view, reason
has, at most, only instrumental significance: it tells us how to satisfy some end. See Wright
Neeley, Freedom and Desire, 83 PNIL. REv. 32 (1974) (discussing these competing conceptions of
motivation); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the rationalized account).
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Wertheimer maintains that, though we may find this less satisfying than defin-
ing coercion in terms of some empirical concept of voluntariness, it is ulti-
mately the only definition of voluntariness that makes coherent sense of the
relationship between the two concepts.
PART I
The following sections will sketch in broad strokes the response to partial-
ly and radically moralized theories, which will be discussed in Sections A and
B, respectively.
A. Partially Moralized Theories
Partially moralized theories attempt to bridge the gap between empirical
facts about voluntariness and normative propositions concerning coercion by
conceptualizing voluntariness as a commodity which occurs in varying de-
grees. This permits defenders of hybrid accounts, such as that of Professor
Dressler, to characterize voluntariness and coercion as inversely proportional
concepts which exist at opposite extremes of the same continuum. In this
fashion, normative criteria are used to designate the line between acts that are
voluntary and those that are coerced.
At first glance, partially moralized theories appear to combine the best of
both worlds. They reflect the intuition that persons placed in coercive situa-
tions do act, in some sense, "against their will." At the same time, partially
moralized accounts appear to be flexible enough to serve the social and legal
need for deterrence while simultaneously serving the ends of fair notice and
uniformity by establishing a general standard applicable to all.
To the extent that partially moralized accounts are predicated upon ques-
tions of voluntariness, however, two types of problems arise. First, partially
moralized theories must confront the same types of difficulties that bedevil the
traditional theory of coercion. Second, the gradational view of voluntariness
implicit in partially moralized accounts raises a number of additional issues.
The first problem stems from the fact that coerced choices are not "invol-
untary" in the usual sense of the term. In both legal and philosophical con-
texts, voluntary acts are defined simply as those in which the subject
acts-i.e., where the subject chooses a course of action and then acts accord-
ingly.3" They require no more than this. Coerced acts are entirely voluntary in
38. These are situations in which the actus reus requirement in the criminal law is not met,
or where an act is not volitional for purposes of intentional torts. The Model Penal Code § 2.01(1)
requires a "voluntary act," and specifically excludes the following from the class of voluntary acts:
reflex movements, bodily movements during unconsciousness, acts performed under hypnosis, and
other acts not the product of a conscious determination by the actor. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201
(1962). Similarly, in tort law, a volitional act is one requiring a mental element representing some
corresponding motivational force, such as an intention or desire, and a corresponding bodily
movement. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 33 (5th ed., 1984). This dualistic test, requiring a
physical and mental element, can be traced back at least as far as the writings of John Austin in
the 19th Century, though it is evident in case law before then. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBtrJY: ESSAYS IN THE PHaLOSOPHY OF LAW 97-98 (1968) (discussing Austin's
view of the act requirement).
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this prevailing sense of the term. The fact that the individual may not want to
perform any of the respective courses of action open to him is irrelevant to the
question of voluntariness (though it might be relevant to excusing him for the
act). Therefore, coerced acts cannot be distinguished from non-coerced acts on
the ground that the former are involuntary.
To put it differently, the traditional theory of coercion depends upon our
acceptance of the analogy between acts of physical compulsion-characteristic
of "no act" situations-and acts precipitated by coercion (which are sometimes
characterized as resulting from a kind of psychological compulsion, as when
we say the "will is overcome"). Those who reject the traditional model view
such talk to be a kind of figure of speech. They recognize that the impermissi-
ble limitation upon external options characteristic of coercion is distinct from
issues of voluntariness, which go to a subject's capacity to carry out a chosen
course of action. In sum, they distinguish external freedom--having differing
options open to one-from internal freedom-being able to act voluntarily.
Independent of these issues is the problem raised by conceptualizing
voluntariness as a gradational concept quantifiable by degrees. Very simply,
the problem is that voluntariness does not admit of degrees. While sliding-
scale accounts of freedom and voluntariness have attained some currency in
common sense accounts of moral responsibility, and are even found enshrined
in the law in such doctrines as the defense of diminished capacity,39 in fact
such views of freedom or voluntariness are conceptually incoherent. The de-
fender of the notion that voluntariness is an empirical commodity that occurs
in varying degrees must tell us what this strange empirical commodity is. They
must be able to point to some psychological fact about the actor that waxes
and wanes with differing ranges of options such that a given act can be more
or less voluntary. For reasons discussed earlier, it will not do simply to point
to the obvious fact that the range of external options may be more or less
palatable depending upon the situation. A limited or unwanted range of exter-
nal options may render the actor's situation more sympathetic, even excusable,
but this does not make the act less voluntary any more than a particularly
palatable range of options would somehow render the choice made from
among them more voluntary.'
To the extent that any partially moralized theory links duress to the con-
cept of voluntariness, as Professor Dressler's theory appears to do, it suffers
from similar difficulties. On the other hand, perhaps such partially moralized
accounts can be re-interpreted as justifying duress wholly in non-empirical
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) (1962) (providing for mitigation of punishment in
capital cases where some mental defect has impaired the defendant's mental state or the capacity
to conform his conduct). Other criminal law doctrines such as the heat of passion defense, more
recently dubbed the "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" test, have served a similar func-
tion. The Model Penal Code provides that a murder charge may be reduced to manslaughter
"when the murder is committed under extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962); see
Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CalM. L.
& CRMNOLOGY 421, 466-67 (1982), for a limited defense of the EMED excuse.
40. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the availability of external
choice options and voluntariness, see Hill, supra note 6.
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terms. This leads us to a discussion of radically moralized theories of coer-
cion.
B. Wertheimer's Radically Moralized Theory.
The following discussion will focus upon three central themes of
Wertheimer's philosophical defense of the radically moralized theory of coer-
cion. First, I will examine his treatment of coercion as an agent-relative justifi-
cation, rather than as an excuse. Second, and perhaps more centrally, I will
explore Wertheimer's contention that coercion claims are contextualized and
the related question as to whether it is possible to put a truth value on coer-
cion claims. Here, I will consider whether Wertheimer's theory may be said to
be determinative in any sense. Finally, I will survey his theory of
voluntariness and its relationship to coercion.
1. Duress, Justification, and Excuse
While duress is generally treated as a kind of excuse in criminal law and
contract law,4 legal theorists are fairly evenly split on whether to consider
duress an excuse or a justification.42 Those who adhere to some form of the
traditional theory of coercion tend to conceptualize duress as an excuse in that
the coercive condition is viewed to overcome the will of the actor, thereby
relieving the victim of responsibility for the act. Thus, theorists defending an
exculpatory theory do so on the basis of the etiology of the coerced act. Con-
versely, those who view duress to be a kind of justification look to,the conse-
quences of the act. On this view, duress is viewed to be a kind of choice of
evils justification similar to necessity. Duress can be analyzed this way be-
cause the law has placed substantive limitations on the types of consequences
for which the defense will be permitted. Most generally, with certain excep-
tions to be mentioned shortly, a criminal defendant usually will not be allowed
the defense where the act he committed in succumbing to the coercive threat
is greater than the harm with which he was threatened in the event he did not
comply. Similarly, the defense was not available at common law as a defense
to murder.43 This seemingly consequentialist (justificatory) limitation was
couched in exculpatory terms by the fiction that the will could (or should) not
be overcome unless the threatened harm was roughly proportional to the harm
created by the coerced act.'
The rejection of the traditional theory of duress tends to blur the distinc-
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962); RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 492
(1981).
42. Some commentators have argued that duress should be viewed as an excuse. See
Dressier, supra note 10, at 1350; Fletcher, supra note 8, at 829-31; Michael S. Moore, Causation
and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985). Others defend the view that duress is a justifica-
tion. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 8, at 433; WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 166; WiLLIAMs,
supra note 8, at 755.
43. Dressier, supra note 10, at 1370.
44. See id. at 1373-74 (arguing that "[s]ociety also has a right to expect a person to demon-
strate a higher level of moral strength when ordered to kill a hundred innocent children than when
commanded to kill one").
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tion between justification and excuse. In other words, the distinction between
excuse and justification becomes considerably less significant in the absence
of the traditional theory. For example, on a moralized account, where a person
is permitted a defense simply because we have decided that it is not fair to
hold someone responsible for any act they have committed under a certain
constrained range of options, it becomes more difficult (and less important) to
decide whether the rationale is ultimately exculpatory or justificatory. It is
more difficult because the rationale can be characterized either in exculpatory
terms, as a defense predicated upon the idea that a person faced with a highly
constrained set of options simply is not responsible for their action, or in
justificatory terms, by arguing that net social utility is achieved by not holding
victims of coercion responsible. The distinction is also less important here
because, once the availability of duress is made to turn on the question as to
whether or not it is fair to hold someone responsible for a choice made under
a given set of conditions, issues of justification and excuse become secondary,
if not completely irrelevant.
In his account of coercion, Wertheimer attempts to capture both the excul-
patory and justificatory dimensions of coercion by classifying justification as
an agent-relative justification.' Put simply, because he rejects the traditional
theory of coercion, he does not wish to conceptualize duress as an excuse. Yet
he must explain the fact that the defense is sometimes permitted where, on an
objective weighing of harms, the harm caused by the victim is equal to or
greater than the threatened harm in the event that he does not comply.' For
example, imagine a case where the defendant-victim plants a bomb which
injures several people to avoid having his six year-old daughter sexually as-
saulted by the kidnapper-coercers. The agent-relative qualification permits
Wertheimer to maintain that, while an objective weighing of harms might
preclude the defense here, the law must take special account of what is argu-
ably the natural human sentiment to wish to protect one's own daughter, even
at the cost of a greater risk to many others.
While we find cases such as this intuitively sympathetic, I would like to
suggest that there are fundamental difficulties with characterizing the reason
for this as justificatory in nature. The problem is that the agent-relative quali-
fication permits us to privilege certain aspects of human personality, values,
beliefs, and desires, etc., in a manner that ultimately undermines the notion of
justification. The point is that justification defenses are essentially "objective"
in the sense that society assigns differing values to two competing courses of
conduct, permitting a privilege for conduct that, in other circumstances, would
be impermissible. The more we take into account the particular individual's
personal, even idiosyncratic, beliefs, values, and feelings the more the defense
45. Id. at 168.
46. Strictly speaking, where the rationale for duress is viewed to be exculpatory such that the
victim is not responsible for his act, the gravity of the resulting act should be irrelevant. While
criminal law does place substantive limitations on this by requiring a proportionality between the
threatened harm and the act, it nevertheless permits a defense in situations where justification
could not apply, such as where the harm created by the victim is greater than or equal to the
threatened harm.
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begins to look like an excuse. The man who saves his daughter from sexual
assault at the cost of greater risk to others is not really justified in performing
his act. Rather, we feel sorry for him. We empathize. And we decide accord-
ingly to hold him not responsible for the act.
Nor can Wertheimer defend the agent-relative rationale against this objec-
tion by arguing that only "rational" agent-relative decisions will be justified.47
The introduction of rationality is merely another way of privileging some
aspects of personality while excluding others under the guise that some are
rational. Put differently, on one (subjective) interpretation of rationality, avoid-
ance of even the most minimal harm to self would be rationally required, even
where this entails the exposure of others to great risk. If, on the other hand, by
"rational" we mean to impose some objective, agent-neutral analysis concern-
ing the proper distribution of harms, then we have relinquished the agent-
relative account altogether. We simply cannot have it both ways. We cannot
have an agent-relative account that nevertheless incorporates within its justi-
fication some objective standard regarding what a person should do in certain
circumstances.
Nor is there a middle way between the two extremes--e.g., by contending
that an agent-relative rationale permits some departure from the permissible
range of outcomes generated by an agent-neutral justification, while precluding
some outcomes as illegitimate, beyond the pale of the "rational." To take, once
again, the example of the father who is coerced to save his young daughter,
suppose he chooses to save her at the cost of wiping out all civilization on
earth. Would this be justifiable on an agent-relative account?
Wertheimer faces a dilemma here: if he concludes that such a decision
might be rational, then we are back to the slippery slope. If this is rational,
anything might be justified as rational, in which case anything could be justi-
fied. In this event, the category of the justificatory collapses into the exculpa-
tory. On the other hand, if he argues that it is not rational, then why not? Why
couldn't the rational man who is particularly devoted to his child choose her
life or well-being to the continued existence of our entire civilization? In short,
if this is not rational, then what is? Who gets to define what counts as rational
and what exactly could the criteria be? Finally, even if we could specify some
criterion for agent-relative rationality, how could any departure from an agent-
neutral justification remain rational without giving up the "objectivizing func-
tion" of rationality?
Misconceiving the nature of duress will have profound implications for
the way in which the defense is viewed, and for the cases to which it applies,
even with the sometimes fuzzy distinction between justification and excuse.
Duress should be viewed as inherently exculpatory in nature. Adopting an
exculpatory theory of duress, however, does not require that we embrace the
traditional theory of coercion, as we will see in Part Im.
47. Alan Wertheimer, Address at the Coercion Symposium at the University of Denver Col-
lege of Law (Mar. 14-15, 1997).
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2. Contextuality and the Determinateness of Duress
We now turn to the epistemological core of Wertheimer's theory of coer-
cion. He elaborates upon a theory of coercion which he characterizes as both
"moralized" and "contextual." The use of these terms highlights the central
tension in his theory between the theory having some prescriptive content and
his claim that duress is context-relative. To put it starkly, it simply is not clear
whether Wertheimer believes one can ever put a truth value on coercion
claims such that they are determinative. Let us briefly survey his general theo-
ry to see how this might be a difficulty.
As we discussed in the previous Part, according to Wertheimer, coercion
consists of a two-pronged analysis which requires us to examine both the
nature of the proposal (e.g., whether it is a threat or an offer) that is the sub-
ject of the coercion claim, and the range of choices open to the putative vic-
tim. For a situation to be considered coercive, it must involve an immoral
proposal to which the victim is morally or legally privileged to succumb. What
constitutes an "immoral proposal" and under what circumstances is the victim
so entitled? Wertheimer's answer is that these are highly contextualized issues;
there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions which is determinate in
specifying when coercion exists." Rather, issues which arise pursuant to ei-
ther the proposal prong or the choice prong must be "moralized"-they must
be evaluated from the standpoint of a moral baseline.
For example, to know whether the proposal is "immoral," we must ask
normative questions about such matters as whether the proposal adversely
affects the ex ante options of the putative victim (e.g., is the "proposal" a
threat that reduces her options?), whether it is substantively immoral (i.e., does
it propose an immoral exchange?) and whether it exploits the victim in virtue
of her background conditions. Similarly, the choice prong requires that we
make normative judgments regarding whether the range of choices open to the
putative victim were sufficiently limited to preclude moral and legal liability.
A central question must now be addressed: Does having a moralized or
contextualized account of coercion entail that there really are no truth condi-
tions for coercion claims-i.e., that we cannot assign a truth value to the ques-
tions raised pursuant to the two prongs of Wertheimer's theory. When we say
that a particular person was coerced in a given situation, are we saying any-
thing about the world at all, or are coercion claims simply subjective labels
attached to a situation after the speaker has decided that he or she should wish
to see the victim released from legal responsibility?
If coercion claims are not truth functional in the way that empirical state-
ments are, then a theory of coercion cannot be determinate and particular
cases of coercion will not be determinable. Most basically, in this event, the
theory will not be able to tell us when coercion exists and when it does not. It
will not be able to settle differences when there is disagreement concerning
particular situations. Further, it will not be able to generate a set of outcomes
48. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 30-46 (discussing the sorts of considerations relevant to
coercion on a moralized theory).
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which can be compared with existing law by which we could gauge the accu-
racy of the theory (or the law.) Similarly, because coercion claims remain
indeterminate, there is nothing to measure against our normative judgments,
and consequently no way of judging whether the theory comports with our
pre-analytic moral intuitions in any particular case. Moreover, a theory that
cannot tell us when coercion claims are satisfied will be unlikely to tell us why
we permit a defense for coercion as an initial matter. It can only generate the
conditional conclusion that if we view a certain choice situation as sufficiently
unfair and if we view a certain proposal as immoral, we will have made out a
claim of coercion.
Given these considerations, is Wertheimer's moralized account indetermi-
nate? The answer is unclear, and it is here that the central tension in his theory
lies. Wertheimer maintains that a coercion claim with a given descriptive or
normative force will have certain correlative truth conditions. Roughly speak-
ing, the truth conditions of a coercion claim are what must be the case for the
coercion claim to be valid or acceptable.'9 He goes on in the next sentence,
however, to say that he does "not want to put much weight on the term
'truth,''.. and further states that the truth conditions will sometimes depend
upon empirical and sometimes upon normative premises." While this may
indicate some provisional commitment to a determinate theory of coercion,
this assumption is dramatically undercut in his discussion of "coercion and
contextualism." It is in this discussion that he presents the prisoner example
mentioned previously, where he states that two persons with contradictory
judgments of the same situation can be equally correct about whether a given
situation is coercive.52
By maintaining that the truth conditions of a coercion claim may vary
with context, Wertheimer might mean any of a number of different things. He
cannot simply mean that, as the context changes, so too do our intuitions
about whether the situation is coercive. This would simply state the trivial
truth about which no one would argue: some situations are coercive while
others are not. Rather, he states that the truth conditions for a coercion claim
vary with context. This seems to indicate not simply that our conclusions vary
with context, but that the conditions for our conclusion (or our application of
the concept) might vary from context to context-i.e., that more might be
required for a claim of coercion in one context vis-a-vis another.
Wertheimer gives as an example of this contextual variability the way in
which we use the term "cold." The person who believes that a thirty-five
degree January day in Vermont is "cold" will be wrong insofar as the temper-
ature is actually mild, "given the context." But if the same conclusion is
reached by someone newly arrived from Miami, they would be correct. Thus,
the argument runs, contradictory opinions can both be correct.
The problem with this response is that the term "cold" here is used in two
49. Id. at 184.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 184-85.
52. Id. at 181.
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distinct senses. The first sense of the term "cold" is used in a statistical sense
referring to the normal range of temperature in Vermont during January. It is
false to say thirty-five degrees is cold in this sense, whether the remark is
made by the native of Vermont or the newly arrived Floridian. The second
sense of the term "cold," on the other hand, is used to reflect the speaker's
subjective impression regarding the temperature. In this sense, the Floridian's
statement that it is cold is true, just as would be a similar statement by a na-
tive of Vermont if he simply happened to feel cold. Thus, Wertheimer's exam-
ple commits the fallacy of equivocation in the very discussion in which he
warns against the possibility of equivocation."
Is there any other sense, then, in which the truth conditions of a coercion
claim vary from context to context while rigidly designating the same concept
of coercion from one context to the next? Perhaps we might think the account
could be salvaged by asserting that the same fact will take on different signifi-
cance from one context to the next. For example, thirty-five degrees will be
statistically cold in Miami in January while not being so in Vermont. In this
sense, it might be argued, the truth conditions for coldness (or coercion) will
vary from context to context.
This move, however, is of little use in defending the contextualized ac-
count of coercion because, in this example, we have not changed the truth
conditions for the application of the concept "cold;" we have merely picked
out one fact (i.e., the fact that it is thirty-five degrees) and recognized that this
is cold in one context and not cold in another. It is not that the truth condi-
tions for coldness have changed; rather, the truth conditions for coldness are
always measured relative to some background conditions (the geographical
locale and time of year) which themselves vary. In sum, the concept of
coldness is univocal though its application is relative to the context being
evaluated.54 The problem with Wertheimer's account is that, while the
truth value of some propositions (e.g., thirty-five degrees is cold) are context-
relative, the truth conditions for any such proposition cannot vary without
varying the meaning of the concept itself. Maintaining that the truth conditions
of coercion vary with context is like saying that coldness will be defined as
any temperature that falls below the average temperature for a region in one
context, while stipulating that coldness in another context will mean any tem-
perature in the bottom ten percent of the normal range of temperatures for that
region. Varying the truth conditions for a concept means abandoning any
univocal concept. It is simply a logical contradiction to claim that one is talk-
ing about the same concept from one context to the next, though one is apply-
ing different truth conditions to the different contexts.
The only other possible route for Wertheimer's theory is to assert that, by
claiming that the truth conditions for coercion vary with the context, he means
53. Id. at 182.
54. Thus, if we operationally define as "cold" any temperature that falls below the average
temperature for a particular region at a particular time of the year, the truth conditions for cold-
ness will be the same in Miami as they are in Vermont. Although, of course, the background
conditions by which coldness is measured will vary from one region to another.
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that the concept of coercion is dependent upon the perspective of the view-
er-i.e., that one person may legitimately view a situation as coercive while
another may not, where both are correct. His example of the prisoner and his
accomplices seems to bear out this interpretation insofar as the courts and the
prisoner's accomplices could both reach accurate contradictory conclusions.
But if this is the correct interpretation of his theory, then he has given up any
semblance of a determinative theory of coercion. Moreover, where the truth of
coercion claims are simply a function of the subjective beliefs of the viewer, it
is simply facetious to speak of there being "truth conditions" for coercion
claims at all. We may, of course, assign a truth value to the subjective beliefs
of differing individuals-i.e., it may be true that one person feels that a certain
situation is coercive while another does not. If this is the move, however, then
the truth conditions do not even have anything to do with coercion anymore;
they are merely a function of what any individual subjectively believes. In
sum, if what it means for the truth value of a coercion claim to be "contextu-
al" is that different people feel differently concerning what constitutes coer-
cion, then Wertheimer has told us something trivially true about persons and
nothing at all about coercion itself.
In the end, it appears Wertheimer wants to have his truth and eat it too.
He wants to be able to say that there are truth conditions for coercion claims
because, if there are not, there would be no point in having a theory (indeed,
if we cannot put a truth value on the conditions for duress, in what sense can
they be "conditions" for duress?). At the same time, however, he seeks the
perhaps infinite flexibility of a protean conception of coercion that would
permit two persons to reach contradictory conclusions about the coerciveness
of the same identical situation where both are correct in their assessments. If
this is what it means for truth conditions to be contextual, then the idea of
"truth" itself has lost all meaning.
Having concluded an examination of this aspect of Wertheimer's theory, it
should be noted that it is still possible to have a "moralized" and
"contextualized" theory of coercion without relinquishing determinacy. The
problem with Wertheimer's account is that it employs relativized versions of
these two concepts in a way that renders the theory hopelessly indeterminate.
First, coercion claims can be context-relative in the sense that particular facts
will take on different relevance in varying contexts. Just as thirty-five degrees
is "cold" in one context and not in another, so too, given certain background
conditions, a particular proposal might be coercive in one context and not in
another. This does not mean, however, that the existence of coercion depends
upon the subjective impression of the viewer.
Nor does a moralized theory of coercion entail that coercion claims are
completely relativized. A moralized theory may be truth functional and fully
determinate given one's adherence to some form of moral realism, as opposed
to some species of moral relativism or moral noncognitivism." Professor
55. "Moral realism" is used to refer to any view that holds that moral propositions reflect
some external reality, or are true or false in something like the way empirical statements are.
"Moral relativism" is a meta-ethical view that rejects moral realism-i.e., by arguing that moral
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Wertheimer's moralized theory of coercion is not truth functionally determina-
tive because it does not take seriously the possibility of moral realism, as his
prisoner example makes clear.' Indeed, perhaps the deepest irony of
Wertheimer's account is that he seeks to provide a "moralized" account of
coercion that cannot tell us what the normative parameters of coercion are.
Part III of this article sketches the parameters of a moral realist theory of
coercion that avoid the pitfalls of relativized accounts such as those considered
here.
3. Coercion and Voluntariness
Over the course of the past twenty-five years, a number of philosophers
have offered differing versions of a novel way of understanding the relation-
ship between motives and values in a way that permits a distinction to be
drawn between voluntary acts and free acts. On such accounts, not every vol-
untary act is free. To put if differently, some sources of human motivation
might meet the technical requisites of the "act" requirement (such that they are
considered voluntary) without constituting an act which we would consider to
be "free." Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this is the heroin addict,
whose use of the drug is voluntary in the technical sense, even as he wishes to
be free of the addiction.
In a seminal article, Harry Frankfurt argues that, for an act to be free, it is
not sufficient that the act simply flow from a first-order mental state such as a
desire.57 Acting from a first order mental state may characterize voluntary
behavior, but animals act voluntarily in this sense, as even Aristotle pointed
out."s What distinguishes persons from animals and free choice from mere
voluntariness is the ability to form second-order mental states-i.e., mental
states about other mental states.59 One acts truly freely, on this view, only
when he acts from a first-order desire which is itself connected with, or the
product of, a second-order value, desire or judgment. In other words, genuine
autonomy comes in valuing (in a second order way) that which one desires as
a first order matter. We rightly characterize as unfree the addict and the neu-
rotic-compulsive because they act voluntarily in response to (first order) de-
sires that are in conflict with second order desires. In short, the addict is un-
free because, though he desires heroin, he does not desire that he desire hero-
in.
With a different twist, Gary Watson has argued that genuine free agency
propositions reflect the individual's (individual relativism) or his culture's (cultural relativism)
view of what is right and wrong. "Noncognitivism" is the view that we cannot know the truth or
falsity of moral propositions-i.e., that moral statements do not refer to some knowable object.
56. Id. at 181. There simply is no way to reconcile a moral realist account of coercion with
the claim that two persons can reach diametrically opposed positions about the same situation and
both can be correct.
57. Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971).
58. Aristotle, supra note 4, at 935, 938.
59. An example of a second-order mental state is having a desire to inculcate a first-order
desire to enjoy classical music, or to have a (second-order) intention to restructure one's first order
desires. In short, second order mental states are mental states that have as their intentional object
some first-order mental state.
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exists only when one acts from motives that are themselves in accord with our
"evaluational system."' ° In sum, our acts must flow from voluntary impulses
which are themselves the product of our considered values and judgments.
This evaluational system serves not only to ground our actions in our deepest
principles and values, but also rationalizes our values and beliefs, making
them consistent with one another.6'
Wertheimer's discussion of voluntariness follows the tradition of such
rationalized accounts of volition. He distinguishes the "volitional" from the
"voluntary," using the term "volitional" to designate the traditional sense of
the term "voluntary," as where the person has acted in the technical legal
sense.' In contrast, Wertheimer argues that an act is not voluntary, for pur-
poses of duress, if it is performed as the result of an immoral proposal that
leaves the actor with a morally unacceptable range of choice options. These
two prongs are "moralized" in accordance with a set of moral principles to
which we do (or should) adhere. A range of choices that fails to conform to
these principles, Wertheimer contends, are involuntary in the sense that they
are "against one's will," even if they are otherwise "volitional."
There are three distinct difficulties with this approach to voluntariness, at
least as it relates to duress. First, even if voluntariness were a function of
some set of moral principles-even if it could be rationalized in the fashion he
suggests-Wertheimer never resolves the inherent ambiguity as to whether
voluntariness is defined by reference to the moral principles to which we do or
those which we should conform. Second, regardless of his answer to the first
problem, the voluntariness of an act is simply not a function of the system of
moral principles to which the actor would (or should) conform. Finally, even
if we could overlook the first two difficulties, it is not clear that Wertheimer's
treatment of voluntariness is consistent with the rest of his theory.
First, are the moral principles that serve to delimit the scope of
voluntariness those principles to which the agent does in fact adhere, or those
to which he should adhere? If we take the former, subjective approach and
argue that it is the agent's own principles that define the baseline for what it
means to be "against one's will," this approach is clearly inconsistent with the
law as it has developed. Certainly a judge, in determining whether a particular
case constitutes an instance of duress, does not undertake an examination of
the agent's moral principles-e.g., whether the agent is committed to prin-
ciples that could generate the range of existing alternatives from which he had
to choose.
Moreover, this entire approach would relativize duress claims to each
person claiming the defense. A person with an amoral set of principles which
60. Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205 (1975).
61. 1 have argued in a previous piece that one dimension of autonomy is the vertical rela-
tionship between first and second order mental states, as Frankfurt argues. Another dimension of
autonomy is the horizontal relationship between various second-order desires-i.e., that one's
second order desires are consistent with one another so that they do not frustrate one another. John
Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self. Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and
Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 377-80 (1997).
62. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 9.
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placed no constraints upon the just range of external options that should be
open to an agent might be entirely precluded from maintaining a duress claim.
On the other hand, for the person who holds a set of principles that limit the
range of choice situations that are considered just, there would exist a corre-
spondingly greater range of cases that the agent would characterize as coer-
cive. And, of course, the great majority of persons have no developed set of
principles whatsoever. Thus, the subjectivized approach not only fails to com-
port with existing law, it does so for good reason insofar as it would prove to
be completely unworkable.
The objectivized approach is problematic for other reasons. First of all,
what are the defining principles by which we are to judge voluntariness? Who
sets the standard, and what is it? Moreover, even if we could agree upon some
such objective standard, the objective rationalized account would have the
implication that one's act could be involuntary without one knowing it, as
when one acts in a situation that violates one's principles, but where one does
not stop to consider this. Conversely, one could act voluntarily while believing
his action to be involuntary, as where the actor is wrong about the application
of these principles.
This leads to the second problem. The rationalized account of
voluntariness is simply so divorced from the way in which we normally define
voluntariness that it leads to anomalies such as those just mentioned. Most
basically, there simply is no necessary link between one's being presented
with a choice situation that violates one's moral principles and the
voluntariness of one's act in responding to this choice situation. This cleavage
between voluntariness and moral principle is particularly aggravated on
objectivized accounts, where it is not clear in what sense one acts "against
one's will" when one must act in contravention of principles that one should,
but does not, hold. Most generally, the rationalized approach simply does not
ring true as a matter of subjective experience. Every person knows the feeling
that accompanies a coercive situation, and this experience has little or nothing
to do with the moral principles to which one adheres. The point here is that
any theory of duress which so thoroughly divorces the ascription of
voluntariness from the phenomenal experience of coercion cannot be correct.
Or, to put it differently, such a theory redefines coercion in a fashion that
raises doubts about whether we are talking about the same concept.
Wertheimer recognizes the problem in noting that the disadvantage of the
rationalized account is that it operates by "detaching voluntariness from the
will, from its psychological referent. '
Finally, the third problem may be more aesthetic than logical. Neverthe-
less, it raises questions about the adequacy of Wertheimer's account as a
whole. After devoting three-quarters of his book to an attack upon the tradi-
tional theory of duress and the corresponding notion that duress is a function
of the voluntariness of an action, Wertheimer attempts to maintain that coer-
cion is, after all, related to voluntariness (though, as we have seen, he rede-
63. WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 305.
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fines voluntariness). The question that must be addressed is why does he see
the need to attempt to relate the two concepts? The answer, I believe, is that
we intuitively understand that coercion does have something to do with the
etiology, rather than simply the immediate consequences, of the coerced act. It
has to do with the fairness of holding persons responsible for acts performed
in situations where their choices are limited. One is left with the unshakable
impression that, as heroically as Wertheimer struggles to free coercion from
the notion that it is essentially exculpatory in nature and function, he implicitly
concedes the same in his treatment of voluntariness.
In conclusion, while there may be some convincing normative and lin-
guistic reasons for distinguishing voluntary and free acts, such as the case of
the heroin addict or the obsessive-compulsive, it is not because their (volun-
tary but unfree) behavior is inconsistent with some set of moral principles. It
is because each is hopelessly conflicted, and because each cannot control the
desire that leads to the resulting behavior. They act voluntarily in satisfying
their respective desires to use a drug or to perform some repetitive action, but
they have no control over the desire itself. They act voluntarily within the con-
straints of the situation, but they do not control or will the forces that shape
that situation. In this respect, the victim of duress is analogously situated. The
problem, however, is not a function of the moral principles to which each does
(or should) adhere.
PART III
As we have already noted, the deepest irony underlying Wertheimer's
theory of coercion is that it presents a moralized approach to coercion that
provides no moral guidance as to when we should conclude that coercion
exists. This is because, at bottom, the theory purchases descriptive accuracy at
the price of a level of generality that precludes any prescriptive commitment.
In essence, Wertheimer's theory approaches coercion from the outside, rather
than from the inside. It looks more like the observations of a cultural anthro-
pologist, or a social observer, than those of a philosopher performing applied
ethical theory. His theory tells the judge that if she concludes that a proposal
is immoral and that a given range of alternatives is impermissibly limited, she
should find that the act was coerced. But he does not even presume to tell the
judge how to answer these other questions-questions which themselves re-
quire the judge to have prejudged the coerciveness of the situation.
None of this is to say that moralized theories as a class are inherently
flawed. The problem with Wertheimer's account is that it is prescriptively
empty. The remedy for this fundamental difficulty is to construct a moralized
account that specifies the prescriptive, rather than simply the descriptive, con-
ditions for coercion claims.
What sort of a theory should this look like? First, it should reflect the
essentially exculpatory nature of coercion. It should recognize, in other words,
that we excuse the victim of duress because we understand that they are not
responsible for the act, not because the act is justified in that it promote some
good. At the same time, however, the exculpatory model should not be tied
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directly to questions of voluntariness, as with the traditional theory of coer-
cion. Rather, the exculpatory nature of duress is a function of the futility of
holding persons responsible for coerced acts. In sum, coerced acts are excused
not because they are involuntary, but because they are not deterrable-because
no appropriate legal sanction could, as a practical matter, have prevented the
act.
The distinction between voluntary acts and deterrable acts highlights a
central ambiguity with respect to the use of the term "voluntary." In the legal
sense, as we have seen, it is sufficient for an act to be voluntary that the act
resulted from a conscious mental state and a corresponding bodily movement
by which the mental state (e.g., the intention) is carried out. Let us designate
this first sense of the voluntary as "volitional" behavior. There is another,
closely related sense of the term, however. This second sense of the term
"voluntary" entails not only such volitional behavior, but requires additionally
that the actor could have performed another course of action had she so cho-
sen or, more generally, that other courses of action were open to the actor.
Coerced acts arguably do not qualify as voluntary acts in this second sense
insofar as other courses of action have been foreclosed by the coercive threat.
In discussing voluntary acts, we have employed the first sense of the word
for three reasons. First, it comports with the technical legal sense of the term,
as used in the criminal law, among other places. This avoids linguistic incon-
sistency brought about by using the term equivocally. Second, it is always
open to argument that a person faced with a coercive threat could nevertheless
have chosen to refuse to perform the act and incur the threatened harm. This
would have the effect of collapsing the second sense of the term "voluntary"
into the first insofar as the coerced actor can theoretically always resist the
threat. Similarly, it raises a host of philosophical complications inherent in
explicating the subjunctive concept that one "could have done other-
wise'"-issues which philosophers have found notoriously intractable.
Finally, where coercion is defined by the actor's inability to resist the
threat, to say that an act will be considered voluntary only if the actor could
have chosen otherwise would be to make the "voluntary" definitionally equiv-
alent to the uncoerced. This would have the consequence of making the tradi-
tional theory of coercion tautologically true, since all coerced acts would be
involuntary in this sense. For all these reasons, we have employed the first,
legal sense of the term "voluntary" throughout this piece. Thus, an "involun-
tary" act, as we will use the term, is simply an act that does not issue from a
conscious mental state through a corresponding bodily movement.
To say that an act is undeterrable is not to say that it is involuntary. If an
act is deterrable, it is necessarily voluntary, but the converse is not true. Some
voluntary acts are nevertheless undeterrable. Indeed, coerced acts are one
species of the set of acts that are voluntary but undeterrable. (I leave open the
possibility that some uncoerced acts might fall into this same class, such as
acts motivated by some form of unyielding desire.) While conceptualizing
duress as a function of deterrence casts the defense in explicitly utilitarian
terms, there is a human side to this. It is precisely because we understand that
coerced acts cannot be deterred that we empathize with the victim of coercion.
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The utilitarian justification for duress reflects the very human, pre-analytic
intuition that it is unfair to hold the victim responsible not simply because he
did not engineer the coercive situation, but because the threat of punishment
would not change his behavior. Thus, it is unfair to expect the victim of coer-
cion to conform himself to the usual requirements of the law.
A utilitarian theory of coercion provides the determinacy necessary to
guide judges' decisions. The defense should be permitted in those cases where
(1) but for the putatively coercive threat, the actor would not have performed
the act, and (2) where the threat of certain punishment, appropriately
relativized to fit the severity of the offense, would be ineffective in deterring
the conduct. The second condition recognizes that deterrence is a relative
phenomenon. This is important to make the defense available in cases where
an inappropriately severe level of punishment would deter conduct for which
the defense of duress should still be available.
For example, imagine a situation in which a street gang threatens to beat
up a non-member unless he agrees to take part in vandalizing a school. If
deterrence is measured from the standpoint of extremely severe punish-
ment-say, the death penalty-it is likely that the non-member's act is
deterrable-i.e., it is likely that he would sooner take the beating than face
execution for the act of vandalism. Thus, his act is theoretically deterrable and,
as a result, would not be considered coerced if the second condition were not
relativized. Holding the victim to this standard, however, would be unfair
since his conduct was, by any ordinary definition, the product of coercion.
Thus, the coercion claim must be made a function of a more appropriate level
of severity of the punishment. As a rule of thumb, then, the second condition
should be measured from the standpoint of the actual punishment threatened
for a given offense in a just legal system.
The central organizing principle that undeterrable conduct should be ex-
cused explains and justifies a number of mediating rules which have devel-
oped at common law and more recently. It explains, for example, why those
who recklessly place themselves in situations where they are likely to be co-
erced are denied the defense' on the assumption that this prior conduct is
deterrable. It also explains the modem trend in the law to permit the defense
even for homicide, where the victim-defendant is threatened with the loss of
his own life, or that of a loved one.'
The foregoing remarks are obviously intended only as a general sketch for
a utilitarian conception of coercion. Undoubtedly, a great deal more needs to
be written to unpack fully the notion of deterrence central to the theory.'
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1962).
65. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the abrogation of the "no
murder" rule under the Model Penal Code.
66. See Hill, supra note 6, at Part IV (discussing an account of the theory).
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THE COERCION OF WOMEN IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*
This essay addresses contextual coercion (or, in Alan Wertheimer's terms,
unfair background conditions') in divorce settlement negotiations. I argue that
psychological, social, practical and legal impediments create a hostile environ-
ment in which many divorcing wives bargain. As a result of these unfair back-
ground conditions, many wives enter divorce settlement agreements that fail to
provide them and their children with adequate financial support. Some wives
seek relief from these unfair divorce settlements and move to have them vacat-
ed on grounds of coercion, duress, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.
These contract doctrines, and the particular spin that family law places on
them, generally fail to comprehend or to take seriously the disadvantages
confronting many women in settlement negotiations. Rather, as written and as
applied, these doctrines frequently confirm, rather than correct, unfair results.
Consider first the financial context in which divorcing wives must bar-
gain.2 Generally the wife and the children are dependent upon the husband.3
Until a court orders temporary support, husbands frequently refuse to provide
child support and/or maintenance. The wife then has difficulty meeting her
basic needs and those of her children. Unless the wife or her lawyer obtains
an order for temporary support and the husband complies with that order, the
wife's financial situation can become desperate, increasing her willingness to
accept a poor settlement. On the streets, this tactic is called "starving her
out.",
4
The wife's low or non-existent income also makes it difficult for her to
pay attorneys' fees. Many wives proceed without lawyers5 or agree to joint
representation by lawyers their husbands have chosen.6 A wife who seeks a
lawyer sometimes cannot find one willing to represent her. Lawyers know that
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.S., Rollins College,
1978; J.D., University of Florida, 1981; M.A. (Sociology), University of Florida, 1989.
1. Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENv U. L. REV. 889, 901
(1997).
2. When I speak of women and their experiences, of course, I speak in statistical gener-
alities that may not apply to all women.
3. Approximately fifty percent of American wives earn no income because they do not
participate in the labor force. Most wives who do work outside the home earn substantially less
income than their husbands. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 449-50 (1992).
4. For description of a case where the husband employed this tactic, see Penelope E. Bryan,
Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAiM. L.Q. 177, 177-88
(1994).
5. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Il. App. Ct. 1993).
6. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
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wives frequently cannot pay their fees and that courts commonly refuse to
order husbands to pay wives' legal fees. Many lawyers, particularly expensive
lawyers, admit that they prefer to represent husbands because they know that
husbands can pay their fees. Even when both spouses can afford attorneys, the
wife is likely to hire the less expensive and less competent lawyer.7
The wife's inadequate financial resources frequently prevent her from
conducting her case in a manner that protects her interests. In order for the
wife to determine the extent and the value of the marital assets, expensive
discovery must occur and valuation experts must be retained.8 Moreover, de-
pendent persons generally perceive their benefactors as benevolent, and a
wife's naive trust of her husband may encourage her to assume that she will
not need her own lawyer and that her husband will treat her fairly at divorce.9
The roles each spouse played during the marriage and their respective spheres
of authority within the marriage' ° can exacerbate the problems created by the
wife's financial dependency.
While some couples today exhibit egalitarian attitudes about marriage, the
traditional division of labor within the family seems quite intractable. More
wives than ever now participate in the workfor~e and share the burden of
providing for the family. Yet husbands still exercise greater control over mari-
tal decisionmaking, particularly important financial decisions. When a husband
has exercised authority over financial issues, the wife may accept his defini-
tion and valuation of the marital property rather than require verification by an
expert, particularly if she lacks the resources to hire an expert. The wife also
may lack the knowledge needed for successful financial negotiations. The
husband may even conceal" or deliberately undervalue assets, "2 relying up-
on her ignorance.
Moreover, despite egalitarian attitudes, wives still retain primary responsi-
bility for homemaking and child-rearing.'3 The wife's acceptance of this role
is secured through her socialization as a caregiver and through the validation
7. Bryan, supra note 4.
8. Cases challenging settlement agreements provide many examples of wives and/or their
attorneys failing to conduct any discovery at all. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d
at 795.
9. Id.
10. Sex role ideologies prescribe spheres of influence and appropriate behavior for marital
partners. Currently these ideologies range from egalitarian/modern to traditional. Modern beliefs
about sex roles prescribe equality between spouses. Egalitarian couples share decision-making and
family roles. Traditional sex role ideology, however, contemplates a marital partnership in which
husbands dominate and each spouse has distinct roles. Husbands are the primary providers, while
wives nurture and attend to relationships within the family. These separate roles impart primary
authority over important financial issues to the husband, and primary influence over decisions
relating to children and family care to the wife. See Bryan, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Frederick, 451 N.E.2d 612 (El. App. Ct. 1991); Bellow v.
Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
12. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
13. VICTOR FucHs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALIrY 72 (1988). Fuchs concludes
that women's disproportionate responsibility for child care provides the most powerful explanation
of the difference in men and women's earnings. Id. at 62. Although the gap between men and
women's wages closed by 7% between 1980 and 1986, Fuchs explains that the improvement
largely was due to the increased percentage of women workers who were born after 1946 and had
fewer children. Id. at 65-66.
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she receives from her husband and children, and from society, for behaving in
conformity with unspoken expectations of self-sacrifice and service. The im-
portance the wife places on her care-giving role encourages her to place great-
er value on having custody of the. children than does the husband. A loss of
custody not only would unacceptably alter her relationship with the children
but also would violate her sense of self. A divorcing mother, then, may be
inclined to accept an unfair financial agreement if her husband threatens a
custody dispute.'4 The wife's meager financial resources may make her fear
of losing custody all the more salient, for she may know that she cannot, and
that he can, hire attorneys and experts.
Many psychological factors predispose wives more than husbands to ac-
cept unfair settlement offers. For instance, wives suffer more from depression
than do husbands; wives generally have less status than their husbands; wom-
en use less assertive (and less effective) conflict resolution styles than do men;
women have lower self-esteem than men; women expect less than men do;
and women fear achieving, particularly when their achievement generates dis-
approval from the men upon whom they have been dependent. Each of these
factors causes wives significant problems in divorce negotiations. 5
Many wives suffer abuse from their husbands. 6 Typically a batterer ex-
ercises control over every aspect of his victim's life; her beliefs, her values,
and her body as well as her access to family, friends, employment, and mon-
ey." The problems created by this extensive control are enhanced by other
common characteristics of abused spouses: risk aversion, guilt grounded in
traditional beliefs about family responsibilities, low self-esteem, low expecta-
tions, depression, and passivity.' When these factors are coupled with the
terror experienced by many battered spouses at the mere mention of their
tormentors, the extreme disadvantage of abused spouses in divorce negotia-
tions becomes clear. An abused spouse may want to obtain her divorce with-
out making any requests for property or maintenance that will ruffle his feath-
ers-trading, in essence, her life for their assets.
Divorce laws contribute to these inequitable background conditions. As
the wife exits the marriage in which her care-giving and self-sacrifices were
endorsed and encouraged, law recasts her experiences in terms of a masculine
market ideology-an ideology that comprehends the world through lenses of
autonomy, self-interest, formal equality and individualism. The sacrifices she
made in the market in order to fulfill her caregiving obligations, the expendi-
14. Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 168 (1984).
15. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 457-81 (1992).
16. Estimates of the frequency of wife beating range from one-third to one half of all mar-
riages. M. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENcE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 31
(1980); Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 41
(1981).
17. Karla Fischer et a., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2120-32 (1993).
18. For various discussions of these problems, see LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOM-
AN (1979); LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); Fischer, supra note 17,
at 2118, 2165-71.
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tures she made of herself, are incomprehensible in a world framed by these
concepts. 9 The fiction of formal equality obscures her compromised position
in the labor market, her continuing care-giving responsibilities, her prior in-
vestment in the family, and her need of assistance. Her continued financial de-
pendency is discounted by an individualism that respects her husband's ability
to leave, unencumbered by continuing responsibilities to her. The brutality of
the transition from family to law and the market stuns and confuses many
wives, leaving them ill-equipped to fend for themselves during divorce negoti-
ations.
A closer examination of the substantive law and its operation clarifies this
point. First, custody decisions are governed by the best interests of the child
standard. A typical statute lists ten or twelve factors that should be taken into
account in determining what custody/visitation arrangement best serves a
child's interest. At first blush, this standard appears friendly to a parent who
has invested substantial time in child care. The indeterminacy and the
politicization of *the standard, however, threaten rather than support a caring
mother.
The "best interests of the child" standard is §o indeterminate as to be no
standard at all. Many have noted the lack of guidance the standard gives to
negotiating parties, the wide discretion it creates for trial court judges, and the
advantage it provides to the wealthier spouse, usually the husband, who can
hire the better credentialed and more persuasive experts.' Moreover, during
the past decade, fathers' groups have employed the rhetoric of formal equality
to press for legislation expressing a preference for joint custody and a pre-
sumption that divorced children benefit from substantial and continued contact
with both parents.
An indeterminate standard grounded in formal equality does not reward a
mother who has invested substantially more time in the children than the fa-
ther. The mother's lack of a solid legal entitlement weakens her position in
custody negotiations and makes her reluctant to push for fairness in financial
negotiations for fear of provoking a custody contest.2'
Spousal maintenance law creates a similar problem. As with child custody
statutes, maintenance statutes typically list numerous factors a court should
19. Martha Fmeman argues that egalitarian ideology has helped to neuter motherhood by
devaluing and making invisible the caretaking function that mothers typically perform. MARTHA
ALBERTSON FNEmAN, THE NEUrERED MOTHER, THE SExUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTfirH
CENTURY TRAGEDmS 68 (1995).
20. See. e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIvORCE REFORM (1991); David N. Bolocofsky, Use and Abuse of Mental
Health Experts in Child Custody Determinations, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 203 (1991) (stating that in a
survey of lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals, over 70% thought the "best interests of
the child" standard was unclear); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custo-
dy Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights
in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1523, 1533 (1994); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
21. Perversely, the worse the father's performance as a parent during the marriage, the more
the mother may desire custody in order to protect the children, and the more vulnerable she may
become to financial manipulation.
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consider in determining whether and how much spousal maintenance to award.
The indeterminacy of the statutes and the inconsistency in judicial opinions
weaken a wife's ability to negotiate for maintenance. She cannot, for instance,
realistically threaten to go to trial and obtain a maintenance award if her hus-
band balks during negotiations.'
The rhetoric of formal equality that pervades divorce law further weakens
a wife's claim for maintenance.23 Thinking of women as equivalent to men
suggests that they are able to care for themselves as men do. Moreover, it
implies that they can behave as men do and compete successfully in the job
market. This formal and gendered idea of equality ignores the fact that women
generally receive less pay than men for the same or equally valuable work;24
that women have more difficulty than men in securing suitable employment;
25
that motherhood inevitably constrains women's marketplace participation
26
especially when women must parent alone after divorce;' that spousal main-
tenance may be necessary for women to begin to achieve actual equality with
men; and that society continues to demand that women fulfill the bulk of our
collective responsibility for caregiving.
Belying women's worlds, equality rhetoric supports the perception that
22. See In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709 (1ll. App. CL 1992) (describing a 67-year-
old wife with poor health who agreed to waive her maintenance rights primarily because she be-
lieved it was the best she could do under the circumstances). Only between 10% and 17% of all
divorcing wives receive any spousal maintenance whatever. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD
SUPPORT AND AUMONY: 1987, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, NO. 167. (1990)
(stating that in a 1988 Census survey 17% of the divorced women reported that their divorce
decree entitled them to spousal maintenance); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTnON:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 167 (1985); Terry J. Arendell, Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contempo-
rary United States, 13 SIGNS 121, 133 (1987); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic Consequences
of Divorce: A View From Canada, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 485 (1994) (stating that in Canada
during 1990 only 16% of women requested spousal maintenance upon divorce and only 19% of
custodial mothers requested spousal maintenance). Custodial mothers with dependent children re-
ceive maintenance less than one-third of the time. E.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Di-
vorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 84 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (stating that in New York in 1984 only 24% of di-
vorced mothers with custody were awarded spousal maintenance); E. MACCOBY & R. MNOOKIN,
DIVIDING THE CHILD 123 (1992) (stating that a California study found that alimony was awarded
in 30% of cases in which the divorcing couple had at least one child under the age of 16). Even
when wives do obtain maintenance, the awards are small and for short durations.
23. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 20 (noting that the use of "rule" or formal equality
rhetoric in divorce reform has compromised the position of many women on economic and cust-
ody issues).
24. Terry J. Arendell, Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United
States, 13 SIGNS 121, 129-30 (1987).
25. Qualified women also have more difficulty than qualified men in achieving deserved
promotion. See WErTzmAN, supra note 22, at 323-56.
26. FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 25-27, nn.23-24. As Professor Fineman notes: "[A] primary
focus now is on women as economic actors, a role that requires a degree of independence that is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the demands of 'traditional motherhood.'" FINEMAN,
supra note 19, at 68. See also Arendell, supra note 24, at 124-25, 128-29; Mary Corcoran et al.,
The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics, 10 SIGNS 232, 234 (1984).
27. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 20, at 5; WErrZMAN, supra note 22, at 355-56 (stat-
ing that the presence of children in the divorced woman's household depresses her opportunities
for economic betterment).
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women need only small amounts of short-term maintenance or none at all.
Furthermore, the idea that spouses (husbands) have the right to leave their
marriages unencumbered by obligations to their prior spouses (wives) finds
expression in the law's current preference for a "clean break" at divorce.
The "clean break" rationale favors the use of property distribution, rather
than maintenance, to achieve financial equity between spouses.' Marital
property in most states is subject to equitable distribution. Again we encounter
statutory indeterminacy, and the predictable result is that wives generally re-
ceive fewer marital assets than husbands. 9 Moreover, even if marital assets
were equally divided, equality once again would mask inequity.
Under current definitions of marital property,"3 most divorcing couples
have little property to distribute. The marital property of a couple married for
many years generally consists only of equity in a marital home.3 In addition,
today's more expansive definition of marital property stops short of embracing
a spouse's enhanced earning capacity.3' A spouse's enhanced earning capaci-
ty, however, frequently is the most valuable financial resource in a marriage.
Excluding it from marital property, particularly when maintenance is
disfavored and infrequent, skews the distributiorl at divorce.3 Consequently,
under current distribution laws, a wife, at the extreme, may be entitled to half
of the value of limited assets. Formal equality again masks inequity.
Representation by an attorney does little to level this uneven playing field.
Like judges and legislators, lawyers are steeped in the ideologies of law, the
market, and patriarchy that ignore the positions of women and undervalue the
caregiving work women perform in the family.' In addition, many lawyers
are incompetent or they incompetently represent some clients. Many attorneys
dabble in divorce cases only when more desirable cases are lacking. Some
unimpressive solo practitioners "specialize" in divorces because desirable
clients go elsewhere, and the steady stream of divorce clients pays the bills.
Only within the past two decades, as attorneys began to recognize the financial
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709 (Il. App. Ct. 1992).
29. See, e.g., WErrzMAN, supra note 22, at 106-07; KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUs-
ICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS AND JUDGES 41-42 (1996).
30. Nearly every state defines as marital all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage with the exception of property obtained by gift or through inheritance. J. Thomas
Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1992) (reviewing DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). During the
past several decades most jurisdictions have expanded their definition of marital property to en-
compass property titled solely in one spouse's name, Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouces and Strangers:
Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. LJ. 2303, 2314 (1994), pension and retire-
ment plans, id. at 2318, goodwill of businesses, William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evo-
lution of American Property Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q.
163, 183-84 (1989), and, in a few jurisdictions, increased value of separate assets, for example,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(4) (1996). Under extreme circumstances a few states allow judges
to award the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse upon divorce. Robert J. Levy, An
Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 156 (1989).
31. WEITZMAN, supra note 22, at 66, 78-79.
32. Arendell, supra note 24, at 131-32.
33. WErrZMAN, supra note 22, at 66, 78-79.
34. See, e.g., PHYLus CHELER, MomERs ON TRIAL: THE BATLE FOR CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY 198-208 (1987) (describing lawyers' gender bias against women in custody disputes).
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potential of divorce law, have high quality law firms specializing in divorce
become common. These firms, however, generally handle only a few wealthy
clients, and many of these clients are husbands.35
The wife's inadequate financial resources encourage attorneys to forego
needed discovery,36 to invest inadequate time in case preparation," to ne-
glect their clients' cases,3" and ultimately to encourage their women clients to
accept poor agreements.39 The wife frequently cannot resist her attorney's
pressure to settle.' Put simply, the context of divorce practice far too fre-
quently invites the wife's attorney to compromise the wife's interests during
settlement negotiations and to encourage the wife to accept a poor deal.
If the wife enters an unfair settlement, judicial oversight could, but does
not, provide relief. At the final hearing most jurisdictions impose a duty on the
judge to review a divorce agreement for fairness or lack of unconscionabili-
ty.4' Currently, however, for many reasons,42 judges pay only cursory atten-
tion to the actual provisions of divorce agreements.43 Since judges routinely
fail in this task, the only option available to a wife who has entered an unfair
agreement is to petition the court to set aside or vacate the agreement.
Many wives lack the financial and emotional resources needed to bring
such a challenge. Those who do must confront hostile judges and insensitive
legal doctrine. Because the context in which divorce settlements are negotiated
is tilted against most wives, courts should listen sympathetically to women's
35. I know a wealthy lawyer who lives in a town of about 75,000 and who recently filed for
divorce. Before choosing his lawyer, he interviewed every law firm in his area known to special-
ize in divorce. During the interviews he provided enough facts about his finances and the marriage
to assure that none of these firms could represent his wife without a conflict of interest. He is not
the first wealthy man I have known to employ this tactic.
36. In many cases where the wife's attempts to vacate a prior divorce judgment that incorpo-
rated a property settlement agreement, the lack of discovery by the wife's lawyer is apparent One
must assume either that all of these lawyers are incompetent, and/or that their clients lacked the
resources with which to pursue discovery.
37. Bryan, supra note 4, at 177-88 (recalling the story of a lawyer's failure to conduct dis-
covery, leading to an inequitable settlement).
38. See WINNER, supra note 29, at 71-92.
39. In Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), for example, the hus-
band and wife met with the husband's attorney the day before final hearing. The husband's attor-
ney called an attorney to represent the wife. That attorney came to the husband's attorney's office
the same afternoon and met with his client, the husband, and the husband's attorney. While there
he reviewed with the wife a divorce agreement that already had been prepared. At no time prior to
walking to the courthouse with her the next day did the wife's attorney talk privately with her. Id.
40. WINER, supra note 29, at 91 (1996).
41. Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form Over Substance
in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 319, 322 & n.14
(1991).
42. Judicial frustration with the costs of litigation, Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cas-
es Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1350 (1994);
judicial deference to family privacy, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); and judicial distaste for divorce cases, see, for example,
James Delaney, How to Bring Legal Sanity to Domestic Relations, 2 FAM. ADVOCATE 20, 20
(1980); Linda K. Girdner, Adjudication and Mediation: A Comparison of Custody Decision-Mak-
ing Processes Involving Third Persons, 8 J. DIVORCE, Spring/Summer 1985, at 33, encourage
judges to uphold questionably procured or unfair settlement agreements.
43. Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the
Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUToERs L. REV. 1133, 1145 (1988).
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complaints of duress and coercion and should look with great suspicion upon
agreements with unfair provisions. In fact, many courts do maintain that the
freedom of the parties to contract should be restricted in divorce because of
the important public policies at stake. The state, say the courts, should guard
against unconscionability in the substance" and against fraud, duress, and
undue influence in the making4' of divorce agreements.
Despite this lofty rhetoric, courts are very reluctant to set aside divorce
agreements.' Some of this reluctance can be explained by the failure of mas-
culine legal standards, imbedded as they are in liberal, market, and patriarchal
ideology, to capture the experience of women.
The law of the State of Illinois provides an example of how courts ad-
dress petitions to set aside or vacate property settlements. In support of the
State's policy of favoring settlement of divorce disputes, the Illinois courts
have created a presumption in favor of the validity of settlement
agreements.47 An Illinois statute specifies that a court cannot set aside or va-
cate a divorce settlement unless the court finds the agreement unconsciona-
ble.' In making this determination, the courts employ a concept of uncon-
scionability taken directly from Illinois commercial law.49 An unconscionable
agreement must be extremely one-sided or oppressive, an agreement "which
no man, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair
and honest man would accept, on the other." The courts use a two part test
to determine unconscionability. They inquire into (1) the conditions under
which the agreement was made, and (2) the resulting economic circumstances
of the parties.5 Claims of duress, coercion, and fraud fall under the first
prong of the unconscionability test. These claims must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence,52 and the evidence must establish an absence of mean-
44. See, e.g., McIntosh v. McIntosh, 328 S.E.2d 600, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
courts throw a "cloak of protection" around agreements negotiated between husband and wife to
ensure their fairness).
45. Sharp, supra note 41, at 327 n.42.
46. Id. at 329 n.50.
47. See In re Marriage of Riedy, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30 (IIl. App. Ct 1985); Bickson v.
Bickson, 183 N.E.2d 16 (II. App. CL 1962).
48. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides:
The terms of the agreement, except those providing for the support, custody and visita-
tion of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the econom-
ic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties,
on their own motion or on request of the court, that the agreement is unconscionable.
750 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/502(b) (West 1993).
49. See In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915 (iII. App. Ct. 1983).
50. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gurin, 571 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Mar-
riage of Kloster, 469 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. App. CL 1984).
51. See In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
52. See In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that a claim
of fraud requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intentionally misstated or con-
cealed a material fact which he had a duty to disclose and upon which the plaintiff detrimentally
relied); In re Marriage of Carlson, 428 N.E.2d 1005 (1]1. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that evidence of
coercion, fraud, or duress must be clear and convincing); Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178 (111.
App. Ct. 1977) (stating that a party seeking set aside must prove by clear and convincing evidence




ingful choice. As should be obvious, the unconscionability standard is difficult
to satisfy and it anticipates none of the problems wives commonly encounter
in negotiating divorce agreements. Unsurprisingly, wives' claims of unconscio-
nability usually fail.
Consider one court's insensitivity to a mother's fear of losing custody. In
August of 1994, Yolanda left her husband, Jeffrey, after nearly twenty years
of marriage." She took their three youngest sons with her to the couple's
summer home. The older two boys stayed with their father in Bolingbrook,
Illinois. Jeffrey worked as a hospital administrator, earning approximately
$150,000 per year. Yolanda had not worked outside the home during the mar-
riage. The court soon ordered Jeffrey to pay to Yolanda $ 2,400 per month for
unallocated family support.5 '
Sometime within the first year after separation, Yolanda decided to move
to Wixom, Michigan with the three youngest sons. On August 28, 1995,
Jeffrey filed an emergency petition requesting the court to enjoin Yolanda
from permanently removing the boys to Michigan. A hearing was scheduled
for three days later. On the date of the hearing, Jeffrey, his lawyer, Yolanda,
and her attorney appeared at the court. For two hours they all negotiated in the
hallway outside the courtroom. Apparently, no discovery had been conducted
prior to negotiations. At her attorney's urging, Yolanda orally agreed to accept
what appears to be between seventeen and twenty-three percent of the marital
assets55 and three years of minimal and non-modifiable rehabilitative spousal
maintenance,56 in return for custody of her three youngest sons." Rather
than argue the merits of Jeffrey's emergency petition at the hearing, Jeffrey,
Yolanda, and their lawyers presented the terms of an oral settlement agree-
ment to the trial court. On the basis of the testimony, the judge agreed to enter
judgment on October 5, 1995.
On October 5, Yolanda appeared in court with her new lawyer, Mr. Hold-
en. Mr. Holden requested a continuance, but the court declined and entered
judgment. On November 5, Yolanda filed a motion to vacate the judgment,
arguing, among other things, that she suffered from duress during negotiations
because of her extreme fear of losing her children.58 Yolanda's fear seems
credible because she already had lost her two older sons to Jeffrey, the court
might have disapproved of her removal of the three youngest sons to Michi-
gan, she had only three days notice of the emergency hearing, and she had
minimal financial resources with which to fight Jeffrey. Moreover, the unfair
financial terms to which she agreed themselves suggest that her fear impaired
her ability to exercise her free will-she felt she had no other choice.59 The
53. In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 1148.
55. Id. at 1149.
56. Id. at 1151-52.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. At the settlement hearing, Yolanda testified as follows:
MR. KOZLOWSKI [Counsel for Wife]: And that's the agreement we worked out today
in the hall, and we will reduce it to writing with the joint custody [agreement], and
you're satisfied with that?
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trial court, however, denied Yolanda's motion to vacate and the appellate court
affirmed. In addressing Yolanda's duress argument the appellate court stated:
Wife bears the burden of showing duress by presenting clear and
convincing evidence that she was bereft of the quality of mind neces-
sary to make a contract. While wife's fear that she may lose custody
of her children no doubt caused her anxiety, we do not recognize this
as a factor impairing her ability to exercise her free will and make a
meaningful choice when the record reflects that she agreed to negotia-
tions, took part in the negotiations and then presented the substance
of these negotiations, under oath, to the trial court. Many spouses
may experience anxiety when appearing in court because of a petition
to dissolve a marriage and this anxiety is no doubt heightened when
one fears she may lose custody of her children; however, this factor,
without more, does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that one
lacked the ability to make a voluntary decision.'
CONCLUSION
Unfair background conditions and insensitive legal standards create the
coercive context in which wives bargain at divorce. Understandably, many
wives agree to inequitable divorce settlements. If a wife challenges an unfair
settlement she confronts a policy favoring settlement, a presumption in favor
of the agreement's validity, a hostile legal standard, and a heightened burden
of proof. Employing these standards, courts usually refuse wives' petitions to
vacate unfair settlements, leaving wives financially devastated and embittered.
Commercial contract doctrine should not govern the validity of divorce
agreements. Alternatively, legal standards should be developed that anticipate
the common problems wives face during divorce negotiations. Moreover,
judges should receive education on the harsh realities of divorcing wives and
should not hesitate to vacate inequitable divorce agreements.
THE WITNESS [Wife]: I have no choice.,
THE COURT: Well, ma'am, I want you to understand that you do have a choice. We
can sit down right now and have a formal hearing and the parties can present
evidence on both sides and call any witnesses that you want and the Court will make a
decision.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: The question I have is, is this your agreement?
THE WITNESS: At this time, yes, sir.
Id. at 1149 (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
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COERCED WAIVER AND COERCED CONSENT
DAVID S. KAPLAN'
LISA DIXONt
Consent and waiver are said to be legally transformative, that is, they are
verbal acts with legal repercussions.' Coercion undermines the validity of
these verbal acts. In the context of criminal procedure, coercion may invalidate
the legal significance of a defendant's consent to a search, the waiver of his
privilege against self-incrimination, or the waiver of his right to counsel. The
question of whether we should or should not invalidate a defendant's actions
because of government coercion is for the most part a matter of public policy.
An examination of the boundaries established by the courts between acceptable
and improper police behavior reveals that the lines are drawn based upon a
desire to promote the public policy goals of effective law enforcement and
public confidence in the criminal justice system as an accurate truth-seeking
mechanism. Depending on whether a law enforcement officer's acts will fur-
ther or hinder societal concerns, the law may characterize his acts as coercive
in one area of criminal procedure but the acceptable norm in another context.
Despite the fact that the words "coercion" and "voluntariness" generally con-
note subjectivity, a defendant's perception of whether his consent was volun-
tary or coerced is largely irrelevant in the determination of whether the law
will invalidate his actions on the grounds of coercion.
Our task in this Symposium' is to analyze not the essence of coercion,
but to determine when the law should treat a defendant's actions as legally
invalid due to coercion. This article examines the circumstances under which a
criminal defendant may effect a valid relinquishment of his Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment rights; how the differences in the procedural safeguards
accorded these rights reflect the degree to which our criminal justice system is
willing to recognize coercive government actions as an invalidating force with
respect to each of these rights; and the moral reasoning underlying this
scheme. Part I summarizes the evolution of the law of waiver and consent in
criminal procedure. It discusses the Sixth Amendment and the rationale under-
* Partner with the law firm of Holland, Kaplan & Pagliuca, P.C., in Denver, Colorado.
B.A., University of Colorado, 1977; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1982. He is an
adjunct professor at the University of Denver College of Law in the areas of Criminal Law, Crim-
inal Procedure, and Trial Tactics.
t Clerk for Justice Michael L. Bender of the Colorado Supreme Court. B.A., College of
William and Mary, 1990, J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1996.
1. Consent is morally and legally transformative in that "it changes the moral and legal
relationship between parties to an agreement." Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Ex-
ploitation, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 889, 890 (1997).
2. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
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lying the concept of waiver, the United States Supreme Court's extension of
the Sixth Amendment standards for waiver to the relinquishment of Fifth
Amendment rights, and the Supreme Court's refugal to extend the concept of
waiver to the Fourth Amendment. Part H analyzes the role of moral consider-
ations in the willingness of the courts to give effect to the invalidating force of
coercion upon the transformative acts of waiver and consent.
I. WAIVER AND CONSENT: THE SIXTH, FIFTH, AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS3
A. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an ac-
cused with procedural protections relating to the structure of a criminal trial,
including the right to counsel.4 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel atta-
ches at all "critical stages" of criminal proceedings in which the absence of
counsel may result in substantial prejudice against the accused and where the
presence of counsel would mitigate or eliminate this prejudice.5
It was in the context of the Sixth Amendment, in Johnson v. Zerbst,6 that
the United States Supreme Court first articulated the now familiar definition of
waiver: "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."7 The defendant in Zerbst was charged with possessing and passing
counterfeit Federal Reserve notes." He had little education, was without the
3. This background is not a thorough review of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
but rather a brief overview to highlight the invalidating role of coercion with respect to waiver
and consent in criminal procedure. The validity of a defendant's consent or waiver after it has
been previously withheld, for example, is beyond the scope of this article.
4. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... and ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has also recognized a due process right to
counsel independent from the Sixth AmendmenL See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Miranda warnings, created as a prophylactic measure to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, also include a right to counsel during custodial interrogation.
Coercion in the waiver of other trial rights raises interesting questions, but is beyond the
scope of this article. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzannatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 800, 805-06 (1995)
(holding that defendants who engage in plea negotiations may waive the protection against later
use of their statements for impeachment purposes); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386
(1987) (holding that release-dismissal agreements-in which defendants agree to release their civil
suits against the government in exchange for the dismissal of the government's case against
them-are not impermissible per se).
5. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967) (holding that post-indictment line-
ups possess a "grave potential" for prejudice and are therefore a "critical" stage of the proceedings
at which the defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel). "Critical stages" are those proceed-
ings which lead to the loss of liberty. The Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant has a
right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, see White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); at a pretrial
line up, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); during a pretrial interrogation when the
state attempts to elicit information directly from an accused who has been formally charged, see
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); and when the government surreptitiously and deliber-
ately attempts to elicit information from an indicted defendant, see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159 (1985). See generally 1 WLLIAM H. ERICKSON, UNITED STATES SuPREME COURT CASES AND
COMMENTS: CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE § 3.01[3] (1997).
6. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
8. Id. at 459.
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financial means to hire retained counsel, and had no family or friends in the
area.9 He was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced on the same day
without the assistance of counsel. At trial, the defendant briefly addressed the
jury, stating only, "I don't consider myself a hoodlum as the District Attorney
has made me out to be several times."' He was sentenced to four and one
half years of incarceration. Standard procedure at the penitentiary required new
prisoners to be placed in isolation for sixteen days; as a result, the defendant
was unable to file an appeal within the allotted time." The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the defendant could not have ef-
fectively waived his right to counsel if he did not know that he had a right to
counsel. In doing so, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts must "in-
dulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitu-
tional rights," and stated that "[t]he determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused."' 3 The Court further stated
that the policy underlying this right was one of humanity and fairness, and that
the Sixth Amendment:
[E]mbodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the aver-
age defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the
lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious....
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. .. . He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defence, even though he have [sic] a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. 4
The Zerbst court held, in essence, that a conviction obtained by govern-
ment exploitation of the defendant's ignorance as to legal procedure was no
conviction at all. Although the public policy behind this rule was, in part, the
ascertainment of truth and the exculpation of the innocent, the Court also
expressed serious concern for persons overwhelmed by the complexity of our
legal system regardless of their guilt or innocence. The Court subsequently
extended this "intentional relinquishment of a known right" standard to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
9. Id.
10. Id. at 461.
11. Id. at 469.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 462-63.
15. Id. at 469.
16. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Massiah v. United States7 extended the right to counsel from the context
of a courtroom to encounters between citizens and law enforcement officials.
In Massiah, law enforcement officials instructed a co-defendant to elicit in-
criminating statements from the defendant as the officials listened to the con-
versation through a radio transmitter. The defendant had been indicted and was
represented by counsel.' 8 The Supreme Court found that the state, by deliber-
ately eliciting incriminating statements after indictment and seeking to use the
statements against the defendant at trial, violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.'9
Although Massiah clarified the parameters of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, the standard for waiver of that right beyond the confines of a
courtroom was not clear until Brewer v. Williams.' The defendant in Brewer
was an escapee from a mental institution who had been formally charged with
the abduction of a young girl.2' He was represented by counsel and had been
advised of his rights.' While transporting the defendant to the jurisdiction
where the abduction occurred, law enforcement officials who knew the defen-
dant to be deeply religious explained to the defendant, in the absence of coun-
sel, that the weather conditions were such that unless the defendant immediate-
ly led the officers to the girl's body it would never be found, and that the
child's parents "should be entitled to a Christian burial."' The defendant re-
sponded by leading the officers to the girl's body. The Supreme Court found
the facts to be "constitutionally indistinguishable" '24 from those in Massiah,
and held that the officers' subtle persuasion amounted to a violation of the
defendant's right to counsel.' The Court recognized that the murder of a
small child inevitably produced great pressure on the state and the courts to
bring the perpetrator to justice, but that "it is precisely the predictability of
those pressures"' that required faithful adherence to the Constitution. Hold-
ing that the Zerbst standard applied to a waiver of the right to counsel at criti-
cal stages regardless of whether the waiver occurred in a courtroom or in a
patrol car, the court emphasized that "waiver requires not merely comprehen-
sion but relinquishment."'27 Hence, a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.'
Zerbst, Massiah, and Brewer together stand for the proposition that once
17. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
18. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201-02.
19. Note, however, that when an undercover agent elicits incriminating information from an
indicted defendant but does not convey this information to law enforcement officials, no Sixth
Amendment violation has occurred. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (finding no
Sixth Amendment violation where there was no realistic possibility that the state gained an advan-
tage).
20. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
21. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 400.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 401-02.
24. Id. at 400.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 406.
27. Id. at 407.
28. Id.
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the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, an effective waiver of that
right, whether it occurs in a courtroom, a patrol car, or in any other location,
must be an "intentional relinquishment of a known right"; the waiver must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. These cases reflect the Court's concern
with police overreaching and procedural fairness to defendants, especially
those defendants who may be vulnerable to such overreaching by virtue of
diminished mental abilities, a lack of education, or some other factor related to
background or experience. Finally, the Court acknowledged the fact that a
layperson's unfamiliarity with legal procedure may prejudice his ability to
preserve his rights at trial. 9
B. Waiver of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects an
accused from being compelled to testify against himself or to provide the
government with testimonial or communicative evidence." Two years after
the United States Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment applicable to the
states,3' the Court announced the most significant Fifth Amendment case to
date, Miranda v. Arizona.32 In Miranda, the Court determined that custodial
interrogation--"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a per-
son has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of ac-
tion in any significant way,"33  was inherently coercive, and that officers
must provide the suspect with a prophylactic advisement of his rights in these
situations in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination and to ensure that any statements made by the suspect were "truly
the product of free choice."'
For purposes of this article, Miranda's significance is twofold. First,
Miranda sheds light on the definition of coercion in criminal procedure by
establishing custodial interrogation as a baseline for presumptively coercive
state action." In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the privacy in
which custodial interrogation generally occurs and the absence of an accurate
29. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (holding that a lay person's
lack of familiarity with legal procedure cannot be offset by legal counsel's representation).
30. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that police did not violate
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination by taking a blood sample over his objection be-
cause the privilege only protects the contents of his mind). The Fifth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
31. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applicable to the states and noting that both state and federal courts determined
admissibility of a confession on a voluntariness standard).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
34. Id. at 457. The documented instances of false confessions are significant enough to justi-
fy concern over this issue. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSiN, CONFEssIONS IN
THE COURTROOM 84 (1993) (discussing psychological perspectives on why suspects confess and
stating that 49 persons in 350 cases were wrongly convicted of murder based on their own false
confession).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514-25 (discussing the policy reasons for establishing constitution-
al safeguards against custodial interrogation without counsel).
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gauge with which to measure the atmosphere in an interrogation room. After
surveying police department manuals which instructed officers to intimidate
suspects through the use of psychological tactics,' the Court concluded that
custodial interrogation was by nature coercive:37 "This atmosphere carries its
own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it
is equally destructive of human dignity."" If custodial interrogation is pre-
sumptively coercive, then the factors that define "custody" are instructive in
discerning the Court's understanding of coercion. "Custody" includes such
factors as the time and place of interrogation; the length of interrogation; the
number of officers 'present; the actions and words of the officers and the de-
fendant; physical restraint or the threat of physical restraint.39 The determina-
tion of whether a defendant is in custody entails an objective, rather than a
subjective, inquiry of "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation." The subjective views harbored by the officer
or the suspect are not relevant."
Miranda is also significant for its adoption of the Johnson v. Zerbst stan--
dard in the context of the Fifth Amendment. Previously, the Supreme Court's
constitutional threshold for a defendant's relinquishment of the privilege
against self-incrimination was voluntariness under the totality of the circum-
stances, which accounted for the characteristics of the accused and the details
of the interrogation.42 The trial court's role was to "determine whether a
defendant's will was overborne... [under] the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation... ." Confessions that were the product of an "overborne
will" and a critically impaired capacity for self-determination were inadmissi-
ble as a violation of due process under either the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment." In Miranda, the Court established that a waiver of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination must not only be voluntary, but also knowing
and intelligent.4 According to the Court, the requirement that law enforce-
36. The tactics included: isolating the defendant in an unfamiliar environment; displaying an
air of confidence in the suspect's guilt; pretending to be an ally to the suspect; strategically alter-
nating hostility with kindness; and discouraging a suspect from consulting with a relative or an
attorney. See id. at 449-54.
37. Id. at 465.
38. Id. at 457.
39. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
40. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 420.
41. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
42. Cases considering the relevant factors in a voluntariness analysis include the following:
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (lack of any advice to the accused regarding his
constitutional rights); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (denial of right to consult with counsel);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (defendant's emotional instability); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (threats and lack of education); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (low
intelligence of the accused); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (extensive questioning);
Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948) (physical abuse); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(youth of the accused); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (repeated and prolonged na-
ture of questioning); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (length of detention).
43. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (citing Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961)).
44. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)) ("This Court
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ment officers advise defendants of their rights served to ensure the knowing
and intelligent nature of a waiver while eliminating the need for lower courts
to engage in speculation as to whether a particular defendant, in light of his
background, intelligence, and education, was aware of his constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The institution of Miranda warnings created a
"simple" means to "overcome [the] pressures" of custodial interrogation.'
A waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination must not only be
knowing and intelligent, but also voluntary. In the context of confessions, the
Supreme Court defined "voluntariness" in Bran v. United States47 as,
"not... extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improp-
er influence." Yet in Brady v. United States,49 the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a guilty plea tendered in reliance upon the government's prom-
ise of leniency and in an effort to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.
Conceding that a promise of leniency was "possibly coercive," the Court held
that this "possibly coercive atmosphere ... could be counteracted by the pres-
ence of counsel or other safeguards" in the same manner that the inherently
coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation could be dissipated by Miranda
warnings. The Court concluded that a plea of guilty entered with the knowl-
edge of the direct consequences "must stand unless induced by threats [or
promises to discontinue improper harassment], misrepresentation [including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises], or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
[e.g. bribes]."'
In addition, a statement is "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment if coercive forces acting upon the defendant arise from sources
other than government action. In Colorado v. Connelly,52 the Supreme Court
held that a defendant's confession-an involuntary manifestation of a mental
disease which compelled the defendant to make the statement-was "volun-
tary" because "voluntariness" is defined as "the absence of police overreaching
rather than 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word."53
In the context of the Fifth Amendment, therefore, the Supreme Court
recognizes the impact of coercive government behavior upon criminal defen-
dants, whether these pressures exist in the privacy of an interrogation room or
in open court. However, voluntariness is defined as the absence of government
has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we reassert these
standards as applied to in custody interrogation."). A defendant's statement which is not given
knowingly or voluntarily is not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief, but may still be
admissible for impeachment purposes if voluntarily made. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
46. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
47. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
48. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43.
49. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
50. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
51. Id. at 755.
52. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
53. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170.
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coercion rather than the defendant's exercise of volition. Advisements and the
presence of counsel serve to neutralize these pressures, but a court may find
that a confession was coerced despite these safeguards if the confession was
induced by threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises.
C. Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment
Government searches conducted without a warrant supported by probable
cause are per se unreasonable." ' Perhaps the most common exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements is a search conducted pursuant to a
valid consent.55 From the perspective of a law enforcement officer, it may be
preferable to obtain consent to search instead of securing a warrant.56 A con-
sent search allows an officer to bypass paperwork and the need to locate a
magistrate who can issue a warrant.57 Evidence produced during a consent
search is less likely to be suppressed on technical grounds.58 Also, because
consent searches require no degree of suspicion on the officer's part, they
allow an officer to pursue inarticulable hunches in detecting crime.59
The flexibility which makes consent searches favored among law enforce-
ment officials also creates a strong potential for abuse. As a practical matter,
at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the defen-
dant did not give consent, the dispute usually amounts to a swearing match in
which the police officer possesses greater credibility than the defendant, who
has every motive to lie in order to preserve his liberty. Hence, absent some
significant discrepancies such as an inconsistency in documentary evidence or
the conflicting testimony of a fellow officer, factual disputes over whether
consent was in fact given are overwhelmingly resolved in favor of the state.
A court may find consent where a defendant uttered no words of consent
but manifested consent through his conduct.' The scope of consent is mea-
sured under a standard of objective reasonableness: "What would the typical
54. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that government
recordings of defendant's conversations in a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991) (holding that defendant's con-
sent to a search of his car included permission to examine the contents of a bag lying on the floor
of the car).
56. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 8.1, at 596 (3d ed. 1996).
57. LAWRENCE TIFFANY Er AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 159 (1967).
58. LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 8.1, at 596 (stating that despite the prosecutorial burden to
prove consent, consent "may be perceived as the 'safest' course of action in terms of minimizing
the risk of suppression").
59. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (stating that where officers
lack probable cause, "a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining
important and reliable evidence").
60. See ERCKSON, supra note 5, § 1.11 [l][d] (citing United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739
(7th Cir. 1976); People v. Bordeaux, 488 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1971)).
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reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?"6 ' In addition, the test to determine whether a suspect has been
seized is an objective one of whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the
conduct of law enforcement officers would "have communicated to a reason-
able person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his business." 2
Assuming that the defendant gave consent to the search, the government
must also demonstrate that the consent was voluntary. 3 Before 1973, lower
courts were divided as to whether the definition of voluntariness included a
showing that the defendant was aware of his right to withhold consent to
search." The United States Supreme Court answered this question in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte' by holding that "voluntariness" does not include
the element of knowledge.' The Schneckloth court held that although a waiv-
er of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights must be knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary, a consent under the Forth Amendment need only be voluntary.67 In
concluding that a voluntary consent was sufficient to effect a valid relinquish-
ment of Fourth Amendment rights, the Court held that a defendant can effec-
tively surrender his Fourth Amendment rights without being aware of the fact
that he possessed these rights in the first place.' The Court concluded that
voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined under the totality of the
circumstances, and that the defendant's knowledge of his right to withhold
consent is one factor in this consideration rather than a prerequisite to admissi-
bility.6
In explaining its refusal to extend Miranda's prophylactic advisement to
the Fourth Amendment context, the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the
meaning of voluntariness. The Court considered, and dismissed, the possibility
that voluntariness was synonymous with "knowledge," because to equate the
two would permit physical or mental threats. The Court acknowledged that
official action is almost always the cause for the defendant's incriminating
statement, and reasoned that as a practical matter, the concept of voluntariness
could not incorporate a "but for" analysis.' Unable to agree on a definition
61. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177
(1990)).
62. Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
63. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) ("When a prosecutor seeks to
rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the con-
sent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.").
64. See, e.g., Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (1965) (holding that consent is not volun-
tary unless it is given with the knowledge that it could be withheld); People v. Tremayne, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that knowledge of the right to withhold consent was a
persuasive, but not a determinative, factor in a voluntariness analysis).
65. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
66. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-25.
67. Id. at 241.
68. Id. at 225-26.
69. Id. at 248-49. The Supreme Court has also declined to extend Miranda to testimony be-
fore a grand jury. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
70. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224 ("Under [a 'but for'] test, virtually no statement would be
voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action
of some kind.") (citations omitted).
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of voluntariness which took into account for the defendant's subjective experi-
ence, the Court turned to an area more readily susceptible to a quantitative
analysis, public policy:
"[V]oluntariness" has reflected an accommodation of the complex of
values implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of
the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a
tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. Without such
investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused,
those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many
crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be
diminished. At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values
reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be
used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair
and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civi-
lized notions of justice.7
Hence, under Schneckloth, the concept of voluntariness has little or nothing to
do with a defendant's subjective perception of the circumstances under which
he relinquishes a constitutional right; rather, "voluntariness" is an "accommo-
dation" of "values," specifically, the need for effective law enforcement and
the need for the public to perceive the criminal justice system as fair. If a
defendant surrenders his constitutional rights under circumstances which fur-
ther law enforcement and which the public will perceive as fair, the
defendant's act is "voluntary." If a defendant waives his rights or consents to
a government intrusion under circumstances which do not further law enforce-
ment or which the public may perceive as unfair, the defendant's act is not
"voluntary." Schneckloth held that the subjective mental state of the person
who allegedly consented is not the focus of a voluntariness analysis.72
The Schneckloth court considered the possibility of imposing a require-
ment that officers advise suspects of their right to refuse before eliciting con-
sent. The Court summarily rejected this alternative on the grounds that it
would be "thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the
detailed requirements of an effective warning."" The Court added that while
advisements may be appropriate in the structured atmosphere of a courtroom,
officers in the field operate under informal and unpredictable conditions which
require flexibility on the part of the officer, and hence, freedom from restric-
tive procedural safeguards. The suggestion, then, is that advisements are not
necessarily given when they are needed, but when they do not interfere with
the investigation of crimes. The Court's reasoning here is questionable; the
phrase, "you can say no" is hardly a "detailed requirement" that is "thoroughly
impractical." The Court's concern, instead, appears to be that informed sus-
pects would be less likely to consent to a search, which in turn would frustrate
the public policy goal of truth-seeking. As the Schneckloth court emphasized,
the community possesses a "real interest in encouraging consent" because
71. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-25 (citations omitted).
72. Id at 235.
73. Id. at 231-32.
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consent searches help convict the guilty and exculpate the innocent.
The Court noted that advisement is required in custodial interrogation
because such questioning "contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to... compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so free-
ly,"74 but that advisement is not necessary in order to question individuals
who are not in custody because "[i]t is an act of responsible citizenship for
individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforce-
ment. 7 Likening consent searches to noncustodial questioning, the Court
determined that advisement is unnecessary in a consent search because "[tlhere
is no reason to believe ... that the response to a policeman's question is
presumptively coerced."'76
According to the Court, waiver and its additional procedural safeguards
apply only to "trial rights," which the Court defined as "a right constitutionally
guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining
process."" The Court quoted Johnson v. Zerbst's reasoning that safeguards
were necessary to the "realistic recognition of the obvious truth" that a lay
person lacks sufficient skill to protect his legal interests "before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty,' 7 and emphasized that Sixth Amendment
waivers require additional procedural protections because a "wholly innocent
accused faces the real and substantial danger that simply because of his lack
of legal expertise he may be convicted." '79 In attempting to explain why this
rationale would not apply with equal force in the context of searches and
seizures, the Schneckloth court stated simply that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects privacy interests rather than trial rights, and that there is "no likelihood
of unreliability or coercion present in a search-and seizure case."' This state-
ment may not be entirely accurate because the Court does in fact acknowledge
the possibility of coercion in a Fourth Amendment context.8'
However, the Court's assertion concerning the reliability of evidence pro-
duced in a consent search is instructive. While coerced confessions may be
unreliable or false, the same cannot be said of coerced consent to a search that
yields, for example, a quantity of heroin. 2 The Court's distinction between
"trial rights" and Fourth Amendment rights is questionable in light of the
Court's holdings in Massiah v. United States and in United States v. Wade. 3
In Massiah, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment was violated when offi-
cers arranged to eavesdrop as a co-defendant elicited statements from the
defendant, who had already been indicted. In Wade, the Court held that post-
indictment lineups implicate the Sixth Amendment. Arguably, these investiga-
tory tactics on the part of law enforcement officials do not affect the promo-
74. Id. at 247.
75. Id. at 232.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 236-37.
78. Id. at 236.
79. Id. at 241.
80. id. at 242.
81. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
82. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
83. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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tion of truth at trial any more than searches and seizures; these "critical stag-
es," however, enjoy the benefit of Sixth Amendment protection. If, as the
Court found in Wade, lineups contain a risk of abuse or unintentional sugges-
tion which undermine truth-seeking, it is difficult to understand why the law
provides protection against this prejudice after indictment, but not before.84
In an effort to explain why the Zerbst standard was extended to Fifth
Amendment, but not Fourth Amendment, rights, the Schneckloth court stated
that police questioning differs from searches and seizures in that custodial
interrogation undermines the integrity of the fact-finding processes because it
"enable[s] the defendant... to tell his story without fear, effectively."85 Ac-
cording to the Court, fear in the context of custodial interrogation was not an
evil in and of itself, but rather an impediment to the defendant's ability to con-
vict or exculpate himself with accuracy. In addition, the Court pointed to the
Miranda court's fear that "[w]ithout the protections flowing from adequate
warnings and the rights of counsel.., the most compelling possible evidence
of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police. '" It is true that "[a] confession is like no other evi-
dence."87 Yet the Court failed to explain how, for example, twenty pounds of
marijuana in a defendant's trunk is somehow less compelling evidence of
guilt. The rights at issue provide some insight into the course taken by the
Supreme Court in refusing to extend the Zerbst standard to the Forth
Amendment. The language of the Fifth Amendment, for example, unequivocal-
ly provides that "no person shall.., be compelled... to be a witness against
himself."88 By contrast, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable"
searches and seizures, and therefore contemplates that some searches and
seizures will occur against the suspect's will. This difference creates distinct
baselines for these constitutional rights. In the Forth Amendment's test of
reasonableness, which balances public policy on the one hand with individual
rights on the other, public policy often wins out, as evidenced by the "emerg-
ing pattern of nonprotection" in the administrative search context. 9
84. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that no right to counsel exists in pre-
indictment lineups). The Second Circuit has also held that a post-indictment consent to search was
not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Kon Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1990).
85. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
86. Id. at 240 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966)).
87. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1990) ("Certainly, confessions have profound
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind
even if told to do so.").
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1992) (discussing administrative searches).
Scholarly interpretations of the distinction drawn by Schneckloth are diverse. See, e.g.,
LAFAVE, supra note 56, §8.1(a) (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)) ("[N]o sys-
tem of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness
on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights."); William J. Stuntz,
Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure 75 VA. L. REv. 761 (1989) (arguing that waivers in the
courtroom receive more protection than other relinquishments of constitutional rights because in
these other contexts, the right holder is not the intended beneficiary); Toby M. Tonaki et. al., State
v. Quino: The Hawaii Supreme Court Pulls Out All the "Stops," 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 289 (1993)
(stating that the waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as an eviden-
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Consent, then, is invalid if not voluntary, and coercive or overbearing
conduct on the part of law enforcement officers will invalidate an alleged
consent. In Bumper v. North Carolina,° the Supreme Court invalidated the
consent purportedly given by the defendant's elderly grandmother after several
officers appeared at her home which was located in an isolated area, an-
nounced that they had a warrant to search the house, and proceeded to conduct
a search. The Court held the officers' representation that they possessed au-
thority that could not be resisted amounted to coercion. In addition to an
officer's claim of authority, other factors bearing on the validity of consent in-
clude a show of force or coercive surroundings, such as the presence of a
large number of uniformed officers, the display of weapons, or a confrontation
in the middle of the night; a threat to obtain a search warrant where there are
not grounds upon which a warrant could issue; prior illegal police action; the
defendant's maturity, sophistication, and mental or emotional state; the
defendant's prior or subsequent refusal to consent; and the defendant's aware-
ness of the right to refuse to give consent.9 '
D. Summary
The Supreme Court has held that police-citizen encounters in the context
of the Fourth Amendment are not presumptively coercive, although state ac-
tion in combination with a defendant's characteristics may produce an environ-
ment in which a defendant's consent to a search is coerced, and therefore
invalid. In the Fifth Amendment context, the Court has held that custodial
interrogation is presumptively coercive, but that an advisement of the
defendant's rights and the availability of counsel sufficiently neutralizes the
coercive nature of such questioning. With respect to the Sixth Amendment, the
Court has acknowledged the "reality" that a defendant's ignorance of criminal
procedure gives rise to prejudice at critical stages of criminal proceedings, but
that the presence of counsel, or the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of the right to counsel, is an adequate safeguard against this prejudice.
"There is no universal standard that must be applied in every situation
where a person forgoes a constitutional right." However, the common
thread that exists within the standards for waiver and consent is the public's
need to perceive the criminal justice system as accurate. In the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment context, the law acknowledges that, by objective standards, the
custodial environment is inherently coercive. Because truth-seeking is hindered
by the exploitation of a defendant's ignorance in these situations, advisement
and the assistance of counsel are provided as a prophylactic measure to coun-
teract this coercion. In the Fourth Amendment setting, however, exploiting a
tiary privilege, impedes rather than aids the ascertainment of truth and that the Schneckloth
voluntariness standard rather than the Zerbst "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" standard should
apply to confessions).
90. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
91. See generally ERICKSON, supra note 5, § 1.11[11 (discussing search and seizure);
LAFAVE, supra note 56, § 8.2.
92. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245.
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defendant's ignorance as to his rights furthers the public policy goal of truth-
seeking. Hence, consent to a search or seizure need only be voluntary, with
"voluntariness" defined not by a defendant's subjective perception, but by
public policy concerns.
II. COERCION
Turning from the circumstances under which we allow coercion to negate
the legal effect of a defendant's consent or waiver, to the circumstances in
which we should allow coercion to negate the legal effect of these actions, we
begin with the Supreme Court's determination in Schneckloth that if not for
confrontations with law enforcement officials, it is highly unlikely that the
majority of citizens would intentionally incriminate themselves. It follows that
citizen-police encounters involve some degree of pressure to cooperate, and
that criminal suspects act with constrained volition in their interactions with
law enforcement officers.93 This proposition finds support in the field of psy-
chology, as well.94
If the courts were to acknowledge the pressures inherent in police-citizen
encounters, procedural safeguards in addition to those already in place might
be necessary to counteract these pressures. Because the public's concerns with
respect to the criminal justice system revolve around truth-seeking, such safe-
guards would be perceived as a hindrance to effective law enforcement and
would not be tolerated. The need to perceive the criminal justice system as an
accurate and fair system may explain some of the inconsistencies created by
the problematic Schneckloth opinion. A defendant in a search and seizure
situation is just as ignorant of his rights as a defendant in a courtroom, and in
both situations he stands to lose his liberty. Although the deprivation of liberty
is not so close at hand in the Fourth Amendment context, the penalty will
ultimately be the same. Our community condones the exploitation of the
defendant's ignorance in a search and seizure context, yet condemns the same
behavior under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Coercion, then, is a legal
fiction, a term of art invoked upon consideration of the public policy concerns
presented under the facts of a particular case.
Florida v. Bostick95 is a good example. In Bostick, the defendant was a
passenger on a Greyhound bus en route from Miami to Atlanta. During a
brief, scheduled stop in Fort Lauderdale, two uniformed police officers board-
ed the bus and approached the defendant, who was sitting in the back of the
93. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) ("To be sure, the aura of authority
surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to re-
spond to questions.").
94. See Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedi-
ence Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 97 U. ILL. L. REV. 215
(1997) (detailing Stanley Milgram's 1960 experiment in obedience theory which proved that
"[Ilegitimate authority... influences behavior to a much larger extent than anyone previously
imagined, often dwarfing a person's fundamental sense of right and wrong").
95. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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bus, blocked the aisle, and began questioning him.' One of the officers car-
ried a gun in a recognizable weapons pouch.' To disembark would have
meant risking the departure of the bus and being stranded in a strange city
without luggage.98 Despite the presence of many of the factors which the
Court had previously characterized as indicia of coercion, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant consented to this encounter." The officers were con-
ducting a suspicionless "sweep" of the bus, a popular method of drug interdic-
tion in furtherance of the "war on drugs."'" It was this policy in favor of
drug interdiction, more than any of the factors previously articulated by the
Court, which drove the decision in Bostick. A jurisprudence which places
greater reliance upon public policy than upon precedent embodies the very
problem that the Court hoped to avoid-a loss of public confidence in the
accuracy and fairness of our judicial system."°'
As Professor Wertheimer writes, "however important society's need for
searches, it arguably has nothing to do with the voluntariness of consent."'"
Perhaps society's need for searches should not be a relevant factor in defining
voluntariness, however, it assuredly is a factor if not the most important factor
under the Supreme Court's current framework. Professor Wertheimer states
that courts follow moral considerations in delineating the situations in which it
will recognize coercion as an invalidating force. In criminal procedure, this
"morality" is society's need to perceive the criminal justice system as an ac-
curate mechanism for truth-seeking. Unfortunately, morality in the sense of
humanity, as envisioned under Zerbst, is notably absent in the context of con-
sent searches. As Professor Wertheimer aptly states, "there is independent
moral value""°3 in protecting the volitional dimension of a defendant's choic-
es in addition to the cognitive-the "knowing and intelligent"--aspect. In
defining fairness, Zerbst recognized the defendant's perspective, emphasizing
that the defendant in that case-arraigned, tried, and sentenced in one day
without an attorney-must have perceived the criminal justice system as "intri-
cate, complex, and mysterious."'" By contrast, the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth explained that the defendant's subjective perception of events was
largely irrelevant to the definitions of fairness, voluntariness, and coercion.
The defendant's perspective certainly should not be the determinative factor,
as such a policy would generate abuse both by and against the defendant.
However, in a system that prides itself on individualized justice, an approach
that renders a defendant's perspective irrelevant leaves much to be desired in
96. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429.
97. See generally id. (explaining that the defendant was on a bus crossing Broward county
on his way to Fort Lauderdale).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 429-30.
100. Id.
101. Consider the statement of veteran criminal defense attorney Larry Pozner after the an-
nouncement of the verdict in the trial of Timothy McVeigh: "Wait'll the next time a jury brings in
an unpopular verdict, then tell me the system works." Richard Willing & Kevin Johnson, Effect of
Oklahoma Trial Far Beyond Guilty Verdict, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at IA.
102. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 117 (1987).
103. Id. at 121.
104. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
terms of fundamental fairness.
Professor Joseph Grano has criticized Professor Wertheimer for a failure
to incorporate but-for causation in his analysis of coercion, arguing that as a
result, Professor Wertheimer overlooks the "overborne will" aspect of coer-
cion. The example given by Professor Grano is that a man who is beaten may
be coerced to confess, but a man who is beaten who was planning to confess
before the beating occurred may not have been coerced to confess. Because a
beating is "wrongful" under Professor Wertheimer's theory, coercion has oc-
curred; however, according to Professor Grano, "[w]hen this sense of volition-
al impairment, or interference with autonomy, seems lacking, we may hesitate,
at least without further thought, to embrace a finding of coercion." °5 It is
true that Professor Wertheimer does not fully reconcile the "voluntariness
principle" with his theory of coercion, and that his theory of coercion takes
into account the Supreme Court's distaste for subjective inquiries as exhibited
by its holding in Colorado v. Connelly."° However, it cannot be said that
Professor Wertheimer endorses the view that the defendant's subjective per-
spective should be eliminated from the equation. To the contrary, he empha-
sizes that, "[i]f, as the critics suggest, the notion of voluntariness were to be
abandoned, I suspect that the problems which haunt its specification would
only reappear under another heading.''""
As Professor Grano's hypothetical demonstrates, a theory of coercion
which eliminates but-for causation lends itself to inaccurate results. Yet the
Schneckloth court explicitly refused to incorporate the concept of but-for cau-
sation in its theory of coercion. The Court's reasoning was that subjective
standards lead to uncertainty and inconsistent results in the law. However, as
Professor Grano's example reveals, ignoring the defendant's subjective per-
spective altogether will also produce uncertainty, because courts will inevitably
be forced characterize some voluntary behavior as coerced, and vice versa. In
determining the circumstances under which we should recognize coercion,
somewhere between Zerbst and Schneckloth we eliminated the subjective
perspective of the defendant, a factor that is important in ensuring that our
system of justice is perceived as a fair system." Perhaps more importantly,
we lost sight of the sense of fairness and humanity embodied in the individual
rights at the heart of this discussion.
105. JOSEPH D. GRANO, CoNFEssioNs, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 76-78 (1996).
106. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "voluntariness prin-
ciple."
107. WERTHEIMER, supra note 102, at 121.
108. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996) (stating that in the transition from
the Warren court to the Burger and Rehnquist courts, "the Court has clearly become less sympa-
thetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating to assertions of the need for public
order," and that the greatest changes have been the creation or expansion of "inclusionary rules"




I. FROM THE SUSPECT'S PSYCHE TO THE CONSTABLE'S CONDUCT
Country lawyers are often better philosophers than philosophers are. Most
lawyers have known for a long time that the term coercion cannot be defined,
that judges place this label on results for many diverse reasons, and that the
word coercion metamorphoses remarkably with the factual circumstances in
which legal actors press it into service.
This article focuses on the constitutional requirement that confessions be
voluntary. Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel have written that this re-
quirement bars the admission of confessions "(i) which are of doubtful reli-
ability because of the practices used to obtain them; (ii) which were obtained
by offensive police practices even if reliability is not in question ... ; or (iii)
which were obtained under circumstances in which the defendant's free choice
was significantly impaired, even if the police did not resort to offensive prac-
tices."2
As I see it, LaFave and Israel's second category says it all. Courts should
define the term coerced confession to mean a confession caused by offensive
governmental conduct, period. They should enter a suspect's mind only insofar
as they must to resolve the causation inquiry. Shifting their attention almost
entirely from the minds of suspects to the conduct of government officers,
courts should abandon the search for "overborne wills" and attempts to assess
the quality of individual choices?
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. A.B., 1962, Har-
vard College; LL.B., 1965, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the comments of Stephen
Schulhofer, Christopher Slobogin, George Thomas, and Welsh White and for the research support
of the Russell Baker Scholars Fund at the University of Chicago Law School and the John Simon
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.
1. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOV-
ERNING POWER 109-33 (1952). Alan Wertheimer says that a "crucial defect of the philosophical
literature on coercion" is its "insufficient sensitivity to the contextual character of coercion
claims." ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 181 (1987). Although Wertheimer is a political scientist
and a philosopher, he is enough of a country lawyer (honorary) to overcome this failing. Even
Wertheimer, however, like Robert Nozick, Joseph Raz, and virtually every other contemporary
philosopher who has addressed the subject of coercion, treats the distinction between threats and
offers as crucial to an understanding of the concept. See id. at 202. Although the threat-offer dis-
tinction is appropriate in many contexts, this article notes that lawyers and judges have disregard-
ed it in coerced confession cases for more than two hundred years. The article contends, more-
over, that they were wise to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63. In at least this one
doctrinal comer, I believe that country lawyers have developed a sounder understanding of the
context-specific issues than philosophers have.
2. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE § 6.2(b), at 295
(1985).
3. The Supreme Court has characterized the issue in coerced confession cases as whether
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The constitutional law governing the admission of confessions has in fact
devoted less attention over time to the state of mind of confessing suspects
and increased attention to the propriety of governmental conduct.4 I advocate
the final step in this progression.5 An exclusionary rule applicable to the prod-
ucts of improper governmental conduct should mark the full extent of the
coerced confession doctrine embodied in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the full extent of the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination as well.6 After identifying constitutionally improper
conduct, courts should apply ordinary principles of causation to determine the
evidentiary consequences of this conduct! Just as courts exclude evidence
(including confessions) derived from unreasonable searches and seizures, they
should reject evidence derived from improper interrogation techniques. The
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments require no more and no less.
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Colorado v. Connelly' was a land-
mark in the Court's shift from suspect-focused standards of coercion to police-
focused standards.9 LaFave and Israel recognize that Connelly effectively
eliminated their third category of involuntary confession cases-those in which
"the defendant's free choice was significantly impaired even if the police did
the defendant's "will was overborne." See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978); Lynunmn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576 (1961); id. at 602 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884); see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (de-
claring that courts must assess the effect of interrogation practices on the "mind and will of the
accused"); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. Ctu. L. REV. 174, 182 (1988); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and
the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 885-86 (1979); Welsh S. White, Confessions In-
duced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE LJ. 947, 951 (1994).
4. Yale Kamisar suggested as early as 1963 that the Supreme Court's talk about overborne
wills might conceal its approval and disapproval of particular interrogation techniques. Yale
Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary Confession?: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RuTGERs L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR,
POUCE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND PoLIcY 14 (1980) [hereinafter
KAMISAR, ESSAYS].
5. Short of gratuitously penalizing improper police conduct that did not cause a suspect's
confession.
6. For an argument that this position accords with the historic purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, see Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996).
7. In judging the reach of exclusionary rules in criminal cases, courts usually speak of
"derivative evidence," see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984), and "the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree," see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 298 (1985), rather than of "proximate cause."
They ask whether the "taint of the primary illegality has dissipated," see United States v. Cox, 475
F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1973), rather than whether an "independent intervening cause" has broken
the causal chain. So far as I can tell, this departure from the terminology used in other legal areas
marks no departure in the principles applied. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88 (1963) (recognizing that even when wrongful governmental conduct is a "but-for" cause of
a confession, a suspect's decision to confess may qualify as an independent intervening cause);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (recognizing that courts follow the consequences of pur-
poseful police misconduct further than they do the consequences of inadvertent misconduct).
8. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
9. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) ("[C]ertain interrogation techniques,
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offen-




not resort to offensive practices."' In essence, Connelly distinguished mental
incapacity from coercion. Connelly held that as long as governmental officers
have not induced a mentally ill suspect's confession, the Constitution poses no
bar to admitting this confession in evidence.
In my view, pre-Connelly efforts to assess whether confessions were the
product of free will were always misguided-incoherent in concept,
unadministerable in practice, and incompatible with our general understanding
of the Bill of Rights as a body of restraints on improper governmental con-
duct.' One can, if one likes, find sufficient governmental action to satisfy the
governmental-action requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
simply in the admission at trial of a mentally disturbed person's confes-
sion-but I do not know why one would want to. Especially in a constitutional
system incorporating the principle that "the trial of all Crimes... shall be by
Jury,""2 permitting a jury rather than a judge to assess the evidentiary value
of a confession obtained without governmental misconduct seems fully com-
patible with due process. 3
I do not quarrel with LaFave and Israel's first category of involuntary
confessions--confessions "of doubtful reliability because of the practices used
to obtain them"--so long as one underlines the phrase "because of the practic-
es used to obtain them." The propriety of police practices should be judged ex
ante from the perspective of the officer or officers whose conduct is chal-
lenged. Courts should consider a confessing suspect's mental condition only
insofar as the interrogating officer had reason to know it.'4
Just as the Constitution does not mandate the exclusion of unreliable
eyewitness testimony, it does not mandate the exclusion of unreliable confes-
sions. An almost blind witness may tell a jury she saw the defendant commit a
crime despite the fact she previously gave four inconsistent statements and has
been convicted of perjury five times. The Constitution requires the exclusion
of unreliable eyewitness testimony only when improper governmental con-
duct-for example, an impermissibly suggestive police line-up---has produced
it.1
5
The rule should be no different for unreliable confessions.'6 Unless im-
10. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 6.2(b), at 296.
11. See George C. Thomas Im, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 79, 85 (1993) ("mhe Framers were concerned about purposive, govern-
mental coercion .... If the government did not coerce the confession, concluding that [a suspect]
acted unfreely does not seem to be adequate grounds for exclusion.").
12. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
13. In Connelly, the auditory hallucinations of a mentally ill killer directed him either to
commit suicide or to confess. He then confessed to a uniformed officer on a downtown Denver
street Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161. His case was little different from one in which an insane person
writes a letter to the police department admitting his crimes. See George C. Thomas I & Mar-
shall D. Bilder, Criminal Law: Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 261 n.95 (1991) (reporting the comments of Yale Kamisar).
14. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65 (noting that the police were unaware of the defendant's
mental illness at the time of his confession and recognizing that a police officer's exploitation of
known mental disabilities may require exclusion of a suspect's confession).
15. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
16. But see George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987
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proper governmental conduct has generated a confession, the Constitution
should give the defendant only a right to present evidence of the confession's
unreliability to the jury. 7 With few exceptions, the Constitution makes juries
the appropriate judges of the probative value of evidence in criminal cases."
II. FREE WILL AFrER THE KILLING OF GOD
Having sketched my general position on the law of confessions, I want to
speak in equally general terms about the concept of coercion, the subject of
this Symposium." On its face, this concept affirms the freedom of the human
will. Its apparent purpose is to identify exceptional situations in which both
moral theory and law should abandon their otherwise pervasive assumption of
free will.
Belief in the capacity of responsible adults to choose has been a central
tenet of Western thought from the beginning.20 As Herbert Morris has ob-
served, human beings have regarded themselves as capable of creating, among
other things, themselves. Morris notes "the inestimable value to each of us of
having the responses of others to us determined over a wide range of our lives
by what we choose rather than what they choose.' Presuming our power to
choose serves us better than the alternative. Moreover, I believe this premise
passes more than a pragmatic or consequentialist test of truth. My sense of
your freedom and mine rests, however, on an amalgam of fuzzy
things--empirical observation, emotional knowledge, reflection on the psycho-
logical impossibility of making an assumption of determinism, and faith in the
ultimate order of the universe. At best, my belief in people's capacity to
choose is the product of what philosophers call reflective equilibrium or infer-
ence to the best explanation; the question is not susceptible to hogchoker
proof. To some extent, in the words of an Iris Dement song, we must let the
mystery be.'
When the premise of free will itself rests on squishy foundations, the task
Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 275-76 (1988) (calling the Connelly result "insup-
portable" and declaring, "[A] total deconstitutionalization of traditionally important reliability is-
sues is unjustified"); Yale Kamisar, Response: On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 946 (1995) (maintaining that
Connelly overemphasized "the police methods rationale").
17. More than 40 years ago, Bernard Meltzer thought it obvious that a confession could be
voluntary even if it were the product of hallucination. He noted that the evidentiary requirement
that confessions be corroborated rests on the fear of "false, albeit voluntary confessions." Bernard
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U.
Cn. L. REV. 317, 320 & n.15 (1954).
18. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (The reliability of a confession "is a matter to be gov-
erned by the evidentiary laws of the forum... and not by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
19. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 875 (1997).
20. See 3 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS § 1 (A. Wardman & J. Creed trans., 1963); PLATO, THE RE-
PUBLIC 250 (F. M. Cornford trans., 1945) (attributing to human beings "an element of free choice,
which makes us, and not Heaven, responsible for the good and evil in our lives").
21. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 486 (1968).
22. bus DEMENT, Let the Mystery Be, in SONGS OF IRIS (Forerunner Music, Inc.), recorded
on IRIS DEMENT, INFAMOUS ANGEL (Rounder Records Corp. 1992).
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of identifying deterministic exceptions is daunting. Indeed, anyone who pur-
ports to separate willed from determined transactions must be either God or an
idiot.23 The attempt of postmodernists to deconstruct the consent-coercion
dualism draws on the difficulty of drawing even an intelligible line between
the two categories. For all we know, every desire may be learned, and all of
our desires may be the products of our culture.
From a postmodernist perspective, the consent-coercion dualism is merely
an attempt to remain on good terms with God after killing Her.24 At the close
of the twentieth century, postmodernist scholars have heard Jean Paul Sartre
clearly: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being-like a worm."'  Al-
though we are the far from divine products of heredity, environment, random
breeding, and Darwinian struggle,26 they declare, we treat some choices as
voluntary, and we sanctify them. We treat other choices as involuntary, and
we say these choices don't count. We use this rhetoric to preserve an illusion
of freedom, although we know we aren't free. Our desire for new cars, CDs,
and microwave ovens may be simply the product of an addiction (the goods-
addiction of our consumeristic society) and no more the product of our wills
than a heroin addict's craving for her drug.27
23. 1 do not contend that courts can always avoid messy, mind-boggling inquiries into free
will. The duress defense in criminal cases requires examination of whether a reasonable person
could have resisted the unlawful pressure to which a defendant was subjected, and courts must
assess individual mental capacity in contested will cases and other cases. Situations in which
courts must assess only the mental or moral responsibility of an allegedly coerced actor seem very
different from those in which they should focus as much or more on the legal rights or moral
entitlements of an allegedly coercing party.
In judging the voluntariness of a confession under the Constitution, I believe that the all-
but-exclusive focus should be on the conduct of the governmental officers alleged to have pro-
duced the confession, and on the government's entitlement to receive this confession in evidence.
But see WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 110 (claiming that when Supreme Court confession deci-
sions focus on either police misconduct or reliability they disregard "the core of the voluntariness
principle, namely, the protection of the autonomy of the agent").
Similarly, I suspect that the free will inquiry is unproductive in contract duress cas-
es-cases in which courts ought again to focus primarily on the conduct of the allegedly coercing
party. In fact, however, courts focus more often on the subjective effect of the alleged coercion.
See, e.g., Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1970) (defining du-
ress as a threat that "'has left the individual bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making
of a contract"' (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (I. 1962)); Wolf v. Marlton
Corp., 154 A.2d 625, 628 (NJ. Super. 1959) ("'[Dluress is tested, not by the nature of the threats,
but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim"' (quoting Rubenstein v. Rubenstein,
120 A.2d 11, 15 (NJ. 1956)). Terms like duress and coercion do seem to focus on individual
agency or autonomy, but unbending linguistic precision could threaten the ability of the concept of
voluntariness to serve its protean purposes. See supra note I and accompanying text.
24. Compare Justice Holmes's remark in a letter to Alice Stopford Green: "I said to a lady at
dinner the other night that morals were a contrivance of man to take himself seriously, which
means that the philosophers... make them ... an excuse for their pretention to be on the ground
floor and personal friends of God." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Feb. 7,
1909) (quoted in Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes's Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 703, 721
(1992)).
25. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ONTOLOGY 26 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1966).
26. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465 (1897)
("The postulate on which we think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation
between every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents. If there is such a thing as a
phenomenon without these fixed quantitative relations, it is a miracle.").
27. See Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem
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One can talk this way when one is in a funk, drunk, in France, or at a
university, but the problem with deconstructing the consent-coercion dualism
is that we need it. Few postmodernists have advocated permitting a robber to
demand money in exchange for his victim's life. At the same time, few have
proposed to block a worker from trading an apple for an orange at lunchtime.
The lunchtime exchange appears beneficial to most of us even if the apple-
preferring worker, had she been raised in California, might have preferred
oranges. Law and the business of living require a means of distinguishing the
workers' exchange from the exchange between the robber and his victim. As
the postmodernists remind us, the line between consensual and nonconsensual
transactions is not foreordained; it is not pre-political; we may draw it as we
like. Until the postmodernists suggest a better way to draw it, however, they
give us little reason to listen to them.
People who seek to distinguish coerced from consensual transactions by
probing the minds of consenting parties may, however, be less convincing than
the postmodernists. One might initially attempt to define coercion as any irre-
sistible or overwhelming inducement-an offer from Don Corleone that you
cannot refuse. The Supreme Court apparently invokes this basic concept of
coercion when it treats the issue in coerced confession cases as whether the
defendant's will was overborne.28 In psychological terms, however, an offer
to buy your house for one hundred times its market value may overwhelm you
more than a threat to wreck the birdbath on your lawn unless you pay protec-
tion money. No one calls an offer coercive because it is so astonishingly gen-
erous that one has difficulty resisting it. Moreover, the attempt to distinguish
irresistible proposals from proposals that merely are not resisted is mind-bog-
gling-a task better left to God. The difference between the homebuyer's
proposal and the vandal's lies in our evaluation of the moral character of the
two proposals. This difference is the difference between a promise and a
threat. It has nothing to do with the strength of the homeowner's power to
resist."
Abandoning the Godfather's definition of coercion as an offer that one
cannot refuse and recognizing the need to distinguish promises from threats,
one might take the opposite tack: The problem is not that some offers are
irresistible but that one would rather not receive some of them at all.' It usu-
of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 173 (1990) ("Much of modem social sci-
ence, political theory, philosophy, and literary theory attempts to demonstrate that desires and be-
liefs are inevitably intersubjective and social. It is not meaningful to talk about disembodied pref-
erences."). MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrrCAL LEGAL STUDIEs 20-21 (1987) (suggesting that
a question of duress arises in every contracts case because "it is an open question ... whether the
contract would have been made had each party had other physically imaginable though socially
unavailable options accessible to him"). But see WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 261 ("Those who
argue ... that socialization limits freedom would do well to remember that not everything about a
person or his condition can be said to limit his freedom without devouring the self who is capable
of being constrained and whose freedom is to be valued.").
28. See supra note 3.
29. See WERTHEtMER, supra note 1, at 204 ("It is important to see that the distinction be-
tween threats and offers is not a function of the distance between the options or their efficacy in
securing the desired response.").
30. See KELMAN, supra note 27, at 22 (attributing to Robert Nozick the view that "[a]n offer
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ally does not make your day to hear someone say, "Your money or your life."
This offer is far less likely to spark a smile than, "Want to trade an apple for
an orange?" Once a robber has drawn his gun, however, the option of paying
him off usually becomes one you want. Deciding whether to evaluate the
gunman's action at the moment it becomes beneficial or at an earlier moment
is a task of normative judgment. This judgment has nothing to do with the
victim's psyche.
One might try to resolve this question of temporal vantage point by taking
the gunman's actions as a whole: Has everything the offeror has done made
the person whom he has allegedly coerced better off or worse off? The
gunman's victim probably would rather not have met the gunman at all; she
might even prefer that he had died when he was young. A worker with no
taste for the apple in her lunchbox, however, is grateful both for the birth and
for the later appearance in the lunch room of a co-worker willing to supply an
orange in trade.
This approach has bite (pardon the metaphor amidst these fruit
hypotheticals) in situations that initially may seem problematic. If you were
dying in the desert, you would welcome the appearance of a monopolist with a
canteen of water even if the monopolist charged you $1000 per sip. The
monopolist's offer would make you better off (assuming you had this kind of
cash), and it would therefore be inappropriate (not to mention unappreciative)
to call his offer coercive.
If this approach were sound, however, the subject of this paper would be
easy. All bargained guilty pleas and many confessions would be involuntary.
The police officer who arrests you before she obtains your confession, the
prosecutor who files a charge against you before she bargains for your guilty
plea, and the government that these officials represent are in one respect like
the gunman: All of them make you worse off before they make you better off
(if they truly make you better off at all). A criminal suspect usually would
prefer not to have met them and might even wish them vaporized. What dif-
ferentiates the government's proposition from the gunman's is not that the
government's conduct, judged as a whole, makes the suspect better off. The
difference, if there is one, is, that the injury threatened by the government,
unlike that threatened by the gunman, is not wrongful.3' The line between
threats and promises is normative, and it must be drawn from the perspective
of a detached observer.
is a proposition the promisor would choose to receive whether he accepts it or not, a threat a
proposition the promisor would sooner never have heard").
31. For reasons why, in confession cases, governmental threats and promises should be treat-
ed as wrongful and coercive, however, see infra text accompanying notes 48-63.
Joseph Raz writes, "Coercive threats differ from offers... in that the former reduce the
options available to the person to whom they are addressed whereas offers never worsen and often
improve them." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORAUiTY OF FREEDOM 150 (1986). This statement is accurate
only if the baseline for determining whether options are reduced or enhanced is normative and/or
sociological (options that a person is entitled to have or reasonably expects to have) rather than
the status quo ante (options that a person has in fact prior to the offer or threat). See infra text
accompanying notes 41-47; WERTHEnMER, supra note 1, at 205 ("In defining [an offeree's] base-
line, we do not take a high-speed snapshot of [the offeree's] present state of affairs.").
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Of course, even after one recognizes the need for moral evaluation of a
threat or offer, problematic cases are likely to remain problematic. At most,
one may gain a clearer understanding of why these cases are difficult and
what the moral issue is. If a monopolist's moral duty is to offer a canteen of
water to a dying person out of charity or to sell it at what medieval Christians
would have called a fair price, a threat to withhold the canteen until the mo-
nopolist receives $100,000 is coercive. If, however, the only test of a fair price
is what the buyer is willing to pay, the monopolist's offer is noncoercive.
However one resolves this normative issue, it is the moral character of the
threat or offer and not the offeree's mental state that determines the permissi-
bility of the transaction.32
To some extent echoing Kant3 and Hume,' Harry Frankfurt maintains
that a person is unfree when he "acts against the will he wants."35 People
have mental states about their mental states, and when a person's actions
accord with a "first-order desire" but not with a "second-order desire" not to
have the "first-order desire," she is not free.3 6 Frankfurt's paradigm--the case
that most closely approximates his model-is the drug addict who wants a
narcotic but regrets wanting it. Endorsing Frankfurt's approach, George C.
Thomas and Marshall D. Bilder treat a confession as involuntary when a sus-
pect wants to confess but does not want to want to confess.
The Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder approach sounds like double-talk to unso-
phisticated country lawyers, 38 but I understand what it means. For example, I
acted contrary to my second-order desire to sit in a front-row seat at a Chica-
go Bulls game when, because of the constraining circumstances of my salary,
I sat in an obstructed-vision seat instead. I must have wanted to sit in the
obstructed-vision seat because I bought the ticket, but I did not want to want
to. Given the state of my wallet, I simply could not help myself. Being far
less rich than Donald Trump is contrary to my sense of self, and I regretted
both my choice and the circumstances that prompted it.
Perhaps this example trivializes the Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder insight; a
second-order desire probably must be a desire more crucial to one's identity
than a wish to sit close to a sporting event. Thirty years ago, however, I be-
32. This is not to deny that the foreseeable effect of an offer on an offeree's psyche may be
relevant in assessing its moral character.
33. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 633 (Norman K. Smith trans., 1965);
IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUrURE METAPHYSICS § 53 (Paul Carus trans., 1949).
34. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § VIII (1953).
35. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 47-57 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 270-71. Thomas and Bilder do not contend that
Frankfurt's approach provides a workable standard for identifying individual involuntary confes-
sions. They do, however, defend the presumption of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
that all confessions produced by custodial interrogation are involuntary on the ground that sus-
pects who do not volunteer confessions generally have a second-order desire not to want to want
to confess. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 270-71.
38. It is also inconsistent with the economist's concept of revealed preferences-the idea that
a person reveals what she wants by what she does. For a hard-nosed economist or a country law-
yer, it is the bottom line that counts. Saying that you want to do something but that you do not
want to want to do it is just whining.
[Vol. 74:4
CONSTRAINT AND CONFESSION
trayed myself more seriously. As I interviewed a judge in Houston about
racism in the criminal justice system, he asked me gleefully, "Do you want to
see a picture of the first all-nigger jury in the State of Texas?" Because I did
not wish to disrupt a revealing interview, I gulped and said, "Sure." Did I
want to want to see the judge's souvenir? I regretted countenancing and en-
couraging his racism and felt that I had abandoned an important principle.
Although I knew that I had resolved an ethical issue in a dubious way, it
did not occur to me that my choice was unfree. I was pleased to learn from
Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder that it was. It is not clear, however, why the law of
confessions should respect a criminal suspect whose sense of self depends on
not admitting his wrongdoing. This suspect may be a murderer whose second-
order desires to get away with his crimes and to continue his killing are really
rotten. Besides, even if a suspect does not want to want to confess, he may
not want to not want to want to confess.39 In the end, what most unsophisti-
cated country lawyers would say about Harry Frankfurt's first-order and sec-
ond-order desires seems about right.'
People who attempt to define coercion or constraint in terms of an
offeree's subjective mental state are somewhat like the postmodemists; they
take the business of assessing the existence or nonexistence of free will too
seriously. These psychics attempt the impossible while the postmodemists,
recognizing the impossibility of the task, abandon the line-drawing effort alto-
gether. Both groups fail to recognize the extent to which our talk of free will
has missed the mark. The critical issue in coercion cases is usually not the
offeree's state of mind but the propriety or impropriety of the offeror's influ-
ences on her choice.
Our first intuition may be that a gunman deprives his victim of free will.
This intuition, however, confronts a difficulty that has been recognized for so
long that George Thomas and Marshall Bilder call it "Aristotle's paradox." '
Handing over one's wallet is not like being pushed into a wall; one chooses to
do it (just as anyone who confesses makes a conscious decision to confess42).
The decision to part with one's property rather than suffer the gunman's vio-
lence belongs to the victim alone, and she may choose between these limited
alternatives as she likes.43 Our indignation at the robber's treatment of the
victim has little to do with the victim's lack of free will. This indignation
arises simply because the robber has unfairly restricted his victim's range of
39. For an apparently serious discussion of this possibility, see FRANKFURT, supra note 35,
at 21.
40. The concept of first-order and second-order preferences does make sense in some con-
texts-for example, that in which a dieter asks a friend not to give him cheesecake even if he
begs (asks the friend, in other words, to honor his second-order rather than his first-order desire).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 1129
(1986).
41. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 244; see ARIsTOrLE, supra note 20, at § 1.
42. Wigmore wrote that "all conscious utterances are and must be voluntary," adding that
"as between the rack and a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less dis-
agreeable; but it is nonetheless voluntary." 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMroucAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 824 (2d ed. 1923).
43. See Don Locke, Three Concepts of Free Action: I, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 109 (J.
Fisher ed., 1986).
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choice. All of us have fewer options than we'd like, but the victim has even
fewer than the rest of us."4 And notice what's happened: In a sentence or
two, we have moved from assessing the victim's state of mind to judging the
morality of the robber's conduct. Fortunately, this more critical issue is also
more tractable.
If the gunman's victim is like me, she will give the gunman her wallet in
a panic without rational deliberation. If she is like Indiana Jones, she will hand
over the wallet coolly while considering whether there may be a way to turn
the tables before the transaction ends. If she is a master of stoic philosophy,
she may even be emotionally indifferent to whether she lives or dies. Her
emotional state and how much or how wisely she deliberates before delivering
her wallet do not matter at all. Whatever the victim's state of mind, the robber
has coerced her. His wrongful threat induced her to hand over her wallet, and
that is all we need to know.'5
One may envision a spectrum of differing degrees of impairment of voli-
tion with the apple-orange exchange at one end and the delivery of one's
wallet to a gunman at the other, but the metaphor is misleading. The choice
between sacrificing a wallet and sacrificing one's life sometimes may be as
volitional as the choice between eating an apple and eating an orange. The
gunman, however, has unfairly restricted the "opportunity set" within which
his victim may use her volition. Rather than crawl inside an offeree's mind,
one can envision a range of more severe and less severe restrictions of an
individual's opportunity set. One can then consider the fairness or unfairness
of the human actions alleged to make this person's choice involuntary.
The case of Adam, whose dentist recently sued him to recover fees for
two dental procedures, underlines the nature of the inquiry. This case began
when Adam awoke one day with a toothache. He went to his dentist who
pulled the tooth. Adam later refused to pay the dentist's bill, claiming that his
contract with the dentist was involuntary. He said that his terrible toothache
had denied him any choice in the matter. A judge rejected Adam's contention,
and the dentist recovered her fee.
The dentist, however, did not recover her fee for the second procedure.
Immediately after her extraction of the tooth, she told Adam that his teeth
needed cleaning. Adam replied that he did not want her to clean his teeth. The
dentist then grabbed Adam's arm, pulled it behind his back, and twisted it
hard. Adam screamed in pain, reconsidered his position, and asked the dentist
to clean his teeth. He once more claimed that his contract with the dentist was
involuntary, and, this time, the judge agreed with him.
Adam's twisted arm was, however, less painful than his aching tooth. His
44. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 10.
45. A tougher case might be one in which a wrongful threat causes an action that the alleg-
edly coerced actor does not regret or even welcomes. Don Locke suggests the case of a pilot
flying to Omaha who is directed by a gunman to fly to Cuba instead. The pilot secretly prefers
Cuba and is delighted that he will be able to visit his mistress in Havana. See Locke, supra note
43, at 100. For the purposes that matter to country lawyers---deciding whether the pilot should be
punished criminally or held civilly liable for breach of contract-I have no difficulty concluding
that he has been coerced.
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subjective sense of constraint-his sense that he had "no choice" but to em-
ploy the dentist-was stronger in the case that he lost than in the case that he
won. The distinction between these cases rests on the fact that a wrongful
human action had induced the second contract but not the first. To speak of an
overbome will rarely helps to resolve the issues in dental cases or confession
cases. A better focus is the propriety or impropriety of human influences on
choice.
Not all improper influences, however, may qualify as coercion. When a
bribe paid to a senator has improperly influenced her vote, we usually do not
say that this bribe coerced the senator. The bribe was an improper influence
on the senator's choice, but we confine the language of coercion to threats (for
example, a threat to vandalize the senator's birdbath) and do not use it to
include promises.
The normative distinction between threats and promises is captured only
crudely by those words. As a linguistic matter, any proposal for a trade can be
tagged with either term. A promise to pay for an automobile includes a threat
not to pay unless the automobile is provided, and the threat "your money or
your life" includes a promise to spare your life in exchange for your cash. In
normative discourse, however, the threat-promise distinction invokes a norma-
tive baseline. One could call this starting point "the normal set of human
expectations and entitlements," "the normal human opportunity set," or simply
"the normal human condition." A gunman's threat narrows normal expecta-
tions-it worsens the normal condition-while an offer to buy a house for ten
times its market value (or to pay a juicy bribe) expands them. The concept of
the normal condition is partly descriptive and partly evaluative.' People's
sense of fair treatment and entitlement are strongly influenced by what hap-
pens to others. Indeed, a purely sociological concept of the "normal" condition
effectively marks the relevant baseline when social practices and expectations
are clear. Nevertheless, the specification of the appropriate baseline is in the
end a normative task.4' When new ethical issues arise, when old ethical is-
sues arise only rarely, and when social practice does not establish a clear base-
line, it is everyone for herself: What is the fair price for the only bottle of
water in the desert? What should the purchaser be able to expect from the
monopolist with a full canteen?
1I1. THE REAL IssuEs IN CONFESSION CASES
Although the distinction between threats and promises shapes the law of
coercion in other contexts, it has been unimportant in confession cases. Eigh-
teenth century English decisions held inadmissible confessions obtained "by
46. Joel Feinberg observes that one may use either a "statistical" or a "moral" test to mark
the relevant baseline. JoEL FEINBERG, HARM To SELF 219 (1986). For reasons explained in the
text, I believe that the two tests blend together in practice.
47. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue that reaches a more ambiguous conclusion, see
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in P-nIosoHy, PoLrIcs, AND SocIErY 101, 115-16 (Peter Lasleti et al.
eds., 1972); see also WERTHiMER, supra note 1, at 212 (advocating the use of multiple baselines
and apparently treating each as equally legitimate). But see id. at 217, 242 (treating the "moral"
baseline as primary or determinative in most situations).
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promises of favour." The United States Supreme Court's first coerced con-
fession decision, Hopt v. Utah,49 said in 1884 that a confession, to be volun-
tary, must be "uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of punishment."' In
1896, the Supreme Court declared a confession "inadmissible if made under
any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor."'" One year lat-
er-one hundred years ago-the Court placed what earlier had been a com-
mon law rule of evidence on a constitutional foundation. In Bram v. United
States,2 the Court invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination and said that a confession could not be received in evidence
unless it was "free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight . . .,,"
Although the Supreme Court now has abandoned Bram's unqualified
prohibition of promises of leniency,54 the Court has not limited its concept of
coercion to threats. If a police officer were to pay a suspect $10,000 to con-
fess, the Court apparently would hold the suspect's confession involuntary."5
I said at the outset that courts should definethe term coerced confession
to mean a confession caused by offensive governmental conduct.56 This defi-
nition collapses both the distinction between threats and promises and the dis-
tinction between duress and fraud. In that respect, it accords with traditional
law. Judges lose little by calling at least some lies and some promises coercive
while they gain the ability to assess all improper influences on choice under
one rubric. Treating threats, promises, deception, and all other improper influ-
ences under the heading of coercion permits courts to consider what the Su-
preme Court calls "the totality of the circumstances" in every case.57
Asking whether a proposal broadens or narrows the normal human oppor-
tunity set may be helpful in some contexts, but it is not helpful in confession
cases. First, in a world in which promises of leniency are permitted, the base-
line for distinguishing threats from promises is impossible to discern. Offi-
cials-judges, prosecutors, police officers, sentencing commissioners, and leg-
islators-are naturally reluctant to punish too leniently offenders who confess
48. See Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (Cr. Cas. 1783); Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep.
1114, 1116 (1775) (Mansfield, J.).
49. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
50. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584.
51. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896).
52. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
53. Bran, 168 U.S. at 542-43.
54. It did so first in guilty plea cases, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970), and
then in out-of-court confession cases, Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (declaring
that Bram "does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession").
55. When the Court abandoned its categorical disapproval of confessions induced by prom-
ises of leniency, it endorsed a test of voluntariness that condemned "promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." Brady,
397 U.S. at 755.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3. Of course coercion cannot always be defined in
terms of improper human influences on choice, for coercion is not always improper. Our law
appropriately coerces all of us not to kill or steal.




(particularly when these offenders include the overwhelming majority of crimi-
nals). When officials wish to encourage confessions, they may therefore skew
the baseline by punishing too severely defendants who do not confess. No one,
not even the officials, may realize it has happened. One can no longer know
the "normal" punishment or what punishment would have been imposed in a
regime without bargains in leniency. If the vanished counterfactual baseline
could be discerned, few apparent promises might prove beneficial.58
Second, even if the distinction between threats and promises could be
intelligibly drawn in practice, both threats and promises depart from normal
expectations of just and appropriate criminal punishment. Punishment ought to
turn on what an offender did and on her personal characteristics, not on acci-
dents of fortitude, strategy, and what deal she can make.59 If the appropriate
moral baseline is sentencing "on the merits," both threats and promises diverge
from it.
60
Third, promises of leniency, particularly when coupled with intimations
that conviction is certain, are likely to generate false confessions. Richard Leo
and Richard Ofshe have presented chilling evidence of this fact,6' and they
were not the first to notice it. For two centuries before the Supreme Court
turned things around, English and American judges rested their condemnation
of promises of leniency on precisely this danger. An English court explained
in 1783, "[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by
the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought
to be given to it."62 As I have noted, police methods that are likely to pro-
duce unreliable confessions merit constitutional condemnation for the same
reason that suggestive police line-ups do.63
Focusing on improper police methods rather than on defendants' states of
58. So long as the number of defendants who resist the pressure to confess remains small,
increasing their punishment need not be costly. One can only guess, for example, whether legisla-
tures and sentencing commissions would have set the same minimum and guideline sentences if
promises of leniency had provided no escape hatch and taxpayers truly were required to pay the
costs of imposing these sentences on all convicted offenders. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652, 658-60, 687-89 (1981) (offering a fuller
assessment of the difficulty of discovering an appropriate baseline and of separating threats from
promises).
59. For a discussion of the strained rationales sometimes offered for rewarding confes-
sions--for example, the claim that even confessions prompted by promises of leniency manifest
remorse--see id. at 661-83, 718-23.
60. This argument raises the question whether the law of coercion can properly be used to
condemn practices that are offensive for reasons other than their harmful effects on offerees. For
example, could an offer that benefited a suspect be regarded as coercive because it was incompati-
ble with the public interest or with sound principles of justice? The case of a confession induced
by a large cash bribe may suggest an affirmative answer. When a suspect has sought to escape the
consequences of an offensive agreement, courts may not pause to consider just why the agreement
is offensive. Moreover, departures from desert-based sentencing seem inconsistent with the dignity
of defendants as well as harmful to the public. (Of course a defendant who was less interested in
his dignity than in the size of his bank account or the length of his sentence might not appreciate
my concern).
61. Richard Ofshe & Richard Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Ir-
rational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 979, 994-96 (1997).
62. Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 255 (Cr. Cas. 1783).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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mind could lead courts in two directions, one less supportive of the
defendants' claims and the other more supportive. The first direction is illus-
trated by a California Supreme Court decision, People v. MacPherson,"
whose grisly facts focus the issue sharply.
Robert MacPherson, who was in custody on a robbery charge, had made
no statements to the police. Then Jack Gruber, his cousin and roommate, was
arrested and charged with a murder that MacPherson himself had committed.
Apparently Gruber's arrest was supported by probable cause and made in the
good faith belief that he was the killer. Following Gruber's arrest, MacPherson
told Gruber's lawyer that he would, if necessary, confess to save his cousin.
Two months passed before the critical events, which are described in the
court's opinion as follows:
[Diefendant, who was still in isolation in his cell at the Alameda
County jail, jammed a pointed pencil into the orbit of his left eye,
and then repeatedly banged his head against the cell wall in an effort
to drive the pencil in deeper. Several police officers ran into his cell
to prevent him from further injuring himself. They grabbed his arms
and legs and carried him to his bunk. While he was lifting defendant,
Sergeant Parker heard defendant say, "Gruber didn't do it. I did."
Defendant lay quietly on his bunk for a few moments and then sud-
denly became violent and had to be subdued again. Officer Heiling
grabbed his arms and held defendant in an armlock on the floor.
Defendant then whispered: "I killed him; I killed him."
The California Supreme Court said, "A confession is involuntary unless it is
'the product of a rational intellect and a free will."' It held that the trial
court should not have received MacPherson's statements.
The issue in MacPherson was not the propriety of the police conduct,
which apparently left little room for improvement. Nor was it the reliability of
MacPherson's confession.67 The court excluded this confession because, with
a pencil in his eyeball, MacPherson was in no position to make a rational
choice. He could not knowingly and voluntarily have waived his right to re-
main silent.
Contrary to the impression conveyed by countless repetitions of the
Miranda warnings, however, the Constitution does not provides a right to
remain silent that a suspect must knowingly waive. It guarantees a right that
almost no one would waive, the right to be free of compulsion.' MacPherson
was subjected to no governmental compulsion; no government officer improp-
erly influenced his choice. Instead, MacPherson's conscience apparently would
not let go of him because of the evil that he was bringing upon his cousin, and
64. 465 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1970).
65. MacPherson, 465 P.2d at 19-20.
66. Id. at 20 (quoting In re Cameron, 439 P.2d 633, 639 (Cal. 1960), and Blackburn v. Ala-
bama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
67. I see little reason to doubt the truth of the defendant's statements, and even if I did, I
would see little reason to take the reliability issue from the jury.
68. As I have argued elsewhere, even the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), is compatible with this view of the Constitution. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 2629-30.
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he ultimately became deranged. The California Supreme Court instructed
MacPherson to go back, regain his senses, consult a lawyer, reconsider his
improvident action, and make his choice as a matter of rational litigation strat-
egy. Neither sound policy nor the Constitution required giving him this second
chance.
Fred Inbau, whose police interrogation manual was exhibited in the
Miranda opinion like a relic from a medieval torture chamber,' has argued
that the norms of polite persuasion in the parlor should not extend to the inter-
rogation room.7" Supreme Court opinions suggest, however, that in some re-
spects American confession law has taken the opposite tack. This law some-
times seems to rest on an etiquette more refined than Mrs. Astor's.7
Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe reveal that Inbau-endorsed tactics of the
sort not ordinarily seen in polite society better characterize the interrogation
process than the restraint prescribed in some of the cases. The backroom of
the stationhouse is still the scene of rough-and-tumble struggle.72 After sus-
pects waive their Miranda rights (and more than three-quarters do"), police
officers press hard for confession. They disparage, they disbelieve, they ridi-
cule, and they lie. They lie about their own beliefs, about the role of defense
lawyers, about victims, about the evidence, about the power of their technolo-
gy, about what could happen to the suspect if he does not confess, and about
what could happen to him if he does.74 Miranda, moreover, may have made
69. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
70. Fred E. lnbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& PoL. ScO. 16 (1961).
71. Before asking a question, an officer must say, "May 1?," and receive an affirmative
answer. He must inform an arrested person of his rights even when this person already knows
them. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. He also must afford the arrested person access to an advisor,
one who may be provided graciously without charge. Id. at 472-73. If the arrested person says,
"I'd rather not," the officer must retire for a time. Then, if he does so politely, he may ask the
arrested person to reconsider. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). If, however, the arrested
person says "I'd like to see a lawyer," the officer may not request reconsideration, however long
the officer waits and however polite his request. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Most
of all, an officer must not be indelicate-for example, by mentioning the desirability of burying a
murder victim while the murderer is present his lawyer is not. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977). These rules of civility are found, not in the works of Emily Post, Amy Vanderbilt, and
Miss Manners, but in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States.
72. In the post-Miranda era, the refinement of the mansion has proceeded to the doorway of
the gatehouse but no farther. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., CRIMINAL JusTICE IN OUR TIME 19
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). When Miranda, the housekeeper, arrived from the mansion, she
did not in fact clean the gatehouse. She did a little light dusting and moved an attractive rug over
the dirt.
73. See Paul G. Cassell & Brett S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 859 (1996) (84% of 129 interrogated sus-
pects in Salt Lake County waived their Miranda rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRImINoLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (78% of the suspects in 182 directly
observed or recorded police interrogations in California waived their Miranda rights, and prior
record was the only statistically significant predictor of their choices: "[Wlhile 89% of the sus-
pects with a misdemeanor record and 92% of the suspects without any record waived their
Miranda rights, only 70% of the suspects with a felony record waived their Miranda rights.").
74. As Welsh White notes, the prevalence of police deception is evidenced both by its fre-
quent appearance in reported cases and by the importance that police interrogation manuals afford
it. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 581-82
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American courts less attentive to the abuses that occur once its formalities
have been observed."
The interrogating officers ordinarily get what they want. Leo and Ofshe
describe an interrogation process so relentless that it easily can, and with
surprising frequency has, produced false confessions. They note:
Interrogators commonly claim that they have witnesses, fingerprints,
hair, blood, semen or other evidence when they have little or nothing.
Whether revealing evidence or telling lies, the interrogator labors to
convince the suspect that the case against him is so overwhelming
that he has no choice but to face the fact that he has been caught,
will shortly be arrested, successfully prosecuted and severely pun-
ished. This sets the stage for eliciting an admission of guilt in ex-
change for the smallest of benefits.76
Officers attempting to undermine a suspect's confidence in his innocence
may tell him that a "proton/neutron test" has established that he handled in-
criminating evidence or that a polygraph examination has revealed his "uncon-
scious" knowledge of the crime. They may inform him that it is time to decide
how he will be viewed in court and that his best opportunity to save himself
soon will be gone. They may intimate that only a truthful confession will
bring their interrogation to an end. And they may tell the suspect, "All we
really want to know is whether you planned to do this or whether it was an
accident.""
False confessions occur primarily in two situations-first, when police
officers convince suggestible suspects that they committed crimes that they
failed to remember until prompted and, second, when interrogating officers
convince innocent suspects that they will certainly be convicted and that things
will go better for them if they confess. Concocted evidence is usually essential
(1979) [hereinafter cited as White, Police Trickery]. Among the many examples of police decep-
tion cited by White are Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (obtaining confes-
sion after falsely telling a suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of the crime);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (obtaining confession after falsely telling a suspect that
another suspect had named him the gunman); United States ex rel. Galloway v. Fogg, 403 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (misrepresenting the extent to which other people had implicated the
suspect); Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1974), affid mem., 523 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1975) (telling a suspect that the murder weapon had been recovered when it had not); State v.
Cobb, 566 P.2d 285 (Ariz. 1977) (telling a suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the
scene of the crime when they had not). For descriptions of many more reported cases in which the
police obtained confessions by misrepresenting the incriminating evidence, see Deborah Young,
Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1996).
75. Louis Michael Seidman notes that the Supreme Court has rarely found confessions invol-
untary in the post-Miranda period and that "lower courts have adopted an attitude toward
voluntariness claims that can only be called cavalier." Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 745-46 (1992). He concludes, "Miranda ... is best characterized
as a retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly camouflaged under the cover of
bold advance." Id.; see also Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375,
385 (1997) (doubting that "Miranda has done anything to eliminate or reduce the mental coercion
police employ to persuade suspects to incriminate themselves").
76. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The
Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. iN L., POL. & Soc'Y 189, 198
(1997).
77. See id. at 196-203.
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to producing false confessions in both situations.78
Leo and Ofshe reveal not only the power of police interrogation but also
its susceptibility to judicial control. Interrogations follow clear patterns and
generally employ a small number of well understood persuasive techniques. If
a coerced confession is, as I have said, a confession caused by offensive gov-
ernmental conduct, the Constitution requires judges to review these persuasive
techniques, to decide which techniques are too dangerous or unfair to use, and
to exclude all confessions that the improper techniques produce. In the course
of this review, judges can develop at least a few categorical rules; they need
not look only to the "totality of the circumstances." '79
In developing rules for police interrogation and in assessing the totality of
the circumstances of particular cases, courts should pay attention to Fred
Inbau. When a crime was unwitnessed and the police seek to bridge the gap
between probable cause for arrest and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they
cannot be Mrs. Astor.' In some circumstances, they should be allowed to
express false sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, play on the suspect's
religious feelings, reveal incriminating evidence that in fact exists, confront the
suspect with inconsistent statements, and more.
Unlike the current Supreme Court, however, Professor Inbau supports the
traditional prohibition of threats and promises, and he does so on the ground
that these techniques pose an intolerable danger of causing innocent suspects
78. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Un-
trustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 109 (1997) [hereinafter cited as White,
False Confessions); GiLsi H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY 228 (1992). In addition, "[mlental health experts have long been aware of the
risk that a mentally retarded suspect's eagerness to please authority figures will lead him to con-
fess falsely." White, False Confessions, supra, at 123. Some innocent suspects confess primarily
to "escape from a stressful or an intolerable situation," see GuDJONSSON, supra, at 228, and some
disturbed and/or attention-seeking people confess falsely even without prompting by the police.
See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For an indication of the frequency of known false confessions (no more than the tip of an
iceberg), see White, False Confessions, supra, at 108-09 & nn.26 & 29 (citing a number of stud-
ies including Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 57 thl.6 (1987) (reporting "coerced or other false confes-
sion[s]" responsible for erroneous convictions in 49 out of 350 miscarriages of justice in potential-
ly capital cases)); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard F. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Con-
fessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interro-
gation (May 30, 1997) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Soci-
ety Association, St. Louis, Missouri) (discussing 34 "proven" false confessions, 18 "presumed"
false confessions, and eight "highly probable" false confessions).
79. See State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993) ("[DIeliberate falsehoods... which
are of a type reasonably likely to... influence an accused to make a confession regardless of
guilt will be regarded as coercive per se, thus obviating the need for a 'totality of circumstances'
analysis of voluntariness."). Examining the totality of the circumstances in every case makes "ev-
erything relevant and nothing determinative." See Joseph Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the
Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243
(1986).
I advocate in this article the same sort of low-level generalization about recurring situations
that I have advocated. for the resolution of search and seizure and sentencing issues. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227 (1984); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901 (1991).
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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to confess.8 Leo and Ofshe have shown him right. 2
In addition to resurrecting Brain in the stationhouse (if not in the court-
room where prosecutors rather than police officers promise leniency in ex-
change for admissions of guilt83), courts should forbid falsifying incriminating
evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect.
8 4
Especially when suspects are retarded or easily suggestible and when decep-
tion is coupled with intimations that leniency will follow confession, this mis-
representation is likely to generate false confessions.' In addition, fabricated
evidence is well designed to terrify innocent suspects who resist confession;'
lying during interrogations may desensitize or habituate officers to other dis-
honest practices; 7 and deception may breed mistrust for the police, limiting
81. Inbau, supra note 70, at 16.
82. See supra notes 61-63, 72-77 and accompanying text.
83. See Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 303, 310 (1987) (arguing that although plea bargaining should be permitted when
the accused is represented by counsel and can properly evaluate what is being offered, "[p]romises
of leniency from the police during interrogation are too likely to be deceptive, and too likely to
give even an innocent suspect the impression that confession is the only way to escape conviction
or mitigate the punishment").
84. See State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring the exclusion
of a confession whenever the police have falsely represented that the defendant's guilt has been
established by scientific evidence). But see White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 583 (noting
that the United State Supreme Court "has neither held nor even indicated that any particular type
of police trickery would, in and of itself, render a resulting confession inadmissible"); Christopher
Slobogin, Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) ("[Clurrent consti-
tutional doctrie... by and large has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanctioned, police decep-
tion during the investigative phase."); Young, supra note 74, at 426 ("Mhe courts regularly admit
confessions obtained by police lying.").
Young notes that in its inception and for a century thereafter the requirement of
voluntariness was considerably more demanding than it is today. Young, supra note 74, at 433-51.
She cites, for example, United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 629 (D.C. Va. 1857) (No. 14,864), in
which the court held a confession improperly obtained because the investigating magistrate told
the suspect, "It is a very plain case. You might as well confess the whole matter. It will not make
the case any worse for you." Young, supra note 74, at 436 (quoting Cooper, 25 F. Cas. at 630).
85. Although the discussion in text focuses on the empirical consequences of police decep-
tion, lying also raises deontological concerns that should at least cast the burden of justification on
the defenders of deceptive interrogation. See SIssELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOIcE IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LIFE 30 (1978) ("[W]e must... accept as an initial premise Aristotle's view that
lying is 'mean and culpable' and that truthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence of
special considerations. This premise.. . places the burden of proof squarely on those who assume
the liar's perspective."); id. at 33 (attributing to St. Augustine the view that "God forbids all lies").
86. The leading police interrogation manual declares that officers should use the manual's
methods only when a suspect is "known or strongly believed to be guilty." FRED E. INBAU ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986). When a suspect is certainly and
provably guilty, however, there is no need to interrogate him. Cf. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS
AT NOON 89 (1941) ("If you have all the proofs, why do you need my confession?"). Despite the
view of police officers that they know whether the people they question are guilty, see Tom Bark-
er & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass:" Some Conceptual Notes
on Police Lying, II DEVIANT BEHAV. 61., 68 (1990), one cannot assume that the use of any inter-
rogation technique will be limited with rare exceptions to criminals. But see Slobogin, supra note
84 (relying on Sissela Bok's analysis of permissible deception to argue that false claims of incrim-
inating evidence during interrogation are ordinarily unobjectionable because suspects arrested on
probable cause qualify as "publicly declared enemies").
87. Sissela Bok speaks of "the great susceptibility of deception to spread, to be abused, and
to give rise to even more undesirable practices." Box, supra note 85, at 26-27. The courts' ap-
proval of some forms of police deception in the "war on crime" may affect the attitudes of offi-
cers toward other forms-deception, for example, in warrant applications, courtroom testimony,
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their ability to secure the cooperation of suspects, other citizens, and jurors
who may be tempted to "send them a message.""8 In Frazier v. Cupp, 9 a
police officer falsely informed a suspect that his companion had confessed.
The Supreme Court held that the officer's misrepresentation "while relevant,
[was] insufficient ... to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissi-
ble." Material fraud vitiates most of life's choices, and although some forms
of police deception can be appropriate,9 permitting false claims of incrimi-
internal affairs investigations, and requests for permission to search. See Carl B. Klockars, Blue
Liei and Police Placebos: The Moralities of Police Lying, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 529, 533-34
(1984); Jerome Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUSTICE ETHIcs, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40,
45; Young, supra note 74, at 464 ("[T]he justification of lying to enemies may extend beyond the
interrogation room. Law enforcement officers may view prosecutors, judges, and even jurors as
enemies, or at least as obstacles.").
88. Bok observes:
The veneer of social trust is often thin. As lies spread ... trust is damaged. Yet trust is
a social good to be protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water we drink.
When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, soci-
eties falter and collapse.
BOK, supra note 85, at 26-27.
Christopher Slobogin writes:
Routine deceit coarsens the liar, increases the likelihood of exposure and, when exposed,
maximizes the loss of trust. When the deceptive practice is carried out by an agent of
the government, it is even more reprehensible, both because the liar wields tremendous
power and because government requires trust in order to be effective.
Slobogin, supra note 84, at 62; see also Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies and Interrogation, 3 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 3 (1995); Young, supra note 74, at 455-75.
Admittedly, many of the harmful consequences produced by misrepresenting the strength of
the evidence are also produced by deceptive interrogation practices that I do not disapprove. See
infra note 91. These troublesome consequences are in fact risked by every form of undercover
investigation.
89. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
90. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
91. Falsely expressing friendship or sympathy for a suspect, falsely suggesting that the vic-
tim deserved her fate, and even confessing falsely that the interrogating officer himself had con-
sidered or engaged in misconduct of the sort alleged seem less offensive than concocting nonexis-
tent incriminating evidence. See INBAU Er A.L., supra note 86, at 98-100. Such tactics seem un-
likely to terrify innocent suspects or to induce false confessions.
For example, I do not quarrel with (and indeed applaud) the tactics that J. J. Bittenbinder, a
former Chicago Police detective, told me that he employed in a case in which one reputed mobster
was arrested for killing another. Bittenbinder opened the door of the room in which the suspect
was held and shouted, "Man, I want to shake your hand! I've been hoping that someone would
get rid of that sonofabitch for us! We've been trying for years, but we never got close to him. I
hear you shot the bastard four times, is that right?"
"No," the apparently puzzled suspect said. "Only once."
"Thank you," said Bittenbinder as he left the room.
Misrepresenting nonincriminating facts to trip-up apparently dissembling suspects seems
unobjectionable in many circumstances. Even misrepresenting the existence of physical evidence
may be unobjectionable when the police do not claim that this evidence incriminates the suspect.
For example, the false statement, "We found the gun and the lab will soon test it," seems less
troublesome than the false statement, "We found the gun, and the lab report says that your
thumbprint is on it." Although the former statement would be likely to discomfit the guilty, an
innocent suspect would probably view it as welcome news. The latter statement, by contrast, could
lead an innocent suspect either to doubt her own innocence or to believe that the police were
trying to frame her.
I do not object to all forms of undercover interrogation--"deception about whether an
interrogation is taking place." See White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 602-08. After a right
to counsel at interrogation has attached, prohibiting undercover interrogation may be necessary to
safeguard this right; in this situation, perhaps the right-to-counsel tail must wag the interrogation
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nating evidence exempts the police not only from the rules of the parlor but
also from bedrock concepts of decency. 92
Welsh White, one of America's most thoughtful students of police interro-
gation, would go less far than I would in forbidding promises of leniency and
misrepresentations of incriminating evidence,93 White, however, has proposed
another limitation on police interrogation that courts should consider essential
to constitutional fairness. They should interpret the Due Process Clause to es-
tablish a maximum period of police interrogation (White suggests five hours),
and every suspect should be informed at the outset that questioning will con-
tinue no longer.9' The period of interrogation should, moreover, be shorter for
juveniles and mentally retarded suspects.95 The longer-than-five-hour interro-
gations that some courts have allowed" are likely to indicate to suspects the
dog. Nevertheless, the interrogation that occurred in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), in which a defendant's confederate agreed to "wear a wire" while the two were at liberty
pending trial, seems intrinsically no more objectionable than other, routinely accepted forms of
undercover investigation. The interrogation in Massiah did not frighten or inconvenience the de-
fendant, and the interrogation posed little risk to the innocent This interrogation did invade the
defendant's privacy, but only after probable cause had been established. Some techniques of un-
dercover interrogation, however, should certainly be condemned--for example, securing a
suspect's confidences by pretending to be a priest or a court-appointed defense attorney.
I disagree with Welsh White that the police should never be allowed to minimize the seri-
ousness of a suspect's alleged offense or to portray themselves as acting in the suspect's interest.
See White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 611-17. Misrepresenting a suspect's legal rights,
however, merits unqualified condemnation. If legal rights are to be meaningful, they must be
known and understood. Law enforcement officers should not be able effectively to repeal these
rights by persuading people that they do not exist See Commonwealth v. Dustin, 368 N.E.2d
1388 (Mass. 1977) (requiring the exclusion of a confession obtained through a false assurance that
only statements given by a defendant under oath at trial could' be used against him); Common-
wealth v. Starr, 406 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 1979) (requiring the exclusion of a confession when the po-
lice misrepresented the admissibility of polygraph results).
Some writers condemn all police misrepresentation in the interrogation of suspects, and
they offer potent arguments in support of this position. See Paris, supra note 88; Young, supra
note 74.
92. Without asserting that her analogy to police interrogation is exact, see supra text accom-
panying note 1, Deborah Young notes, "We would be shocked... if a doctor presented false test
results to obtain a patient's consent to surgery." Young, supra note 74, at 470; see also Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 n.8 (1987) (stating that, in some situations, the Supreme Court "has
found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a suspect's waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privilege"). But see INBAU ET AL., supra note 86, at 131 ("With all offenders, in
particular the nonemotional type, the interrogator must convince the suspect that not only has guilt
been detected, but also that it can be established by the evidence currently available or that will be
developed before the investigation is completed.").
93. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 149-53 ('[N]ot all confessions given as
a result of promises appear to be untrustworthy," but "[ilnterrogators should be prohibited from
making any statements likely to lead a reasonable person in the suspect's position to believe that
he may receive a significant benefit with respect to the disposition of his criminal litigation if he
confesses."); id. at 147-48 ("[Sltatements exaggerating the strength of the evidence against the
suspect... should not be absolutely prohibited.... On the other hand, specific misrepresenta-
tions designed to convince the suspect that forensic evidence establishes his guilt should be pro-
hibited.").
94. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 143-45. Cf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (Black, J.) (stating that a 36-hour interrogation is "so inherently coercive
that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom").
95. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 142-43.
96. See, e.g., State v. Doody, 930 P.2d 440 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that the confession of a
17-year-old defendant during a nearly 13-hour interrogation was voluntary); State v. La Pointe,
678 A.2d 942 (Conn. 1996) (holding that a confession after more than nine hours of continuous
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only way to end their interrogators' badgering is to yield.97
The first step in implementing these rules (or any others) must be the one
urged by Glanville Williams, Yale Kamisar, Paul Cassell, and many oth-
ers-videotaping police interrogations.9" When interrogations are fair, this
process often generates powerful evidence for the prosecution. Jurors can view
tapes of competent, unruffled suspects confessing in matter-of-fact tones to
civilized interrogators. About one-third of all law enforcement agencies in
American jurisdictions of 50,000 or more use videotaping to record some in-
terrogations," and the agencies that do like it." In England, where a stat-
ute generally requires the recording of police interviews with suspects, a Royal
Commission concluded, "By general consent, tape recording in the police
station has proved to be a strikingly successful innovation providing better
safeguards for the suspect and the police officer alike.""' Two American
states require the recording of interrogations,'" but most police departments
resist the practice. The objections they voice do not include the one that moti-
vates them: They do not want judges, jurors, and the rest of us to see them do
just what Leo and Ofshe say they do.
We know how to fix the defects of our interrogation process, but appar-
ently no one wants to. Repair requires using the technology available to us to
learn what occurs inside interrogation rooms, examining the substance of
police interrogation practices rather than the ritual dance that precedes them,
and forbidding altogether many forms of governmental force, fraud, threats,
and promises. Defining coerced confession to mean a confession caused by
offensive governmental conduct could help to focus the issues. Nevertheless,
we apparently prefer symbols-litigation about Miranda niceties, judgments
interrogation was voluntary); People v. Kokoraleis, 501 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1986) (holding a
confession voluntary although made by a defendant with an I.Q. of 75 during a deceptive interro-
gation that lasted 13 hours); People v. Towndrow, 654 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 1997) (holding
that a confession after 14 hours of interrogation was voluntary). I am grateful to Welsh White for
calling most of these cases to my attention.
97. One suspect who confessed falsely later compared his interrogation to "when I went in
for surgery." This suspect ultimately decided that the only way to persuade his interrogators to
"back off" was to agree with them. "Every time I answered, 'No,' they were getting close to my
face," he said. "One of the Detectives had bad breath." See White, False Confessions, supra note
78, at 143 & n.249 (citing Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAw., May 1993, at 58).
98. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM.
L. REv. 6; Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record,
66 GEo. L. J. 209, 236-43 (1977); KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 132-36; Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 486-97 (1996);
Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017 (1934); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CoNvICrING THE INNOCENT
xvii (1932); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4, at 39 (1975); UNIFORM
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 243 (1974).
99. See William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, NAT'L INST. OF
JUST.: RESEARCH IN BRIEF, Mar. 1993, at 2.
100. See WILLIAM A. GELLER, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTIcES-A REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 152 (1992) (stating that 97% of the agencies that videotape
confessions or interrogations consider the practice either very useful or somewhat useful).
101. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 26 (1993).
102. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,
592 (Minn. 1994).
19971
978 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4
about the totality of the circumstances (after we studiously avoid discovering
them), and metaphysical appraisals of which misguided suspects truly had free
will when they succumbed to Dirty Harry.
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I. INTRODUCTION'
How do police elicit confessions from the innocent? Why do the innocent
confess to crimes that carry lengthy prison sentences, life imprisonment or
execution? Though researchers have studied psychological interrogation and
false confession for more than eighty-five years,2 these questions have not
been adequately answered. This is largely because only recently has the pro-
cess of interrogation been studied directly.3 Over the past thirty years re-
searchers have undertaken many observational,4 retrospective5 and labora-
1. We thank Paul Cassell and Welsh White for helpful comments. This article extends and
documents the model of interrogation influence that we first developed in RICHARD J. OFSHE &
RICHARD A. LEO, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLICE INTERROGATION: THE THEORY AND
CLASSIFICATION OF TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 189-251 (1997) [hereinafter OFsHE & LEO,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY].
The interrogation transcripts and interviews excerpted herein come from more than 125
cases of disputed interrogation that Richard J. Ofshe evaluated between 1987 and 1997 and from
additional interrogation transcripts and case materials that Richard A. Leo collected during the
same period. Although not all of the interrogations are mentioned in this article, the disputed
interrogations that resulted in statements were classified as either voluntary true, coerced true,
stress-compliant false, coerced-compliant false, persuaded or coerced-persuaded false confessions.
Voluntary false confessions that were not elicited by police interrogation are also contained in the
archive. The excerpts are unedited, with the exception of ellipses inserted by the author when
deleting redundant statements.
All specific examples of interrogation tactics are taken from recordings of interrogations in
major felony or murder cases. All of these interrogations resulted in confessions. The persons
classified as guilty were convicted at their trials or entered guilty pleas. The persons classified as
false confessors are almost all individuals who were either proven innocent by indisputable
evidence before trial and therefore not tried, proven innocent and acquitted at trial, acquitted at
trial or found guilty and subsequently proven innocent. In a few instances the persons identified as
false confessors were convicted at trial or entered a guilty plea despite maintaining their
innocence. An independent analysis of the case facts has led to their classification as false
confessors for research purposes. For a discussion of case classification, see Richard A. Leo &
Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming'1997) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences].
2. See, e.g., EDwIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); JEROME FRANK &
BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); C. RONALD HUFF Er AL., CONVICTED Bur INNOCENT:
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WIrNESS
STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (1908); EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS
(1964); THEODORE REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS: ON THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1945); 0. JOHN ROGGE, WHY MEN CONFESS (1959); MARTIN YANT, PRE-
SUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991); Hugo Adam Bedau
& Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987).
3. For a review of this literature, see OFsHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1;
Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221-33 (1997).
4. See, e.g., John Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth of Proof?, 33
BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 326 (1993); Barrie L. Irving, Police Interrogation: A Case Study of
Current Practice (Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure, Research Study No. 2, 1980); Barrie L.
Irving & Linden Hilgendorf, Police Interrogation: The Psychological Approach (Royal Comm'n
on Criminal Procedure, Research Study No. 1, 1980); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room]; Paul Softley, Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations (Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study No. 4, 1980); Michael L. Wald et al., Inter-
rogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L. J. 1519 (1967).
5. See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY (1992) [hereinafter GUDiONSsON, PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS]; LAW-
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tory6 studies that have allowed for the testing of hypotheses about how inter-
rogation procedures influence suspects and lead to the decision to confess.
7
Understanding the interrogation influence process has also been greatly aided
by the mandatory recording of interrogation in Alaska (since i985),s Min-
nesota (since 1994),9 and England (since 1984),' together with the spreading
practice of recording by police agencies across the United States." The stud-
ies and records of interrogation that have accumulated now make it possible to
empirically describe and analyze the process of interrogation and the decision
to confess. 2
RENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (1993); Phillip M.
Coons, Misuse of Forensic Hypnosis: A Hypnotically Elicited False Confession with the Apparent
Creation of a Multiple Personality, 36 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 1 (1988);
Gisli Gudjonsson & James MacKeith, A Proven Case of False Confession: Psychological Aspects
of the Coerced-Compliant Type, 30 MED. Sci. & L. 329 (1990); Gisli H. Gudjonsson & James
MacKeith, False Confessions, Psychological Effects of Interrogation, in RECONSTRUCTING THE
PAST: THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGISTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 253-69 (A. Trankel ed., 1982); Leo &
Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1; Mickey McMahon, False Confession and Police Deception:
The Interrogation, Incarceration and Release of an Innocent Veteran, 13 AM. J. FORENSIC PSY-
CHOL. 5 (1995); Stephen Moston et a., The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behavior
During Police Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23 (1992); Richard J. Ofshe, Coerced Con-
fessions: The Logic of Seemingly Irrational Action, 6 CULTIc STUD. J. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Ofshe,
Coerced Confessions]; Richard J. Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis During Interrogation: False Con-
fession Due to Dissociative State; Mis-Identified Multiple Personality and the Satanic Cult Hy-
pothesis, 40 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 125 (1992) [hereinafter Ofshe,
Inadvertent Hypnosis]; T.N. Thomas, Polygraphy and Coerced-Compliant False Confession: 'Ser-
viceman E' Redevivus, 35 Sci. & JUST. 133 (1995); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105
(1997); Philip Zimbardo, Coercion and Compliance: The Psychology of Police Confessions, in
THE TRIPLE REVOLUTION 492-508 (C. Perruci & M. Pilisuk eds., 1971); Richard A. Leo, False
Memory, False Confession: When Police Interrogations Go Wrong, presented at the Annual Meet-
ings of the Law & Society Association, Toronto, Can. (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Denver University Law Review) [hereinafter Leo, False Memory].
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PSYCHOL. 707 (1966); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial
Instructions, and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 489 (1980); Saul M. Kassin
and Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats
by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 233 (1991) [hereinafter Kassin & McNall,
Police Interrogations]; Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence M. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock
Juror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED SOc. PSYCHOL. 133 (1980); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Keichel,
The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization and Confabulation, 7
PSYCHOL. Sci. 125 (1996); Christina Maslach, The 'Truth' About False Confessions, 20 J. PER-
sONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1971).
7. The most recent observational study of interrogation in America found that suspects gave
partial or full confessions 42% of the time. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4, at
270.
8. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Alaska 1985) (stating that "an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates
a suspect's right to due process"); Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (estab-
lishing the recording requirement).
9. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
10. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60 (Eng).
11. See William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, NAT'L INST. OF
JUST.: RESEARCH IN BRIEF, Mar. 1993, at 1; William A. Geller, Police Videotaping of Suspect
Interrogations and Confessions (1992) (report to the National Institute of Justice).
12. Unlike the Supreme Court's analysis in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-55
(1966), it is no longer necessary to rely on interrogation industry accounts to learn what happens
in the confines of those base, little rooms in the bowels of police stations across America.
THE DECISION TO CONFESS FALSELY
Police-induced false confessions are a serious problem for the American
criminal justice system. 3 Because the "third degree" has virtually disap-
peared, 4 false confessions might seem unlikely, irrational, and perhaps so
rare as to be exotic for those unfamiliar with modem psychological interroga-
tion techniques. 5 However, confessions by the innocent still occur regular-
ly, 6 and will likely continue until police and other criminal justice officials
develop a better understanding of the dangers of contemporary interrogation
practices and establish safeguards to prevent their misuse. This article docu-
ments the process of interrogation and explains why police-induced false con-
fessions, like truthful ones, are rational responses to the influence tactics and
manipulation strategies that American police use during interrogation. 7 False
confessions occur when interrogation tactics are not understood and are mis-
used by those who implement them, most often when the misuse violates legal
rules that are in place for well-settled reasons. 8
No one suggests police set out to extract false confessions or prosecutors
intentionally seek to convict the innocent. There is little evidence that such
intentional abuses of power happen with significant frequency. While some
miscarriages of justice are caused by malicious intent, it appears that poor
training and negligence are the principal reasons that false confessions occur.
Police are not trained to avoid eliciting them, to recognize their variety and
distinguishing characteristics, 9 or to understand how interrogation tactics can
cause the innocent to falsely confess. Instead, interrogation manual writers and
trainers persist in the self-serving and misguided belief that contemporary
psychological methods are not apt to cause an innocent suspect to con-
fess2 0-a fiction that is flatly contradicted by all of the scientific research on
interrogation and confession.
A confession-whether true or false-is arguably the most damaging
13. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
14. See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police In-
terrogation in America, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35 (1992) [hereinafter Leo, From Coercion
to Deception].
15. See Paul G. Cassell, The Exotic and the Routine: An Empirical Essay on the Tradeoffs
Between False Confessions and Lost Confessions, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
1998).
16. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
17. See OFSHE & LEO, SOcIAL PsycHoLoGY, supra note 1; E.L. Hilgendorf & Barrie Irving,
A Decision Model of Confessions, in PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 67 (S.M. Lloyd-Bostock
ed., 1981); Irving & Hilgendorf, supra note 4.
18. See discussion infra Parts Ifl.B.2.c.-nI.B.2.f.
19. See discussion infra Part ll.F.
20. See, e.g., FRED E. INAU Err AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 147 (3d
ed. 1986) ("None of what is recommended will induce an innocent person to confess."). The only
advice this manual gives interrogators with respect to avoiding taking a false confession is that
before doing something about which there might be a concern, the investigator should ask himself,
"[i]s what I am about to do, or say, apt to make an innocent person confess? If the answer is no
the interrogator should go ahead and do or say what is contemplated." Id. at 217. The authors of
this well-known, widely read, and highly influential interrogation training manual do not even
have an index reference for "false confessions." See also Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley,
Criminal Interrogation Techniques on Trial, SEc. MGMT., Oct. 1992, at 69 (stating that "none of
these techniques, in and of themselves, is unique to interrogation, and none of them would cause
an innocent suspect to confess to a crime").
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evidence the government can present in a trial." As a result, when police
elicit a false confession, they are likely to cause the wrongful conviction and
imprisonment of an innocent person. Someone who confesses is presumed
guilty and treated more harshly by every criminal justice official and at every
stage of the trial process.' Once police elicit a confession-even if it is ob-
tained by questionable or prohibited means, is internally inconsistent, is con-
tradicted by the case facts, and does not lead to corroboration-they will al-
most always arrest the confessor and consider the case solved.' Criminal
justice officials typically will not believe a defendant's retraction 4 and may
see it as further evidence of deceitfulness. Defendants who have confessed are
likely to experience greater difficulty making bail, a disadvantage that signifi-
cantly reduces their likelihood of acquittal.' If a person has confessed, prose-
cutors are likely to file charges, "charge high," and make the confession the
centerpiece of their case.' Prosecutors are less likely to initiate or accept a
plea bargain, and defense attorneys are more likely to pressure their clients to
plead guilty because of the high risk of conviction." At trial, the jury is like-
ly to treat the confession as more probative of the defendant's guilt than any
other evidence28 and, if convicted, the defendant is likely to be sentenced
more harshly because he" failed to show remorse."
This article first sets forth and illustrates a decision-making analysis that
explains why contemporary interrogation methods, if misdirected, used ineptly,
or utilized improperly, sometimes convince ordinary, psychologically and
intellectually normal individuals to falsely confess. The illustrations of police
tactics come from recordings of interrogations conducted throughout the Unit-
ed States.3 Part II of this article briefly presents the decision model in the
context of an abstract interrogation and explains the influence process that
underlies interrogation. Part m explicates the decision model using field data
to illustrate the steps through which psychological interrogation proceeds. 2
21. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 820b, at 303 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1970).
22. See OFsHE & LEO, SOCiAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1; DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A
YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991); Kassin, supra note 3; Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room,
supra note 4, at 298.
23. See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. See SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABour CRIME AND DRUGS: A PoucY
GUIDE (3d ed. 1994).
26. Paul G. Cassell & Bret J. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 905-12 (1996).
27. See PETER F. NARDULu ET AL., THE TENOR OF JusrIcE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE
GUILTY PLEA PRocEss (1988).
28. Gerard R. Miller & F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their Implications for
Psychological Research, in PsYcHoLOGY AND THE LEGAL PROCEss (Bruce Dennis Sales ed.,
1977).
29. Because the majority of interrogators and criminal suspects are men, we use male pro-
nouns throughout this paper.
30. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
32. We often choose not to indicate whether quoted material was taken from the interroga-
tion of an innocent or a guilty party. The confessor's guilt or innocence makes little or no differ-
ence in how the tactics of contemporary American interrogation are implemented. Often, inter-
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Finally, Part IV discusses how to better identify false confessions, reduce their
frequency and thereby reduce the miscarriages of justice they needlessly cause.
II. How POLICE ELICIT TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: AN OVERVIEW33
A. Introduction
Contemporary American methods of interrogation have been developed
for the purpose of influencing a rational person who knows he is guilty to
rethink his initial decision to deny culpability and choose instead to confess.
An interrogator strives to neutralize the person's resistance by convincing him
that he is caught and that the marginal benefits of confessing outweigh the
marginal costs. To accomplish this, interrogators manipulate the individual's
analysis of his immediate situation and his perceptions of both the choices
available to him, and of the consequences of each possible course of action.
An interrogator's goal is to lead the suspect to conclude that confessing is
rational and appropriate.
Psychological interrogation is effective at eliciting confessions because of
a fundamental fact of human decision-making-people make optimizing choic-
es given the alternatives they consider.34 Psychologically-based interrogation
works effectively by controlling the alternatives a person considers and by
influencing how these alternatives are understood. The techniques interrogators
use have been selected to limit a person's attention to certain issues, to manip-
ulate his perceptions of his present situation, and to bias his evaluation of the
choices before him. The techniques used to accomplish these manipulations
are so effective that if misused they can result in decisions to confess from the
guilty and innocent alike.35 Police elicit the decision to confess from the
guilty by leading them to believe that the evidence against them is overwhelm-
rogators have considerable evidence indicating the guilt of someone they decide to interrogate, but
in investigations that culminate in a confession from an innocent, this is never true. When an
innocent is interrogated, all of the evidence an interrogator claims to possess is invented or errone-
ous. Even when the suspect is guilty and an interrogator has some evidence against him, much of
what is claimed may be invented.
Although the truth of an interrogator's claim to any piece of evidence is questionable, and
his picture of what the future holds for the suspect is deliberately distorted, these truths cannot be
guessed based either on his statements or his conduct. For an innocent to decide to confess, he
must believe that the evidence the interrogator claims to have actually exists, even if he believes it
is entirely mistaken or has been fabricated. He must also believe that his future is as certain as the
interrogator paints it, even though it is unjust.
The reader is invited to sometimes pause after reading an interrogation excerpt, suspend
disbelief, imagine being confronted with whatever the interrogator has just said and, presuming
that the suspect believes it, ponder this question: Might a reasonable, innocent person fully en-
meshed in the sort of interrogation described by the quoted materials become demoralized, fearful,
hopeless and so panicked that he might comply and make the choice to falsely confess?
33. This analysis presumes that the crime under investigation is homicide.
34. See DECISION MAKING (W. Edwards & A. Tversky eds. 1967); ANATOL M. RAPOPORT
& A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENsTERN,
THEORY OF GAMEs AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
35. The decision-making model presented in this paper applies both to interrogations that
produce true confessions as well as interrogations that produce false confessions. For purposes of
this paper, however, we focus almost exclusively on false confessions. For an analysis that focuses
both on true and false confessions, see OFsHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1.
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ing, that their fate is certain (whether or not they confess), and that there are
advantages that follow if they confess. Investigators elicit the decision to con-
fess from the innocent in one of two ways: either by leading them to believe
that their situation, though unjust, is hopeless and will only be improved by
confessing; or by persuading them that they probably committed a crime about
which they have no memory and that confessing is the proper and optimal
course of action.
B. Detective Work and Suspects
Suspects fall in two categories: likely suspects, for whom there exists
solid evidence suggesting their guilt; and possible suspects, which includes
everyone whose name comes up during an investigation. When police interro-
gate suspects whose guilt is a mere possibility rather than a reasonable likeli-
hood, they run a significant risk of eliciting a false confession.' Not surpris-
ingly the chain of events that leads to a false confession starts with the error
of choosing to use methods of psychological interrogation against the wrong
target.
37
No matter why a suspect is selected, the interrogation process that follows
will, at least superficially, be the same. However, at every step of the process,
the commonly used tactics of interrogation will not produce their intended and
normal influence effects when directed at an innocent suspect. A suspect's
knowledge that he is innocent necessarily interacts with each tactic and will
produce a different understanding of what is happening than will the
cognitions that result from the interaction of an interrogation tactic with a
person's knowledge that he committed the crime. While the major effects of
these different interactions are not necessarily observable in the behavior of
the person under interrogation, their impact on the sequential decision making
of guilty and innocent suspects will eventually lead to conduct that
distinguishes them.
If an interrogation is poorly founded-based on guesses, hunches, or pseu-
doscientific behavioral cues 3s-a detective necessarily lacks a valid founda-
36. In the Phoenix Temple murder case, Maricopa County Sheriff's detectives subjected five
mistakenly chosen individuals to psychological interrogation and succeeded in eliciting three false
confessions to mass murder, a batting average of .600. Richard Ofshe, I'm Guilty If You Say So, in
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE STRUG-
GLE TO FREE A "WRONG" MAN (Donald S. Connery ed., 1996); see also Roger Parloff, False
Confessions, AM. LAW., May 1993, at 58-62; Russell Kimball & Linda Greenberg, False Confes-
sions, PHOENIX MAG., Nov. 1993, at 85-95.
37. See GUDJONSSON, PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, supra note 5; OFSHE & LEO, So-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1; WRIGHTrSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 5; Coons, supra note 5;
Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1; Ofshe, Coerced Confessions, supra note 5; Ofshe,
Inadvertent Hypnosis, supra note 5; McMahon, supra note 5; Thomas, supra note 5; White, supra
note 5; Zimbardo, supra note 5; Leo, False Memory, supra note 5.
38. Police trainers and interrogation manuals mislead detectives into believing that they can
divine whether a suspect is innocent or guilty from simple non-verbal and behavioral responses to
their questions. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 20; see also DAVID ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS
WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION (1993). There are no non-
verbal or behavioral signs that somehow distinguish truth-tellers from liars. See Paul Ekman &
Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991).
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tion from which to accuse and confront the suspect. The weakness of the
interrogator's position and the suspect's knowledge of his innocence will likely
affect the style of the suspect's resistance and the strength with which he
resists. Dealing with a strongly resistant suspect will tend to frustrate the in-
vestigator because it makes his task more difficult. The difficulty of the inter-
rogation may lead him to use a very aggressive or a hostile questioning style
that emphasizes the power and authority of his role, and eventually to use
coercive tactics. An investigator may employ tactics that coerce confessions by
blatantly threatening the suspect, or he may use an indirect approach by lead-
ing a suspect to reason by pragmatic implication39 that he will receive an ex-
treme punishment if he continues to deny guilt, but lenient treatment if he
confesses.
If a detective is inadequately trained, interrogates a poorly selected sus-
pect, is inept, and/or uses certain techniques improperly, he runs a risk of ob-
taining a false confession. For example, too often the pressure of high-profile
cases causes investigators to make the mistake of interrogating a suspect who
is, at best, only a possible perpetrator and under normal circumstances would
not be considered a sufficiently strong suspect to warrant interrogation. Cir-
cumstances may, however, force a detective to try to obtain a confession from
his best suspect no matter how weak the evidence suggesting guilt may be.
With no evidence pointing to anyone, the investigator will know that he has to
rely only on his intuition and interrogation to close the case. When this hap-
pens, interrogations may be conducted unwisely and in their most extreme,
stressful, and error-producing forms.
Once investigators identify a likely or a possible suspect, they often con-
duct what appears to be an interview. This session may truly be an investiga-
tive interview or it may be an opening move in what the investigator intends
to develop into an interrogation. At this point investigators neither take a hos-
tile tone nor tell the individual that he is a suspect. Instead, they treat him
respectfully and are likely to say they need his help in solving the crime.
Under the non-threatening guise of information-gathering, the interrogator
typically begins by obtaining an account of the suspect's relations with the
victim, his knowledge of the offense, and his whereabouts at the time of the
crime. The goal is to obtain information that elevates the person into a likely
or principal suspect and ties him to a baseline account that establishes his
knowledge of, and alibi for, the crime.
By using an interview format, the investigator is better able to develop a
rapport with the suspect and to initially define their interaction as an exchange
between persons involved in a cooperative effort to solve the crime. Even after
the interrogation has turned openly accusatorial, the investigator is advantaged
if he continues to personalize the interaction by finding common ground with
39. "Pragmatic implication" refers to information processing that occurs "between the lines,"
or is inferred from what the speaker is saying or suggesting. See Kassin & McNall, Police Interro-
gations, supra note 6; see also Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More
Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977); Rich-
ard J. Harris & Gregory E. Monaco, Psychology of Pragmatic Implication: Information Processing
Between the Lines, 107 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYcHOLoGY 1 (1978).
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the suspect; by claiming to understand what led him to commit the crime; by
telling the suspect that he does not think badly of him despite his certain be-
lief in the suspect's guilt; and by telling him that it is others in the criminal
justice system, who do not understand or empathize with him, who will make
the important decisions in his case and apply the law without mercy.
By personalizing the interaction, the interrogator avoids reminding the
suspect of the irrevocably adversarial nature of their roles and the power dif-
ferences between them. To the extent that the investigator is able to conduct
the interrogation in an interaction style appropriate for two people working on
a problem-solving task, he facilitates the suspect's decision to say "I did it"
and his subsequent confession. It is far easier to admit wrongdoing to someone
who appears to be a sympathetic acquaintance, if not a friend, than to some-
one whose role is simply to build the most damning case possible and to help
send one to prison.
An investigator who acts like a zealous agent of the state is not as believ-
able as someone who sympathizes with the suspect's plight, understands his
transgression, and might be willing to bend the rules to help him. An investi-
gator who casts himself in the role of an understanding person obliged to
gather evidence and solve the crime is more likely to be believed when he
offers advice about the suspect's best course of action and indicates how he
can help once the suspect admits his guilt and confesses.
Although during the interview investigators often learn information that
causes them to exclude an individual from suspicion, their goal is to discover
information that is incriminating. It doesn't matter whether a detective had
always planned to abandon the interview format and shift into an accusatory
interrogation style or whether he decides to do so during the interview. The
quality of the evidence underlying his decision, however, has consequences for
what tactics will be effective during questioning. If the investigator's decision
is well founded he will have evidence such as witnesses' statements, co-
perpetrators' confessions, or laboratory reports with which to confront the
suspect, and he will be able to prove he has the evidence when and if it is
necessary. Moreover, if the guilty party has been selected, he will be genuine-
ly vulnerable to the interrogator's tactics, and is likely to be more easily con-
vinced he is caught and led to make an admission.
C. Miranda
An interrogator who presses forward will eventually abandon the inter-
view style and turn the interaction into a full-blown interrogation. The reading
and waiver of Miranda rights typically signal the transition. The optimal point
at which to advise a suspect of his constitutional rights and obtain a waiver is
prior to the start of the accusatory part of the interrogation. The non-
threatening interview format contributes to a suspect's decision to allow ques-
tioning to proceed.' Up to this point police have portrayed questioning as
40. Empirical studies have found that the vast majority of suspects--ranging from approxi-
mately 78% to 96%-waive their Miranda rights. See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra
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relatively risk free; they have treated the suspect solicitously or in a business-
like manner, and they have not informed him that he is their prime sus-
pect-all of which makes it easier for him to waive his rights to silence and
counsel.
Neither an innocent nor a guilty party is likely to appreciate the full sig-
nificance of the Miranda warnings. An innocent person will likely believe that
he is not in any jeopardy by waiving his rights and answering questions be-
cause police have sought out his help in solving the crime and, after all, he is
innocent. He may also believe that the Miranda warnings are merely a bureau-
cratic formality that are significant only for the guilty. The guilty person will
likely risk waiving his rights because he doesn't believe the police have decid-
ed to arrest him, wants to find out what evidence they have, and hopes to
direct their attention elsewhere.
D. Two Steps to Admission
Interrogation begins in earnest after the Miranda advisement. Both the
tone and the content of the interaction change dramatically. No longer friendly
or solicitous, an investigator may become confrontational and demanding. He
no longer asks the suspect for information, but instead accuses him of com-
mitting the crime. Interrogation is not simply insensitive to a suspect's denials
and protestations of innocence; it requires that both be strongly rejected. Pre-
suming the suspect's guilt, an investigator's objectives are to overcome the
suspect's denials, neutralize his resistance to making an admission, obtain the
admission, and, finally, elicit a confession that describes why and how the
crime was committed.
Because a guilty party who lies when denying responsibility and an inno-
cent person who truthfully denies it are often indistinguishable to an investiga-
tor, they are in exactly the same functional position throughout the interroga-
tion and will be treated in ways that are more similar than they are different.
While a guilty party will likely be very unhappy that he is being accused and
confronted with evidence that supports the accusation, he is somewhat insulat-
ed from shock because he has always been aware of possible detection and
can understand that he has been caught.
An innocent suspect is likely to experience considerable shock and disori-
entation during the interrogation because he is wholly unprepared for the con-
frontation and accusations that are the core of the process, and will not under-
stand how an investigator could possibly suspect him. An innocent individual
may become progressively more distressed, confused, and desperate as he is
told of evidence that incriminates him. He will express doubt and dismay
when the investigator claims to possess a lengthening list of damning evi-
dence. When an investigator assures an innocent that the evidence does in fact
exist, the suspect will likely insist that someone has made an error or is trying
to frame him.
note 4; George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 'Steady State'
Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv. 933 (1996).
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Two sub-goals must be accomplished before a suspect can be expected to
make an admission of guilt. The first is convincing him that he will soon be
arrested. The second is motivating him to say "I did it" rather than continue to
deny guilt or to remain silent. The first goal is achieved by shifting the
suspect's perception of his situation from confident that his denials of guilt
will be adequate to protect him from arrest, to recognizing that all his future
holds is certain arrest, certain prosecution, and certain conviction. The second
task can only be worked on effectively after the first goal has been achieved.
Once a suspect fully appreciates his dismal situation, the investigator can
influence him to admit guilt if he is led to believe that making an admission
will improve his position.
As the influence process moves forward, an investigator cannot stop to
ponder whether a suspect is guilty or innocent. He focuses his attention and
efforts on convincing his target that the case against him is airtight. The inves-
tigator accomplishes this by repeatedly accusing the suspect of committing the
crime; by exuding unwavering confidence in his guilt; by pointing out or in-
venting logical and/or factual inconsistencies, omissions, contradictions, and
the implausibility in his account; and, most importantly, by repeatedly con-
fronting him with supposedly incontrovertible evidence of his guilt. The inves-
tigator impresses upon the suspect that his best arguments are unconvincing,
that there is no way out, and that his immediate future inevitably involves
arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment or execution.
The next step in interrogation is to motivate a now resigned and despair-
ing suspect to admit guilt. When an investigator judges the suspect to be at a
low point, he offers the suspect incentives to motivate him to re-evaluate his
decision to deny responsibility for the crime. The strategy presumes that a
suspect who realizes that his arrest and incarceration are certain will find that
the incentives associated with admitting guilt make doing so appear to be the
alternative that leaves him best off. The range of incentives that investigators
use to tip the scale can be arrayed along a continuum ranging from weak to
strong. At one end are intangible and nonmaterial psychological and interper-
sonal benefits such as an assuaged conscience, an improved self-image, the
investigator's respect, the community's respect, or the liberation that comes
with telling the truth. At the other end are outright threats of harm and promis-
es of leniency. Investigators sometimes suggest that a suspect's failure to
confess will lead to a death sentence, while confessing will lead to a lesser
charge or even avoidance of any prosecution. Whether the investigator offers
incentives at the low or high end of the continuum and whether he communi-
cates them through pragmatic implication or direct statement, he seeks to con-
vince the suspect that his new situation will only be improved if he admits
guilt, but that it will continue to worsen if he denies guilt or remains silent.
E. The Post-Admission Narrative
Once a detective elicits an admission, the most important task of interro-
gation commences. While the dramatic high point of interrogation scenes in
film occurs when the suspect says, "I did it," in real life this moment signals
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that a suspect is ready to make a confession and to provide the investigator
with the internal indicia of reliability and independent evidence he needs to
obtain a conviction. Any investigator who is not fully aware of the limited
psychological and legal significance of the words "I did it" is always in dan-
ger of arresting an innocent who has been overwhelmed by the interrogation
process.
While a suspect who says "I did it" is far more likely to be guilty than
innocent, this may not be true in any particular interrogation. Because both
guilty and innocent suspects can be made to say "I did it," a mere general
admission, absent additional indicia of reliability provided by the fit between
the confessor's description of the crime and the crime facts and/or corroborat-
ing evidence derived from the confession (e.g., location of the missing murder
weapon, loot from a robbery, the victim's missing clothing, etc.), is not a
sufficiently strong indicator of guilt on which to base an arrest. Investigators
are not trained to realize that the words "I did it" are not a certain admission
of true guilt when uttered after hours of confrontational and manipulative
interrogation that is possibly, in a legal and psychological sense, coercive.
These words establish merely that the investigator has succeeded in overcom-
ing the suspect's resistance, reversing his denials and eliciting an admission.
This is equally true whether the "I did it" statement is, in fact, a voluntary or
an involuntary admission from a guilty party, or a compliant or persuaded
admission from an innocent.4'
Admissions and confessions are different in the law.42 An admission does
not itself prove guilt and is far less significant than a confession, which re-
quires a description of the circumstances of the crime. Such descriptions are
usually obtained as part of a suspect's post-admission narrative. While the
legal definitions of "admission" and "confession" probably contribute to why
interrogators are trained to take post-admission narratives, their conscious
goals are more simple. The investigator seeks to obtain evidence that will
prove the suspect's guilt and produce a conviction. A guilty party's post-ad-
mission narrative will likely demonstrate his personal knowledge of the crime,
often leads to new evidence, and can explain anomalous crime facts.
The likely truth of a suspect's admission can be evaluated by analyzing
the fit of his post-admission narrative with the crime facts, and/or establishing
that the confession statement leads to new physical evidence. While it is not
possible to verify every post-admission statement, a skillful interrogator will
seek as much verifiable information about the crime as he can elicit.43 If the
41. See infra Part II.F.
42. A criminal admission is "[t]he avowal of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt
may be inferred, but only tending to prove the offense charged, and not amounting to a confession
of guilt." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 48 (6th ed. 1990). A confession is a "voluntary statement
made by a person... wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and
discloses the circumstances of the act or the share and participation which he had in it." Id. at
296.
43. As interrogators are presently trained, they fail to obtain corroboration of a confessor's
statement in many of the ways that are possible. Typically, an interrogator will seek to demon-
strate the validity of one or more points that are dramatic (i.e., method of killing, unusual method
of binding or silencing the victim, etc.). There are a host of far less dramatic pieces of information
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confessor's description of the crime fits the verifiable facts and is not inconsis-
tent with the physical evidence, it is likely that the confessor possesses the
personal knowledge that would be known only to the perpetrator. The more
verifiable information elicited from a suspect during the post-admission period
and the better it fits with the crime facts, the more clearly the suspect demon-
strates his responsibility for the crime.
Using this fit standard to evaluate the validity of an admission is well
understood by law enforcement. For example, police are trained to use the
post-admission portion of the interrogation to develop actual evidence of the
suspect's guilt through both fit and derived evidence. They also regularly rely
upon this standard to identify a true admission that might be mixed in with a
collection of volunteered false statements.
If an element of a crime is particularly heinous or novel, police often keep
this fact from the press so that it can be used to demonstrate a confessor's
guilty knowledge. Police sometimes deliberately include an error in media
releases or allow incorrect statements to go uncorrected so that a true perpetra-
tor will be able to demonstrate his personal knowledge of the crime.
The problem of finding the true confession in a pile of false statements
occurs regularly in high profile cases. Such cases often provoke voluntary
false confessions from the mentally troubled." Police routinely evaluate the
validity of these statements by testing the fit of the confessor's description of
the offense against crime facts that have not been made public but that the
perpetrator would surely know.'
Seeking corroboration during the post-admission phase of interrogation is
fundamental to investigating a crime. ' Police routinely demonstrate the value
of obtaining a complete narrative following an admission. They recognize that
the strongest form of corroboration comes through the development of new
evidence using a suspect's statement.47 Police also seek proof that the suspect
knows at least one piece of information that is particular to the crime and so
unusual that it is highly improbable that anyone would guess it. If informa-
tion-such as the fact of a certain sort of mutilation of the victim-has been
kept from the public and if the interrogator has not deliberately or inadvertent-
ly suggested it, then a person who reveals it corroborates his confession.
A guilty suspect who voluntarily makes an admission is thereby demon-
strating a willingness to cooperate with the interrogator to some extent.'
Since a suspect is unlikely to realize the distinction between an admission and
that a true perpetrator would be likely to know and would be at least, or perhaps more, likely to
surrender. While these sorts of facts are not dramatic, they are just as valuable for establishing that
the suspect has personal knowledge of the crime. Such things might include a description of the
room in which the crime happened, especially if it has distinctive furnishings (assuming that the
suspect has never before been there), the type of clothing the victim was wearing, the method of
entry into the residence, etc.
44. See, e.g., Miles Corwin, False Confessions and Tips Still Flow in Simpson Case, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1996, at Al.
45. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 198.
46. See id. at 172.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id. at 73, 192-93.
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a confession, he is likely to think that he has already confessed when he utters
the words "I did it," and is likely to view his post-admission narrative as noth-
ing more than an elaborated "I did it" statement. A suspect who says "I did it"
should also be willing to tell some, if not all, of the story of the crime.
This logic applies equally to involuntary admissions made by both guilty
and innocent suspects who have been coerced. Because the interrogator has
promised each suspect that he will receive a benefit and avoid a harm by
making an admission, coerced suspects should also be willing to contribute the
story of the crime if asked for it. Both guilty and innocent suspects are likely
to view their admission as functionally equivalent to a confession, and both
are likely to think of the post-admission narrative process as part of the deal
that led them to make the admission. The innocent who has been persuaded of
his guilt is also likely to be motivated to answer the interrogator's questions
because he feels both shock and genuine remorse about what he has concluded
he has done.
The post-admission narrative can in many instances be used to distinguish
the innocent from the guilty.49 Because the person's post-admission narrative
is a statement about the crime, it is evidence of something-the question is
whether it is evidence of guilt or innocence. Whereas a guilty suspect can cor-
roborate his admission because of his actual knowledge of the crime, the inno-
cent cannot. The more information the interrogator seeks, the more frequently
and clearly an innocent will demonstrate his ignorance of the crime. His an-
swers will turn out either to be wrong, to defy evaluation, or to be of no value
for discriminating between guilt and innocence. Assuming that neither the
investigator nor the media have contaminated the suspect by transferring infor-
mation about the crime facts, or that the extent of contamination is known, the
likelihood that his answers will be correct should be no better than chance.'
The only time an innocent person will contribute correct information is when
he makes an unlucky guess. The likelihood of an unlucky guess diminishes as
the number of possible answers to an investigator's questions grows large.5
Although an investigator's purpose in taking a post-admission narrative is
to develop evidence of the suspect's guilt, he may develop evidence of the
suspect's innocence. If a suspect's post-admission narrative accurately de-
scribes the crime and leads to missing evidence, the narrative is strong evi-
dence of guilt. If, however, his answers about missing evidence are proven
wrong, he cannot supply verifiable information that should be known to the
perpetrator, and he inaccurately describes verifiable crime facts, then the post-
admission narrative provides evidence of innocence.
49. Id. at 105, 180-81.
50. Techniques currently taught to investigators tend to contaminate the suspect. Id. at 189.
51. When the alternative answers are small in number ("Was the body face up or face
down?"), a correct answer does not necessarily reveal anything about whether the person knew the
answer or made an accurate guess-someone who is ignorant will be right 50% of the time. When
the number of possible answers are enormous ("Exactly where did you hide the murder weapon in
the 72 hours since the crime?") and the suspect's answer leads the investigator to the evidence, the
significance of a hit can be as great as a DNA match with a probability of error in the tens of mil-
lions.
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While a guilty suspect can prove his accurate knowledge of the crime, an
innocent person cannot prove his ignorance. Because a suspect's post-admis-
sion narrative can never prove that he does not possess certain information, his
incorrect answers can only be taken as evidence consistent with a lack of
actual knowledge of the crime. Therefore, while a good fit between a suspect's
confession narrative and the crime facts is strong evidence of his guilt, a poor
fit is, at best, consistent with innocence.
The relationship between the fit of a suspect's post-admission narrative
and his guilt or innocence is illustrated by the interrogations and prosecutions
of Johnny Lee Wilson,52 Edgar Garrett,53 the Phoenix Temple murder sus-
pects,54 George Abney,55 and Richard Bingham.56 Johnny Lee Wilson was
pardoned by the governor of Missouri in 1995 although he had confessed to
arson, robbery, and murder in 1986." During interrogation, Mr. Wilson told
police many facts that could be proven to be wrong and did not contribute any
accurate information that would certainly have been known to the perpetra-
tor.5" For example, he told the interrogators where to find the loot from the
robbery-but it was not there. Also, he was unable to tell them that a stun-gun
was involved in the crime, that it had been lost in the house, and that the kill-
ers had set a fire to destroy it. Years later, the real killer came forward, con-
fessed, and proved his guilt. Although the stun-gun's existence had been kept
secret, the true killer was able to tell the police all about it.59
Police in Goshen, Indiana, persuaded Edgar Garrett that he killed his
daughter, Michelle, who had mysteriously disappeared.' During fourteen
hours of interrogation, Edgar Garrett gave an increasingly detailed confession
describing how he murdered his daughter, whose body had not yet been found.
No independent evidence linked him to the crime or corroborated his confes-
sion. At the same time, his post-admission narrative contradicted all the major
facts in the case. Edgar Garrett confessed to walking into a park with his
daughter through new-fallen snow, bludgeoning her with an axe handle at a
river's edge, and dumping her body in the river. However, the police officer
who arrived first at the crime scene did not see footprints in the snow-covered
field at the entry to the park but, instead, saw tire tracks entering the park,
bloody drag marks leading from the tire tracks to the river's edge, and a single
set of footprints going to and returning from the river. Obviously, someone
had unloaded Michelle Garrett's body from a vehicle and dragged it to the
52. Interrogation Transcript of Johnny Lee Wilson, Lawrence County, Mo., Sheriff's Dep't
(Apr. 18, 1986).
53, Interrogation Transcript of Edgar Garrett, Goshen, Ind., Police Dep't (Jan. 27, 1995)
(Case No. 20C01-9502-CF-003).
54. Interrogation Transcripts of Dante Parker, Leo Bruce, and Mark Nunez, Maricopa Coun-
ty, Ariz., Sheriff's Office (Sept. 12, 1991); see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. Interrogation Transcripts of George Abney, Flagstaff, Ariz., Police Dep't (Aug. 28-Sept.
1, 1987).
56. Interrogation Transcript of Richard Bingham, Sitka, Alaska, Police Dep't (May 15,
1996).
57. See OFSHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 222-26.
58. Interrogation Transcript of Wilson, supra note 52.
59. See OFsHE & LEo, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; supra note 1.
60. See infra Part m.B.3.b.
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river, but Edgar Garrett did not own a car and no evidence was ever devel-
oped that he had access to one that day. Michelle Garrett's coat was recovered
from the river separately from her body and had no punctures, suggesting that
she had been killed indoors and transported to the river bank.
Edgar Garrett's confession regurgitated the theory the police held at the
time of the interrogation: that his daughter had been clubbed to death. Weeks
later, when Michelle Garrett's body was recovered, police learned that she had
been stabbed thirty-four times; that her body showed no evidence of signif-
icant head trauma; and that the axe handle Edgar Garrett confessed to club her
with showed no traces of her hair or blood. At trial, the jury acquitted Edgar
Garrett.
61
None of the three individuals from whom Maricopa County, Arizona,
detectives coerced false confessions during the Phoenix Temple mass murder
investigation could tell police where to find the missing loot or independently
describe the physical facts of the crime.6' The real killers were eventually
identified because they were in possession of the murder weapon on the night
of the killings. When police searched their homes, loot from the robbery was
found. The perpetrator who confessed was able to describe how the crime was
planned, its execution, and a significant fact withheld from the public-that
certain graffiti had been left at the crime scene to mislead the police.
A Flagstaff, Arizona, interrogator persuaded George Abney that he had
murdered a woman he had never met. He promised Abney that if he cooperat-
ed he would not go to prison but rather would receive hospital treatment for
the mental illness that allegedly caused him to kill. During the post-admission
questioning, Abney was invariably wrong in his guesses about the crime facts,
including the most basic essentials of the victim's description. Among many
other things, Abney's interrogator insisted on knowing where the victim's
missing clothing could be found. On the night Abney confessed, he was taken
to the murder scene to help him remember the location of the clothing. He
failed. Because he had been told that only by demonstrating remorse through
cooperation would he receive hospital care rather than prison, more than a day
later he called the interrogator to his cell and literally begged to be allowed to
try again. He failed a second time. It was later discovered that Abney had an
airtight alibi, which was corroborated by several witnesses who came forward
as soon as his arrest was reported in the press. For these and many other rea-
sons, including the identification of the likely killer, a jury acquitted Abney at
trial.
6'
Richard Bingham confessed to murdering a young woman by himself in a
forest in Sitka, Alaska, and was immediately arrested. At the time of
Bingham's arrest, police had not tested the semen found in the victim's body,
the foreign hairs found on her body or the fingerprint evidence found at the
61. Indiana v. Garrett, No. 20C01-9501-CF-003 (Ind. Cir. Ct, Goshen, Ind., Nov. 7, 1995).
62. Interrogation Transcripts of Parker et al., supra note 54. See Parloff, supra note 36;
Kimball & Greenberg, supra note 36.
63. State of Arizona v. George Abney, No. 13314 (Coconino'Cty. Sup. CL, Flagstaff, Ariz.,
July 19, 1988).
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crime scene. When the DNA testing, the hair testing and the fingerprint com-
parisons were completed, the results all excluded Bingham. In addition, the
perpetrator had silenced the victim by carefully packing a great quantity of
mud into her mouth. The interrogators raised the subject of how the victim
was silenced several times during the post-admission portion of the interroga-
tion. Each time Bingham offered a commonplace guess that was wrong. At
trial, the jury acquitted Bingham.'
While interrogators routinely seek post-admission narratives, in some
instances they may not be able to move a suspect, whether guilty or innocent,
beyond making an admission. If a suspect says "I did it" but provides no
confession narrative, the interrogation has failed at its primary objective: de-
veloping evidence of an individual's guilt in a way that will lead to convic-
tion, or revealing his innocence in a way that will deter an unjust arrest. When
this occurs, the results of the interrogation should be carefully considered, and
the reason why the interrogator failed to obtain a post-admission narrative
should be examined. For example, the interrogation may have ended prema-
turely because the investigator did not even try to obtain more than a general
admission. Or he may have considered collecting a post-admission narrative
unnecessary because of the great strength of the independent evidence corrob-
orating the suspect's guilt.
If, however, an investigator attempts to debrief a suspect but fails to get a
full confession narrative, the history of the interrogation needs to be consid-
ered when weighing the admission. What were the circumstances under which
it was given? What caused the post-admission portion of the interrogation to
fail? It makes a difference, for example, whether the interrogator had a valid
evidentiary basis for interrogating the suspect or was playing a hunch; whether
the evidence of the suspect's guilt was real or fabricated; what motivational
tactics the interrogator employed to elicit the admission; whether the
interrogator's tactics were coercive; whether the suspect demonstrated a simple
reluctance to answer any more questions but never recanted his admission;
whether he terminated the interview by requesting an attorney; whether he
reasserted his innocence before terminating the interrogation; or whether the
investigator terminated the interview after the suspect reasserted his innocence.
Psychological interrogation methods will inevitably continue to produce
many true and some false confessions. The procedure of evaluating a post-
admission narrative provides a decision rule for weighing the importance of a
confession when evaluating a suspect's likely guilt or innocence. If a narrative
leads to previously undiscovered evidence known only to the perpetrator, or
demonstrates a suspect's personal knowledge of the crime, the confession must
be given great weight. Because one correct answer is sufficient to prove per-
sonal knowledge, there must be no question of possible contamination, and the
answer must be so improbable that there is no reasonable likelihood that it
could have been correctly guessed.
If the interrogator fails to explore whether a narrative lacks indicia of
64. Alaska v. Bingham, No. 9601712 (Alaska Super. Ct., June 20, 1997).
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reliability and whether it fails to provide accurate information on numerous
points that can be objectively evaluated, then it must be concluded that the
interrogation has failed to produce evidence of the suspect's personal knowl-
edge of the crime. Since a failure to demonstrate something is not proof of its
non-existence, an evaluator of the statement cannot conclude that the absence
of this information proves an absence of personal knowledge. The failure to
demonstrate actual knowledge can only lead to the conclusion that the admis-
sion is suspect, and that both it and the narrative are of little or no value as
evidence of guilt.
If an interrogator inquires about provable matters and/or seeks to derive
new evidence from the suspect and the confession statement is replete with
demonstrable errors about the crime scene and does not lead police to new
evidence, then the narrative should be recognized as consistent with the capa-
bilities of someone who has given a false confession, and it should be con-
sidered evidence demonstrating the unreliability of the statement and tending
to support a suspect's innocence.
F. Types of False Confessions
The improper use of interrogation procedures can result in four types of
false confession: stress-compliant, coerced-compliant, non-coerced persuaded,
and coerced-persuaded.6
1. Stress-Compliant False Confessions
The inherent stressors normally present in the accusatorial phase of inter-
rogation, together with exceptional factors associated with either the interroga-
tion or the suspect, can so overwhelm a person that he chooses to give a type
of confession known as a stress-compliant false confession. He makes this
choice to escape an experience that for him has always been excessively
stressful or one that has become intolerably punishing because it has gone
beyond the bounds of a legally proper interrogation.
Interrogation in America is anxiety-provoking by design. Many of the
variables that make interrogation effective tend to distress a person to some
extent. At a minimum, suspects are confined in an unfamiliar setting, isolated
from any social support, and perceive themselves to be under the physical
control of the investigator. They exercise little or no control over the timing,
duration, or emotional intensity of the interrogation, the outcome of which
remains uncertain. To overcome a suspect's resistance, an investigator employs
influence techniques that are intended to induce significant distress and anxi-
ety, attack the person's self-respect, eviscerate his self-confidence, and rein-
force the claim that his guilt is well known and certain.
For example, an investigator may invade a suspect's personal space; false-
ly confront him with incontrovertible evidence of his guilt; misrepresent the
seriousness of the crime; accuse him of fictitious crimes; press him with lead-
65. See OFsHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 207-20.
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ing questions; assert the futility of denying guilt; alternate displays of sympa-
thy with displays of hostility; cut off any attempt to verbalize his innocence;
or offer to support or personally help him only if he confesses. An investigator
is likely to use these techniques repeatedly and in combination. As a result, a
suspect may become physically exhausted, emotionally distraught, and/or con-
fused.
An investigator may suggest, or a suspect may come to reasonably be-
lieve, that the interrogator will not let up unless the suspect says "I did it." If
an innocent suspect fails to realize that he can terminate the process by invok-
ing his Miranda rights, is ignored when he does invoke, or believes that he
will be arrested as soon as the interrogation concludes, he may continue the
interaction until he can no longer stand the strain and must escape the physical
confinement, fatigue, and distress of relentless questioning.
Confessing may seem his best choice by the time he reaches the point at
which he is no longer able to protest his innocence.' Some persons are not
able to withstand the intensity of interrogation. This may be due to unusual
characteristics of the person, such as an abnormal reactivity to stress,67 acti-
vation of a phobia,' an intellectual limitation that has led to learning to be-
come submissive,' or some other unusual characteristic that comes into play.
Or this may be due to the character of the interrogation-it may reach an
exceptional level of intensity, its length may fatigue and debilitate an other-
wise normal individual, or it may incorporate some other exceptional and im-
proper element.7° Although interrogation is an inherently distressing experi-
ence, it should not cause a stress-compliant false confession when reasonably
conducted and directed at a normal individual.
2. Coerced-Compliant False Confessions
In response to classically coercive interrogation techniques such as threats
of harm and/or promises of leniency, some suspects will knowingly give a
coerced-compliant false confession. More than any other category of police
induced statements, coerced-compliant false confessions are recognized in the
law as. overbearing a suspect's will.7 While the use of explicit threats and
66. Interrogation is a time-sequenced process. As it progresses, a suspect's perceptions of his
situation change due to the tactics through which interrogation is carried out. Early in the process
a suspect's perception of the consequences of each of the three possible choices open to him will
be different than what it is later. At the start he may believe that both invoking his Miranda rights
and maintaining his denial of responsibility are associated with arrest and trial. In the beginning,
he may believe that only confession leads to certain punishment for something he did not do.
Later, in reaction to the investigator's strategy, he will likely associate both invoking his Miranda
rights and maintaining denial with arrest and the harshest possible punishment; he will associate
confessing with minimizing his inevitable punishment. Under these circumstances, a person who
can no longer tolerate the stress of interrogation will reason that it is better to escape it by com-
plying with the investigator's demands and confessing rather than by remaining silent or invoking
his Miranda rights.
67. See GUDJONSSON, PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, supra note 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274
(1946).
71. For example, in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), Chicago Police officers threat-
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promises may not be as common as it once was, American investigators using
psychological methods can communicate coercive threats and promises by
subtle, indirect, and camouflaged means. For example, investigators sometimes
suggest that they will accept an account of the offense in which the central act
is described as an accident or an act of self-defense.
In its most extreme form, the "accident scenario technique," also known
as "maximization/minimization,"7 includes formatting and suggesting a ver-
sion of the crime facts that drastically lowers the legal seriousness of the of-
fense and the appropriate charge. For example, if the crime is obviously a
premeditated murder, the investigator leads a suspect to believe that the crime
facts can be recast so that the appropriate charge is involuntary manslaughter,
a reasonable response to the victim's provocation, or perhaps that the killing
happened in self-defense. This tactic is effective at eliciting admissions for the
same reason that more explicit promises of prosecutorial leniency work: be-
cause the interrogator communicates that the suspect will receive a reduced
level of punishment, or no punishment at all, if he admits to a description of
the offence that the interrogator finds acceptable."
3. Persuaded False Confessions
Both types of "persuaded" false confessions-non-coerced and co-
erced-are given after a person has become convinced that it is more likely
than not that he committed the crime, despite possessing no memory of having
done so. Both are elicited when an interrogator attacks and shatters a suspect's
confidence in his memory. A non-coerced persuaded false confession is elicit-
ed when an investigator relies on routine influence techniques of interrogation,
whereas a coerced-persuaded false confession is elicited when threats, promis-
es, or other legally coercive interrogation techniques are added to this mix.
Although persuaded false confessions are typically neither intended nor
recognized by investigators, they follow a common pattern. Investigators typi-
cally open an interrogation by confronting the suspect with evidence of his
guilt. If the suspect is innocent, the supposed evidence will be either erroneous
ened to arrest Lynumn-which, they told her, would lead to a cut-off of her welfare payments, the
loss of her children, and a prison term-if she did not confess to selling marijuana. Lynumn con-
fessed and was subsequently sentenced to 10-11 years. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
police coerced her confession and reversed her conviction. In Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954), a police psychiatrist elicited a confession from Leyra after explicitly promising him that he
would be let off easily if he admitted murdering his parents. As in Lynumn, the Supreme Court
ruled that Leyra's confession was coerced and reversed his conviction. Id. at 537.
While the use of explicit threats and promises may no longer be as common as in the
1950s and 1960s, interrogators currently employ more subtle and camouflaged threats and promis-
es to elicit confessions of guilt. The accident scenario technique, for example, is nothing more
than a device for delivering veiled threats and promises: it communicates the expectation that the
suspect will receive a lower level of punishment if he confesses (leniency), but that he will receive
a significantly higher level of punishment if he does not confess (threat). See infra Part II.B.2.f.
72. See Kassin and McNall, Police Interrogations, supra note 6.
73. Id. at 248 ("Although the courts take promises and threats more seriously when they are
made explicitly than when they are implicit in an interrogator's remarks, our data indicate that
because people often process information 'between the lines'.., these different means of commu-
nication are functionally equivalent in their impact.").
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or fabricated. If an innocent person believes that the evidence exists, he may
become confused because he cannot account for the incriminating facts that
contradict his memory of where he was when the crime occurred and his
knowledge that he has no awareness of committing the crime. The investigator
may lead the suspect to resolve his dilemma by persuading him that he has
experienced some form of amnesia.
Because guilty suspects sometimes also claim no memory of committing
the crime, interrogators have developed a routine counter to this disingenuous
denial. An interrogator will typically respond by suggesting some convenient
reason for the suspect's otherwise inexplicable absence of memory-for exam-
ple, a drug or alcohol-induced blackout, 4 a momentary lapse in conscious-
ness," a repressed memory,76 or perhaps even multiple personality disor-
der."
The guilty and the innocent react differently to these ploys. When dealing
with a guilty suspect, the interrogator's counter can easily and effectively blunt
the suspect's attempt to use this denial. An innocent suspect, however, is
likely to be confused and shaken by the investigator's tactics. If the innocent
reasons that the evidence objectively proves his guilt, he may accept the amne-
sia suggestion because it explains his absence of any memory of committing
the offense. If an investigator is knowledgeable about a suspect, he will pro-
pose an amnesia theory that fits the suspect's background. For example, if the
suspect is an alcoholic or a drug abuser, the interrogator will likely suggest
some form of alcohol or drug-induced blackout. If the suspect has a history of
alcohol- or drug-induced mental illness, the interrogator will likely suggest
some form of psychogenic amnesia.
The issue of amnesia is likely to become a major turning point in the
interrogation and can, in combination with other interrogation tactics, lead the
suspect to conclude that "I probably committed this crime." A persuaded
person's belief in his guilt is tentative and unlikely to rise to the level of cer-
tainty. But it is sufficient to lead him to agree that he is probably guilty and
motivate him to confess by confabulating answers (i.e., make good faith
guesses) to questions about how the crime occurred, inferring how the crime
must have occurred from the investigator's suggestions, and/or regurgitating
the investigator's theory of the crime.
74. Interrogation Transcript of Tom Sawyer, Clearwater, Fla., Police Dep't (Nov. 6-7, 1986)
(Case No. 86-28504); Interrogation Transcript of Garrett, supra note 53.
75. Interrogation Transcript of Peter Reilly, Connecticut State Police Headquarters, Hartford,
Conn. (Sept. 29, 1973).
76. Interrogation Transcript of Bradley Page, Oakland, Cal., Police Dep't (Dec. 10, 1984);
Interrogation Transcript of Paul Ingram, Thurston County, Wash., Sheriff's Dep't (Nov. 28-29,
1988); see also Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis, supra note 5.
77. Interrogation Transcript of Diane Colwell, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't (Nov. 8, 1994)
(Case No. 94-20678).
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III. ILLUSTRATING THE DECISION MODEL
A. The Miranda Warning"
Investigators tend to introduce the Miranda advisement in a manner that is
to their advantage. They might do so by presenting it as a bureaucratic formal-
ity and deliver the warnings in a perfunctory manner; they might actively de-
emphasize the significance or implications of Miranda and suggest that it is
unimportant or something to be ignored; or they might try to persuade the
suspect that it is in his best interest to waive Miranda altogether by telling
him that if he does not consent to questioning, people will think him guilty."9
At this point, investigators encourage suspects to believe that answering their
questions is relatively risk free.
Sometimes police question "outside Miranda" by ignoring a suspect's
explicit invocation, or by telling him that nothing said during the interrogation
can be used in a court of law. ° The likely outcome of ignoring Miranda is
exclusion of the improperly obtained admission into evidence at trial; the
admission can, however, be used for impeachment if the defendant testifies."
Therefore, interrogators have little to lose by ignoring a suspect's invocation
of Miranda, but may gain incriminating information and possibly have it ad-
mitted at trial.
In some cases, American police do not give Miranda warnings because
they reason that a suspect is not technically in custody since he is not under
arrest and is free to leave the station house. 2 An investigator reasons that if
he informs the suspect of these facts, then he does not have to remind him of
his constitutional rights. For example, investigators in three different California
locations told suspects:
Interrogator. Okay. Now I want you to understand, you're not under
arrest, okay? The door is right there, it's not locked,
you're free to leave at any time. Okay? 3
Interrogator- You know that if you want to leave you're able to leave.
I've only shut the door for our privacy and it's un-
locked, so you just say I don't want to talk about it and
off you go."'
Interrogator: Shane, uh, let's get a couple ground rules straight here.
You're not under arrest. We don't suspect you did
wrong. You're here to help us out, okay? If you don't
78. The illustration of the decision model begins here since the Miranda advisement often
signals the beginning of the obviously accusatory portion of the interrogation process.
79. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Miranda Revisited].
80. This sometimes occurs even during recorded interrogations.
81. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
82. See Leo, From Coercion to Deception, supra note 14, at 43-44.
83. Interrogation Transcript of Tom Jordan, Placer County, Cal., Sheriff's Dep't 3 (Apr. 8,
1993).
84. Interrogation Transcript of Albert Gonsalves, Sacramento, Cal., Police Dep't 1 (Dec. 16,
1992).
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wanna talk to us, you don't have to. If there's anything
that you don't wanna answer, you don't have to answer
it. Anytime you wanna stop or leave, you can. So, that's
how it is.'
An investigator in Barrow, Alaska, was even more explicit about the
voluntary nature of a suspect's presence:
Interrogator: You do know that you're not in custody or anything like
that and the same rules apply. We're not, you know,
you're free to get up and go or when you, the only rea-
son the doors closed and we're sitting in here is for
privacy purposes and not cause you're under arrest or
anything like that, ok?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrogator- You understand that.
Suspect: Yes.
Interrogator: Okay. And you come down here yoluntarily to talk with
us, right? Ok.
Suspect: Yes.'
Even clearly custodial suspects most often waive their Miranda rights and
consent to interrogation.87 Although innocent suspects are likely to waive
their rights because they do not perceive a risk in speaking to police, some
view invoking Miranda as either wrong and/or tantamount to an admission of
guilt. For example, shortly after falsely confessing, a middle class university
student described why he did not invoke his Miranda rights when he was first
accused:
Suspect: Somehow it seems-it feels to me that if I ask for a
lawyer that I'm admitting guilt and I know I'm not, but
it's, you know, it's just a preposterous idea to me that
it's even considered."
Sometimes interrogators increase the likelihood of receiving a waiver by
first heightening the suspect's motivation to speak and then reading the
Miranda warnings. A Sacramento, California, investigator handled the
Miranda advisement of a man who had been taken into custody, photo-
graphed, and was already being questioned as follows:
Interrogator: I don't think this woman was telling us the whole truth.
Okay. I think that it's not, probably not as significant as
she's letting on at this point. Okay. So this is why
you're here. Now I'd like to talk to you about what this
woman is saying, we've more or less ah, you know, if
we just talk to her and she alleges this felony crime
85. Interrogation Transcript of Shane Schmitt, Sacramento, Cal., Police Dep't 1 (Aug. 27,
1992).
86. Interrogation Transcript of John Adams, Barrow, Alaska, Police Dep't 5 (Sept 3, 1993).
87. See supra note 40.
88. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 3, at 4-5.
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occurred, then we're more or less obligated to make an
arrest.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: And I know there's more to it and I know, I know you
were there. That's not a problem because, because we
have, that, that ain't no big deal. But I also need to
know the real truth because I'm not sure she's telling us
the whole story.
Suspect: What, what is she trying to say?
Interrogator: Well, she's alleging that you pointed the gun at her.
Suspect: Uh-huh (negative). Nah-uh.
Interrogator: (Unintelligible). Alright before we, before we do that, I,
like I said I know there's more to this story than she's
telling us. But -
Suspect: I don't even know her, you know what I'm saying (un-
intelligible) -
Interrogator: Whoa, whoa, whoa. I can't take your statement until we
get through that Miranda issue.
Suspect: Oh.
Interrogator: You can't tell me anything until we get through that.89
Because they do not see any reason to distrust the police, the innocent are
unlikely to realize that they are about to undergo a highly stressful and fatigu-
ing experience that has been designed to change the course of their lives and
may do so for the wrong reasons.
B. The Two Parts of Interrogation: Pre-Admission Influence and Post-
Admission Narrative
Although interrogation occurs during the course of an investigation, it is
not usually part of the information-gathering process that leads a detective to
believe someone is guilty. Even the leading interrogation training manual
recommends that an accusatory interrogation should be undertaken only when
an investigator is certain of the suspect's guilt.' The purpose of interrogation
is not to discover or evaluate an alibi, but to obtain an admission of guilt and
a complete account of how the crime happened. As one Seattle, Washington,
detective commented, "Interviews are just to see what the truth is, an interro-
gation is an in-your-face situation."'
89. Interrogation Transcript of Kentrick McCoy, Sacramento, Cal., Police Dep't 14-15 (Sept
1, 1996).
90. See INBAU Er AL., supra note 20, at 77.
91. Interview by Richard Ofshe with Rick Geis, Detective, Seattle, Wash., Police Dep't 9
(Jan. 17, 1996).
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1. Pre-Admission Step One: Shifting the Suspect from Confident to
Hopeless
a. Accusation
Even after an investigator has issued Miranda warnings, he may continue
to use a non-threatening interview format to question the suspect about his
alibi or any other subject that may provide information that contradicts or
confirms facts he has already learned from the investigation. At some point,
however, the investigator's manner, tone, and style shift from neutral, friendly,
and non-threatening to accusatory-serious, aggressive, and confrontational.
No longer pretending to seek general and background case information, an
investigator now claims full knowledge about the suspect's culpability and
demands that he admit guilt.
The investigator typically commences the accusatory phase of interroga-
tion by pointing out something that contradicts what a suspect has said or that
the suspect has been inconsistent in his statements. He may also commence his
overt attempts to manipulate the suspect with a direct and often surprising
accusation. A Pasco County, Florida, interrogator told a suspect:
Interrogator: She left with you. Look at me Jeff.
Suspect: Say what?
Interrogator: She left with you.
Suspect: What are you tellin' me?
Interrogator: What I'm tellin' you. I think you killed your wife. I
think you got into an argument, I think she hit you.
She's got a temper.'
At this early stage, a detective's accusation is usually simple and straight-
forward. As a San Diego, California, detective told a suspect:
Interrogator: Robert, this is our case, on Mary Shelton. You could see
we've done a lot of work. Our shit is together. We
know what we have. We know that you did it and you
know that you did it.93
Early on and repeatedly throughout the pre-admission part of interroga-
tion, an investigator will implore the suspect to "tell the truth." As a Kern
County, California, sheriff's detective told a suspect:
Interrogator: We've been nice to you and we're giving you a lot of
credit, from what you're telling us. Don't lie to us.
Because it doesn't change anything. It changes absolute-
ly nothing. You sit here and you tell us the truth.94
Detectives sometimes feign anger or actually lose their tempers and resort
92. Interrogation Transcript of Jeffrey Christian Crouch, Pasco County, Fla., Sheriff's Office
7 (Jan. 28, 1987) (Case No. 87-008093).
93. Interrogation Transcript of Robert Byars, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 84 (Dec. 21,
1993).
94. Interrogation Transcript of Michelle Duke, Kern County, Cal., Sheriff's Office 27 (Aug.
27, 1995) (Case No. 95-95-33322).
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to screaming at the suspect and demanding that he confess. This heated ex-
change occurred during an interrogation in San Diego, California:
Interrog. 1: Tell us about it!
Interrog. 2: Tell us about it! You give up! Tell us about it! Tell us
about it! For once in your life, tell us about what the
hell happened! For once in your life!
Suspect: I don't know what the hell happened, to her, who, some-
body killed her! Or who, who, it was that killed her! I
don't know!
Interrog. 1: You killed her!
Suspect: No! I sure in the hell didn't!
Interrog. 1: Now, listen to me.
Suspect: That's a fuckin' lie!
Interrog. 1: You killed her.
Suspect: No I did not!
Interrog. 1: Okay.
Suspect: I did not! That's a damn.
Interrog. 1: You caused her death, okay?
Interrog. 2: I think it's over.
Suspect: It is! I did not kill her!! You wanna, can you prove it!?
Interrog. 2: Yes!
Suspect: I didn't kill that woman, I don't go out killin' nobody. I
had no gun! I had no kind of gun or nothin', or no
knives!
Interrog. 2: (Unintelligible).
Suspect: I can, I don't use my hands on nobody! Unless I have
to.
Interrog. 2: Bullshit!
Suspect: Unless I have to!
Interrog. 2: Bullshit!
Interrog. 1: Bullshit! Don't, that's all you got! That's all you need!
Suspect: But I don't hit no, no woman with 'em!
Interrog. 1: Bullshit!"'
b. Overcoming Objections
One of an investigator's first challenges is to overcome a suspect's ten-
dency to object when accused of committing a crime and his preference for
protesting his innocence. By taking the position that he is certain of the cor-
rectness of his accusation, the investigator puts the suspect on the defensive
95. Interrogation Transcript of Elmer Lee Nance, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't, Tape 2, at
29-30 (Sept. 27, 1991).
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from the beginning. The investigator attempts to set up the interaction so that
the suspect tries to convince the investigator of his innocence-something that
is unlikely to happen. Because of the context in which interrogation is set, an
investigator cannot dare to obviously seek information that might, with addi-
tional checking, allow him to evaluate whether the suspect's denials are true or
his alibi is valid. Because an appearance of certainty makes claims about
having evidence more likely to be believed, the investigator can never depart
from his position of certainty. From this position all of the suspect's denials
must be reacted to as if they are recognized as attempted deceptions. Any
denial is called a lie and lies are not going to be tolerated. A San Diego, Cali-
fornia, detective told a suspect:
Interrogator Now, why do you think we are here? You know, if you
lie to me that's not really good for you because, you
know, I've interviewed, Mark and I've been up all night
interviewing people so we know what's going on and
we know if you're going to lie to us and we just want
the truth. We just want to hear your side of the story.
Because all the other people we've talked to we've
heard their side of the story and now we want to hear
your side. So, just be up front with me. You know, just
tell me like a, like a man, you know. You're 18, you're
an adult. Tell me what happened.'
An angry display of impatience may be accompanied by an accusation
that the suspect is trying to manipulate and deceive the investigator
Interrogator: I don't think you do understand our situation.
Suspect: You know you are trying to get.
Interrogator: We are trying to find out who killed that woman by
asking you for your cooperation and you're jacking us
around, Lee!97
Whether it is a genuine outburst or a calculated tactic, yelling at a suspect
and demanding that he confess is a primitive interrogation tactic. However,
some investigators seek to elicit admissions simply by startling and intimidat-
ing a suspect, aggressively posturing, and forcefully demanding that he con-
fess. If, however, an investigator chooses to show extreme displeasure, for
more well-developed tactical reasons he is likely also to attack the suspect's
self-image. A San Diego, California, investigator told a suspect:
Interrogator. Don't lie to me, okay?
Suspect: I'm not I'm not lying to you.
Interrogator Just don't fuckin' lie to me. Just listen to me. You've
been lying your whole fuckin' ife. You've been blam-
ing other people for all your problems and that's
bullshit. It's time you faced the music. It's time to say
96. Interrogation Transcript of Eric Jerrod, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 4 (Sept. 24, 1995).
97. Interrogation Transcript of Nance, supra note 95, at 16-17.
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yeh, okay, I did fuck up. Now's the time in your life to
get your act together and finally stand up, be a man and
say okay, God-damn it this is the truth, I'm gonna tell
the truth and I'm gonna be proud of myself, other than
being such a shit ball.
Bullshit, you just sat here and you said yeh, I saw
her and I know what happened. That's what you just
said Mr. Nance and you said nobody'd believe me. And
you haven't even started to explain it. 'Cause number
one, either you're such a chicken-shit that you don't
want to tell the truth or number two, you're afraid to tell
the truth or number three you've been lying so God-
damn long your whole fuckin' life, you don't know
what the truth is, now which is it?9"
Sometimes investigators refute a suspect's denials by bluntly asserting that
he is lying, as in this passage from another San Diego, California, interroga-
tion:
Interrog. 1: That's a crock of shit Jason. Who in the hell's gonna
believe that? You're really setting yourself out to hang
here buddy. I mean that figuratively. Not literally. What
I'm saying is you're sticking your butt out there and
there's no protection. Come on. That's not what hap-
pened. I know it. Donaldson knows it. And you know it.
Interrog. 2: The ship is sinking and you're the captain of the ship,
buddy.
Interrog. 1: Start doing something here. Start telling us the truth.
Interrog. 2: You are sinking fast.9
Frequently an investigator will communicate his certain belief in the
suspect's guilt by trying to downplay interest in gaining more evidence or
even having any discussion about this question. The attitude he expresses is
that there is already enough evidence to satisfy him of the suspect's guilt.
Having no interest in any discussion of guilt or innocence, the investigator
expresses interest in a secondary matter-why the crime happened. Any dis-
cussion of this, of course, requires the suspect to first admit responsibility. A
Sonoma County, California, investigator told an adolescent defendant:
Defendant: Well, I can't give you any answers because I didn't do
it.
Interrogator. Well, it's not a matter of you not or, doing it or not. We
know you did it, okay? And we're
Defendant: (Inaudible).
Interrogator: Listen. I would like to be very fair with you and open
98. Id. at 41-42.
99. Interrogation Transcript of Jason Albritton, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 148-49 (July
20, 1995) (Case No. CD114372, P66142).
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with you and up front with you about this, okay? And
that's why I'm telling you this. Um, I don't feel an obli-
gation to go through all the evidence .... The game is
over, okay, and I hope you're not lookin' at it as a
game. Because it's not a game. Um, you know, some
people were, uh, some, some people were killed and we
would like to know the reason behind that .... It's not
a matter of whether or not you did it, so, um, that's not
what we're here for. We know that you did it. And we
have a quite provable case."°
The investigator repeated this theme a few minutes later.
Interrogator: I hope, I hope that you're not sittin' here tryin' to con-
spire how can I get out of this, how can I beat this. You
know? It's not a matter of if you did it. That's not the
issue. You need to understand that no, we're not here
asking you if you did it. If we didn't know, we wouldn't
have arrested you. We would have brought you in and
asked you if you did it. We know that you did it. We
don't know why you did it, Alan. You understand what
I'm tellin' ya?"'0
c. Evidence Ploys
i. General Claims of Strong Evidence
The message of interrogation in the pre-admission phase is that the evi-
dence already in hand leads to the conclusion that the suspect's factual guilt
has been established beyond any doubt."° Although sometimes it is possible
to be entirely truthful when making this claim, it is permissible for the claim
to be a complete lie. By forcefully presenting a claim that he knows is entirely
fabricated to someone he guesses is guilty, the investigator hopes to create the
impression of an airtight case and convince the suspect that resistance is futile.
When real evidence is lacking the investigator knows full well that it is only
by getting the suspect to give a full and detailed confession that he will be
able to find the evidence that will prove correct his speculative, intuitive, and
risky guess." 3
When the investigator who interrogated the Sonoma County adolescent
discussed above began to reveal his evidence, he was careful to distinguish
100. Interrogation Transcript of Alan Adams, Sonoma County, Cal., Sheriff's Office 2 (July 4,
1991) (Case No. 910605-16).
101. Id. at 7.
102. The most recent observational study of interrogation in the America found that in 85%
of the interrogations observed, investigators used the tactic of confronting suspects with the evi-
dence of their guilt. In 43% of the interrogations, investigators attempted to undermine the
suspect's confidence in his denial. In 30% of the interrogations, suspects were confronted with
false evidence. See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4, at 267.
103. INBAU Er AL., supra note 20, at xiii-xiv.
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between the evidence he had and the evidence he anticipated he would find.
Because the suspect had committed the crime, both he and the detective knew
that the as yet untested categories of evidence would strengthen the case
against him:
Interrogator: Listen. I'm not gonna insult your intelligence. Uh, and
please, don't insult ours, okay? We've been doin' this
for a long time. But the problem is here, is that we have
a case that is proven, a proved case, and it's, it's all
matters of fact. We're not here guessing.
Suspect: I don't understand how it's proven.
Interrogator: Well, actually, um, we have witnesses to the fact that
you made the purchases. Urn, we haven't yet rolled your
fingerprints but we are going to be rolling them, to com-
pare those. Uh, there's also other physical evidence in
terms of microscopic evidence that you're not aware of,
but we are, because of the business that we're in.
You're gonna have to explain to us, uh, or you should
explain to us how in the hell the weapon is at your
house, that's gonna ballistically match back up to the
one that killed the victims, Oscar and Betty, as well as
all the other bullets, and the casings. There are casings
(inaudible) uh, the property that was purchased with the
cards after the fact. We already have some of them.
We're retrieving more. In fact, um, some of it I expect
will be in your truck. So you see, the case is, is, is well-
proved. I don't know why you did it. Maybe you don't
know why you did it. But the fact is that you did it."°
Sometimes interrogators grossly overstate their case and claim to possess
a great deal of evidence that simply does not and never will exist. For an
innocent suspect who naively trusts the police and believes that they would not
lie, the cumulative effect of an endless stream of false evidence can be devas-
tating. A young suspect interrogated in South Carolina recounted his experi-
ence:
Interviewer: Did it ever, did you ever think about the possibility that
maybe they were intentionally lying to you?
Suspect: No. You see, um, you have to understand, when I was, I
was always grew up my Mom and Dad always told me
"You trust a cop," you know "They're not going to lie
to you." You know and I always had faith in them until
now.
Interviewer OK. So the possibility of their playing games with you,
your telling me, just didn't even pop into your mind.
Suspect: Right. You know and um, so they kept on talking to me
104. Interrogation Transcript of Adams, supra note 100, at 3-4.
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Interviewer.
and we started talking about my Mom, you know, then I
brought up the subject up of my Mom, urn, they told
me, they said "Why don't you go ahead and tell us now,
and quit lying to us. We know you did it." And then he
said that, they said "Your Mom even says it's time for
you to tell the truth. Says she loves you but you know
this whole thing needs to be over."
And, um, at that point in time I didn't, well it blew
my mind. You know, they was telling me about my
Mom, and um, they told me that, urn, they went up
there, you know, they talked with Mom and you see
they left me about 45 minutes alone one time."
I mean it just, when you think about your Momma,
you know she's always going to be there no matter
what. You know you could always turn to your mother
if you can't turn to nobody else and urn, urn, it was like,
you know, she was, I guess you could say was, I feel
like my Momma is my backbone, you know. Cause she
has helped me out a lot and it's just like I lost it. You
see where I'm coming from.
Uh hum.
Suspect And, you know it's like, when I lost her it was all, you
know, it's like well it's over.
6
They told me they had a DNA match on me. They
said that it's never been beaten before in court. That it
was no way on earth that it was wrong, and that, you
know, it was mine.
Interviewer. What was your reaction when they told you they had a
DNA match?
Suspect: Urn, my reaction was, you know, it just can't match, I
mean, I told them, I come out and told them said it's
"Mine don't match, I volunteered to give it to you."
Um, I told them, I said, why would I want to come
down here and sign my own death certificate. They said,
see here, it's just a matter of time you gonna find out
it's me, you know, I told them if I'd have done it I sure
wouldn't volunteered to give it to them, they'd have to
make me give it to them.'"
An investigator's claim of an ever increasing amount of valid, incriminat-
ing evidence is likely to eventually cause a guilty party to recognize that the
game is over and that he is caught. In response to the repeated evidence ploys,
an innocent is likely to perceive his situation as frustrating, unreal, desperate,
105. Interview of Kenneth Register by Richard Ofshe at 15-16 (Aug. 24, 1992).
106. Id. at 17-18.
107. Id. at 22-23.
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and tending toward hopeless.
Although an investigator will not know whether all or some of a suspect's
denials and answers are true or are a collection of entirely implausible, incon-
sistent, and impossible lies, it does not matter since the investigator's strategy
is to treat every major component of the account as utterly false. For example,
in a Richmond, California, interrogation, a detective sought to obtain a confes-
sion by insisting that the suspect would not have sought out a prostitute for
any reason other than the thrill of committing a rape:
Interrogator- You got a gun in your car and you've got prior gun
convictions, okay? Looking at all these things, I think
you're giving me a little bit of bullshit. And I don't
think you're being a hundred percent truthful. And a
little bit of bullshit, you may as well bullshit me the
whole way and tell me you're President Clinton's broth-
er or something, okay? I need the truth. I want the abso-
lute truth. That's what we work on. This story makes no
damn sense, it makes no sense whatever.
Suspect: Sir, I didn't tell her, I didn't.
Interrogator Prostitutes, you don't stick your tongue down a
prostitute's throat.
Suspect: I didn't stick my tongue down her throat.
Interrogator: You don't kiss prostitutes. You don't lick their ears, you
don't suck their nipples, you don't bite their nipples,
okay? That, that doesn't happen. When you screw them
you use a condom. Okay? When they give you head,
you use a condom. All righty? When your girlfriend's
sitting in the shower, she lives less than five minutes
away from you, you guys live together, you don't find a
prostitute, you go lay your girlfriend, let her give you
head. It makes no sense.1ra
During the interrogation of an adolescent about a murder that had oc-
curred earlier in the day, a San Diego, California, detective worked to under-
mine the suspect's position as follows:
Interrogator: We have neighbors that see things, and we collect evi-
dence, and you could sit here and lie all night if you
want, but all that stuff, bloody clothes that you're wear-
ing, the scratches on your body, the neighbors that saw
ya, the lady that you almost ran over, the man that was
standing right there at the corner, and you know what
else?
Suspect: What?
Interrogator: We've already talked to Danielle? She's up front with
108. Interrogation Transcript of Newell DePuy, Richmond, Cal., Police Dep't 39-40 (May 20,
1995).
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us. And you're sitting here giving us a B.S. story, but
this does not make sense.
Suspect: I'm not.
Interrogator It just doesn't make sense, okay? Everything you're
saying just doesn't make sense. Let me just tell you
something. The neighbors saw you, okay, it's, it's sim-
ple as that. They, they described you to a "T," what you
were wearing and everything. So, so your, your story
just doesn't make sense, okay, and I'm, I'm being up
front with you. This is the only time to bail yourself out.
This is the only time to start telling the truth. George
didn't sit here and take all these clippings and all these
evidence and blood stains and everything from ya, okay.
Together we've been do, probably doing this kind of
work for almost 40 years.
Suspect Yeah.
Interrogator. Okay. And, and what you're saying doesn't make sense.
I've asked you two or three times the same question,
and each time you give a different answer. Okay. I, I
think, I think you're being honest in, in the aspect of
your describing everything except you, you're being
dishonest in one aspect of it."°
A Kern County, California interrogator told a female murder suspect:
Interrogator: I know exactly what you're telling us and we find that
very hard to believe because there's blood in the kitchen
where you went and got a soda, you know, on the floor
and there's blood on two paper towels in the kitchen,
tissue paper, you know, sitting right there at the first
chair when you were getting in the refrigerator to get
your Sprite, the chair that would be against your back
there, right there. Right in full view of the living room. I
mean, if you are in the living room, you can see right
there. And there was nobody in that house during the
time the guy was found and the time you guys were
there so where did these mystery tissues come from.
You're out in the living room the whole time. You
know how they got there. " °
Whether it is real or fabricated, interrogators represent that their evidence
against the suspect is conclusive. For example, during a Salt Lake City, Utah,
interrogation:
Suspect If you are implying that I killed Irene to get away from
the kid, then you are dead wrong.
109. Interrogation Transcript of Viktor Jarod, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 48-49 (Sept. 24,
1995).
110. Interrogation Transcript of Duke, supra note 94, at 18-19.
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Evidence ploys are intended to overcome a suspect's resistance to the
realization that he has been caught. The fact that the suspect's denials of the
evidence has failed to convince the investigator of the his innocence is intend-
ed to serve as a demonstration. The implication is that he will also be unable
to convince a prosecutor, a judge, or a jury of his innocence. The investigator
strives to create the impression that because his opinion is based on hard facts,
all other equally reasonable and informed persons will reach the same conclu-
sion.
Vallejo, California, detectives portrayed a defendant's continuing denials
as pointless:"'
Interrog. 1: Okay, that, the problem we're having Eugene is this,
first off in order to make it clear to us exactly what
participation you had in this crime, because I'm not
gonna, ya know like I said from the get, we're not
gonna sugarcoat it. We're talkin' to you. This is a
crime. Obviously you know what happened. We have
overwhelming evidence to indicate that you were in-
volved. We're here from California to give you this op-
portunity. Now I don't know how much clearer I can get
111. Interrogation Transcript of Calvin Shane Myers, Salt Lake City, Utah, Police Dep't 11-
12 (Case No. 94-6578).
112. Eventually this man confessed to avoid a threatened penalty. At trial he was acquitted.
See infra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
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Interrog. 1: Then why did you kill her?
Suspect: I didn't kill her.
Interrog. 1: Who did?
Suspect: I don't know. Finding this out, I would like to know.
Interrog. 1: Why would some people and all of the evidence say that
you killed her.
Suspect: I didn't kill her. I can get really pissed and I can beat
the snot out of someone if I wanted to. I couldn't kill
anyone man.
Interrog. 2: Well that's not what the evidence is pointing to.
Interrog. 1: I think you're having a hard time sleeping at night.
Suspect: No I haven't been, I have no reason to.
Interrog. 2: We're not just talking about Irene's life, we're talking
about a fully developed six month old fetus.
Suspect: And you're telling me that it was my baby.
Interrog. 1: And we're talking about on the night that she died,
some people that saw you with her and Steve, here in
Summit County. We're talking about a guy who told us
that he saw you do it. We're talking about a lot of other
evidence.
Interrog. 2: Overwhelming evidence."'
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with you on that. What you need to understand is, first
off, is you're still denying to us that you were even in-
volved in this, is that correct?
Defendant: This is correct.
Interrog. 2: Okay, and until you can realize and understand that the
evidence we have that implicates you in this crime is
too overwhelming to deny that. it's going to be a losing
battle for you Eugene."'
ii. Demeanor Evidence
Investigators use a variety of evidence ploys to explain why they are
confident of a suspect's guilt. Sometimes they assert that the suspect's guilt is
revealed by his demeanor. While this is arguably the weakest type of evidence
ploy, it is also the easiest to claim and the safest. A suspect may ignore it, but
cannot disprove it.
Because interrogations that follow from well-developed investigations
sometimes allow the investigator to literally destroy the guilty suspect's often
absurd defensive claims with the same evidence that will be used in court, an
experienced investigator is likely to have observed some dramatic examples of
the impact of revealing evidence to a guilty suspect. The response is often an
obvious and striking inability to mobilize resistance. This sort of dramatic
reaction would tend to convince most casual observers that the response is a
reasonable indicator of guilt. An experienced investigator's confidence that he
can read a suspect's guilt is probably, in part, based on having sometimes seen
these sorts of reactions from guilty suspects.
The problem is that these reactions are not invariable for all guilty sus-
pects nor are all emotional reactions to interrogation tactics so crystal clear.
While these peak moments stand in sharp contrast to the confused, anguished,
and desperate expressions that permeate the record of an interrogation in
which an innocent suspect is being confronted with an accusation based on
false evidence, confusion, anguish, and desperation are not unique to innocent
suspects. Many guilty parties will reveal considerable distress and anguish
about what they have done or because they have been found out.
Investigators are not trained to realize that hunch-based interrogations will
often bring them into contact with an innocent, perhaps vulnerable, suspect
who will show distress at being confronted with an accusation of murder and
the possibility of life in prison or a death sentence. They may also not have
been trained to appreciate the variability with which people express distress.
Therefore they may easily categorize a suspect's distress as an indicator of
guilt and both convince themselves that their initial guess was correct and feed
back to the suspect their misperceptions of the suspect's conduct.
113. Interrogation Transcript of Eugene Livingston, Vallejo, Cal., Police Dep't, Solano Coun-
ty, Cal., Prosecutor's Office, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FBI Office in Albany,
Ga., 58 (Dec. 18, 1993).
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Sometimes an investigator will pretend that he is a human lie-detector and
assert that the suspect's body language demonstrates his guilt. A San Francis-
co, California, detective told a suspect:
Interrogator: The problem is, Robert, you want, you've wanted to tell
somebody about this since they arrested you and let you
know you had a warrant for murder in San Francisco,
you were shocked it took this long for it to come out,
and you wanted to tell somebody about this, I could tell
by looking at your body language, the way you're act-
ing, you wanna get this off your chest, you wanna re-
solve this matter, and put it behind you so you can go
on with your life." 4
A Goshen, Indiana, interrogator told a suspect:
Interrogator: Listen to me. Your eyes are like windows to your soul,
Ed. Okay, and your eyes want to tell me.
Suspect: My eyes are all messed up because I haven't hard-
ly-ain't had a hell of a lot of sleep.' 5
During the interrogation of a female suspect, Orange County, California,
police claimed that her reaction to a photograph demonstrated her guilt:
Interrog. 1: Lisa, as soon as we laid that picture down in front of
you. It was written all over your face. As soon as you
saw that bite mark it was written all over your face.
Interrog. 2: Your eyes said it all.
Translator: We discovered we can tell from your eyes that you
knew this wound was bitten by you or not.
Suspect: (Sobbing).
Translator: We put this picture in front of you right? Your attitude
and the color of your face that showed it all you
know. 16
iii. Eyewitness Evidence
One of the most common evidence ploys is to tell a suspect that one or
more uninvolved eyewitnesses have identified him. Often these reports are
valid, but sometimes what the investigator claims is completely fabricated.
Solano County, California, detectives told a suspect:
Interrogator I know when you get into a bad situation that you want
to try to protect your friends and/or yourself. Okay? And
to do that, the only way to do it is to lie. Okay? And
114. Interrogation Transcript of Robert Junior Anderson, San Francisco, Cal., Police Dep't 23
(undated).
115. Interrogation Transcript of Garrett, supra note 53, at 274.
116. Interrogation Transcript of Lisa Peng, Orange County, Cal., Sheriffs Dep't 95 (Jan. 8,
1994) (translation from Chinese).
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right here and now the lies won't work. They're not
gonna, you know, to not tell exactly the truth the way it
happened, the way you know it happened in your heart,
that's the only thing that's gonna work here and now.
Okay? And there's a, there's a lot of inconsistencies in
your story that I already know about. Okay? And I've
got too many eyewitnesses to this whole thing that, that
call, that you call your friends that when it comes down
to a serious situation, they done sold you out."'
Salt Lake City, Utah, interrogators claimed:
Interrog. 1: How would an old retired couple that's working at
Bells in Silver Creek, remember you being up there
with her about 2:00 o'clock in the morning?
Suspect: I wasn't up at Bell's at 2:00 in the morning
Interrog. 1: They remember you being there.
Interrog. 2: And they remember Steve.
Interrog. 1: They remember the three of you.
Suspect: I was not up there.
Interrog. 1: You mean they're lying these people?
Suspect: I'm not going to say they're lying, but I was not there.
Interrog. 2: If it wasn't you, Steve and Irene were there, who would
it have been?
Suspect: I don't know, Steven has a lot of friends and he knows
a lot of people.
Interrog. 2: But you were with Steven that night? The night they say
you were there.
Suspect: Yeah but I wasn't with him at 2:00 o'clock in the morn-
ing.
Interrog. 2: Well what time was it?
Suspect: I dropped him off at his house, probably about quarter
after one. I went home and went to sleep.
Interrog. 1: In the morning?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrog. 2: Were you there, were you at Silver Creek.
Suspect: No I wasn't.
Interrog. 2: They say you were.
Suspect: I've seen people that resemble me, walking in the mall.
Interrog. 1: You're saying that it was just coincidental that there
were three people.
Interrog. 2: Steve was with you.
Interrog. 1: Steve was with you and they picked you out, they
117. Interrogation Transcript of Childs, Solano County, Cal., Sheriff's Dep't 18-19 (Apr. 26,
1992).
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picked him out and they picked Irene out. "'
A Boynton Beach, Florida, interrogator told an innocent suspect:
Interrogator: Something's wrong. I mean the boy is saying you were
there. There's no reason in the world that a nine year-
old's going to lie about who was there.
Suspect: I was not there.
Interrogator: Well, you know, I don't know what to tell you. I can't
make you tell me you were there at all, you know, obvi-
ously. But the stories just ain't matching up here.
Everybody's story matches up except yours." 9
Regardless of the validity of the alleged eyewitness evidence, a suspect
can blunt its impact by insisting that the eyewitnesses are mistaken or lying.
Eyewitness ploys are weak unless embedded in a foundation that makes them
just icing on the cake. An interrogator is not likely to be surprised when an
eyewitness ploy fails to prove to a suspect that he is caught. The following
illustration is from a San Diego, California, investigation:
Interrog. 1: Now, let me tell you another thing. You said a black
fellow accused you of kidnapping somebody. While you
were have, while, you, well, let me finish to this black
fellow, the guy you said that accused you of kidnapping
somebody. That is the victim's husband. He's a black
guy. He drove in to the map stop, he talked to these
people here, Mr. and Mrs. Casias. Mr. and Mrs. Casias
pointed you out, you drove into the map stop, is what
they said and what the victim's husband, the black fel-
low, they said, you know, we did not see the girl. But
it's funny, you may want to go talk to that gentleman
over there in the Chevrolet pickup truck with the camper
because he told us, he told us that he saw the girl.
Suspect: That's a lie.
Interrog. 1: The reason, hang on a second, hang on a second. That is
the reason why he went over to talk to you and confront
you, that's the reason why he accused you, is because
he got the information from these folks here.
Suspect: They're both a bunch of damn liars.
Interrog. 1: I don't think, I'm sorry.
Interrog. 2: Hey Mr. Nance, shut up and listen. God damn it, shut
up. Now listen to me. We have talked to an awful lot of
people here and all through your life, all you've been
doing is saying other people lie, other people are full of
shit, you, friend are a God-damn liar.2 °
118. Interrogation Transcript of Myers, supra note 111, at 9-10.
119. Interrogation Transcript of Martin Salazar, Boynton Beach, Fla., Police Dep't 24 (Feb.
17, 1996).
120. Interrogation Transcript of Nance, supra note 95, Tape 1, at 36-37.
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iv. Co-Perpetrator Witness Evidence
If investigators know that more than one person is involved in a crime
and are either interrogating two or more suspects, or can lead the suspect to
believe that his co-perpetrator are also being interrogated, they may play one
suspect against another. This tactic is implemented by claiming that the co-
rpetiators ha've already confssed and have provided evidence that will be
used against the suspect. If the suspect rejects this claim, the investigator may
ask why his friends would lie or why so many others would identify him as a
perpetrator.
If the suspect is guilty, the interrogator might be able to bring a co-perpe-
trator to the door or into the room and might allow the suspect to speak if the
co-perpetrator has actually confessed. Sometimes, however, investigators make
mistakes. For example, in a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, case detectives allowed a
killer to become a witness against a young man who had seen the killing.
When the killer was brought into the interrogation room and presented as a
police-endorsed witness, the suspect became convinced that his situation was
hopeless. Several months later he described his experience during the unre-
corded portion of his interrogation when the co-perpetrator confrontation oc-
curred:
Suspect: Well, at first Wiley just, when it first, when he first
started getting a little defensive, he said that they got
witnesses against me and that they can, he can prove
that I did it. And I kept telling him no, that I don't
know what he's talking about; that it's the, the two-guys
story.
He said, "Yeah?" He said, "All right. We got [1121
in the next room next to you that's telling us that you
did it. Now, what do you thing about that?"
I said, "I don't believe you." I said, "I don't believe
you." He said, "You don't believe me, huh?"
So he went out of the room. I didn't think nothing
of it. And then he comes back. The door is open. He
opens up the door, and John is standing right there. He
said, "Now tell us what you said, John." He said, "Yeah,
that's David Adams. He's the one that killed Butch." At
that point my heart dropped. I didn't know what, I did-
n't know what to do then. I looked at John. I just got
scared, started crying.
Interviewer You said you looked at John and you got scared?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interviewer What did you get scared of?
121. The name of the man identified as the killer has been deleted because he has never been
arrested for this homicide.
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Suspect I remembered what he was telling me, if I say some-
thing. I didn't know what to say now. Because he has
told me he's going to hurt me and my family if I say
something.
And I just, I just started crying. I didn't know what
to do, and my mind just started racing a hundred miles
per hour at that minute. I didn't, I was, I was like in a
situation like, I said, "Screw it. I did it."' 2
As a Kern County, California, sheriff's detective told a suspect:
Interrogator: Your friends are the most important assets right now,
always have been, cause you don't have a tremendous
amount of them that you have been close to, so you'd
do anything to protect losing those friends because if
you didn't Billy would be alone, those friends would be
taken away from you, you wouldn't have anything if
you didn't have Joel, or you didn't have Scott.
Well you don't have Joel and you don't have Scott
right now, they have turned on you. They have told us
what's happened, they told us that, that it was your idea,
they told us that you were the one who did it, um so
without that friendship that you held so dearest in your
life, that is no longer. Because if it was, they would still
be true to you and not tell on you and you know that
what I am saying is true.
And I'm not just in here making it up, because I
know too much after, after our last interview. But
they've told us exactly what's happened. Now do you
consider that to be true friendship? This was not the
pact that you guys had after the killing when you went
to Mexico. That bond has been broken, they're standing
out here for themselves, they really don't give a shit
about Billy right now because they're out there for
themselves and Billy's all alone in this room right now,
and Billy needs to talk, and tell us what happened. So
what happened in there Billy?'23
Similarly, a Vallejo, California, detective told an innocent defendant:
Interrogator. Okay, as Sgt. Becker said Eugene, we, we, have talked
to a lot of people in this case. We've talked to you a
couple of times, and every time we've talked to you, I
think we were pretty, pretty honest with you. We were
tellin you what we were hearing, and we asked you a
122. Interview of David Adams by Richard Ofshe. Broward County, Fla. 28-29 (Mar. 18,
1993).
123. Interrogation Transcript of Billy Wayne Smith, Kern County, Cal., Sheriff's Office, Tape
2, Side A, at 11-12 (Nov. 22, 1992).
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couple times to uh tell us what you know about this
case.
Now Mr. Young, uh as Sgt. Becker said, has uh
given us a complete statement. He told us exactly what
happened, what his role in the robbery was, and uh what
everybody else's role in the robbery was. He implicated
you also in the robbery. He's identified you as being a
participant.
Now everybody who tells us things, at times may
see things different, or. may not be completely truthful.
That's why we wanta come to you now and get your
part of exactly what happened, and your participation in
the robbery. In other words, we got a folder, about four
or five folders thick of what the people are saying about
Eugene Livingston. We have nothing on what Eugene
Livingston had to say about this incident, and the best
thing we can do now Eugene is be completely truthful,
because it's over with... 24
In the Phoenix Temple murder case,' Maricopa County, Arizona, de-
tectives used a bold, false co-perpetrator ploy against an innocent man.
Interrog. 1: We can't find anybody who can tell us that you were in
Tucson.
Interrog. 2: But we found four people that say you were in Phoenix
at a church.
Suspect: I wasn't in a church.
Interrog. 1: And those people said that you were in a Blazer and
that you went inside the church and that you know what
happened inside there and that you came out and left
there after (Unintelligible). Now Victor, ah Leo, you
know that that's right. I mean you're shakin' your head
trying to convince yourself, you know, but you cannot
erase what happened. You cannot erase what happened.
You were there.
Suspect: No I wasn't.
Interrog. 1: You went there (unintelligible).
Suspect: I was not there!
Interrog. 1: You know who you were with.
Suspect: No I don't.
Interrog. 1: You know who the people were that were there and you
know what you know about what happened.
Suspect: I don't know anything.
Interrog. 1: Sooner or later, you know, you've got to say it.
124. Interrogation Transcript of Livingston, supra note 113, at 3-4.
125. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Suspect: I, I wasn't there, I was not there.
Interrog. 2: We have four witnesses. We've got absolutely no one in
Tucson, no one in the world that can say you were in
Tucson on that night. We've got physical evidence from
the Bronco's, from the church, and you're tellin' us you
weren't there.
Suspect: I wasn't there!
Interrog. 1: You want to go down for these killings, I mean, you
know, and just take what everybody says that you're
involvement was, I mean that's what we're talking
about.
Interrog. 2: The fingers pointed at you right now, Leo. Not anyone
else, but you.
Suspect: I, I don't know nothin' about that cause I was not here
in Phoenix at that time.
Interrog. 2: Well you're gonna take the rap for it. All yourself, its
gonna be all on your shoulders because everyone else is
saying you, Leo, they're not saying themselves. Hell no,
they're not saying themselves. Sure they're saying they
were there. But you were the one. And that's the way
it's gonna come down, plain and simple, plain and sim-
ple.
Interrog. 1: Leo, we're talkin about murder here. 26
The detectives returned to the confessing co-perpetrators several times
before they elicited a false confession. In fact, the only supposed witness the
police actually had was a psychiatric patient who could not correctly relate the
major facts of the crime:
Interrogator: Leo, there were too many people there, you've got too
many people (unintelligible) eight guys now. You can't
expect 8 guys to keep a secret forever. No way. And, it
has already been opened up, it's over. By the time we
get done with this investigation, we'll have contacted a
number of more people who these people have told, and
all will give an account of what happened that night.
So (unintelligible) we are going to have a bunch of
guys who confessed to the crime, who indicated you
were there, picked your photo out of the photo-lineup.
And then we're going to have all the people that they
talked to giving out the same information and point their
finger at you and say he was there also. You are going
to be standing there alone, denying it, and it is only
going to hurt you. Because, when you walk out this
door, you are going to make a big mistake.
12 7
126. Interrogation Transcript of Bruce, supra note 54, Tape 2, at 34-35.
127. Id. Tape 3, at 12.
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The same team of investigators told another innocent Temple murder
suspect that others had named him:
Interrog. 1: Are all these people lying?
Suspect: I guess. Yes.
Interrog. 1: They're all saying the same lie.
Suspect: Yes, I don't know, I don't know what's going on.
Interrog. 1: What you're saying, what you're saying is that all these
people got together, that they concocted their same story
to cause you problems?
Suspect: I don't know why they picked me out. Why they did it,
I don't know.
Interrog. 1: Did you piss someone off?
Suspect: No.
Interrog. 1: So why, why did they do it?
Suspect: I don't know.
Interrog. 1: Well, there's only one good answer to that. To verify it.
That it did happen.
Suspect: Well maybe they are lying and I don't know why they
did it.
Interrog. 1: But if they're lying Mark, what they're going to do is
tell us a bunch of different little stories (unintelligible)
not the same story.
Suspect: (Unintelligible) the same story. I, I can't remember what
went on.
Interrog. 1: Well, no, you do remember. It's just that, that you don't
want to remember.
Suspect: You think I do, I don't want to be here. I don't know
why you don't believe me, that I don't want to be here.
Interrog. 1: Well, how can I believe you
Interrog. 2: The reason you don't want to be here is you're here
because we know you what you did, but what you knew
about it
Interrog. 1: How, how can we believe what you're saying if it's
totally contradictory of what we're told by other people?
Interrog. 2: One more person, just one more person, hey Pat. We
have (unintelligible). I mean this is, this is a (unintelligi-
ble) just, just one more person.
Suspect: I know, I'm, I'm stuck, I'm, I'm
Interrog. 2: This is going to be getting out of hand. You're going to
be the last one and they're going to lay it all on
you.
1
128. Interrogation Transcript of Nunez, supra note 54, Tape 4, at 18-19.
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v. Technical and Scientific Evidence
(a) Introduction
Suspects can easily counter all types of witness observations that suppos-
edly prove their guilt. They can counter demeanor evidence by rejecting the
investigator's interpretation, eyewitness evidence by claiming it is in error, and
co-perpetrators' evidence by asserting it is a lie. Evidence ploys that are based
on well known technical or modem scientific procedures are likely to be more
influential because the mere mention of a special technology-whether it is
well-known or new--carries the prestige and incomprehensibility of modem
science. Both the guilty and the innocent have a harder time explaining away
evidence that is allegedly derived from scientific technologies.
In the investigation of infant deaths, false and erroneous reports of medi-
cal evidence can be so devastating that they can lead a grieving parent to
misclassify a child's natural or an accidental death as a murder, and result in a
false confession. If an investigator prematurely accuses a parent of a recently
deceased infant by claiming supposedly conclusive medical evidence, the
result can be disastrous.
Sometimes a false medical evidence tactic is directed at a grieving parent
who has literally been taken directly from the emergency room where his or
her child has been pronounced dead. By the time a careful evaluation of the
medical evidence reveals that the death was not a crime, the parent may have
already falsely confessed. "Shaken baby" cases are a particularly difficult and
dangerous problem since even when the report of a significant head trauma is
accurate. Dating the age of the injury is difficult and, therefore, the mere fact
that the suspect was with the infant during the period immediately prior to the
discovery of obvious symptoms of serious injury does not guarantee that he is
the perpetrator. The infant son of the partner of a Los Angeles woman lost
consciousness while she was the only adult in the apartment she shared with
her associate. Medical evidence later revealed that the child's fatal head injury
had happened due to a fall about a week earlier. Despite two visits to hospitals
because of the child's listlessness in the intervening week, his skull fracture
was not discovered until after his death. Although CAT scans done before his
death showed the fracture, no one at the hospital had taken the trouble to
examine the films, and so his condition was missed.
The suspect was brought in for a polygraph examination by a civilian
technician. The polygraph examination, however, was nothing more than an
excuse to put the suspect in a position to be interrogated by an investigator
who used the machine as part of his act. During the primitive and heavy-
handed interrogation, the technician repeatedly threatened and browbeat the
woman. Initially she maintained that she never mistreated the child in any
way. She also repeatedly expressed her fear of being sent to jail and losing
custody of her three children.
The polygrapher was not subtle about coercing the woman. As soon as the
polygraph examination was concluded he departed for a brief time, reappeared,
announced that she had failed, and went to work:
Polygrapher: It's not a question anymore, I'm -not asking you. I
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know what happened, Okay. But what I'm trying to
find out, is this something that happened that was
premeditated, then a cold blooded thing or was it
some accident. 2 9
Over the course of the interrogation the polygrapher pressed the woman to
agree that she had done something to the child that caused his death and that
whatever she had done it was an accident. He stressed tihe accident explanation
forty times during an interrogation that took less than two hours. His repeated
assurances that he was sure that the death was not what it might seem, a pre-
meditated murder, set up two alternatives for the suspect: one leading to a
high level charge and the other to a far less serious punishment.
The woman was adamant that she had not shaken, hit, or mistreated the
infant. When she realized that she was going to jail, the polygrapher suggested
that if she simply cooperated, she would receive the non-jail alternative that he
set up early on:
Polygrapher: I'm here because Billy Jack needs your help be-
cause his doctors need your help, so they know
what the correct treatment is. Maybe you need to go
to parenting classes."'
Although the polygrapher emphasized a non-jail alternative if the death was an




So I'm going to jail for something I didn't do?
No, it doesn't (unclear) into that. (unclear) is one
thing, how did this accident happen.... I'm asking
you to learn from this so it doesn't happen
again.... Now I'm here to accept the reason. I'm
here, I don't mind talking to the detective, calling
back downstairs, say hey look at this wasn't
planned out, there was no plan here, this is how the
accident happened.'




I don't want to go to jail.
Nobody does, we're not talking about that, all I'm
saying is if this was an accident, I need to know, if
it's something simple like losing your patience.'32
Eventually the woman acquiesced and started making up stories that fit
the polygrapher's suggestion of an accident. She was arrested. It was not until
months later that the CAT scan was read and the correct cause of the child's
129. Interrogation Transcript of Sonja Stapleton, Los Angeles, Cal., Police Dep't 13 (Oct. 12,
1994).
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id. at 25.
132. Id. at 32.
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death was determined.
In another southern California investigation, a father was pressured to
admit that he had shaken his baby. San Diego, California, interrogators told
him about the mistaken medical evidence:
Interrogator: There's medical evidence and what you're telling us
does not match the medical evidence. The medical evi-
dence only happens one way and one way only. You
shook your baby whether you meant to or not very, very
hard. Very hard. She can't get bloodshot eyes and hem-
orrhaging in her eyes from just doing what you just
showed us. It's a violent shaking whether you lost con-
trol, lost your temper, whatever reason. And you just
can't sit here and tell us that didn't happen.
These doctors are gonna testify it's a violent shak-
ing. You know what retinas are in the eyes? They're
quite possibly detached. That means pulled away. That
means it's a violent shaking. And we don't think you
did that on purpose. But we know you did it and you
did it quite hard. So you need to tell us how you did it.
Your baby is now dead. And this is very serious. What
you told us today needs to be the truth. We don't think
you meant to do it. Now you're doing real good Jason,
but you got to tell us the truth. Okay? You got to tell us
the truth. 33
(b) Marks Made by Fingers, Mouths, and Shoes
While an investigator will sometimes declare that he possesses scientific
evidence, it is safer to suggest that he may have it and ask the suspect to
respond to this possibility-a ploy that permits the investigator to save face
should the suspect know that he could not possibly have left behind any evi-
dence. For example, a Richmond, California, investigator claimed to possess a
suspect's fingerprints but obviously erred and then attempted to recover in
mid-ploy.
Interrogator Okay. Now my concern is that her fingerprints are going
to come up on your gun for some unknown reason,
okay? Along the same lines, they fingerprinted the con-
doms you have, okay? They fingerprinted the condoms,
you can fingerprint latex.
Suspect: We didn't have a condom, though.
Interrogator Okay, now just listen. They fingerprinted those con-
doms, okay? What I want to know, number one, is are
we going to find her fingerprints on your gun?'34
133. Interrogation Transcript of Albritton, supra note 99, at 76.
134. Interrogation Transcript of DePuy, supra note 108, at 28.
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In San Diego, California, an investigator first made certain that a false
fingerprint claim would be possible:
Interrogator: Did you ever have your fingerprints taken?
Suspect: Yeah. I got, I got arrested for a trespassing on (inaudi-
ble) and when they took me then I got fingerprinted.
Interrogator: What if I told you your fingerprints are all over that
k1ife? And what if I told you that I think that you
stabbed her too? Be up front with me Eric. You've been
up front with me so far. Did you stab her too?3'
In some cases, an investigator may lie and claim that he has access to
new, high-technology scientific instruments with which to extract fingerprints
that will conclusively establish the suspect's guilt. For example, this ploy may
be used when it might otherwise seem unlikely or impossible that police could
have obtained fingerprints from the crime scene such as when a body has been
dumped into the surf at a beach. A Pasco County, Florida, interrogator told a
suspect:
Interrogator: Jeff, I want to explain somethin' to you, what we got
down there. We found your wife, we got tire tracks.
You ever heard of a laser. Know the kind that you shoot
on Star Wars
Suspect: Yeah, I know.
Interrogator: A laser, law enforcement have had a laser, I guess for
what, about three or four years, we've used it. We can
actually get fingerprints off bodies. We actually can.
It's, it's been proven. This is what's made this job a
little easier. Uh, a lot of things go on partner, we're
gonna be talkin' to your babysitter. We'll also be talkin'
to your five year old. Listen to me. You're wife didn't
leave with nobody last night. We're gonna find that
out.',
San Diego, California detectives told a suspect of a non-existent technolo-
gy--the "Cobalt Blue" test-that lifted his fingerprints from a corpse.
Interrog. 1: There's only, the only thing we have left to do and we
have done it because we send them off to a special lab,
okay is, is, she was strangled. What we do is we put,
what we do is we dust, we dust her neck with ah.
Interrog. 2: Cobalt blue.
Interrog. 1: Cobalt blue. Okay? And what we do is when we put
that, when we go ahead and dust it, we have to photo-
graph at the same time that we're dusting because when
you apply pressure on somebody, on somebody, it will
leave, it will leave an imprint. It will leave an imprint.
135. Interrogation Transcript of Jerrod, supra note 96, at 18.
136. Interrogation Transcript of Crouch, supra note 92, at 6.
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Now, these, we took your prints.
Suspect: (Unintelligible).
Interrog. 1: Okay yeah we did take your prints at the time that the
detectives were here. Apparently they did. It's my un-
derstanding because.
Suspect: A method I haven't seen before.
Interrog. 1: Yea well they do it, yeah they do it a little bit different
here in Sacramento than we do. We do the basic, you
know, just the basic ah fingerprints, palms. You know.
We have sent the file and your prints over to the FBI
lab okay? They're gonna go ahead and, and see what
they get on it. There are prints on her. Okay I'm gonna
tell you right now there are prints on there. For any
reason, are your prints gonna be found on her neck? 3 '
A Solano County, California, sheriff's detective told a suspect about a
Ninhydrin Gas Test that does exist and can under some circumstances lift
fingerprints from clothing. The test's ability to retrieve the prints was taken as
certain:
Interrogator: Okay, so let me ask you this. We sent his clothing off to
the Department of Justice Criminalistics Laboratory.
There's a new technique that they use, where, you might
even have heard of it. It's called a Ninhydrin Gas and
they can get fingerprints off of clothing and off anything
now. Paper, currency, and they put it in the tank and
they let the fumes go with it and everything shows up.
Are your fingerprints from your hands, either one hand,
gonna show up on his back as if you pushed him? Think
close cause this is important. On his clothing. On his
outer clothing that he was wearing.'38
Child sexual assault crimes that involve touching or even a small degree
of penetration are unlikely to leave physical evidence. A creative investigator
can easily maneuver around the problem. For example, an Anchorage, Alaska,
interrogator told a suspect:
Interrogator: Well is there any, any reason why we'll find anything
on her-on her clothes or...
Suspect: Oh no go ahead.
Interrogator: Hands or, or uh...
Suspect: Go ahead.
Interrogator Uh, her face or.
Suspect: No.
137. Interrogation Transcript of James Nimblett, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 14 (July 30,
1990).
138. Interrogation Transcript of Michael Johnson, Solano County, Cal., Sheriff's Dep't 45
(Apr. 26-27, 1992).
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Interrogator: In her hair.
Suspect: No go ahead. Go ahead.
Interrogator. Okay and if we do find that where, where does it come
from, where did it come from?
Suspect: It wasn't well I'll tell you what you won't find any on
her because it's - there's nothing there, you know just.
Interrogator. Ok. Robert have you heard about uh, DNA?
Suspect: DNA?
Interrogator Um hum.
Suspect: I know uh. What do you mean?
Interrogator. Uh, DNA, it's a, it's a sys, it's a-a-a scientific method
of uh, identifying people through body fluids such
as...
Suspect: Um hum.
Interrogator: Blood and semen.
Suspect: Oh yeah, yeah, okay yeah.
Interrogator: And all of that uh, and it's, and it's very specific.
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrogator. It's, it's as specific as a...
Suspect: I know they can tell a person (inaudible) semen (inaudi-
ble) what it is you know and.








I've heard about that yeah.
Have you, did, and let me ask you this have you ever
uh, the skin cells, the skin cells right off your hand,
have you ever changed like the, the sheets on a bed or
anything like that. It looks like dust comes off of 'em
uh, what those are is, it's not really dust it's skin cells
even. And when we, we shu, shuffle this off as you





we can use these in DNA also.
Did you know that? Okay. Is there any reason why
we're gonna find any of your skin cells inside of any of
Chelsea's clothes?
39
Sometimes investigators select a suspect for interrogation because they are
139. Interrogation Transcript of Robert Lindell, Anchorage, Alaska, Police Dep't 11-12 (May
6, 1994).
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mislead by erroneous forensic evidence. Flagstaff, Arizona, investigators relied
on a doubly flawed forensic report when they told an innocent man that his
dental impression matched what was erroneously believed to be a bite wound
found on the murder victim:14°
Suspect: I've had that fear. But this is all really weird. I can't
believe this is happening.
Interrogator. (Inaudible) and...
Suspect: Yeah, and I appreciate it.
Interrogator. You know...
Suspect: I.
Interrogator ... bite marks are just like fingerprints.
Suspect: Pardon?
Interrogator- Bite marks are just like fingerprints.'
4
Tucson, Arizona, police simply invented the existence of shoeprints that
supposedly matched a pair of a suspect's shoes:
Interrogator. The, the reason I ask you, okay, is that comparing some
of your shoeprints, with the shoeprints in the wash,
when we went out there Sunday.
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrogator They look like your shoeprints. Okay? And that's why I
need you to, to remember. Okay? Because I've got this
bad feeling that you go down there and you passed out




DNA testing has in many respects transformed the process of criminal
investigation in little more than a decade. So much attention has been given to
the procedure that most people, even those who are generally poorly informed
about scientific advances, have some awareness of its reputation.
Orange County, California, police told a suspect that DNA in saliva found
in a bite wound on the victim's body irrevocably linked her to the crime:
Interrogator. How did your saliva get on her arm then? How did your
mouth get on her arm?
Suspect: I, I had no idea.
Translator- I don't know.
Interrogator This is your mouth okay? You explained to us how it
got on her arm?
140. The supposed bite wound was actually a knife wound. The suspect was shocked by these
test results. See id.
141. Interrogation Transcript of Abney, supra note 55, Interview 3, Video 2, at 45.
142. Interrogation Transcript of Jaxnie Givens, Tucson, Ariz., Police Dep't 12 (Nov. 16,
1995).
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Translator: Then if it was not yours, you, you can explain that how
did your saliva got on, got on, got on to that dead
body's arm?
Suspect: I, I, I had no idea. I had no idea. Could it be some error
made on your test?
Translator: No error was made. One hundred percent accurate. 43
Knowing that a suspect had once been treated at a local hospital, San
Mateo County, California, sheriffs used an elaborate false evidence ploy:
Interrogator: When you're taken into an emergency room when
you're a gunshot victim or you've got any trauma where
it involves the cardiovascular system, in other words
when you're bleeding, what they do is take blood sam-
ples, okay, and they use those blood samples for type
and cross matching. They also keep a blood sample on
hand in case the patient comes back in or needs any fur-
ther blood transfusions. And what they do a test they
call it an examination. They call it type and cross
matching.
Okay? And what that is they, they can go through
and tell what blood type you are, and then they break it
down as far as clotting factors. Well there are a number
of other tests that they can do to the blood, and that's
why they preserve the sample in case anything goes
wrong. They also take urine samples. When they give
you that (unintelligible) bag, you know the bag with the,
uh, urine to, which in this case they did do for you. And
what they do is they go through and they check your
urine. They check to see if there are any, uh, blood cells
in your urine. They also check it for a bunch of other
types of tests.
Uh, the reason I'm mentioning this is because the
incident that we're talking about that occurred on or
about the, uh, Valentine's Day in 1992. And when those
fluids were examined, they positively matched the, uh,
samples that were taken from Stanford Medical Center
of you. Okay? So what I'd like to do, Stephen, is I think
there's an explanation for everything. And, and we try
to give everybody an opportunity to tell their side of the
story. So do you or don't you remember something that
occurred on or about Valentine's Day this year?'"
The ploy was developed further by introducing DNA:
Interrogator: Let's go back to what I first told you. Okay? You had
143. Interrogation Transcript of Peng, supra note 116, at 73.
144. Interrogation Transcript of Stephen Lamont Williams, San Mateo County, Cal., Sheriff's
Detective Bureau Office 5-6 (July 6, 1992).
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your surgery before, they took blood samples.
Suspect: Um-hum.
Interrogator: Stanford Medical Center.
Suspect: Urn-Hum.
Interrogator: They retained one of the blood samples that they re-
tained in the blood bank, and they also do what they call
a printout, and where they print it out, the type and
cross-matching of the blood to show what type of the
blood you have. Subsequent to that, we've had some
tests done on the sample of blood that they had. And
those tests included testing for DNA. Do you know what
DNA is? When they break your blood down.
Suspect: Drugs and Alcohol?
Interrogator: No, no, no. When they break, when they break your
blood down to the cells, individual cell, each individual
cell has a little code inside it. And for each individual,
those codes are different. Okay? Now we had that exam-
ined and then we also had some fluids that were found
at the scene of the crime examined. And so
Suspect: Hey, hold it. I was with somebody and they took a (un-
intelligible), and now I'm in trouble?
Interrogator: Well, let's, put it this way. I'm sure there's some logical
explanation, but we just need some help here. What
they're saying is that the examination of the blood that
they had taken over at Stanford Medical Center from
you in the examination of the fluids at the crime scene,
they break it down to the genetic factor, the DNA, and
they say it's you. No ifs, ands or buts. 45
False evidence ploys based on scientific procedures leave a suspect with
little opportunity for a counter. Investigators represent positive results of fin-
gerprint, hair, or DNA tests as error-free and therefore unimpeachable: "[Tihe
DNA doesn't lie. That's the only thing that doesn't lie,"'" or "This thing is
a scientific test. These things won't lie."' 47
Investigators search for weaknesses in a suspect's denials, seek to exploit
them and move the suspect towards confession. If the evidence ploy does not
prompt a suspect to reverse his denials, the investigator may suggest that the
evidence contradicts at least part of the suspect's previous account. If the
suspect changes any part of his account, even if it is irrelevant to the issue of
guilt, an interrogator will take this as evidence that the suspect is lying and as
informal confirmation of his guilt.
Sometimes even innocent persons will change part of their account to
145. Id. at 22-23.
146. Id. at 53.
147. Interrogation Transcript of Robert Smith, Richmond, Cal., Police Dep't 17 (Mar. 26,
1991).
1997] 1031
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
lessen the pressure they feel to comply. An innocent suspect who makes the
mistake of complying and departing from his initial account on even one mi-
nor point makes a major mistake. Making the change will increase the
investigator's confidence in his guess about the suspect's guilt; he will read
the change as a sign that resistance is weakening and therefore is likely to
become more determined to intensify his attack.'"
A San Diego, California, detective told a murder suspect that his laborato-
ry confirmed a DNA match between the suspect and semen found in the
victim's body. While the interrogator hoped that the tactic would yield a con-
fession, he also suggested that the suspect might admit having had sex with
the victim the evening before her death. If the suspect had agreed, the investi-
gator would have interpreted this change as demonstrating the suspect's guilt.
Interrogator- Okay they took head hair from you, they took ah I don't
know all the other physical evidence that ah that they
did on Monday. Ah I did the all, the autopsy on the
young lady from Balboa Park. I went to the coroners
and we took swabs from her. We took oral, we took
vaginal swabs. We took ah, we combed her public ah
area. Ah we took head hair. We, we did it all. We went
ahead and sent you, sent your blood to our lab as soon
as, as soon as detectives got there. And we matched
them up with the semen that, that, from the young lady.
They matched, so we do have a comparison here.
Suspect: Uh ha.
Interrogator And I'm gonna be very up front with you on that. You
did have sex with her whether or not it was the night
before or that morning. Again, things aren't right and it
may be this gentleman that's down in Stockton right
now may be off but the bottom line is you did have sex
with her. And that's what we're here basically to find
out. Ah they do match. 49
(d) Off-The-Shelf Technology
One way to strengthen an investigator's argument that the suspect has
been found out is to claim the existence of a new technology that links the
guilty party to the crime. A clever investigator can invent a technology that
can link any suspect to any crime and even to any specific act that the suspect
declines to admit. Some investigators are so creative that they seem able to
immediately invent whatever technology is necessary, as a Sacramento, Cali-
fornia, investigator demonstrated:
Suspect: I can't (unintelligible) had no control over how she got,
ah, what whatever, you know what I'm saying, she
148. Interview of Jerry Lee Louis by Toby Hockett in Arcadia, Fla. (July 31, 1992); see also
Interview of Jessie Misskelley by Richard Ofshe in West Memphis, Ark. (Dec. 15, 1993).
149. Interrogation Transcript of Nimblett, supra note 137, at 7.
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could have got bruised coming out of the window.
Interrogator: He didn't tell you about the reticulated demographic, ah
subcutaneous photos. He didn't tell you about that?
Suspect: What is that?
Interrogator: Okay. When a blunt instrument impacts a soft body tis-
sue. . . . There is a chemical, okay, that reacts physically
to damaged enzymes and also subdural contacts with
metal surfaces.... Okay, let's say you're wearing a T-
Shirt and someone walks up to you and puts a knife up
against you, with this chemical that we use we can take
trace elements that are present in, in the metallurgy of a
firearm. And it reacts and it almost looks like a tattoo.
So that we can take that knife or we can take that gun
and we can put it against that reaction, that chemical re-
action and you see ah, trace the object that was against
the person. Okay."s
When inventing new technologies, an investigator is constrained only by
the limits of his imagination and his ability to lie convincingly. For example,
Richmond, California, investigators not only invented the "Neutron Proton
Negligence Intelligence Test," but conducted it on young man and reported
that it conclusively demonstrated that he had fired the gun that killed two
people.
Interrogator: What this is, it's a chemical test Ok. It's good for about
a week. It's the latest thing. It's high tech. What hap-
pens is that those two papers we put on your hands and
the chemicals, it would react with the paper. Take it
down to the lab guy, he runs some tests on it. It's a
presumptive test. That's all it is.
Suspect: What's a presumptive?
Interrogator: Presumptive? That means it's just the first step OK. It
tells me to take Test 2. Test 2, I stick your finger, your
trigger finger is usually the best one cause that's usually
the one people use, stick it in a little, it's like a plastic
thing, close it up and there's little chemical things in
there and they break 'em up. Ok. And the molecules on
your fingers reacts to the neutrons and protons and all of
the other good stuff which I don't really understand, I
just know how to do it, a, I stick your finger in there
and put it in there and I seal it up and then I pop these
three little vials.''
Interrogator- This is the newest thing. The only way to get, if you
handled the gun when it's shot. Just give me your trig-
ger finger. Just stick in here as far as you can. Ok, for a
150. Interrogation Transcript of McCoy, supra note 89, at 114-15.
151. Interrogation Transcript of Smith, supra note 147, at 11-12.
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second. Really get a good reading on it, so that there is
no mistakes. Do you have a piece of white paper that
we can stick in front of this Darryl? So he can, a note
pad will do. These chemicals are so strong, I don't
wanna, I'll bust it with these. Now what it should do if
you haven't fired anything, there's not going to be any
color. Ok. But if there are particles of neutron and pro-
ton and all that gunshot residue stuff, then it'll.
Suspect: Wait! Would them gloves, don't them plastic gloves I
had on.
Interrogator: Were they latex or rubber?
Suspect They are ah, I don't know. I want you to look at them
and tell me because while I put them on.
Interrogator You have some gloves? You have some gloves? Are
they like surgical gloves?
Suspect: Yea, cause when I take them off, they got powder shit
on my, hands.
Interrogator: That's a different kind of powder. However, if you use
the latex gloves, latex aren't good. Ah, if you use.
Suspect: But I didn't.
Interrogator. When you are using those kind of gloves even for cook-
ing your dope, you're taking a real serious health risk.
Cause those gloves, everything goes right through 'em.
That's why we don't don't even use them. Let's just,
let's see. I mean maybe there's nothing here. But if it's
clear, you're in the clear as far as shooting. If there are
colors especially pink. If it shows blue first then pink
that means you fired a gun.
Suspect: I didn't fire no gun.
Interrogator: Watch out when I smash it cause sometimes these break
and the chemicals fly out. Huh. You didn't fire'a gun
but your hand did.
Suspect: My hand didn't fire no gun, officer.
Interrogator: Well, why is that pink man?
Suspect: Man, I didn't fire no gun. That's real.
Interrogator And that's pink Robert.
Suspect: Man, I didn't fire no gun, man that's real.
Interrogator: You have a lab envelope so I can retain this as evi-
dence.
Suspect: Do you have a regular crime lab one?
Interrogator. Yea, there we go.
Suspect: Man, I didn't fire that gun Sgt. Browne. I'm serious,
man.
Interrogator: Well, so am I Robert. This thing is a scientific test.
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These things won't lie. That's why we use them. And as
I was saying before, I have a real hard time believing,
ah, now I have a hard time believing that you didn't fire
that gun out there at least once.
Suspect: Man, I didn't fire that gun, not even once. Man, I swear,
man, I swear I didn't man. Oh no, I didn't shoot that
gun man. If I shot that gun, I would have broke down
and told you man. I didn't shoot that gun.
Interrogator. Robert listen. This is scientific.
Suspect: Man, ya'll. Ya'll. Ya'll. Ya'll framing me with this or
something cause I ain't touched that gun. Man, I swear I
didn't shoot. I touched it but I didn't shoot that gun.
5 2
Interrogator: You didn't fire that gun one time? Up in the air? Into a
wall? Into the ground?
Suspect: Man, I swear I didn't shoot that gun. To my solid mem-
ory man, I didn't shoot that gun.
Interrogator: Well, take a second and research your memory because
the Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test tells me
differently. You sure you didn't test fire it or something.
You had to shoot it somehow.
Suspect: I might have shot it at my brother's house or something.
Interrogator: You might have?
Suspect: I'm telling you the truth.'53
Even so-called evidence as nonsensical as the Neutron-Proton Test can
influence a naive suspect or someone easily intimidated. The target of the
Neutron-Proton ploy described his reactions to the test results.
Suspect: I felt relieved. OK, well I said, now they fixing to know
who, who really did it. Then when you talking about, he
came and said it was positive, then I said, Jesus Christ!
Then I said, man I know you didn't say positive. But
then you tell me that test and everything. Well this test
will show that I didn't do it and then when that test
didn't, man I then, that's when I said fuck that, it's time
to start coming with the truth. Man, look man, I know
whatever I say can't hold up to that fucking thing man,
cause that's ya'll thing. Ya'll invented that thing to
catch killers and man, only thing I say is man, I don't
know.1
5 4
152. Id. at 15-17.
153. Id. at 32.
154. Id. at 41.
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vi. Lie Detector Ploys
One of the most common and influential evidence ploys involves lie de-
tecting machines-whether polygraph devices or voice stress testers. While the
nominal purpose of a lie detection test is to diagnose the subject as truthful or
deceptive, the primary function of any lie detector test administered during an
interrogation is to induce confession.' 5 By creating the impression that the
procedure is infallible and by playing on a suspect's fear of arrest, the lie
detection examination can be a powerful pseudoscientific tool of persuasion
and manipulation. The passages below illustrate how investigators can use
such examinations to lead a suspect to believe that his situation is hopeless.
A San Diego, California, investigator introduced the idea of taking a lie
detector test by saying that he wanted to eliminate a suspect from the investi-
gation. The investigator knew that he would be free to accuse the suspect
regardless of the test results and could feed back a false test result if neces-
sary.
Interrogator: Okay. Let me ask you another question. Would you be
willing to take a polygraph test today?
Suspect: If it's part, if it has to be done I would.
Interrogator: Okay. Let me explain the reason I asked that. I really
want to believe you. You know, I really do. I, I respect
a man like yourself. But there's always that question and
you know as well as I do, and you obviously are a
responsible person, and you're proud of what you ac-
complished. And I think that's to be respected.
Suspect: Right.
Interrogator: Well, Dan and I are proud of what we do and we try
and do the best job we can. And we try and cover all
the bases. And with you in particular, we want to be
real honest with you, we want to get your interview
done and over with so we don't have to bother you
again, so you can go about living your life and we can
go about doing what we need to do. One of the things
that would help us, and you, is if you would be willing
to take a polygraph test.'56
An Anchorage, Alaska, investigator used a similar ploy:
Interrogator: Well you know like the polygraph, if you took that thing
and passed it then you could tell everybody pointin' the
finger at you that you passed it.'
Earlier, the investigator had stressed the downside of not taking the exam-
ination:
155. See DAVID THORESON LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES AND ABUSES OF THE
LIE DETECrOR (1981).
156. Interrogation Transcript of Nance, supra note 95, at 4-5.
157. Interrogation Transcript of Susan Johnson, Anchorage, Alaska, Police Dep't 13 (Sept. 30,
1993).
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Interrogator Charlie took and passed the polygraph. See he's not
afraid to take the polygraph. You've been around long
enough to know that there is no way you can go in there
and pass that polygraph if you did this to Jim. And
that's why you keep stallin', my, my lawyer don't want
me to, my sister don't want me to, I need, I'm sleepy,
I'm tired, I need to sober up, Susan I've heard all those
excuses before from different people. Now I'm not even
gonna ask you to take it.
Suspect: Whatever, whatever.
Interrogator: Any more because it's obvious you don't want to, OK?
And I told you the only reason we wanted you to take it
was to give you an opportunity to show us that you're
telling the truth. But I didn't want you to go in there
because I don't think you'd pass it. I know you
wouldn't pass it.'58
If a suspect questions the validity of the lie detector, the investigator will
claim that the device is highly reliable, if not infallible. He may suggest or
infer that only a guilty suspect would question or refuse to take the examina-
tion and that taking the test will allow him to prove his innocence. A detective
in Sacramento, California, put it this way:
Interrogator Are you saying that you did not ever touch her in her
breast area, vaginal area?
Suspect: Yes, I'm saying that.
Interrogator: Okay, would you be willing to take a lie detector test to
prove that?
Suspect: A lie detector test?
Interrogator: Uh huh.
Suspect: Umm, I don't know, you know, what good are lie detec-
tors?
Interrogator: It gives me an indication.
Suspect: They don't work.
Interrogator. Oh, that's not true. If they didn't work, they wouldn't
use them.
Suspect: Why aren't they legal then?
Interrogator: They're legal, they're just not allowed to be brought into
court.
Suspect: Well that's what I mean about legal. Why aren't they
legal being in court?
Interrogator Because there are a lot of questions there's.
158. Interrogation Transcript of Susan Johnson, Anchorage, Alaska, Police Dep't 4-5 (Sept
28, 1993).
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Suspect: That's what I'm saying you know, that's where I'm, my
first thought was, I mean you know it doesn't prove
nothing.
Interrogator: Yeah, it does prove something.
Suspect: Then why isn't it legal in court?
Interrogator: Because there can be misrepresentations on those parts.
Suspect: Right now, right now I'm getting this claustrophobic
feeling right now because of the fact that I'm suppose to
be innocent until proven guilty, yet I've got to prove my
innocence?
Interrogator: Well, in this situation it's important, that's why I'm
giving you the opportunity to show that. 59
Some investigators tell suspects that the polygraph never makes mistakes
and that it can discern their inner thoughts or, as a Barrow, Alaska, investiga-
tor claimed, "The thing reads your mind.""W With this sort of build up, the
practice of falsifying test results and reporting to a suspect that he failed the
test convinces some innocent persons that they have no hope of escaping
arrest, while for others the tactic can undermine their confidence in their inno-
cence. There is no way for a suspect to rule out the investigator's claim that
his unconscious mind is revealing his guilt, even if he has no awareness of
committing the crime.
An investigator who uses a false lie detector strategy may believe that the
suspect who claims no knowledge of the crime is merely lying. However, for
an innocent who credits the lie detector with the impressive power of plumb-
ing the unconscious, the device reveals a "truth" that becomes increasingly
difficult to deny. For example, Connecticut State Police used this approach
with an innocent teenage male who had no awareness of having killed his
mother. When the investigator later told him that he failed the test, he came to
believe that he was the murderer.
Interrogator: All right. That's why I have this. That reads your brain
for me.
Suspect: Does that actually read my brain?
Interrogator: Oh, definitely, definitely. And if you've told me the
truth this is what your brain is going to tell me.
Suspect: Mm-hm.
Interrogator: If you.
Suspect: Will this stand up to protect me?
Interrogator: Right, right.
Suspect: Good. That's the reason I came up to take it, you know,
for the protection of having.
Interrogator: Let me put it this way, Pete. If you didn't hurt your
159. Interrogation Transcript of Gonsalves, supra note 84, at 53-55.
160. Interrogation Transcript of Adams, supra note 86, at 17.
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mother last night, I'll be only too happy to say so. All
right? If you did, I'll have to say that. All right?
Suspect: Right.1
61
A Sacramento County, California, sheriff's detective worked hard to con-
vince a suspect that he was caught because he supposedly failed his polygraph
and this established his guilt without question:
Interrogator. I uh, I worked your charts. Why don't you turn around
here so we can talk. Worked your charts. In fact, I did
em' a couple of times.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator. And urn, 'member I, how I told ya about uh, how uh,
reliable they are?
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: Based on the type of stuff I do? They are very reliable.
Suspect: Yes, sir.
Interrogator: What uh, what I did was, I did three charts on ya, and
let's say we have a zero.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: And we have a minus nine over here to show that that's
where I would have to go to show that you were decep-
tive. Excuse me, minus thirteen I really have to show,
and it's plus nine. So I don't have to go as far to show
you're telling the truth as I have to go to show you're
telling, telling a lie.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator- Okay. And this is in regards to the shooting incident.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: Okay? Nothing else. I didn't uh, didn't uh, worry about
anything else really.
Suspect: Yes, sir.
Interrogator: Where I ended up was over here at minus twenty-nine,
which means absolutely. I mean I have, I have absolute-
ly no uh, no qualms about it whatsoever as uh, you, you
were being deceptive with me, and I can understand
why. I really can. Uh, you know, as I said I have no uh,
personal thing in this and I, you know, I, I, I really tend
to think that you have been an alright guy and somethin'
happened here that uh, on that particular day that,
somethin's screwed up somewhere. And I went through
the entire report and what you're saying doesn't jive be-
cause of the many witnesses that saw what was going
on.
62
161. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 37-38.
162. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, Sacramento, Cal., Sheriff's Dep't 1-2 (Aug. 20,
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Detectives in Clearwater, Florida, relied on a similar ploy but had to order
the polygraph operator to make a false report to the innocent suspect. When he
did, he told the suspect that his test result was the worst the operator had seen
in twenty-five years.
Interrog. 1: The test says you're a liar.
Interrog. 2: Did you tell him about the other part? I didn't tell him
about the part why he's afraid to tell us, John. Do you
know what it is? Do you know why, John?
Interrog. 1: I know why. He's embarrassed.
Interrog. 2: He's embarrassed to tell us that.
Interrog. 1: That test says you're a liar. No ifs, ands or buts. You're
lying. The test even says you tried to hold your breath
to readjust your breathing through the thing. But you
know what blew it off the screen. He's going to show
you. Your heart. Your heart pumped those needles right
off the screen. He's never seen one that high. This guy's
been doing that for as long as I'm here, I think.
Interrog. 2: Yea, the guy's an expert at it. He's got.
Interrog. 1: You know why your heart. Cause you were a caring
guy. A guy thirteen months on the wagon. A guy who
was trying not to kid himself. You're a fucking liar.
You're lying to us and we're gonna prove you're
wrong.
63
During the interrogation of a false confessor in an Arcadia, Florida, inves-
tigation, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) polygraph opera-
tor refused to make a false failure report to the suspect. The lead investigator,
a FDLE interrogation specialist, took it upon himself to transmit the false
polygraph report. He also confronted the suspect with false fingerprint and
erroneous eyewitness evidence. Shortly after the interrogation started, an offi-
cer was dispatched to contact the alibi witnesses, who verified the suspect's
alibi. Nevertheless, the interrogator coerced a false confession from the sus-
pect.
At the suppression hearing, the interrogator claimed that during the more
than ten hours that followed the verification of the alibi, no one ever told him
that the suspect's alibi was solid and exonerated him. It took over four and
one-half years for the confession to be suppressed and for the man to be re-
leased from jail.'"
A man who falsely confessed described the thinking that led him to com-
ply with an investigator's demand that he take a voice stress test. Although he
was proven innocent of the murder, he was told he failed the test:
Suspect And at this time it was like I just, what's going through
1993).
163. Interrogation Transcript of Sawyer, supra note 74, at 167.
164. See Interview with Louis, supra note 148.
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my mind is I knew that I was going to fail this and I
don't know why, because on the way over I had doubts
about doing this, I said "But," you know, "I don't want
them to think that I'm hiding something so I have to go
through with it."'"
The effect of negative lie detector results, in conjunction with other false
evidence ploys, can be so devastating that it can actually shatter a person's
belief in his innocence as well as convince him that he will be convicted. A
few hours after an innocent man confessed in Oakland, California, he ex-
plained his reaction to being falsely told that he failed the polygraph:
Interrogator: Okay, and the other thing being that we told you we
disbelieved the story you were telling us and the, the,
that in fact that the polygraph, you were uncomfortable
with the polygraph, did that come into this, us convinc-
ing you too, or.
Suspect: Urn, well I, I mean, I'm, I was willing, I was so open to
everything right then and I've been so, that's my prob-
lem right now. I do not have any barriers up and when,
so this polygraph said I was lying and I went God, you
know, maybe I lied. Maybe there is something I can't
remember. I don't recall and then you guys were insis-
tent on, "No, you're lying, you're lying, we know, you
have, you know, fingerprints."'
d. Shifting the Innocent from Confident to Hopeless
The strategy of relying on evidence ploys to lead a suspect to believe that
he has been caught and that admitting guilt does no real harm will work with
some guilty parties. 67 That this strategy can produce the decision to confess
from someone who is guilty is illustrated by the comments of suspects in two
northern California investigations. A Sacramento, California, investigator asked
a suspect who had just confessed:
Interrogator. What made you to decide to admit something in here?
Why did you do it?
Suspect: Because I knew it was hopeless to lie to you.'
A suspect in a San Francisco, California, murder investigation described
how the perception that he had been caught altered his decision making:
Interrogator. You explained to us in great detail what happened in
San Francisco and about the murder.
Suspect: The only reason why is because I'm gonna be found
165. Interview of Martin Salazar by Richard Ofshe 36 (May 16, 1996).
166. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 4, at 25.
167. See Moston et al, supra note 5 (discussing strength of evidence on three factors that
predict the decision to confess).
168. Interrogation Transcript of Schmitt, supra note 85, at 142.
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guilty anyway."6
The sanguine and resigned attitude expressed by these two guilty parties is
a far cry from what an innocent is likely to say. Innocent persons and some
guilty parties struggle to maintain their position of denial and express their
shock by stating that a mistake has been made, offering reasons why the
interrogator's reported evidence is in error, and offering to undergo whatever
testing will establish their innocence. For example, a man erroneously accuscd
in a Boynton Beach, Florida, investigation reacted to his interrogator's use of
both flawed and false eyewitness claims as follows:
Interrog. 1: I can put you there at the house today. I know you were
there today.
Suspect: I was not there.
Interrog. 2: The boy says you were there.
Suspect: I was not there. I was not there.
Interrog. 1: Why would the boy mistake you for somebody else,
saying "Martin was here?"
Suspect: I have no idea.
Interrog. 2: I mean you're pretty distinct; you're kind of big like me,
you know.
Suspect: I was not there. I mean I'll swear on a stack of bibles;
I'll take a polygraph, anything. I was not there. I left my
house.
Interrog. 1: Paul never came in one morning and busted you having
sex with her.
Suspect: No, he did not. I've never had sex with that woman.
Interrog. 1: Why are all these people lying about you, then?
Suspect: I have no idea. I mean I don't even know what all this
is about. 7 '
A few days after his arrest, a wrongfully accused defendant in an Arcadia,
Florida, investigation described his emotional reaction to some of the false
evidence ploys used during his interrogation:
Defendant: Yeah, and he tells me, he looks at me and he says, we
got your fingerprint. No, the first thing he told me was,
when he took out, he took out my picture, right, my
pictures, he told me the people identified me.
Attorney: Well, tell me in, try to play him for a second and I'm
you, and he comes in and sits down. You be him and
tell me what he said.
Defendant: You've been identified by the witnesses. You've been
pointed out.
Attorney: What did you say?
169. Interrogation Transcript of Anderson, supra note 114, at 34.
170. Interrogation Transcript of Salazar, supra note 119, at 27.
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Defendant: I say, how am I going to be pointed out when I wasn't
there? Are you sure they ain't talking about a Mexican,
because I always get mistaken as a Mexican, right?'7'
Determined to prove his innocence, this man had had a heated argument with
his interrogator, insisting that the evidence could not be true and that the tests
should be re-done.
Defendant: He said they are my fingerprints.
Attorney: Okay.
Defendant: All right, and I sit there and told him, how can my
fingerprints match up to someone else's fingerprints?
And the only thing I knew of history of fingerprints,
don't no man's fingerprints even match the next man's
fingerprints.
Attorney: Okay.
Defendant: All right, but yet he said, told me again, they's your fin-
gerprints. Now, I know you was at the store, now.
Attorney: All right. What did you say?
Suspect: Now, I'm getting mad again.
Attorney: And what did you do then?
Suspect: So then I just kept telling him, I don't know how my
fingerprints match up to somebody's, y'all better redo
them fingerprints. Because my fingerprints don't match
up to nothin in that store, because I ain't been in that
store."
Once the accusatory phase of interrogation begins, an investigator does
not attempt to discriminate between denials or alibi claims that are truthful
protestations by an innocent suspect or the flimsy lies of a guilty party. It no
longer matters that the interrogator cannot distinguish truth from lies because
he has been trained, above all else, to express unwavering confidence in the
suspect's guilt. To maintain the facade of well-founded certainty, an interroga-
tor must clearly establish that no amount of denial will shake his belief in the
suspect's guilt.
For an innocent suspect, the experience of suddenly being embroiled with
a person in authority who levels serious accusations of guilt but is unwilling to
acknowledge the possibility that they may be false must be akin to awakening
and discovering that you have changed into a cockroach and that no amount of
breast beating will alter the situation."" A Maricopa County sheriff's office
investigator told an innocent suspect in the Temple murder case:
Interrogator Well, uh, we have a problem. And, uh, the problem is
that, you know, your name has come up in this deal.
171. Interview of Louis, supra note 148.
172. Id. at 49.
173. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE METAMORPHOSIS, IN THE PENAL COLONY, AND OTHER STORIES
(Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1995) (1919).
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Okay? And, uh, for your name to come up, I mean, we
just didn't wake up and open the newspaper one day
and, uh, you know, pick your name out or throw a dart
at a dart board and say come down and pick you up, al-
right?
And, uh, there has been some, uh, you know, state-
ments and information given and that has checked out.
You know, uh, almost one hundred percent okay? Leo,
your time has come, man. Okay, your time is now. And
you got a big, heavy, giant weight on your shoulders. I
can tell by looking at you.""
For an innocent suspect, the steadily growing list of inculpatory facts
makes it increasingly difficult to classify the interrogation as a simple mistake.
Wrongly accused suspects frequently come to see themselves as either being
set up or railroaded. A man who had falsely confessed described the experi-
ence in an interview:
Suspect: What made me most scared is at one point I thought I
was being, you know, framed or set up by somebody,
because once again, I don't remember which one of the
interrogations it was, but they drew a picture of the cord
for me when they were asking me, "Don't you think
your fingerprints are going to be on this cord?" and this
and that, "Because the end of the cord is pretty flat so,
you know, you can get a pretty good fmgerprint on
there." And I believe it was Shelke who asked Griswald
to draw a picture of it for me." 5
Regardless of the theory that the innocent suspect entertains, he cannot
fail to understand that the case against him is airtight, that his arrest is inevita-
ble and that his fate is determined.
Interrogator: I'll tell you what we know about you. You were in-
volved with the incident at the Temple. Plain and sim-
ple. And you're gonna go down hard. You're gonna go
down hard because everyone else is gonna put the shit
on you. Like they already have. 6
Each time the suspect objects, the interrogator has an opportunity to re-
peat the list of facts that irrefutably confirm his guilt. As the false confessor in
Arcadia, Florida, described the experience:
Defendant: All right, then he gave me the impression I ain't going
nowhere, see what I'm saying, and then they told me
my fingerprints matched, which I kept continuously
telling them, well, how can my fingerprints match some-
thing when I wasn't there. They told me they had, I
174. Interrogation Transcript of Bruce, supra note 54, Tape 1, at 11-12.
175. Interview of Salazar, supra note 165, at 90-91.
176. Interrogation Transcript of Bruce, supra note 54, Tape 2, at 40.
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failed the polygraph test, now, see, now I done got to
the point where I know I didn't do nothing, but they
telling me that I done something and ain't no way for
me to get out of it, see what I'm saying? So the only
way out for me, for me to get out, was to tell them what
they told me.
Attorney: Why did you feel that was going to do anything for
you?
Defendant: Because, I knew it wasn't going to do nothing good for
me, I'm just saying. I knew it wasn't going to do noth-
ing good for me, I just knew either way it went, I was-
n't going nowhere, see what I'm saying? That was the
impression I was getting. They say, we have your fin-
gerprints, your fingerprints matched, you failed the poly-
graph test, all right, witnesses, pointed you out, all
right.'"
During an interrogation in the Phoenix Temple murder case, a Maricopa
County, Arizona, sheriff's detective made it clear that the suspect's statements
during the interrogation would determine his fate. Eventually this man con-
fessed falsely to executing nine people. Under pressure to provide a post ad-
mission narrative of the crime, he used the information with which he had
been deliberately contaminated during the interrogation and invented a descrip-
tion of how it happened. Although much of what he invented was wrong,
because he had been told how the killings were done he was able to correctly
describe how the death wounds were made. He explained that he placed the
barrel of the rife at the base of each victim's skull and fired. If this man's
innocence had not been independently established and the interrogation dem-
onstrating his contamination had not been recorded, his ability to contribute
this sort of precise information would almost certainly have led to his convic-
tion and incarceration.
The interrogator reversed the suspect's denial and elicited a false confes-
sion by convincing him that his situation was hopeless:
Interrogator- OK. Airight, the bottom line is, ok, we got you in the
Blazer and the Bronco goin to the church that night, ok.
You're one of 8 people in the Bronco and Blazer at the
church that night Leo. And it's all over with, it is all
over with. The game's up, aright.
Now let me tell you something, man, this is the
biggest moment of your life right here. You gotta make
a decision.
Another innocent Temple murder suspect expressed his mounting confu-
sion and fear.
Interrog. 1: So these other people that are telling these facts?
177. Interview of Louis, supra note 145, at 16-17.
178. Interrogation Transcript of Bruce, supra note 54, at 29.
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They're the same. How could they be lying? So it had
to be you cause you tell us something totally different. I
don't know what you're talking about. Mark it don't
make sense. You understand common sense.
Suspect: Yes, I understand.
Interrog. 1: You think a judge uh prosecutor is gonna believe that
Mark doesn't know what he's talking ab ut, Mark has
no knowledge about what's going on?
Suspect: I don't believe this is happening.
Interrog. 1: Mark, you have to believe this is happening because it
happened about a month ago.
Interrog. 2: It's not gonna go away either.""
Later, he expressed more about how he was reacting to the interrogation:
Suspect I'm scared, I don't know where to go, I don't know
what to do, what to say. And you're telling me I know
something I don't know. And I don't, I don't, how is
that supposed to feel? Tell me that what someone going
to feel your gut busted out and stuff like this. You, your
held for two hours and not knowing what's going on
and someplace out of town and blamed for something
that you, you weren't there, or didn't do."
In Sacramento, California, a detective graphically drove home the nature
of the situation of a young man who had witnessed a murder but had initially
claimed that he had not been at the crime scene:
Interrogator. Well I hear you failed the polygraph.
Suspect: I just can't get that picture out of my head, Sir. I know,
I know in my heart and soul I, I did not shoot that man,
Sir. I saw everything that happened. I saw every, I saw
when he got hit. I saw him jump. I heard the girls
screaming', but I didn't shoot the man, Sir. I'd never
shoot the man. I did not touch the gun. I did not know
the gun was in the car, Sir. I was, maybe I could have
stopped it. I know I probably could have stopped it, but
its, it seemed like it happened too fast and I don't know,
I was just stuck in one spot. When you showed me
those pictures of the men, I know those men. And I
know that you knew, that I knew those men, and I apol-
ogize for lying to you. Uh, uh.
Interrogator: Well at this point Cheval, I'm, I'm not here trying to
help myself. Frankly I've got you by the balls.
Suspect: Yes, sir."'
Vallejo, California, police investigators conveyed the message that there
179. Interrogation Transcript of Nunez, supra note 54, Tape 3, at 10.
180. Id. Tape 4, at 8.
181. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, supra note 162. at 33.
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was no way out for a man they wanted to use as a witness against members of
a group that robbed a Loomis Armored Car facility and killed three men. The
threat of a death penalty eventually motivated him to confess falsely, but his
attempt to save himself fell apart because he could not supply the information
the investigator's demanded: 82
Interrog. 1: We've got you, and we've got Mr. Young. You may not
realize it yet, that we have you.
Interrog. 2: You should realize it, but you don't.
Interrog. 1: That man is gonna come into court and testify to that
and more. You know why the jury's gonna believe him,
beyond the fact that he knows so much about the crime,
one of the uh, uh arrangements that we have with this
man is that if we prove he's lyin', deal's off, but we can
still use the tape against him. We can play the tape
against him in court, where he just admitted killing two
people, and we can go all the way.
This is a special circumstance crime. You know
what that potentially means. If that man is lying, the, the
one count of first degree murder is out the door, and he
can be tried for everything that he was involved in.
There's no way that man's not gonna be found guilty. I
got him on video tape, admitting to killing two people.
You think he's gonna jeopardize his life to lie about
you.1
8 3
Later, this man expressed his comprehension of his circumstances:
Interrog. 1: Eu, Eugene, everybody that tells us these things, the, the
only response you can have is that they're not being
truthful. Is it possible Eugene that you're not being
truthful with us?
Suspect: I'm being very truthful. I'm just in awe basically at this
nightmare, and these people that you went and be on the
front line at war with me. I'm dead.
Interrog. 2: Well Eugene it's not a nightmare, cause you wake up
from a nightmare, but tomorrow when you wake up,
this'll still be there.1
8 4
He perceived the interrogation to be his worst nightmare because he under-
stood the interrogators' message perfectly: the (false and erroneous) evidence
the police were confronting him with was going to lead a jury to sentence him
to death:
182. This man stood trial for the triple murder because of his coerced confession, only to be
acquitted by a jury who watched his interrogation and confession on videotape. The jury consid-
ered the videotape in light of the fact that the state had no evidence except that he admitted partic-
ipation in a crime he could not describe, with others whose identities he was unable to supply,
even when complying with the interrogator's demands would save his life. See infra text accom-
panying notes 263-65.
183. Interrogation Transcript of Livingston, supra note 113, at 48.
184. Id. at 126.
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Interrogator Let, let's get right down to it the chase here, what are
you worried about? What are you worried about? If, if
you was to tell us the truth of what's happened out
there, what's your main concern, because it's obvious to
me that you're worried about something, because look-
ing at you right now, all, everything you're doing here
you're tellin me you do wanta be straight up with us,
something is worrying ya. What's worrying ya?
Suspect: Well I'm worried this right here, that uh what I'm tell-
ing you, and you guys seem to have patched enough
things to present to the court room and make me look
guilty. Uh, so that means I gotta go to the gas chamber
for something I didn't do, that's what worries me."
Flagstaff, Arizona interrogators threatened a woman with losing her chil-
dren and spending twenty-five years in prison if she did not comply with their
demands:
Suspect: Please don't do this to me. (Sobbing). You guys let me
take my kid to my parents.
Interrogator. No.
Suspect: And talk to my parents.
Interrogator. No, we'll let your
Suspect You guys can drive with me! Please!
Interrogator: We're gonna call them and have them come in and pick
them up. Let them know.
Suspect: How can you call my parents?
Interrogator We're gonna go out there. We're gonna send an officer
out there, okay. And
Suspect Gil, you can't take me to jail, I didn't do anything. I'm
begging you, please, I didn't do anything. (Crying).
Interrogator. Get up, Trena.
Suspect I didn't do anything (sobbing), I swear I didn't do any-
thing! I didn't do anything, honestly, I swear to God I
didn't! (Crying)
Interrogator. Trena. Trena. Get up off your knees."'
In a post-interrogation interview, a young man in Oakland, California,
recounted his reaction to the fabricated evidence the investigators introduced
and to the stress of the interrogation:
Interrogator [I]f I can reiterate, we had, we've put evidence having
you in the area earlier, you were told that we had an
eyewitness putting you in the area further down than
185. Id. at 70.
186. Interrogation Transcript of Trena Richardson, Flagstaff, Ariz., Police Dep't 77 (Apr. 20,
1994).
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you're admitting to being, that it was our belief that
your story was, you were telling us a lie and that the
fourth thing you said was that the polygraph had scared
you. I guess the physical surrounding of the machine
and the fact that you always had to be in control while
answering the questions in a cooperative manner.
Suspect: Urn, (pause) the eyewitness I'm not sure about. Some-
how that, I mean that because I was scared and that you
believed that I had been further down in whatever evi-
dence you had for that and somehow you picked up my
two fingers and said that those were somewhere down
there. Um, and the polygraph scared me, my arm was
blue, and uh, I had to be in control 'cause I was trying
to cooperate and all these an, questions (pause) and
trying to (pause) picture her and stuff is just.
Interrogator: Okay. But, the sum total of those four items, those four
items, is what made you tell us incorrect information, is
that correct?
Suspect: Um, (pause), yeah, yeah. And the, the polygraph.
Interrogator. And those.
Suspect: Yeah, all that.
Interrogator: All that. Is, is that the total.
Suspect: I was shocked. I was distraught, shocked past th(
Interrogator:
belief
that yes ... there is a possibility.
Is that the sum total of the, of the things that played on
you that...
Suspect: That's what convinced me, that's what convinced me
that there was a possibility that I might have killed
her.' s
An Arcadia, Florida, defendant who falsely confessed described how the
detectives' tactics during the first phase of questioning induced feelings of
hopelessness:
Defendant: I done gave up hope on everything nor, all right, be-
cause I ain't never see, I ain't never see, I ain't never
been put in no position like that, see what I'm saying? I
hadn't been put in no position like that, to be answering
the same questions over and over when you sit there and
try to purely tell the person what you had done, and you
ain't done this and that, and they say you have, see what
I'm saying, saying you done this and that. I done got to
the point where I just gave up hope on everything now.
All right, I didn't care about myself no more, right. I
187. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 4, at 4-5.
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didn't care about anything.'
If an investigator offers to accept a self-defense version of a crime and
helps the person understand that this is his way out, the person will from then
on be aware that he can escapethe punishment of the interrogation by accept-
ing the deal. A young false confessor who had witnessed a murder and was
subsequently accused as the killer in a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, investigation
described his experience:
Suspect: I remember just wanting to get it over with, telling him
whatever he wanted. I wanted to tell him whatever he
wanted to hear just so I could get the whole thing over
with, so I could get out of there and just, if I was an old
man, I would probably have had a heart attack. I mean
that's how I felt. I just wanted to get it over with. It hurt
so much, I just wanted to get it over with, no matter
what it, I just wanted to get it over with and told him
what he wanted to hear."'
A man who confessed falsely during a Clearwater, Florida, investigation
described the cumulative effect of the stress of the sixteen-hour-long interroga-
tion, the shock of finding himself accused, the despair that the several false
evidence ploys created, the loss of confidence he experienced when told that
he failed the polygraph, the confusion when he was told that he didn't remem-
ber the killing because he had a blackout, and the fear he felt when he was
threatened with the death penalty if he did not agree with and confess to ev-
erything the interrogators demanded he say:
Suspect: The truth is and this is gonna piss you off.
Interrogator. Tom!
Suspect: The truth is, the only reason I'm telling this stuff is
because you got evidence to get me. I don't believe I
did it. That's why I want to talk to somebody. I'm going
fuckin bananas. 9
188. Interview of Louis, supra note 148, at 26.
189. Interview of Adams, supra note 122, at 52.
190. Interrogation Transcript of Sawyer, supra note 74, at 291.
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2. Step Two: Eliciting the Admission 9'
a. Introduction
Once the investigator has introduced all of the evidence he intends to use
or invent, he shifts his attention to eliciting the admission "I did it." Most
often guilty suspects have to be motivated to admit guilt, but some become so
convinced that resistance is futile that they end the cat-and-mouse game by
confessing at this point. For an adolescent in San Diego, California, the piece
of evidence that finally broke his resistance was that his girlfriend and co-
perpetrator had confessed and described his role in the crime:
Interrogator: Why are you blaming it on Ryan?
Suspect: (Crying). I'm not! I didn't do it!
Interrogator- Why wouldn't Danielle say that Jarod didn't have any-
thing to do with it, it was all Ryan?
Suspect: (Crying).
Interrogator: Why wouldn't she tell me that? You guys are boy-
friend/girlfriend.
Suspect: You guys are good. It was me and Danielle. You guys
are good.
Interrogator No, we're not good. I just, like I was saying, Jarod, I
don't think.
Suspect: Me and Danielle did it. 92
From the point at which the investigator re-focuses on eliciting the admis-
sion, the central issue of the interrogation becomes why the suspect should
agree to tell the truth. This demand has entirely different meanings for guilty
and innocent suspects. The investigator's meaning for the phrase "tell the
truth" is that the suspect should comply, admit guilt, and make an accurate
confession that confirms what the investigator believes happened. A guilty
suspect easily and correctly understands what the investigator wants at the
conclusion of step one, just as clearly as he did at the start of the interroga-
tion. Given that the investigator has accomplished his goal and has succeeded
in leading the suspect to reach a new appraisal of his circumstances, he will
have come practically full circle from his position at the start of the interroga-
tion. In the beginning, when he forcefully rejected the investigator's accusation
and demand for an admission, he viewed the cost of confessing as high. Want-
ing to avoid arrest, he had everything to lose by admitting guilt and nothing to
191. In the illustrations below, the interrogators' evidence ploys are entirely fabricated in
examples taken from cases in which the suspect is innocent, and may or may not be fabricated in
cases in which the suspect committed the crime. The likely guilt or innocence of suspects has not
been identified in all of the case illustrations. It should therefore be kept in mind that the
interrogator's repeated assertions that the suspect's position is hopeless does not mean that his
statements about the case evidence are accurate. In the illustrations below, this is rarely the case.
A presumption that what the interrogator says is true and that the suspect is guilty will cause the
reader to misperceive the situation of the person who receives the interrogator's intended
persuasive communication.
192. Interrogation Transcript of Jarod, supra note 109, at 54.
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gain. By the conclusion of step one of the interrogation process, his appraisal
of his situation has almost reversed itself-now he has almost nothing to lose
by admitting what has become obvious but has not yet been shown what he
has to gain.
An innocent suspect at the same point in the interrogation process hears a
different message. For him, the truth is what he has been saying all along and
the investigator's abhsnhIt rejection of it has taught him that the investfigator's
"truth" is something different. He understands that the demand for the
investigator's "truth" is a request for a false confession. While certainly not
having come nearly full circle, his situation, too, is different from what it was
a few hours earlier. His calm about speaking with the police has been replaced
by distress, a fear that his life has changed, and a realization that he is about
to go to jail. He has discovered that being innocent means little. The night-
mare of the interrogation, however, remains as incomprehensible as it was
when he was first accused.
Fundamentally, an innocent person's appraisal of his circumstances and
options is similar to that of a guilty party's, except that the innocent knows
that what is happening is unjust and this knowledge affects his willingness to
confess. Because he knows he is innocent, both his will to resist making a
confession and his distress at the prospect of being arrested are likely to be
greater than what a guilty party feels. A guilty suspect will have been aware
from the start of the adversarial nature of his relationship with the interrogator
and of his jeopardy. Unlike the innocent who hopes that he can change the
interrogator's position and avoid arrest, the guilty party is likely to realize that
this will not happen. His knowledge that he committed the crime and that the
evidence simply will not go away forces this realization. If the stress of inter-
rogation becomes too intense, he knows he can terminate it.
The innocent suspect is likely to cling to the hope of bringing the situa-
tion back to normal, is likely to be adamant that he won't admit to something
he did not do and may be experiencing considerable stress. Although his
Miranda rights are known to him, invoking them does him no good since his
goal is to reverse the process that is bringing him to arrest. The investigator
has made him realize that once the interrogation ends he will be arrested. To
alter the process, he must not only continue to resist confessing but must
convince the investigator of his innocence. If he stops protesting his inno-
cence, even if he does not confess, he will have accepted the fate the investi-
gator has told him is certain-arrest, prosecution, and conviction.
What the innocent does not know at this point is that during the next
phase of the interrogation his situation will be made to seem far worse than he
has as yet imagined. The investigator will confront him with a more detailed
analysis of his future-one full of reasons why he must not only confess but
must do so immediately if he wants to minimize the damage he is about to
sustain.
In a typical interrogation of a guilty suspect, the interrogator's task is
straightforward. In order to bring a guilty suspect full circle and change denial
into admission, the interrogator must now show the suspect that he has some-
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thing to gain by making an admission. 93 Since the guilty suspect now per-
ceives himself as having been caught, offering even a small benefit may lead
him to reason that admitting the obvious changes the situation little, if at all,
and making the admission results in some small improvement in his situation.
If the suspect can be led to consider only the possible futures that the interro-
gator wishes him to evaluate, he is likely to conclude that confession leaves
him better off than remaining silent.
Investigators have at their disposal a range of increasingly valuable incen-
tives that can be introduced to precipitate a decision to confess. Whether they
realize it or not, investigators are engaged in a rather straightforward negotia-
tion in which they seek to buy the admission as cheaply as possible. The
interrogators' incentives range from non-coercive, legally permissible psycho-
logical benefits to the strongest sorts of threats and offers of leniency (which
presumably the investigator realizes are illegitimate). Although some interroga-
tors are quite willing to make blatant threats and promises, 9 they usually
resort to indirect methods for issuing threats and promises.
Investigators behave as if they are engaged in a negotiation. They are
aware both that incentives vary in strength and that offers of a material benefit
and threats of harsher punishment are prohibited and must be communicated
subtly. This is illustrated in the excerpt from a San Mateo, California, child
sexual abuse investigation detailed below. This interrogation was being con-
ducted following a policy of avoiding advisement of Miranda by telling the
suspect that he was free to leave prior to the start of the interrogation. The
suspect had been picked up at his home and taken to the station to answer
some questions about the sexual molestation of his niece. The investigator
confronted the suspect with some false and some true evidence indicating that
the offense of sexual abuse of a child could be substantiated. The evidence
convinced the suspect of his imminent arrest: "What, what can I say? I'm
getting charged here?"'95
Rather than responding to the suspect's comment with the straightforward
answer that he would be arrested, as the leading training manual advises in-
terrogators to do,"9 this interrogator manipulated the situation by immediate-
ly bringing up the child's need for treatment. In using this maneuver, he avoi-
ded honestly answering the suspect's query and not only avoided informing
him of the inevitability of his arrest, but also introduced the idea that the
repair of the child and the family was the primary consideration. Consistent
with avoiding the Miranda advisement, this investigator's strategy was de-
signed to mislead the suspect about his criminal jeopardy and focus his atten-
tion on suggested non-jail resolutions. The interrogator's apparent strategic
purpose was to lead the suspect to conclude that he could avoid arrest if he
cooperated and made an admission. Hence, as first step, the interrogator
193. A recent observational study found that 88% of suspects are exposed to some sort of
appeals to self interest. See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4, at 267.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 96-130.
195. Interrogation Transcript of Domingo Villaneuva, Redwood City, Cal., Police Dep't 15
(Nov. 11, 1996).
196. See INBAU Er AL., supra note 20, at 196-97.
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stressed treatment for the child and repair of the family as the primary issue:
Interrogator:. Well, I'm hoping for the truth because what I've got is,
I've got a family who has a five year old daughter that
has been, had sex with. I mean she's okay. But the lon-
ger we drag this out, going back and forth, whether you
did it or you didn't do it.
Suspect: I didn't do.
Interrogator- That's not going to help her out any. Um, best thing for
the families, I've done a lot of these cases, and if there's
a hope of getting the family to get reunited, you know
through therapy or through, you know."9
In his next attempt to motivate an admission, the investigator sweetened the
offer. He played down the seriousness of the crime and emphasized that no
physical harm had been done to the child-her injury was easily repaired. The
investigator expanded his offer of "therapy" and suggested it as a non-jail
alternative for the suspect:
Interrogator: Like I said, she's okay. She's not you know, beaten up,
she's not, you know, doesn't need to be hospitalized.
She just maybe needs to talk to a therapist or something.
And, and, uh, in time she's gonna be okay. And now
what I'm looking at is whether you're gonna be okay.
And you're telling me that this didn't happen when I've
got everything that says it did happen. And that you're
the one that was there when it, urn, what, what are we
gonna do here? I want to make sure that...
Suspect: I wasn't there, though.
Interrogator: ... that you get help if you need it or if you want it.
In his third attempt to motivate an admission, the interrogator again re-
viewed the false evidence to remind the suspect of his situation and then fo-
cused his thinking on the harm associated with remaining silent at this point.
The suspect asked another question about his future. This time the question
allowed the investigator to answer with information that did not change the
subject. But his answer differentiated between the alternatives of silence and
admission. The interrogator associated silence with the prospect of the suspect
appearing before a judge while the admission alternative was associated with
treatment, "just being done with it," and being able to "put this stuff behind
you," which did not necessarily include time in jail.
Interrogator: Well, here's some things that, that they have done at the
hospital. They collected specimens from her and whether
or not you did this, they're gonna be able to compare
body fluids from her, they collected off of her with you.
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interviewer- Okay. And that will be a real definitive way, you know,
197. Interrogation Transcript of Villanueva, supra note 195, at 15.
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whether you actually did or not, regardless of whether
you said you didn't do it and, um, I'm hoping that if,
you'd be honest with me in the beginning and then we
get a confirmation through medical science that this did
happen. And that's why I got you here today, so you
can tell me everything that happened. Like I said, you're
not a bad person if this did happen. But if you're look-
ing at not telling the truth from the beginning, its just
gonna be all the worse later on down the road so.
Suspect: What do you mean the worse?
Interrogator: Well, what's gonna happen is we're gonna sit down in
front of a judge and we're gonna have a bullshit story
that you're telling me right up front, when we know
different, when the evidence suggests different. That's
what I'm asking you, just be honest. I mean, you got a
lot inside of you that I'm sure you want to just get out
and just be done with it. And the only way that you're
going to be able to put this stuff behind you is by telling
the truth right now. So how did this happen?'"
As the record of the interrogation substantiates, the suspect concluded that
if he confessed to some bad acts but not to the act that had been associated
with jail time (i.e., sexual intercourse), he was better off since he would re-
ceive treatment instead of punishment. He admitted to sexual contact with the
child weeks earlier, but maintained that he had not even touched the child ear-
lier that day and so could not be the donor of the semen the investigator al-
leged was found in her vagina. In fact no semen was found in the child's
vagina, and so the suspect was undoubtedly telling the truth on this point.
The investigator worked to support the delusion his tactic had creat-
ed-that admitting to other acts of sexual abuse would result only in treat-
ment, not punishment. After the suspect began making admissions to acts of
sexual abuse short of intercourse, the investigator reinforced the conclusion
that this could be handled privately:
Suspect: You can't go, tell my family all this shit.
Interrogator- You know, look you're nineteen years old.
Suspect: Yeah, Yeah, I gotta grow up.'
Still later, the suspect again expressed his concern that everything be kept
private. The suspect's concern about keeping this confidential is consistent
only with the expectation that he would not be charged and tried. Again, the
investigator supported the suspect's deluded conclusion:
Suspect: I don't want this shit going out to (unclear) you know.
Interrogator To, to what?
Suspect To my friends or my family members.
198. Id. at 17.
199. Id. at 21.
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Interrogator: Well, I'm not here to bad mouth you to your friends or
anybody else. But you, you think that her parents have a
right to know what happened. Right, they're her parents.
They have a right to know what happened in order that
she can get better. And in order for you to get better,
you're going to have to face them sooner or later. Okay.
Its not something that you're gonna be able to hide
forever, 'cause that's not something that's gonna make
you get better, just by putting your head in the sand and
saying this never happened.'
As illustrated above, a suspect who knows he is guilty and is convinced
that he has been caught is likely to search for ways to better his situation and
is in the market for the incentives the investigator offers. A suspect who is
innocent is likely to focus on correcting the error that is happening all around
him and will likely see confessing falsely as having a great cost. A guilty
suspect in the same factual situation but trying to decide whether to confess
truthfully will likely focus rapidly on minimizing his punishment.
If an investigator is committed to obtaining a confession but is interrogat-
ing an innocent suspect, he is likely to discover that eliciting an admission of
guilt is far more difficult than what he is accustomed to having to contend
with. 1 In order to get an innocent to confess falsely, an investigator will
have to introduce strong threats for remaining silent and strong promises of
substantial benefit for giving the false confession.
b. Low End Incentives: Moral and Self-Image Benefits"°
Tactics that communicate incentives at the low end of the continuum
involve reminding the suspect of the emotional benefits of truth telling versus
the continuing emotional distress associated with denying guilt. For example,
an investigator may emphasize the moral or self-image benefits the suspect
will experience if he tells the truth, as happened to an innocent suspect in
Flagstaff, Arizona:
Interrog. 1: George, you're the type of person that you're going to
have to tell this to somebody. You cannot live with
yourself unless you get it out and say I did not mean to
do this. It's a mistake. I want to try to make right what I
did wrong. And that's the type of person that you are.
You have to be commended for that.
Interrog. 2: You don't want to carry this with you any longer. We
200. Id. at 16.
201. The most recent observational study of interrogation found that 23% of suspects interro-
gated made incriminating statements and an additional 42% confessed in run-of-the-mill interroga-
tions. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4, at 280.
202. A recent study of interrogation in the United States observed that in 37% of cases,
interrogators appealed to the importance of cooperating as part of their strategy for eliciting an ad-
mission. Interrogators appealed to the suspect's conscience 23% of the time, and used praise or
flattery in 30% of the cases. Id. at 267.
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know that. That's what you came here for. You came
here to leave something here, and that's what you need
to do is to leave it here, and you'll leave it.2 °3
A Richmond, California, investigator emphasized the purity of truth tell-
ing:
Interrogator: Okay, just tell me this, Newell, real quick, just to let
you know what we need, what we need here is we need
a hundred percent truth, okay? Now I'm not saying
you're giving us a hundred percent truth but what we
need is a hundred percent truth. It's just like the AIDS
virus. You wouldn't want just a little bit of AIDS virus,
you don't want none of the AIDS virus because it taints
the whole body. A little untruth taints your whole damn
story, okay? So what we need here is a hundred percent
truth, okay. °4
Investigators sometimes trade on the commonplace normative prescription
against lying and invoke it to motivate a suspect to tell the truth. For example,
a Solano County, California, interrogator told a suspect:
Interrogator- You can't, you can't come in here and lie to me. I don't
even want to talk to you if you're gonna lie to me.
Okay? You gotta understand something. This is, this, the
gravity of the situation is much too serious, and the only
thing that, the only thing you got going for you is to tell
the truth. Okay? The truth will prevail. You ever hear
the term "honesty is the best policy."2 °'
An investigator can capitalize on the suspect's anxiety, fear, and emotion-
al turmoil by calling it remorse and by urging him to respond to his emotions
and express his remorse by confessing. The investigator may tell the suspect
that he will experience emotional relief, if not psychological health, by admit-
ting guilt and getting it off his chest. For example, a Connecticut State Police
investigator told an innocent teenage boy:
Interrogator. All right. This isn't the end of the world. I've talked to
a lot of people who have been involved in a lot of seri-
ous things and they're normal individuals today. Once
they got it straightened out upstairs. See?
Suspect: Mm-hm.
Interrogator As long as you don't get it straightened out in your
mind you'll never have a day of peace.20 6
Similarly, Costa Mesa, California, investigators implored a 14-year-old
suspect to tell the truth:
203. Interrogation Transcript of Abney, supra note 55, Interview 3, Video 3, at 18.
204. Interrogation Transcript of DePuy, supra note 108, at 27.
205. Interrogation Transcript of Andrew Childs, supra note 117, at 6.
206. Interrogation Transcript of Peter Reilly, supra note 75, at 99.
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Interrog. 1: You say, why tell the truth, because you're going to get
in the same amount of trouble, well, if that's the way
you feel, why not tell the truth? For you, the same
amount of trouble, why not tell the truth? Why not get it
off your heart?
Suspect: Because there's nothing on there.
Interrog. 1: Yeah, there is. You killed somebody.
Interrog. 2: A guy with a family. Apparently, he's got a daughter, a
wife. He's been married for like thirty-four years (in-
audible) a long time.
Interrog. 1: I've killed somebody before and it haunts you and I was
justified in doing mine. I mean it haunts you for a long
time.
The most important reason for you to come clean,
because if you come clean, your body comes clean and
your soul comes clean and you don't have to live,
you've gotten this off of you. Otherwise, you're walking
around with this, on top of you and it's going to screw
up your whole life, the rest of your life.
And believe it or not, you're only fourteen years
old, okay? Fourteen is a long time, from the end of your
life. You have, you have a long life to go, Okay? Things
will get better. They're shit, right now, I agree. You
couldn't be in much more shit than you are, right now,
okay? You've got to go up from here. It doesn't get any
worse than that.
My personal feeling is that, you cannot proceed
down the path, the correct path, if you leave all this
stuff with you, you know, so when you get if off your
chest, and you get it off your shoulders and put it on
ours now, you know, you don't have to deal with it
anymore, other than, you know, talking about it or, or,
ah, I mean, it's off your soul type of thing. I don't know
if you believe that or not, but you have to, you have to
like get rid of it, to get rid of it, if you know what I
mean. To get rid of the pain, you have to, you have to,
you know, tell us about it.2'
San Diego, California, police emphasized how good telling the truth
would make a suspect feel:
Interrogator. Right now you have to tell us. Cause believe me you'll
feel better by telling us. You need to get this off your
chest.... And this is your opportunity right now to feel
207. Interrogation Transcript of John Doe, Costa Mesa, Cal., Police Dep't 23-54 (Sept. 1,
1995). The defendant's actual name is concealed because of his age. Id. at 54.
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really good and say what happened. You need to take
responsibility. You need to feel a lot better feeling about
yourself. You have to Jason.' 8
Anchorage, Alaska, interrogators reminded a suspect that confession
brings harmony:
Interrogator You know as well as I do that, uh, by denyin' the truth
you're never gonna have peace with yourself.2 '8
Investigators sometimes base appeals on a belief in God, imploring the
suspect to confess out of religious duty or for absolution. Vancouver, Wash-
ington, sheriff's detectives brought God in on their side of the table:
Interrog. 1: What are you gonna tell God, IT? How are you gonna
explain it? How are you gonna ask him to forgive you?
Interrog. 2: There's gonna come that time, JT.
Interrog. 1: How are you gonna explain it?"'
A Boynton Beach, Florida, interrogator urged confession because whether
someone is punished on earth hardly matters:
Interrog. 1: Let me tell you something. I'm a deacon in the First
Baptist Church in Lake Worth, and the bottom line is
this: If you're sorry and you ask the man himself for
forgiveness, then you're off the fucking hook because
this place here don't mean shit.
What this means is when you stand in front of the
man, ask him for forgiveness, you're fine. This ain't
nothing but a thing. This is a start up place for us; this
ain't eternity. The only thing we can do here is do the
best that we can to be the best people we possibly can.
And we all make mistakes. And the thing is if you try to
rectify mistakes while you're here so you don't live in
eternity or fucking hell or whatever you believe in."
An investigator can emphasize that he wants to help the suspect and still
operate at the low and uncontroversial end of the incentive continuum. Help in
this context is left vague and at most implies an undefined, better emotional
state than the suspect is presently experiencing. The suspect need only confess
to receive help from the investigator in attaining this better state, as implied by
one investigator.
Interrogator What you really gotta do, is you gotta help yourself
now. You really have to help yourself. You really have
to help yourself. You gotta get outta this thing where
208. Interrogation Transcript of Albritton, supra note 99, at 76-77.
209. Interrogation Transcript of Susan Johnson, Anchorage, Alaska, Police Dep't 32 (Nov. 29,
1993).
210. Interrogation Transcript of James Thomas, Clark County, Wash., Sheriff's Office 61
(Dec. 20, 1993).
211. Interrogation Transcript of Martin Salazar, Boynton Beach, Fla., Police Dep't 49-50
(Feb. 23, 1996).
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you're, you're denying even to yourself, cause it doesn't
work and you know it. Now what we gotta do is get
something goin' for you."'
Or, expressed another way:
Interrog. 1: You're putting out a request, you're putting out a cry for
help, and we're here to answer it for you.
interrog. 2: George, I think it's important for you to know that the
way we look at this because, true, we have a different
aspect of it, perspective than most people do, and what
we're saying here basically is that a mistake was made,
we want to try to make that right as much as we possi-
bly can and that in no way, shape, or form are we judg-
ing you as a person because we don't have the right to
do that. We can't do that because we've made too many
mistakes ourselves. You and what goes on between you
and God are two different things.213
While low-end incentives are unlikely to motivate a guilty suspect who
still believes he can avoid punishment, they are sometimes sufficient to tip the
scale when directed at someone who recognizes that his desire to avoid pun-
ishment is unrealistic. If an investigator has succeeded in framing a suspect's
perception as an interaction between two cordial persons rather than as be-
tween hunter and prey, the suspect is more likely to allow himself to feel
some respect for the values embodied in the appeals, and to desire to appear
as someone who shares these cultural prescriptions.
c. Systemic Benefits: Indirect Threats and Promises
The psychological benefits of reducing guilt, doing the right thing, show-
ing empathy for the victim's family, straightening things out with God, and
appearing honorable in the eyes of the investigator or the community are not
likely to elicit a decision to confess from an innocent person for a variety of
reasons. One reason is that telling a lie-confessing falsely-violates all of the
cultural prescriptions activated by the investigator. Low-end incentives are
actually negative incentives to confess for an innocent suspect.
An investigator who is unable to motivate an admission from a suspect by
offering low-end incentives has only two choices: terminate the interrogation
or introduce stronger incentives. If the investigator focuses a suspect's atten-
tion on more concrete incentives, he will likely suggest that there are both
systemic benefits for confessing and opposing systemic punishments for hold-
ing to denial or remaining silent. The more clearly the investigator points out
the supposedly inevitable consequences of admitting responsibility versus
continuing denial, the closer he moves toward introducing legally coercive
threats and offers of leniency. The investigator's tactic is to paint a picture of
212. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, supra note 162, at 10.
213. Interrogation Transcript of Abney, supra note 55, Interview 3, at 14.
1060 [Vol. 74:4
THE DECISION TO CONFESS FALSELY
how the system operates that is deliberately incomplete and not necessarily
accurate. It is a picture designed to communicate information that will affect
the suspect's decision making in a predictable way. If the suspect were to rely
exclusively on the information fed to him by the investigator, a decision to
confess would be almost certain.
The investigator's strategy over the course of the interrogation is to press
the suspect to rely on the investigator's analysis of reality and the future. Time
is on the investigator's side. The cumulative effects of fatigue, stress, fear,
confusion, and endless confrontation are likely to increase the investigator's
persuasive effect. The logic of the investigator's position is unimpeachable; his
task is only to get the suspect to accept his axioms.
Looking at what the investigator chooses to include and leave out of the
picture, it is obvious that he is manufacturing an advertising poster for confes-
sion. For example, when an investigator describes a courtroom scene and
encourages a suspect to imagine how a juror will react to his failure to tell his
side of the story now, the interrogator leaves out the alternative scene in which
a defense attorney tells the jury that the state has absolutely no physical or
eyewitness evidence linking the defendant to the crime, that the investigator
lied to the defendant about these matters during the interrogation, that the
defendant always maintained his innocence and never confessed, and that the
state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt.
Once an investigator starts to clearly identify the benefits of confessing
and makes them appear substantial, it becomes difficult to pretend that these
follow in some vague, natural manner. While the investigator might begin by
telling the suspect that showing remorse generally confers a benefit, he may
then promise that he will write in his report that the suspect was remorseful;
he may next suggest that showing remorse will influence how the district at-
torney charges the case; his next suggestion might be that showing remorse
will allow the interrogator to be able to say valuable things to the judge and
jury; and he might become so bold as to argue that showing remorse will
influence the jury's decision about his guilt or innocence and the judge's deci-
sion about the amount of punishment the suspect will receive.
The importance of "speaking now" can be emphasized without necessarily
linking it to a specific benefit, but it is not likely to function very well as a
motivator. In this excerpt from a Salt Lake City, Utah interrogation a suspect
is given the opportunity to confess but no systemic benefit was stressed:
Interrogator: The investigation is ending with your arrest because, uh,
of, uh, what you did do. We know how it happened,
when it happened. We have the physical evidence, uh,
from the scene. And, uh, what we'd like to do right now
is give you the opportunity just to explain why it hap-
pened. Uh, that's, that's the big question in our minds
right now.""
A San Diego, California, investigator stressed the importance of pleasing
214. Interrogation Transcript of Adams, supra note 100, at 1.
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the authority figure. Confessing was more clearly associated with a bene-
fit-appreciation from the investigator because it was personally important for
him to understand what happened. But the inducement of approval from the
investigator was interpersonal and slight. The investigator made no link to
anything that was a significant benefit for the suspect:
Interrogator: Now just, just listen to me okay? Now I've talked to an
awful lot of murderer's, okay? And sometimes I can
understand where they're comin' from. But people have
to be truthful with me before I can even, even begin to
understand it. And you know, we're, we're gettin' a
little truth out of you, but we aren't gettin' the whole
truth. Now, just listen to me. I can understand you bein'
scared, nervous, whatever. I can understand that. That's
a natural phenomenon.
But like I keep tellin' ya, the truth, the truth, and
what you're tellin' us isn't jivin'. We know things! We
are giving you an opportunity to tell us the truth. Ya
know? Instead of bullshitin' or lyin'. Ya know. We
know about you, Mr. Nance. We could write a book
about you. We know almost everything there is to know
about you, with the exception of Nancy White.
Suspect Well I did not kill her.
Interrogator. Tell me about it." 5
If merely asking for information doesn't work, then an investigator may
try to delude a suspect into reasoning that confessing at this point is necessary
because it is to his advantage. This progression often starts with announcing
that this will be the suspect's only or last opportunity to tell his side of the
story. In the following Sacramento, California, interrogation, the investigator
pressured the suspect to decide whether to admit guilt by suggesting that time
was running out:
Interrogator This is a time for you to tell the whole truth, okay?
Don't come part way, and don't tell me a story that I
can't believe and other people won't believe. Like I told
you, I can only go so far. I won't sit here and listen to
you lie again and again to me and my patience will run
out. And when I go out that door, you won't have any-
body else to tell this story to, and who's gonna believe
you? Right now I'm listening to you, I'm trying to do
the thing that's right here and the thing that's right is to
tell the truth and you know it.
Suspect: I only
Interrogator. Not part of the truth, not a piece of the truth, not a little
bit here and a little bit there and then you change your
215. Interrogation Transcript of Nance, supra note 95, Tape 2, at 4-5.
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mind. Like I said, it only goes so far, I can only tell you
again and again and again tell the truth, tell the truth,
tell the truth. And each time you lie to me, it takes a
little bit of my patience away. A little bit, and little bit,
and a little bit. And I'll step out of here and I'll think
about it and I'll come back in here and talk to you. But
I'm not gonna be here and you're gonna have to live
with what you said. Because I won't ask you anymore.
She was going away from you wasn't she?
2 16
This attempt to pressure an admission alluded obliquely to the advantages
of acting immediately--"you won't have anybody else to tell this story to, and
whose gonna believe you?'--with no reference to the advantages of being
believed. In contrast, a detective in Flagstaff, Arizona, not only emphasized
the time pressure on the suspect, but also unambiguously spelled out the end-
of-line benefit of immediate compliance:
Interrogator. You're in a lot of trouble, you know that.
Suspect: Yes I do.
Interrogator: Uh, this sit down today, right now, okay.
Suspect: Uh-hum.
Interrogator. Will probably be the last time you're gonna talk to both
of us. You know why?
Suspect: Why?
Interrogator. Because you're gonna go to a judge today, right, for
your initial appearance. The state of Arizona is gonna
provide you an attorney. They're not, he's not gonna let
you come and talk to us.
This is gonna be your last chance for any type of,
uh, oh when, uh, Rick talked to you yesterday, when I
walked out of the room, where we could negotiate time
and charges, this rightnow is the last chance, because if,
ok I told you, I don't quite believe your story, and the
investigation doesn't stop today, it starts." 7
Few investigators are as open about the strategy of offering systemic
benefits as was this detective. But the strategy is nothing more than a shell
within which to conduct a negotiation and bargain about outcomes for the
suspect. It must be conducted obliquely because of the legal constraints on
what is permissible to use as a motivator, but it must also communicate the
offer and the obligation; otherwise a bargain will never be reached. If, as in
these interrogations, a recording is being made, a difficult communication
problem is created. The Flagstaff investigator just ignored the recording and
spoke forthrightly. The confession he obtained was suppressed.
Although investigators are presumably aware of the prohibition against
216. Interrogation Transcript of Schmitt, supra note 85, at 132.
217. Interrogation Transcript of Richardson, supra note 186, at 124.
1997] 1063
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
making promises and threats, they do not always respect it. As psychological
interrogation has developed over the last fifty years, so have more subtle tac-
tics that accomplish the prohibited goal by less obvious means.
In the interrogation of an adolescent in Solano County, California, a de-
tective laid out a subtle version of how the system supposedly worked. Before
giving this speech, the detective had coerced a witness statement from another
young man who had also been arrested, and then was offered a way out by
changing the story of what he had seen. The young man agreed that he had
witnessed his friend deliberately push another boy into a passing train, some-
thing he initially said had not happened. The coerced witness statement had
already been reported to the principal suspect as the main piece of evidence
that would seal his fate:
Interrogator- The way the system works is I am, you know, contact
you, talk to you. I talked to everybody. Then I send the
whole thing off to the um, District Attorney and the
courts and they evaluate it, okay? When we're talkin'
here tonight, you know, I've yet to go back to the Dis-
trict Attorney and tell him one of two things, aright?
And that's it. I can tell him, "You know, I talked to um,
to Mike tonight after having talked to ninety percent of
the people you know, that were out there, including two
people that were standing within ten feet of him when
urn, when Mr. Mockus got hit by the train and every-
body tells the same story, right down to the wire.
But when I talked to Mike, you know, he told me
something that was totally vague, you know, and ends
didn't meet ends and there was just, you know, for
whatever reason, he's, he's not being honest and you
know, there must be something, you know, some deep
reason why he doesn't want to be honest, you know.
In other words, he's just sayin', you know, 'screw
you guys' ... . I can go to them and I can go, "Look,
you know, Mike has been in very minimal trouble. He
urn, came forward to me. What he told me is the truth.
He understands that he made a mistake, but you know,
he's ready to deal with the problem that he's created
and he's been honest about it. And here's the reason
why this happened and he told me what was going
through his mind. Why this thing happened. You've got
to understand the gravity of the situation, warrants your
honesty. It warrants complete total honesty and nothing
else. Because you're going to have eight other people
that are going, that are going to go up and say exactly
what happened and then your story, this is the only
chance that I'm gonna talk to you. I'm not gonna keep
coming back and talking to you. I don't need to and if
this is your initial, our initial contact, first time I met
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you in my life and it looks a lot better for you if you're
honest on our initial contact and I can go to the DA's
office and say, "You know, he just got himself in a little
deep. But he's honest about it and here's the reason this
thing's happened and he explained it and it makes sense
to me.,
218
In the following exchange, an Oakland, California, suspect explained how
the investigator's emphasis on psychological benefits and sentence reduction
was effectively communicated to him and had caused him to falsely confess a
few hours earlier:
Interrogator- Could you tell us why you were telling us that-why
you don't remember if you must have killed her.
Suspect: Cause you were saying that I had to search (pause) to
relieve my conscience and that I would never be able to
live. I'd sit in jail and rot away from the inside if I
could not remember. And if, and not even remember
'cause you felt that I could-but I could not remember
what had (pause) happened.
Interrogator: Did we tell, you would rot in jail for that?
Suspect: Yeah. From the inside I would, I would. Eat away from
the inside.
Interrog. 1: I think the term was that we told you that something
like that would gnaw at you and eat at you from the
inside.
Interrog. 2: Okay, that, that is different from-rotting in jail. We are
talking. about it would gnaw at your insides. Is that
right, or it would play on your conscience?
Suspect: But it is also, I mean, prison or jail was mentioned and
(pause) the idea that there was a way out and that was
by (pause) cooperating and I was cooperating. But not to
what you, not the answers that you wanted. And every
time I told the truth.1 9
As with every tactic that communicates an offer of a material benefit for
making an admission, emphasizing the systemic consequences of admission
can be done directly or indirectly. Over the course of a lengthy interrogation
an investigator who is trying to get this offer across is likely to revisit the sub-
ject. With each return to the subject the investigator is likely to clarify the
meaning of his suggestion that a benefit will follow admission. The following
excerpts from a Sacramento, California, interrogation involve a man who had
already been arrested for child sexual abuse:
Interrogator You know, Robert, while you were in here talking to
your wife, I'm talking to some of those other officers
218. Interrogation Transcript of Johnson, supra note 138, at 24.
219. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 4, at 3-4.
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that were talking to the kids. You know, their stories are
pretty believable, and, you know, you're going. to need
some counseling. You really are, you know, and the way
to start out is you got to be strong. Okay? You got to
admit what you've done, and, and you got to start on
your way to recovery. That's the only thing that's going
to get you any shorter time periods or anything like that.
You have to recover. You can't continue to do this. You
know what I'm saying?'
The suspect continued to deny guilt. The interrogator responded by stressing
that evidence from several children was conclusive and then emphasized again
the benefits of making an admission:
Interrogator: [Dieny all this all you want. That's not going to do you
any good. I mean cause those kids aren't lying. And the
only thing that's going to help you ....
Interrogator- The thing is to talk it out. Get it out of your body now,
you know, get it out, get a counselor, get your life back
on track.'
After a few more minutes, the interrogator spoke more openly about the bene-
ficial consequences of confessing. The suspect expressed his concern about
outcomes:
Interrogator. If you want that family, you're going to have to pull
yourself together. You're going to have to be strong.
Okay? You can start today or else you can go sit in jail
and think about it. I don't care.
Suspect: Where... where do I go?
Interrogator: It doesn't matter to me because it's your-you go right
here. You start talking right here. You start on your way
to recovery. The District Attorney knows that you're on
your way to recovery. You're not putting these kids on
(unclear). You're not just thinking about yourself. Okay?
All right. That's how you start. And then no matter what
comes of it. You know, the main thing is that you re-
covered. Okay? That you get that counseling. All right?




The defendant apparently began to consider the value of the offer and
tested whether the investigator could deliver his end of the deal. After again
demanding an admission, the investigator said:
Interrogator: All right, Robert. Well...
Suspect: Well what am I going to say? You say you can get me
220. Interrogation Transcript of Robert Fitzsimmons, Sacramento, Cal., Police Dep't 29 (July
10, 1996).
221. Id. at 31.
222. Id. at 36.
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into recovery and counseling, I guess?
Interrogator: Yeah. 3
The interrogator clarified the advantage of the admission/counseling deal in
the following exchange:
Suspect: Still have to go to court, right?
Interrogator: That's up to you.







A set time for what?
For jail time.
For jail time? Yeah.
Prison or wherever the hell I go.
That doesn't mean that you have to go to court. Of
course a judge would have to send you, yeah. Or...
put you in a program for ... you know ... to make
sure you get your treatment that you need. All these
things will be taken into consideration.224
During the ride to the police station, the arresting officer told the suspect
that child molesters are likely to be killed in jail and that he was unlikely to
survive. Not surprisingly, the suspect became leery about going to the county
jail. The investigator used every mention of leaving or being with family to
persuade the suspect to take the deal:
Suspect: There's no way I can leave.
Interrogator: Yeah that's true. There's only one way you can leave.
One way you can only leave. One way. And that's to
get yourself together. Get your life started back, get this
thing behind you. That's the only way you're ever going
to walk out of here. Is that true?2'
The investigator repeatedly emphasized that the system valued rehabilitation
above punishment and that rehabilitation was available once the suspect con-
fessed:
Interrogator: Well what we're trying to do is we're trying to fix
things. What happened in the past has already happened.
Suspect: Right.
Interrogator: You know. That's like in, in baseball. I mean you throw
the ball, there's nothing you can do to pull that ball
back. You just got to accept what happens and make the
best of it. And that's what we're here to do today is
make the best of this situation and try to fix it so it
doesn't ever happen again. Because when you leave
223. Id. at 37.
224. Id. at 42.
225. Id. at 52.
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here, you want to have a clean slate. You want to start
fresh.226
Eventually, the investigator succeeded in getting the defendant to accept the
deal-his best choice was to admit to sexual contact with the children at this
point and thereby get counseling and less time in jail. In a phone conversation
from the interrogation room, the suspect explained to his wife what would
happen if he confessed -or mained sile.nt:
Suspect: Then they, well they'll put me on the counseling
thing.... I just go to the jail I guess. I don't know for
how long. 7
An investigator may focus the suspect's attention on how a prosecutor,
judge, or jury will review the case and determine his punishment, how they
will react to the suspect's litany of denials, and how they are likely to be
affected by a demonstration of remorse and/or confession. For example, a San
Francisco, California, detective told a suspect:
Interrogator- Here's the situation, I'm just here to be your conduit, to
let you tell me why it happened.
Suspect: Well you ain't gonna be the prosecutor.
Interrogator. Well, we're gonna be the ones that talk to the prosecu-
tor, all right, and really it's just a matter was it man-
slaughter, voluntary, involuntary, second degree, first de-
gree.22B
While working on an innocent young man who had already been persuad-
ed of his guilt, a Connecticut State Police investigator focussed his attention
on the importance of creating the right impression:
Suspect: Do you think when this comes to the court it will be
considered temporary insanity?
Interrogator. Oh, Pete, don't worry about courts. All right? Don't
worry about things like that.
Suspect: That's all I can think of.
Interrogator. The thing ah, to help yourself right now. In other words
they got to present all this stuff before the judge, you
know?
Suspect: Mm-hm.
Interrogator- If they present what they have right now, before a
judge, your-there's no doubt in my mind that the judge
is going to think he's got a cold blooded killer. All
right.
Suspect: Mm-hm.
Interrogator: Instead of somebody who went off the deep end for a
226. Id.
227. Id. at 73.
228. Interrogation Transcript of Anderson, supra note 114, at 3.
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few minutes. Okay?
Suspect: Right.'"
The investigator's goal is to motivate a suspect to offer an account that
simultaneously admits his involvement but places him in the best possible
light. By doing so, the investigator encourages the suspect to reason that he
will receive prosecutorial, judicial, and/or juror leniency. Investigators studi-
ously avoid educating suspects about the realities of the justice system. An
investigator in Flagstaff, Arizona, fashioned a view of the future in which a
female suspect would not be able to convince a jury to believe her story even
though she became involved only after the killing and as a result of her
husband's threats:
Interrogator Trena, put yourself in a juror's shoes. I'm explaining
your story to them. Are they gonna believe you? This
happened at the bum scene and you were forced, you
felt you were threatened that you were gonna end up in
the trunk, everything is done like you explained, then
you go back and have sex. That's gonna be a big, big
point. That's gonna be a big point. Put yourself in the
juror's shoes. Why should they believe you? I don't be-
lieve you.'
A San Diego, California, investigator flipped this argument 180 degrees
and told the suspect that if his story was sad and compelling enough it would
help. The investigator communicated the idea by referring to a case that sup-
posedly resulted in jury nullification:
Interrogator: You better believe it counts. It does count. If you've got
twelve men or twelve, yeah six women and six men in
that jury box and they're listening to that what, what,
what's being said. I'm gonna tell you what. It does
weigh a lot. It does weigh a lot in terms of, in terms of
what, of what you know, of what goes down and what
they're thinking. It does weigh a lot, man. Again that's
what, I, you know, that is just from past experiences of
being in court and everything. I mean I've sat in court
and I'm going, "God damn it, how in the hell could they
not convict this guy of fucken' first degree murder."
Well what happened was they ended up feeling more for
the guy or the girl or whatever because of the certain
factors that led up to the incident.23" '
A San Mateo, California, investigator explained that since the suspect
would not be testifying at his trial, now was the time to get his account on the
record. The interrogator invited the man to give any self-serving story that he
wanted to tell:
229. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 283.
230. Interrogation Transcript of Richardson, supra note 186, at 126.
231. Interrogation Transcript of Nimnblett, supra note 137, at 32.
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Interrogator: I got a question to ask you. A few months from now
when you're sitting in front of a jury, the man that saw
you in the morning and the night before comes up and
tells the truth of what he saw. You're sitting there, now,
that's what happened, but he didn't, he's not telling the
reason why. You think a jury is going to listen to that.
Now, is your time to bring up that reason. Now is
your time to tell your side of the story, so that
everybody's gonna know that you're not gonna be talk-
ing, you know, just from what this guy has to say, this
witness. Get it on the books now, so that, you know,
they're gonna know. "Hey, wait a minute, okay. I made
a mistake, but this is the reason for the mistake. I'm
willing to tell the truth to as exactly what took place and
why. Yeah, I shot him." It might have been defensive, it
might have been an accident. Do you think that a jury's
gonna listen to an excuse six months from now?232
In a Jackson Hole, Wyoming, investigation, an interrogator told a defen-
dant who had just been arrested for child molesting the following:
Interrogator: You recall you had a problem. You knew you had a
problem, when you were at the Triangle X. That's why
you are no longer at the Triangle X. What it boils down
to is we want to get to the root of the problem, exactly
what happened as far as what you did with those, those
three or four girls, or whatever.
The details need to be brought out. And if you're
not going to bring out the details, what I have to go do
is go back and tell the judge, tell the prosecutor that he
doesn't-he knows he had a problem there. You want
to-you're starting to get some help. I mean, tell me,
tell Bret, tell the judge that you are telling the truth. Tell
the prosecutor that you're telling the truth and we don't
have to deal with it anymore... 233
The investigator went on to suggest that the results of an admission at this
point would be beneficial:
Interrogator: Tell us a little bit about, about the number of times, the
number of kids that were involved here, so that I've got
some way to go back to the, to tell the people that I'm
dealing with, that, you know, the prosecutors and the
judges, so that I can say; yeah, this is it, there's no
more, there's not going to be any more surprises, and I
232. Interrogation Transcript of Bernard Knight, East Palo Alto, Cal., District Attorneys'
Investigators 26-27 (Sept. 24, 1992) (Case No. E92-11302).
233. Interrogation Transcript of Russell Stone, Salt Lake City, Utah, Police Dep't 46 (Dec. 5,
1995).
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believe that Russ is telling us the truth. And I want to
be able to go to them and tell them that they're telling
us the truth, that you're telling us the truth. That will,
that will clear the whole issue for them, and we're not
going to - you know, as far as what's going to happen
with you, you've got to figure in your, in your own
mind.
If you've got a guy on one hand that's being truth-
ful, and another guy that you think's holding something
back, how are you going to deal with this person? If you
got, if you've got somebody that's truthful and some-
body that's deceitful, how are you going to deal with
people coming from different angles, different direc-
tions? And that's, that's one way you're going to have
to consider for yourself as to how you're going to deal
with the case. Do you understand.234
It would be difficult to defend any implication from these remarks other
than that a contrite, remorseful defendant admitting guilt and asking for mercy
and help from the prosecutor and judge will receive it. Although the investiga-
tor did not guarantee the result, his tactic was likely to lead the defendant to
conclude that a benefit would almost certainly follow.
An investigator might attempt to effect a suspect's decision making by
leading him to believe that the jury is going to be harsher on him if he contin-
ues lying. For example, Vallejo, California, investigators told a suspect:
Interrog. 1: It's over, we gotcha, but what ya gotta understand is the
way the system works. We're doing the investigation. I
wanta be able to set forth the complete investigation
now in front of the District Attorney, and say these are
the people involved, these are what their involvement
was, and make your decisions on what you file, and
we'll go to court.
But like it is now, they're saying Eugene's doing
this, this and that, but Eugene's sitting back saying no I
didn't do nothin, and it makes themselves, it makes
them sound like they're being truthful, and to be quite
honest with ya, there's more there than they're telling
us, and you can tell us what's really there.
Interrog. 2: Eugene, Eugene, don't you know, I mean I know you're
smart enough to realize that if you lied to us, we can
prove you're lying. That's just as bad if not worse than
standing up like a man and admitting what you did.
Interrog. 1: Absolutely.
Interrog. 2: Because people are gonna sit in judgement of you one
234. Id. at 50.
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day on this crime, and they're gonna look at the fact
that you lied, and what are they gonna say about why
Eugene lied. There's no reason he would lie if he wasn't
covering up for something, and unfortunately those
people are not gonna know for sure what you're cover-
ing up, only you know that, cause it's in your mind.
They don't know if you're covering up just your partici-
pation in the robbery. They don't know if you're cover-
ing up the fact that you ordered the hit. They don't
know how much you're covering up. They just know
that you're lying and you're covering up, and then it's
just as damning if not more damning than the fact that
you sat right there and tell us exactly what hap-
pened.
235
A Maricopa County, Arizona, sheriff's detective told an innocent Temple
murder suspect to consider how the judge would treat an admission and ex-
pression of remorse. The investigator's strategy was apparently designed to
lead the suspect to believe that some self-serving account of what was an
execution-style mass murder and robbery would garner leniency:
Interrogator Remember what I told you judges are pretty reasonable
people ya know they weigh facts and they examine
things and they try to be unbiased and they weigh all the
evidence. . . What do you think their decision would be
in a situation like that as opposed to ya know hey what
happened here? I messed up I was some place I
shouldn't been ya know something happened I didn't
know it was gonna happen I'm sorry for what happened
and I didn't have any control over it. What do you think
the outcome in a situation like that's gonna be then
opposed to the other where the guy just don't care?...
You know the key factor in all this is hey, I'm sorry,
I'm sorry.,
d. More or Less Explicit Threats and Promises
If thinly veiled suggestions about how to manipulate the system do not
work, an investigator may decide to more openly communicate that certain
harms follow from continued denial and that there are benefits available for
confessing. The investigator may suggest that he has the power to deliver the
outcome implied in his comments or that it will certainly be delivered down
the line by other criminal justice officials. Either way, the suspect is expected
to conclude that he is certain to receive one or the other of the two alterna-
tives that the investigator associates with the decision to confess or to remain
silent. If an investigator decides to shift to these more direct methods of com-
235. Interrogation Transcript of Livingston, supra note 113, at 79-80.
236. Interrogation Transcript of Nunez, supra note 54, Tape 3, at 12-13.
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municating threats and promises, his tactics will appear straightforwardly
coercive.
For example, Vallejo, California, interrogators made the consequences of
admission versus denial clear:
Interrog. 1: Again we're right back into a first degree murder situa-
tion, where you just walked in, premeditated, I'm gonna
get that son-of-a-bitch, what you told Vance, and then it
looks like to us that you just went back there the next
day, opened up, walked in and got a man, he was proba-
bly sleepin on the couch, cause he's on the couch, lying
on the couch, and started bangin his head in.
Interrog. 2: From the outside, from our side looking in, it just looks
like cold blooded murder, and it doesn't have to be that
way.
237
San Diego, California, interrogators told a adolescent female who was
suspected of murder that failing to confess would leave her in big trouble:
Interrogator: You're, you're in trouble. Okay?
Suspect: I know.
Interrogator: And you're in big trouble and, and the-You're in such
big trouble that this is the only time you can help your-
self. Cause if you don't tell me, you know, what this
situation is or what happened over there, you're in big
trouble.
Suspect: (Sigh).
Interrogator: And, you know, you're, you're, it's only your bacon
you're saving right now. It's nobody else's."
Sometimes interrogators suggest that the crime was obviously committed
by someone in need of psychiatric care rather than imprisonment. They lead
the suspect to understand that if he admits guilt, he will receive hospitalization
and care but that if he continues to deny guilt he will receive prison and pun-
ishment. For example, a Connecticut State Police investigator told a teenager
who had no memory of murdering his mother:
Interrogator: Don't be afraid to say, "I did it." (garbled).
Suspect: Ya, but I'm incriminating myself by saying I did.
Interrogator: We have, right now, without any word out of your
mouth, proof positive.
Suspect: That I did it?
Interrogator. That you did it.
Suspect: So, okay, then I may as well say I did it.
Interrogator Yes.
237. Interrogation Transcript of Vince Yarborough, Vallejo, Cal., Police Dep't 20 (1994)
(Case No. 94-02881).
238. Interrogation Transcript of Danielle Barchers, San Diego, Cal., Police Dep't 493 (Sept.
24, 1995).
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Suspect: Okay.
Interrogator: And by so doing, we take the first step towards getting
you the kind of help you need. That's all.239
Later, the investigator made clear that the offer of help meant keeping the
young man out of prison:
Interrogator: Now, let's get the problem solved. Let's, I mean, let's
take some positive action to get you some help. i'm tell-
ing you I don't want to see you hurt. I don't want to see
you in Somers. I don't want to see you in prison. That's
not what I get paid for. I don't get paid by the number
of people I put in jail. Neither does he. And, neither
does Sgt. Kelly or Sgt. Schneider. Or anybody on our
whole State Police Department. That's not our (garbled).
If we can help you or any other citizen or any kid, that's
what we're paid for and that's what we're trying to do.
Now somebody is dead. You are responsible, we know.
We can prove it with extrinsic evidence. Now, we're
telling you that we are offering you our hand, take it.
Does that make sense to you?2"
Flagstaff, Arizona, interrogators told an innocent suspect that because he
was abused as a child, he was more likely to grow up to be criminal and thus
needed help, not punishment:
Interrogator: That's basically one of the things that we always try to
tell people who are involved in molestation, as well as
children, they must talk about it, they must get counsel-
ing, they must get it out because if they don't, what
happens is what happened to you. You didn't get the
help you needed on that. And I truly believe that you
are telling me that. And I know this for a fact because I
have seen statistics that people who are molested as
children have a higher percentage rate of becoming in-
volved in a negative way with law enforcement later
down the road. In other words, they commit crimes.
Because they have got all this great, great, great, great
mental turmoil inside of them.24'
Shortly after this exchange, the investigator reported the following:
Interrogator: My superiors did not agree with the way that I wanted
to handle this thing. You can believe.
Suspect: They want you to book me and charge me.
Interrogator: That was discussed. And I told them no, I was not going
to arrest you, and I haven't arrested you, that I wanted
239. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 191.
240. Id. at 250-51.
241. Interrogation Transcript of Abney, supra note 55, Interview 3, at 16.
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to give you the opportunity at this point to tell me things
like you have already told me. You know, who could sit
on a jury and say that, yeah, this man committed a
crime, but look at what he was a victim of. Look what
happened to him when he was a child, and look at all
the times he's cried out for help you know.242
A Palmer, Alaska, police investigator offered psychiatric help to a woman
whose infant son had just died for not yet determined reasons. But first she
had to agree to the investigator's demand to confess that she killed her infant
son.
Interrogator I want to see if I can get you whatever help I can get
you and this is the lady right there that might be able to
help you. But you got to tell me the truth now.
Okay?243
Investigators control and limit the reasonable alternatives the suspect will
likely consider by defining the problem as a simple two-choice situation. An
investigator may ask a suspect whether he is a cold-blooded murderer or just a
person who made a mistake and accidentally caused the underlying event. This
technique depends on ordinary human information processing and reasoning
capabilities.' By framing a suspect's alternatives as admitting to either a
premeditated crime or an accident, an intellectually normal individual would
infer that two different levels of sentencing will follow.
Even when it makes no difference whether the killing was planned or
unintended, as in felony murder cases, interrogators lead suspects to believe
that accidental homicides are a lower level of offense and therefore less
severely punished. For example, Vallejo, California, police told the following
to a suspect in the investigation of a robbery in which three guards were exe-
cuted:
Interrog. 1: Eugene, as we were saying before, now this, this person
here is, is going to testify to what he told us, and what
he told is, is something that we went and looked into. In
other words we're not gonna sit there and just take his
word for it. We're gonna look into this, and we're
gonna see if we can prove through other means what he
is telling us is true. We've done that Eugene. We've
done that through other people's statements. We've done
that through some physical evidence at the crime scene,
okay. As you saw when we first started this interview
out with him, uh Mr. Highsmith and uh Mr. Young and
his attorney sat down and went over some legalities. Uh,
Young realized that he's going to come straight up
242. Id. at 19.
243. Interrogation Transcript of Beverly Huckstep, Palmer, Alaska, Police Dep't 5 (Dec. 21,
1992).
244. See Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations, supra note 6; Nisbett & Wilson, supra note
39; Harris & Monaco, supra note 39.
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truthful with us.
We believe he's being truthful until we can prove
differently. We proved a lot of the things that he said is
true, and as we told you from the beginning, Eugene we
did search warrants at a lot of houses. We did a search
warrant at your house. We did search warrants to your
van. Your phone number is in his roladex. He has your
phone number. We can show that association. We, we
will talk to James. James knows you. James has your
phone number. James is willing to testify to that. We
have that on uh video tape as we're talkin to you.
We've talked, we've talked to Victor.
What we're trying to tell you here Eugene is what-
ever happened that night, whatever involvement you
were in that night, whatever intentions you had, we
don't know, but sitting here and talking to you in the
last two years, and the interviews we've did with you, I
don't believe that you necessarily knew that this was
gonna happen, or end up the way it ended up. I don't
think that was the last thing on the minds. And unfortu-
nately it did, but now we're at a situation where the
only way we can get this settled once and for all, and
get this off your mind, off your chest, off your shoul-
ders, and everybody else's, cause as you can see we're
not grasping for straws, like we did when we first in-
terviewed you. We've corroborated a lot of things Mr.
Young said.
This is your opportunity now to tell us exactly your
side of what happened. What was the plan? Why did it
go bad? And as you can see, he's puttin everything off.
You're the mastermind, you planned it, you did this, you
did that.
Interrog. 2: Not only that, but the big thing Eugene here is that he's
saying that you ordered the killing, at least the first
guards, you said it may be necessary to kill that first
guard in order to cover up how you got in, okay.
Now we are not so naive. We been doing this job a
lot of years. We're not so naive to think that when we
talk to someone that there's not a good chance that he
may slant what he says a little bit to make himself look
a little bit better. Now there's no doubt this man was in
there and did the crime. He's gonna plead guilty to first
degree murder. He knows a lot about the inside layout.
He knows about the doors. He knows a lot of other stuff
that I cut out of that tape. There's gonna be absolutely
no doubt to the jury or to the judge that this man par-
ticipated in the crime, and he's telling the truth about
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that.
The real issue here that we're hoping to get from
you, and the only thing that you can tell us in your own
welfare here, is there's not gonna be any doubt that you
set up this robbery. The question is, did you intend for
those guards to get killed, or did you intend it to be a
straight out robbery? You're the man that has to tell us
that on your behalf, cause you've seen what this man
said.
Defendant: Exactly.
Interrog. 2: And if you don't tell us, nobody else is going to speak
up for you Eugene, and this is your opportunity to, to do
that. Now it's one thing in today's day and age to set up
a robbery. We know that you were having financial
problems, okay, a lot of money there, a lot of tempta-
tion, a lot of people get themselves into a position in life
to where they feel desperate enough to do something as
far as stealing. Not a lot of people get so desperate that
they're willing to kill people for it. There's thieves and
there's murderers. Thieves are not good people. They're
a hell of a lot better people than murderers.
Now you need to tell us were you gonna be a thief
that day, or did you intend to be a murderer? Did you
intend for those guards to get killed Eugene, or did you
just want it to be a robbery?"
e. High End Threats and Promises
If a suspect fails to understand or act on the choice before him, an investi-
gator may use even heavier-handed tactics to communicate an expectation of
significant differential punishment outcomes for silence and confession. Some
boldly assert that the suspect will be charged with the most serious offense
possible if he does not confess, but if he admits guilt he will receive a lesser
punishment. Presenting these alternatives to a suspect who already believes
that there is sufficient evidence to arrest and convict him will coerce confes-
sions from the guilty and false confessions from the innocent.2" It makes no
difference if the evidence exists or is fabricated, as long as the suspect be-
lieves that the police have it. It makes very little difference whether the sus-
pect knows he is guilty or knows he is innocent. If the tactics of the interroga-
tion have their expected effects, his attention will be focused on the choices
the investigator has placed before him, and he is likely to confess if he would
rather avoid the death penalty and receive less, rather than more, punishment.
With this degree of clarity and at this level of threat and/or promise, the
245. Interrogation Transcript of Livingston, supra note 113, at 36-38.
246. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
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coercive nature of the interrogation is fully revealed. No one knows how often
threats of this sort are delivered in unrecorded interrogations because there is
typically no way to absolutely resolve the swearing contests that arise between
suspects and investigators. Sometimes, however, it is possible to establish that
a death threat and/or offer of leniency was made during the unrecorded portion
of an interrogation because the suspect makes a reference to it in the recorded
portion. When this hatpens, an embarrassed investigator is likely not to
challenge the remark, realizing that to do so while the tape is running only
makes matters worse.
For example, in a largely unrecorded Pompano Beach, Florida, investiga-
tion, two detectives threatened a suspect with the electric chair if he did not
accept the deal they offered. Only the final portion of the interrogation (i.e.,
the confession statement) was recorded. The recording captured the suspect
making two separate remarks that confirmed the deal and the death threat.
Both interrogators ignored his comments when he brought up these subjects.
Early in the recorded portion of the interrogation, the suspect made reference
to the offer that the investigators had made off-tape:
Interrogator Okay and you're freely talking to us today.
Suspect: Yes.
Interrogator Okay. Uh, okay. We're talking about a robbery that




Suspect: I think I'll plea bargain, right? I'll plea bargain.
Interrogator Well, you tell us the truth. That's all we're interested in
right now and what occurred here.247
At the conclusion of the interrogation, one of the detectives made the mistake
of asking the suspect why he confessed:
Interrogator: Why you giving this statement? Is it the truth?
Suspect: It's the truth.
Interrogator- OK.
Suspect: This man had me frightened of the electric chair.
Interrogator: Excuse me.
Suspect: Frightened of the electric chair and all of that.24
Due to the significance of the Phoenix Temple murder investigation,
Maricopa County, Arizona, sheriff's detectives decided to record their interro-
gations. The interrogating detectives nevertheless relied on death threats de-
spite the recording:
Interrog. 1: You've been sentenced before... you've been sen-
247. Interrogation Transcript of Shandy Huggins, Pompano Beach, Fla., Police Dep't 3 (Feb.
10, 1995).
248. Id. at 14.
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tenced before for little things and you know that if that
judge gets pissed off at you it's a lot different than if
he's not. And you right now you can make a decision to
make a difference about how the judge feels about you
and you need to take it.
Interrog. 2: What if he might send you to the gas chamber, and I
don't say that to scare you, Dante, but in this situation
that's a real possibility and I'm not gonna sit here,
Wayne's not gonna sit here and lie to you about these
things cause that's not gonna serve us any purpose.
Interrog. 1: So you're sitting here thinking it's us against you, that's
not the case. We're here to help you out.
Interrog. 1: You need to think ahead to that sentencing time and
have you walk before that judge, that's something to
think about. Because you've been there before, think
about how it was, think about how it's gonna be. 49
The detectives followed immediately with the suggestion that the nine
murders could be characterized as an accident, which would supposedly bene-
fit the suspect. Eventually he falsely confessed to all nine murders.
Interrog. 1: You've heard about premeditated murder?
Suspect: No.
Interrog. 2: Have you heard about that?
Suspect: No. What's that?
Interrog. 2: You know first degree murder, second degree murder?
Suspect: Yeah.
Interrog. 1: Premeditated murder is the worst kind, I planned it, I
went in and killed 'em. You're the only one that can say
that's not how it happened. You're the only one that can
help yourself out and say no hey wait a minute, yeah I
was there but hey it wasn't planned and that is (inaudi-
ble) truth from me was it planned or not, alright? You
understand the difference, I know you do. Cause you're
a smart person (inaudible).
But we don't think it went down the way you
planned it, that's the key for you. I don't want to see
you, because you know, you probably don't trust police,
you know, you grew up on the streets, you've been in
prison you probably don't trust us, okay, that's natural
for you. But you've got to believe me when I'm tellin'
ya, the difference between premeditation, go in there to
do this and go in there and it happens, are bigger then,
I'm sure you understood. If you understood that you'd
come clean you really would (inaudible) and you're
249. Interrogation Transcript of Parker, supra note 54, Tape 2, at 13-14.
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gonna feel better once you do.
Suspect: Oh I understand but there's nothing to come clean with.
Interrog. 1: No doubt in my mind, no doubt in his mind and we
have the exact same facts that the jury's gonna have.
Okay? Exact same facts. They're gonna get everything
we've got. And they're gonna know the answers just
like we do. The only thing that they're not gonna know
is did he plan it, did he plan to kill 'em or did it just
happen. And... and we've been in enough juries to
know they think the worst unless somebody says no
that's not how it happened' °
Sometimes guilty suspects can be coerced into confessing in order to save
an uninvolved relative. In the investigation of a high profile gang-related free-
way shooting in Los Angeles, California, a young man had been identified as
the shooter by another gang member. During his interrogation, he refused to
admit to the crime when confronted with both true and false co-perpetrator
eyewitness evidence. The investigator's response was to threaten the suspect
with arresting his brother if he did not admit responsibility for the murder.
The suspect's brother was not a gang member and had not been in the van at
the time of the shooting.
Interrogator. [hey've implicated your brother. They've implicated
you. You telling your mom for a fact Avan didn't do
anything. That only leaves one other person and that is
you.
Suspect: Then book me.
Interrogator. Oh, I am. What I'm trying to avoid is having to book
your brother too.
Suspect: Why do you have to book him? Just book me.
Interrogator. I can't, I have a guy who says he was there, says your
brother was there.
Suspect: What if I tell you he wasn't there?"'
The interrogator continued:
Suspect: No. You even said yourself all the people in the van are
in the same boat or whatever.
Interrogator Yeah.
Suspect: Whatever.
Interrogator. Yeah. You guys are, but the thing is, is that so is your
brother, you know. And he might not have to be-
Suspect: How?
Interrogator -Is what I'm saying. 2
250. Id. Tape 3, at 3.
251. Interrogation Transcript of Leo Burgos, Compton, Cal., Police Dep't 45 (Apr. 4, 1996).
252. Id. at 46.
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The interrogation kept returning to the subject of the younger brother's fate:
Interrogator- It's like I tell you. You were there. I know you were
sitting in the van. I know you shot. I. know where you
got the gun. I got some of those guys in jail. If I didn't
have all that, Leo, I wouldn't be here with you. You
wouldn't be in here with me. You know what I mean?
And you're holding out for the wrong reason, because
these guys didn't hold out. No, they told the truth.
Suspect: You sure my brother will go home tonight?
Interrogator: Okay. If the truth is that your brother has nothing to do
with it, yes, your brother will go home, okay. Because,
first of all, I want to believe your brother, and to be
honest with you I want to believe you.
No, no. See? I'm telling you if you tell me the truth
and it makes sense to me I will believe itY
3
The suspect wanted to be absolutely certain the deal was in place-that if
he admitted responsibility his uninvolved brother would indeed go home.
Interrogator: So, um, like I tell you, you know. It's just the truth I'm
after. I'm not asking you to roll anybody out. I'm not
asking you to say, "Hey man you know it was so and
so's gun. I got it from -," because I know that already.
I just want to know what you did. I want to hear it from
you. I want to hear.
Suspect: Just want to know if my brother's gonna go home."'
The interrogator followed up:
Interrogator: What happened that night, Leo? You guys are coming
down the freeway on the one hundred, right? By Man-
chester? Right? Kid is driving? Huh? Like I tell you
make that other guy a liar, and if he's a liar and your
brother goes home and if you're responsible for some-
thing.
Suspect: Man to man, my brother will go home tonight.
Interrogator: Man to man, if you
Suspect: Right now?1
5
The suspect then went on to admit being in the car and shooting at someone
he believed to be a rival gang member. His target turned out to be a ten year
old child who was leaving Dodger Stadium with his family.
One of the innocent Temple murder suspects resisted confessing despite
the threat of the death penalty and constant pressure for hours. What finally
253. Id. at 48.
254. Id. at 50.
255. Id. at 51.
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caused him to comply were threats against a friend and a family member. It is
unlikely that promising to humiliate and harm others by harassing and inter-
rogating them would normally cause an innocent person to confess to mass
murder. Taken alone, out of the context of the entire interrogation, almost no
single psychological threat or promise would likely have this effect. But inter-
rogation is a time-sequenced and cumulative process in which each new ele-
ment, like the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, adds to the weight
of what is already in place.
Interrog. 1: Dante, if T.C.'s not involved in this man, give it up.
Interrog. 2: Make some right out of it, Dante.
Interrog. 1: We need to get that stopped.
Interrog. 2: Everybody's here Dante, the game's up. All I need to
know is Dante.
Suspect: Leave T.C. out of it. T.C. don't have anything to do
with this.
Interrog. 2: Peter either.
Suspect: Peter either.
Interrog. 2: He's being brought in. What happened Dante, did you
pull the trigger?
Suspect: I didn't pull no trigger.
Interrog. 1: We're gonna...
Interrog. 2: Right?
Interrog. 1: We're gonna be in Tucson, Dante.
Interrog. 2: This is not a game my man, this is your one chance. I
mean that, like Larry told you I just want to know if
you're a killer Dante.
Interrog. 1: They're gonna hit that house big time. T.C.'s gonna go
down right in front of his kids. 6
Once this man broke and started to make admissions, seven investigators
worked on him for hours and pressed him for information about the crime.
When he was unable to supply them with the information they wanted, they
repeated the same threats and promises that provoked his first decision to
confess.
An adolescent in a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, murder investigation de-
scribed the coercive threats used in the unrecorded portion of his interrogation.
The investigators sought to induce him to agree to the story of the crime that
would lessen his punishment:
Suspect: He's telling me that I'm lying that who knows what
happened, that if I keep lying, I'm going to be in prison
for the rest of my life. He said that they'll like me in
prison with my pretty eyes and stuff. He said I'm going
to be in prison for the rest of my life. I'm going to get
256. Interrogation Transcript of Parker, supra note 54, Tape 7, at 9-10.
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the electric chair if I keep lying about this-if I keep ly-
ing to him because he knows what happened.... He's
telling me that he knows what the story is, he knows
what happened.
And that I'm over here lying, and if, he knows, he's
saying, "I know you're lying and you keep, if you keep
lying, "and he's standing up now, put his finger in my
face, "if you keep lying, you're going to be in prison for
the rest of your damned life." I'm telling you what
really happened. I know what the fuck happened.
"You're going to go to prison for the rest of your life.
They're going to like you with your pretty eyes. And if
you don't go to prison, you're going to get the electric
chair. ... " So I was, I didn't know what to do, so I
told him, I just decided to tell him what he wanted to
hear. I said, "all right." 7
Another young male defendant in South Carolina described a portion of
his interrogation as follows:
Suspect: And that's when David told me about his feelings he
couldn't put in the report and everything. And he told
me I could spend the rest of my life in jail. And um, so
at that point, I said "You mean I'm going to die in jail.
And urn, David, he was the smart one, you know, and
he made, you know, the smart comment "if you don't
fry." You know, and when he said that I said "What do
you mean, the electric chair?" And he said this could be
an electric chair case. And um, so um, they talked
about, you know, they told me that and then um, you
know, after he told me about his feelings and stuff he
told me that and urn, but he said we can avoid all of
that if you'll just help us out, tell us something.
Interviewer- That can avoid all of that?
Suspect: Uh hum.
Interviewer: Exactly what did he say about that?
Suspect: He said, um, that you know again about talking with the
judge, you know, he said that he could talk with the
judge, you know, to get me out of it. And he just had to
have something for his report.
Interviewer: Did that make any sense to you at the time?
Suspect: Well at the time I was real scared, and I thought, hey if
I do what he wants me to do, you know, the man's told
me I'll be leaving."
257. Interview of Adams, supra note 122, at 35-38.
258. Interview of Register, supra note 105, at 29-30.
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While innocent and guilty suspects comprehend and react differently to an
interrogator's accusations of guilt and claims about incriminating evidence,
both experience growing certainty of arrest and conviction. As one suspect
told the following to a prosecutor who interviewed him hours after he falsely
confessed to Oakland, California, police:S uspect: A- -- ai
,-pn I a n I going to get myself h-ung for this? I mean
because I, the part they said finally that I was going to
go to jail as a murderer, and that the only way that I
would have a chance and that I could continue my life
to do those things that I find worthwhile, is if I could
recall the section before when I saw BiBi and the time
that I would actually have struck her, and I mean,
there's none of that. Everything they said is just because
they leaned on me until, I mean they scared me to
death. They said I was going to spend the rest of my
life...
Prosecutor: Okay.
Suspect: ... in jail, in prison.
They said that I must have, that I was lying and they put
a lot of pressure on me and I said that if it's not lying,
it's what I believe that I did not drive down there. They
said they have witnesses and they saw my car there and
had all the proof and I felt like, well, I'm already found
guilty for that and now, what's next, you know. And
they said I'd spend the rest of my life in prison for that,
so yes, that's my comment to my cognitive, my cogni-
tion is that no, I never did, I tried to make that clear on
the tape, that this is all, just that I want to close my eyes
and dream and think of, whatever, and then they's men-
tion something like over there in the bushes and all of a
sudden I can, bushes are imagined, and then I was try-
ing to save myself because they had found me guilty,
they had found me guilty. And they said they were my
friends and if I couldn't, and if they were here to help
me and if I couldn't get them to not, to .... 29
Sometimes interrogators are so explicit in their offer that they engage in
open plea bargaining: offering a suspect a specific promise of prosecutorial
and judicial leniency in exchange for an admission. For example, Flagstaff,
Arizona, investigators offered a woman less punishment in exchange for tell-
ing them the location of the body of a victim they believed her deceased hus-
band had killed:
Interrogator: When we walk out of here today, there's no more deals.
Period. And we already know, Gil and I already know
259. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 3, at 3, 5.
1084 [Vol. 74:4
THE DECISION TO CONFESS FALSELY
what you just said that we can get the whole truth. And
maybe, maybe, we can drop something, but until we
find out what everything is, we're not gonna tell you
that we can do it. Okay. So you tell us every bit of the
truth right now.
Suspect: (Crying). Is it gonna help me or make it worse.
Interrogator: Oh yeah. It's gonna help you a lot. Alright.
Suspect: I'm sorry. I'm just so scared (crying).'w
Interrogator: We get Jason's body. Twenty-five years. We don't get a
body, it's life.
Suspect: I didn't kill nobody. I didn't do anything wrong, Rick.
Interrogator: Didn't say you did.
Suspect: So why am I being arrested? I didn't do anything.
Interrogator: Twenty-five years, we get a body. Life if we don't get a
body. You decide which one you want.
Suspect: I didn't do nothing.
Interrogator: We're out here today to find the body.
Suspect: The only.
Interrogator. You provide it and, and, you provide it and we'll go
from there.
Suspect: I don't know.
Interrogator: Plain, plain and simple. Okay?... We're not here,
we're not, we don't want to hear I don't know, I don't
know, I don't know. We want to hear it's here. And
we're gonna out and find it and then we're gonna go on
with life. But we're not going on with life until we find
it. So, you want on hold again, that's fine.26
Suspect: What do you guys want from me?
Interrogator I want Jason and I want him today.
Suspect: I don't know where he is.
Interrogator: I want to know where he is today. If you tell me where
he is and I go find him, we'll deal. But I want Jason. I
want to cut this crap out and I want to have another
person, because I'm tired of this, Gil's tired of this, our
families are tired of this, the Sheriff is tired of this, we
want.
Suspect: I'm tired of this.
Interrogator Jason. Or whoever the hell he is. Dead or alive, we want
him. That's the only way you're gonna get something
out of this.
Suspect: What do you mean?
260. Interrogation Transcript of Richardson, supra note 186, at 24.
261. Id. at 78-79.
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Interrogator: I guarantee you. Do you wanna be in prison for life?
Suspect: No. I don't want to even go to prison for one day.262
This woman eventually fabricated a story to satisfy the interrogator's immedi-
ate demand. Since she had no idea whether the person they sought was alive
or dead, her confabulated statements were subsequently proven wrong.
While interrogating a recently arrested man who had been maintaining his
innocence, Vallejo, California, police, in conjunction with a prosecutor and an
FBI agent, explicitly offered a promise of prosecutorial leniency in exchange
for a confession. Prior to formally presenting their deal, the interrogator had
informally threatened the suspect with the death penalty if he did not confess.
When he became desperate, the prosecutor formally offered the suspect a deal
so he could avoid the informally-threatened death penalty:
Interrogator: I'm gonna have Jim Highsmith talk to you from the
Solano County DA's Office.
Prosecutor: Okay Mr. Livingston, uhm the uh prosecution, I'm, I
represent the District Attorney in Solano County. My
name is Jim Highsmith. I've been sitting here uh during
this interview today and listening to your uh responses
to the questions to the detectives. We are prepared to uh
offer you one thing in exchange for your truthful testi-
mony, and that is that we will not seek the death penal-
ty, and I want to recite to you what the agreement is,
and I want you to listen very carefully to what this
agreement will be. Okay, you ready?
Suspect: Yes sir.
Prosecutor:. You will agree truthfully, completely, and fully reveal to
the prosecution agents, that is to these detectives, uh by
this interview all that you know concerning the Loomis
robbery of November the 13th, 1991, uh in which three
people were murdered. You will agree to provide all of
the information that you know about these crimes, in-
cluding but not limited to information concerning the
part that you claim, and all people who were involved in
the planning and the execution of the, of the robbery
and the murders.
Uh, and uh in exchange for this truthful testimony,
the prosecution, that is the Solano County DA's Office
will not seek the death penalty against you in connection
with the charges which we have brought against you. Uh
in the event, however, that you, you do not give us a
truthful statement, uh we will file a complaint, that is,
strike that, we will seek the death penalty. In other
words, you have to give a truthful statement as to all as-
262. Id. at 91-92.
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pects of the case. Do you understand that?
Suspect: Yeah.
Prosecutor: Okay, uhm you understand that uh you will receive no
immunity for perjury, if we find later on uh that you
perjured yourself. Another thing, okay, have we coerced
you in any other way? Uh has, has, is this, will this be
your free and voluntary statement?
Suspect: Yes.
Prosecutor: Okay, and uh no other promises have, have been made
to you. You understand that?
Suspect: Yeah.
Prosecutor: The only thing that we've agreed to is that we will not
seek the death penalty. You understand that?
Suspect: Yeah.
Prosecutor: Do you agree to tell us truthfully everything that you
know about the Loomis homicide?
Suspect: Yes, uh I got a question.
Prosecutor: Yes.
Suspect: If you're not seeking the death penalty, what you be
seeking, life?
Prosecutor: We will, we will seek all, all other, everything up to and
including uh life, yes, and it could be life without pa-
role. Uh I'm not saying that's what it'll be, but that's,
I'm not making any other promises. All this is, is that
we will not seek the death penalty. Do you agree to
that?
Suspect: Life without parole.
Prosecutor: That could be a possibility, because we have charged
special circumstances in this case. But, but that's all
we're willing to do at this point. Do you understand
that?
Suspect: Where's the light at?"6
Prosecutor: Well let me, I, I don't want any wavering on your part.
You have to understand that we are giving up a consid-
erable thing. There are three people that died, and that
that's all we're willing to give up. We will not seek the
death penalty in exchange.
Suspect: But I didn't kill these people.
Prosecutor: That's true, but I'm, I, again telling you that we will not
seek the death penalty. That's all we're willing to give
up, and that you will, you will give a truthful statement.
263. This is a reference to an earlier conversation in which the interrogators told the suspect
that cooperating was his "light at the end of the tunnel." Interrogation Transcript of Livingston,
supra note 113.
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Do you agree to that? If not, say so, because we'd be
wasting our time. Do you, uh, agree to these conditions?
Suspect Yeah, but is, is it possible it might change?
Prosecutor: Anything's possible, but I'm not gonna promise you
that. All I'm saying is we will not seek the death penal-
ty. That's all I can tell you. Any other questions.
Suspect: No.
Prosecutor- Okay, do you, do you agree to give us an honest state-
ment?
Suspect: To the best of my knowledge.2
After agreeing to the deal, the suspect attempted to make up a confession
based on what he knew about the crime, that is, what the interrogators had
told him and what was common knowledge. When pressed for specific infor-
mation, he broke down and admitted he was making up the answers to avoid a
death sentence. At this point the video recorder was turned off; when it was
turned back on, the suspect attempted again to satisfy the interrogators. His
second attempt also failed because he still could not answer their specific
questions correctly. He then reasserted his position prior to being offered the
deal-that he was not involved in the robbery/murders. The interrogators
revoked his "deal," the prosecutor charged him with capital murder, and the
confession he had given was used at trial."6
f. The Accident Scenario Technique2 '
i. Introduction
Interrogators use the accident scenario technique or the maximiza-
tion/minimization strategy to deliver threats and promises in a way that is
more sophisticated than simply placing the alternatives before the suspect.26
When directed at innocent persons or at guilty parties who realize that they are
negotiating a reduction in their punishment in exchange for confessing, the
tactic is usually made progressively more transparent. If the suspect is not
motivated to comply or does not realize what is required of him, the investiga-
tor can become more explicit both as to the consequences of accepting or
rejecting the deal and what the suspect needs to do to carry out his end of the
bargain.
The investigator implements the accident scenario technique in its most
subtle form by suggesting that some sort of accident, outburst, struggle, or
unintentional turn of events caused a criminal event or changed the ending of
264. Id.
265. Even though his so-called confession was obviously both involuntary and unreliable, it
was nevertheless allowed into evidence at trial. The jury acquitted him of the triple murder charg-
es.
266. In most of the illustrations below, the interrogators' references to incriminating evidence
are erroneous and/or false.
267. A recent observational study found that investigators attempted to minimize the serious-
ness of the crime in 22% of their interrogations. See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra
note 4, at 267.
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a crime. Done this way, the investigator leaves it up to the suspect to invent
the story of how the crime happened. A suspect must be aware, or have been
made aware, that certain stories take away premeditation or reduce the serious-
ness of the crime.
If a suspect doesn't understand that explaining what happened as an acci-
dent leads to a lesser punishment or doesn't want to admit even to being in-
volved in an accident, the investigator can clarify what the story needs to
involve by formatting it and/or making the benefit clear. An investigator can
even explicitly lay out the elements of the accident for a suspect and require
only a series of one word answers to signal agreement.
Under the circumstance of either an unformatted or a formatted accident
scenario, a suspect shifts from denial to agreement because he understands that
he will either avoid a harm and/or realize a benefit by making the change.
When a person makes this shift, he is doing nothing more complicated than
maximizing his expected utility. While he may be operating on information
that has been deliberately distorted, and in a situation in which every effort
has been made to limit the alternatives he considers, he is nevertheless making
a choice among the alternatives he perceives and so can be expected to act
rationally under these constraints.
Investigators will use this tactic in the formatted form even when the
crime scene facts clearly indicate a premeditated murder and directly contra-
dict any possibility that an accident or a self-defense event occurred. When
used in this fashion, the tactic is intended to first elicit a false confession by
offering a benefit for adopting the story. As the tactic is supposed to play out,
the investigator next attacks the statement because it does not fit the crime
facts, and finally obtains an accurate account of the crime. The three funda-
mental problems with this approach are that: 1) it relies on coer-
cion-promises of leniency and/or threats of harm-to elicit the initial agree-
ment to the false confession; 2) while it may be possible to lead a guilty sus-
pect to produce an accurate description of the crime, innocent suspects will
never be able to do this unless they are informed of the crime's facts, e.g.
contaminated; and 3) since guilty suspects know how the crime happened,
some will realize that the interrogator's suggestion of an impossible accident
version of the crime facts is a trap.
Because guilty suspects can often see through the tactic, it may generally
be more effective when directed at the innocent. In order for a guilty suspect
to go for this ploy, he must either ignore the fit of the scenario and the crime
facts or believe that the detective is so corrupt that he is willing to under-
charge the crime in order to close the file. The innocent suspect is more likely
to be taken in by the tactics because he doesn't know how the crime really oc-
curred.
ii. The Unformatted Accident Scenario
The interrogator can progressively expose both the motivational compo-
nents and the story requirements of the accident scenario technique. The inter-
rogator can offer the suspect the opportunity to tell a self-serving story with
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little fanfare and without explicitly mentioning the benefit of choosing this
option. Reno, Nevada, investigators suggested to a fourteen year-old that the
robbery and killing he had done might have been caused by the victim:
Interrogator: It's our job to find out, exactly what happened, and in
this particular situation, one of the people was dead and
you're the only one that knows exactly, exactly what
happened (inaudible). A body was found, You're re-
sponsible for that guy laying out there. We don't really
know, exactly, what happened. I mean, it could be a
whole bunch of things. Maybe the guy was some kind
of weirdo and he tried to pick up on you. Maybe, who
knows. It's just a lot of possibilities that we don't have
the answers to."
In a partially recorded Pasco County, Florida, interrogation, the adult sus-
pect immediately comprehended the meaning of an interrogator's offer of help:
Interrogator: Listen to me, a lot of crazy things go on in this world.
The only thing right now you've got is you, that's all,
listen to me, things happen my man that we don't have
no, no control over. I've been with my wife before
when I'm tellin' ya, and I know, alright. Jeff, help me,
help you. You hear me?
Suspect: Mean it.
Interrogator: I mean it man. I'm not shittin' ya. You hear me? Jeff,
don't carry this thing around with you. God damn, don't
do it. You hear me, huh, look at me, hear me man? I've
been around too long. He has too. We told so many
people, their loved ones are dead and there's always a
reason. People down the street may not understand it.
May have been an accident and it just may have been an
accident.
Suspect: Wasn't blaming themselves.
Interrogator: You hear me?
Suspect: Well maybe an accident? Yeah.
Interrogator: What I mean is an accident. I don't think you meant to
kill your wife. I really don't, I mean it, I'm tellin' ya,
you wouldn't do it, you've been married to her too
long.2"9
In the following example, a San Diego, California, investigator laid out
two alternatives before the suspect: having the jury regard him as a premedi-
tated murderer or as something less serious. The investigator then suggested
how the suspect can realize his preference, openly stressing the central element
of the story he wanted the suspect to invent:
268. Interrogation Transcript of Doe, supra note 207, at 32.
269. Interrogation Transcript of Crouch, supra note 92, at 27-28.
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Interrogator Would you rather, and hear me out Elmer okay, would
you rather, let's give you a situation. For you to be
charged with this, with this murder, would you rather be
looked upon on the eyes of the jury, and hear me out
please, as a cold-blooded killer. Or, or as a person that
did something that just got out of hand and did not in-
tend, did not intend. Which, if you were in that situa-
tion, which would you prefer? And I'm asking you
Elmer? I'm asking you which would you prefer to be
looked upon as. As somebody that was just cold-blood-
ed, just flat out went ahead and killed a young girl or
somebody that was in a situation that just went haywire
and did not intend. And that's the magic word. Did not
intend. °
A Sacramento, California, investigator made clear to an adolescent that he
would be charged either with murder or a less serious offense. He suggested
an accident in the following:
Interrogator: We don't know exactly what happened. We don't know
if somebody intentionally killed her or if this, this was
an accident. If somebody did something that they didn't
mean to do. Something that happened and things got out
of hand. I don't know. I don't know. I think you're
involved in her death.
Suspect: I don't know how.
Interrogator: And I think you need to take this opportunity now,
Shane, to explain to us so that we don't think it's a
murder. Because if it's a murder, you're gonna wanna
cover it up and hide it. Now, if something happened
then you need to explain it to us. Now is this the time to
do it .... If it was an accident, people will understand.
If something happened, things got out of hand, if she
fell, I don't know, but you need to explain that. Because
we can't explain it for you. If people had an opportunity
to explain that for you when you could've done it your-
self, they're gonna explain it as a murder. And it wasn't,
was it?"'
A detective in Solano County, California, manipulated another adolescent
using a false witness evidence ploy coupled with an accident scenario invita-
tion:
Interrogator: Both Andy and Josh told me not more than two or three
hours ago, that when you're all running up at the train,
they both said that you pushed him into the train.
270. Interrogation Transcript of Nance, supra note 95, Tape 3, at 3.
271. Interrogation Transcript of Schmitt, supra note 85, at 37.
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Straight up. Now my question to you, when you pushed
him into the train, was it an accident or was it inten-
tional?
That is very important. Because they're gonna tell
their story and it don't make you look good unless
you've got an explanation and I can't say it for you,
"Hey it was, you know, an accident or it was intentional
or whatever." Not reached up to grab him or pull him
away. Shoved him. And he fell into the train. Straight
up. That's what they told me. I'm just tellin you what I
know. Alright. Was it an accident?272
San Francisco, California, police educated a suspect as follows:
Interrog. 1: Hey Robert, we know you killed the guy, the only ques-
tion is why, and if you don't want to tell us that that's
fine, but I mean that's to your advantage, I mean, right
now we're thinking you went to the guys house, and
you planned on killing him, and ihat's how you did it,
you planned it from the beginning, and that's first de-
gree murder. The only question is why you did kill him,
was there some reason? Was there a fight, what hap-
pened, did, uh, is there some kind of circumstances that
lead up to it that'll help explain it, and modify it, that's
the only issue, that's the only question.
Interrog. 2: The only question is, in this situation is why? Did he
threaten you? You told me no, he didn't threaten you,
that no homosexual ever threatened you. Did he make
you angry, did he throw you out, uh, did, you know,
what was the reason, and that's all we need to hear, uh,
you know, the rest of this stuff you're just fixating on
things that aren't important and the question really is
why, uh, it's not a matter of whether you.2
San Mateo, California, detectives made clear that an appropriate story
would result in a benefit:
Interrogator: Sometimes things happen, you know, it could be an
argument, it could be a fight, he could have come at
you. You know, instead of a murder, this might be an
accident. It could be a manslaughter situation in the heat
of passion. But he's not gonna know until you tell him
the truth. You were there.
Suspect: I was not there.
Interrogator Well, we're, we're a little bit past that, Bernard. Ber-
nard, we're a little bit past that. Okay. Right now you're
272. Interrogation Transcript of Johnson, supra note 157, at 68.
273. Interrogation Transcript of Anderson, supra note 114, at 21.
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in the driver seat. You can help yourself. And, uh, if it's
the truth that's, you know, can help you, if there's, if it
was an accident or something like that, or it was a fight,
who knows? 74
When the investigator presents the suspect with a beneficial option, he
may tell the suspect only about the advantage of admission and how !he sus-
pect might frame it, as in a Sacramento, California, interrogation:
Interrogator- I know that you're the one that pulled the trigger. Now
there's no need if you're gonna continue to deny it, you
and I have nothin' else to say but now, if you wanna tell
me the truth, if you wanna tell me that the gun went off
accidentally, the gun was a malfunctioning weapon,
whatever, but I don't want to hear no more lies about
that you didn't pull the trigger because that's just not
the case.... All I want out of you is the truth.
I want to help, I can help you, you can help me,
you can help your dad, you can set the whole thing
straight, but you're not gonna do it with these lies, be-
cause nobody, nobody's gonna believe you because you
are a liar. You shot him, the witnesses say you shot
him, the polygraph says you shot him. There's nothin at
all to tell me that you didn't do it. Nothing. Absolutely
nothing.
The only thing you might convince me of is that the
gun malfunctioned or it went off, whatever. Maybe you
didn't intentionally shoot him but you had the gun in
your hand when it went off. That's the only thing you're
gonna convince me of. Cause none of the rest of it's the
truth. Do we have anything to talk about?
275
One strategy for offering a suspect leniency is to run him through the
various degrees of a crime and their respective consequences and then invite
him to choose the crime level at which he prefers to be charged, as in the
following Boynton Beach, Florida, interrogation of an innocent man:
Interrogator- Do you know the difference between first-degree murder
and second-degree murder?
Suspect: Uh-huh.
Interrogator: Okay, first-degree murder entails life in prison without
parole or the electric chair. Okay. Second-degree mur-
der, first-degree murder is like a premeditated murder;
second degree murder is a, a passion crime, you know,
somebody gets mad. It's a lesser, it's lesser than first-
degree, okay? What you need to think to yourself is,
okay, if you were there tonight, okay, you need to tell
274. Interrogation Transcript of Knight, supra note 232, at 18.
275. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, supra note 162, at 35.
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us, because we'll know if you were there or not.
Suspect: I was not there.
Interrogator If you killed her, just help yourself out, because this will
be your one and only shot." 6
To insure that a suspect "gets it," police may give him a short course in
the finer points of criminal law and sentencing guidelines, as in the following
San Diego, California, interrogation:
Interrog. 1: Do you know the difference between first and second
degree? First degree murder in comparison to man-
slaughter? What is that ah, you know a little bit better
than I do in terms of years? You know, in terms of
years.
Interrog. 2: First degree murder's ah life. Second degree murder you
can get twenty-five years. Manslaughter you can get
probation. Involuntary manslaughter, it just depends on
the circumstances. We got to know the story.2"
Interrog. 1: What is the worst possible scenario if this gets adjudi-
cated in court and what is the worst possible? Okay, you
end up getting, getting convicted of first degree with
special circumstances. You know, you're looking at,
you're looking at um, you're looking at life with no
possibility for parole. That's what you're looking at
man. I mean I'm just letting you know. I'm just putting
the cards out on the table here. If she consented, then
it's not rape. If she went crazy on you, I mean you put
her out. Granted you put her out but your intent was not
to kill this lady. I mean you're not stupid man. You
wouldn't come back to a God damn campsite if you
thought you'd killed somebody."8
The point is I'm interested in why it happened
okay. I'm interested in why it happened and I don't feel
in my mind that it was premeditated, that you intended
to. I just don't. I knew your condition. I knew her con-
dition at the time and you ended up coming back. That's
the point. The point is, is do you eventually want to end
up getting tried for first degree murder? You know what
I'm saying? I mean that's all, that's the only point is
where I'm, where I'm coming from. And I'm just giving
you these, these options here because this is not a cold,
malicious, cold blooded, you know, 'I'm gonna, I'm
gonna kill you' type of thing."
During an unrecorded interrogation in New Brunswick, New Jersey, an
276. Interrogation Transcript of Salazar, supra note 119, at 50-51.
277. Interrogation Transcript of Nimblett, supra note 137, at 36.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 46.
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investigator went so far as to pull a statute book off the shelf and read the
penalty associated with each level of homicide."' ° The suspect described this
part of the interrogation as follows:
Suspect: I remember the one guy talking to me telling me about
this is the detective in there, he was telling me you
know, well you know, how he had the book, so he was
telling me the different types of murder charges and
stuff.
Interviewer: He was reading from the book?
Suspect: Yes, he was reading from the book all right and telling
me you know, how it could be murder one and stuff you
know, he was going for the whole nine yards, you
know. I remember him saying that, you know, they
could charge me all right, they were going to charge me
with capital murder. He says do you understand what
capital murder is? I said no not really. He says well, he
says a capital murder he says you know, they can give
you lethal injection, you know.
Then I believe it was somewhere around that point
that he picked up the book and he says look, this is
what capital murder is. You know and then he turns
around and says, well you know, if you two were just in
the car and you were arguing because of Randy you
know, and you know, things got out of hand you know
and ah, you know you accidentally hit her or she went
to hit you and you know you might have grabbed the
knife and killed her or something. He said that would be
like an involuntary manslaughter or a provocation pas-
sion you know.
Then he started reading what they carry. You know
but ah, I remember him explaining, I mean he went
through the book and explained all of them to me all
right and what time each one carried. It might have been
about five minutes or so after that, he turned around and
says to me, says well why don't you just talk to Kerwin
you know and see what Kerwin has to say you know
maybe we can get these charges dropped down to some-
thing lesser you know.
Kerwin came in all right and him and Kerwin were
saying something you know and then Kerwin comes
over and said well you know if you tell us that you
know you two were arguing and that you know Tree
was, you know, got mad and stuff and told me about
Randy and this, that and the other thing you know, you
280. The police confirmed their discussion of sentencing options with the suspect during this
unrecorded interrogation.
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could help yourself, you can get your sister out of all
this.
Interviewer Now let me see if I got this straight. The first detective
sitting at the desk starts telling you about the different
penalties starting with death penalty and running down
to overtime parking?
Suspect: Right."'
iii. The Formatted Accident Scenario
By the time an innocent person undergoing interrogation has reached the
point at which he realizes that cooperating with the police is his only hope, he
will appreciate the special meaning the investigator has attached to the word
"truth." For the innocent suspect, the investigator's demand for truth has al-
ways been a request for a lie. When the formatted accident scenario is put into
play, the interrogator and the suspect finally arrive at equivalent working defi-
nitions of "truth." Presuming the subject's guilt, the interrogator understands
that what he wants from the suspect is a lie and so 'does the suspect, but each
pretends that the truth is finally being spoken.
After the conclusion of an interrogation in Oakland, California, a young
man told the truth to the detectives who had elicited his false confession a few
hours earlier
Interrogator Have we asked you to tell us anything but the truth?
Suspect You wanted me to (pause) tell you what I had done to
cause that was an accident.
2
Inbau, Reid, and Buckley's training manual for police interrogators..
promotes the practice of formatting an account of the crime that turns the
event into an accident, a reasonably provoked response, or an act of self-de-
fense. This tactic communicates that there is a way out of the suspect's predic-
ament with little or no punishment. In the following passage, the manual dem-
onstrates how to transform a first degree murder into an act of self-defense.
The implication is that once the interrogator classifies the crime in this way
other criminal justice officials will accept his conclusion that this is how the
crime happened, and thus the suspect will be charged accordingly.
"Joe, you probably didn't go out looking for this fellow with the pur-
pose of doing this. My guess is, however, that you expected some-
thing from him and that's why you carried a gun-for your own
protection. You knew him for what he was-no good. Then when
you met him, he probably started using foul, abusive language, and
he gave some indication that he was about to pull a gun on you. Then
you had to act to save your own life. That's about it, isn't it,
Joe?"
281. Interview with John Chew, Toms River, NJ. 24, 27-29 (Aug. 9, 1994).
282. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 4, at 27.
283. See INBAU Er AL., supra note 20.
284. Id. at 104.
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After the investigator has elicited this false confession to the less serious
crime, the manual advises that he obtain an accurate account of what hap-
pened, thereby transforming the false confession into a true confession and
returning the crime to its factually proper description as a premeditated mur-
der. The coerciveness of this technique is simply ignored by the manual au-
thors." 5 In an appendix to the text, they attempt to rationalize this approach
by arguing that the manipulation of a suspect's perceptions about how much
punishment he will receive is permissible because no real threats or promises
were issued:286
During a legal interrogation, reality can not be changed. A confession
will be inadmissible as evidence if the interrogator takes away the
consequences of the confession (promises), or physically adds anxiety
(threats, abuse) during the interrogation. However, the interrogator
can legally change the suspect's perception of the consequences of
confessing or the suspect's perception of the anxiety associated with
deception through influencing the suspect's beliefs.
This rationalization makes about as much sense as saying that a person who
brandishes a weapon and asks for money is not committing armed robbery if
there are no bullets in the gun.
San Mateo, California, police suggested a false confession to self-defense
that appears to be modeled after the Inbau, Reid, and Buckley text example.
Interrog. 1: You're doing nothing, absolutely nothing to help your-
self. You know, if it's, if it's an accident or there was
something, there was some type of provocation to make
you believe, you know, you might have been afraid of
this guy. Maybe he had a gun. Maybe he pulled it, I
don't know. Did he? Right now is the time and opportu-
nity to go for this. You only get one time. That's the
way I work. I don't know how Tom works it. I got to a
guy and if he don't want to help himself, the heck with
him.'"
Interrog. 2: I can see the two of you to on Clarke [Street]. Jerry
trying to get big, flex his muscles, do whatever. Either
he pulled a gun on you or whatever, and somehow you
got the gun away from him or you had your own gun
and you were trying to defend yourself and then you
shot him.f9
A Connecticut State Police investigator suggested to an innocent young
man that he killed his mother in self-defense:
285. See Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations, supra note 6.
286. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 327-47.
287. Id. at 333.
288. Interrogation Transcript of Knight, supra note 232, at 24-25.
289. Id. at 25.
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Interrogator: Is this what happened last night, Pete, that you came
home and because, as you said, you're tied to your
mother's apron strings, she flew off the handle and went
at you or something and you had to protect yourself? Is
this how it came down?
Suspect: It's still not coming out. It's still not coming through. I
still can't remember and i want to.
Interrogator: I mean, this could be the whole thing here.
Suspect: Ya.
Interrogator: She could have went at you. And, this is strictly a self-
defense thing where you had to protect yourself against
her.'
During an investigation in Orange County, California, a police officer
passing as an interpreter tried to convince the suspect that if she claimed that
she acted in self-defense, the killing was not a crime, and therefore she would
not be punished:
Officer. My feeling was that this Miss Chi right? This is my own
opinion. This, this, this I am sure of it you know? This was
not indicated by that police officer you know? My feeling
was that whoever had that knife first, was that, my feeling
was that it was Miss Chi. I think you were trying to defend
yourself. So you bit to get her to drop the knife you know?
So you did it out of the sudden urge then accidentally
stabbed her a few times. The result was this was how she
die. Do you agree with what I had said?
Officer- If-if-if you knew that you were connected to Miss Chi's
murder then you better surrender?
Officer. If you killed Miss Chi out of self defense--Chi, Jen-
Bing-by law you will get some leniency you know? It
would be found not guilty. But if you planned the killing
then you could be facing the death penalty. Otherwise you
could be facing severe penalty or, Mrs. Peng, are you con-
nected to Chi, Jen-Bing's murder? Then earlier, if you didn't
understand I will explain the law to you again right? For
self-defense, not guilty. To planned to kill someone, guilty.
In court they would not give any leniency to people who
killed someone out of sudden urge you know?29
Vallejo, California, police used the technique in an attempt to lead a sus-
pect to reason that a self-defense killing in the course of committing a bur-
glary was to his advantage. To prepare him to see it this way, the investigators
first informed him about the consequences of remaining silent:
Interrogator: Since I don't know how to explain it to you any better,
290. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 121-22.
291. Interrogation Transcript of Peng, supra note 116, at 81-82.
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uhm right now we're prepared to, to book you for first
degree murder, uh murder during the commission of a
burglary, first degree. Uh, cause we don't know of any
right way to do it, because we're not hearing from you
what happened in there.
If the woman came at you with a skillet, there were
some bolt cutters on the ground, if the woman came at
you with the bolt cutters because you got in an argu-
ment or something, it could explain what happened in
there, but right now we're led to believe that you went
in there and banged on a woman for no reason at all,
and then took her property, and we don't we're not,
can't believe that that's the case, cause I've know ya,
and you're just not the type of person I would think to
go in there and bang the woman, take her stuff,
somethin' happened inside the house. She called you
names, she called you a thief, she did somethin' to you
that, she was fightin with ya or somethin'. Somethin'
happened, ya know, and that's what we're, we're tryin
to find out, to get a story from you about what happened
in there so we don't have to look at it as you're just a
guy that went in there and bashed her on the head and
took her TV.'
A detective in Sacramento, California, not only formatted the story and
pointed out the suspect's jeopardy, but also offered to deliver the message to
the jury for him. The investigator said that the suspect's best opportunity to
save himself would be gone when the interrogation ended. If the suspect did
not confess to the accident story, the interrogator would not be able to help
him at his murder trial:
Interrogator- Now, I guarantee you that as long as you continue to lie
to me, just like myself, the twelve men and women on
that jury, they're gonna put me on the stand, "Detective
Reed tell us about Cheval Wright? Did you interview
him here, did you interview him, did you interview him
here. When did he finally start telling the truth?" and
I'm gonna say, "Eight twenty of ninety-three at 13:35
hours, after confronting him for the final time that he's
still lying to me, he told me the truth. '293
The only thing that you can do from this point
forward is do something for your self, which is to tell
the whole truth so that people can believe that when the
gun was handed to you it was cocked and it went off
accidently. Nobody's gonna buy into this about you
handing it to him then he, so okay, even if they buy into
292. Interrogation Transcript of Yarborough, supra note 237, at 9.
293. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, supra note 162, at 41.
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it, it still makes you the murderer, so you're better off to
go with the truth and to convince the jury through me,
because your attorney probably will never let you take
the stand. I'm gonna be you settin' up there. I'm the
only one that's gonna be tellin' that twelve men and
twelve women on that jury what really happened.
it's gonna be Me and them other dirt bags. Them
other dirtbags are gonna get up, they're gonna make you
look as bad as they can. "Oh ya, he wanted us to stop,
he wanted us to rob these people, and he's just an
asshole, he wants to shoot people, that's the way Cheval
Wright has always been."
Well you and I know that's not true. I know that,
you know that, and I think your dad knows that from
the way he acted yesterday cause we was truly sincere.
Now I'm your mouth piece, Cheval, I'm the one that's
gonna be up in front of the jury tellin' em what you
said. 94
We're still down to that point where we get on the
stand and me, as a professional witness, the question
from the prosecutor's gonna be after I get done testifyin'
about this story you just give me, did I believe you're
tellin' me the truth? And I'm gonna say no. And then
those other guys are gonna get up on the stand and
they're all gonna say the same thing. And then say "Ya,
he was over here acting bad, talkin (inaudible)" or what-
ever was said like that and it's gonna go on and on, and
they're just gonna bury you.25
After this session, the investigator administered a questionnaire about the
interrogation. The suspect's answers confirmed that he decided to confess after
realizing the extent of his jeopardy and directly in response to the
investigator's offer to deliver the fraudulent accident scenario to the jury.'
Interrogator: Could the interviewer have said or done anything differ-




Suspect: You know, told me something like um, you know, told
me maybe, give me some idea what was going to hap-
pen to me.
Interrogator: Gee, that's something that all interviewers have trouble
294. Id. at 42-43.
295. Id. at 44.
296. The suspect said that he had seen the gun in the hand of one of his acquaintances and
had physically tried to stop the robbery shortly before the other man shot the victim. The
suspect's account was confirmed by the statement of a surviving victim of the crime.
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with because you never really know.
Was anything said or done during the interview that
prompted you to hold back the truth for a while?
Suspect Yes. Like when you told me that, the rest of my life
was going to be spent in jail.
Interrogator: What was the most significant thing the interviewer said
or did that led you to tell the truth?
Suspect: You would tell the jury something that they wouldn't
believe from me.2
During the investigation of a premeditated murder, in which the perpetra-
tor viciously beat, strangled, robbed, and probably raped the victim, a Boyton
Beach, Florida, interrogation specialist recast the death using the accident sce-
nario technique. He suggested that the accident happened because the victim
requested "rough sex." Using the threats and promises inherent in this tech-
nique, the interrogation specialist elicited the suspect's agreement to this gross-
ly inaccurate account. Subsequently, two other detectives took over and tried
to obtain a confession by confronting the suspect with facts that negated the
accident scenario. The innocent suspecte9" broke down and admitted that he
lied about his involvement, and that he had only agreed to the accident scenar-
io because he feared receiving the death penalty:
Suspect: The guy acted like if I said it was an accident, every-
thing would be fine. Just forget about all this shit. I
don't want to put my parents through this shit.
Interrog. 1: Well.
Suspect: I ain't got no choice. I mean everything's pointing to-
wards me, I just didn't fucking do it, but.
Interrog. 2: Marty, let me ask you this.
Suspect: I did it just to try to get off. You know, just, I don't
want to get a first degree murder charge.
Interrog. 2: Okay.
Suspect: I have no choice. I mean if that's what you have to do,
you have to do.'
I mean like I said, you know, you guys telling me
about, you know, we're going to book you on first-de-
gree murder, and if I just come out and say it was an
accident, you know, everything will be just fine, you
know, just.
297. Interrogation Transcript of Wright, supra note 162, at 76.
298. Martin Salazar's innocence was established shortly before trial. A fingerprint in the
victim's blood had been discovered on the socket end of the extension cord used to strangle her.
The print was neither the victim's nor Martin Salazar's. After the defense discovered that the
prosecution had hidden this exculpatory evidence, the prosecution dropped all charges against
Salazar. After charges were dismissed, the detective who elicited the coerced confession refused to
accept the state attorney's dismissal. He located a forensic expert who would report that Salazar's
fingerprints could not be excluded. The state re-indicted Salazar. At this time, Salazar is awaiting
trial.
299. Interrogation Transcript of Salazar, supra note 211, at 41-42.
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An officer I was talking to.
Interrog. 1: Said that everything would be fine if you.
Suspect: Well, my future would be (inaudible) I'd have a future.
But if I got booked for first-degree murder I might as
well just forget about everything.
interrog. 2: Were you ever told tonight you were under arrest forl
first-degree murder?
Suspect: I was told I was going to be. As soon as he walked out
of here.
Interrog. 2: Okay.
Suspect: And that I would never see the fucking sun again. And I
just got scared and I told him, you know-god damn. I
lied to you guys and said I did it just to try to get a
lesser charge so I could get a, just.
Interrog. 1: I don't understand that at all.
Suspect: I mean it's just, he scared the shit out of me.3"e
When interviewed prior to trial, this man described how the interrogator im-
plemented the accident scenario technique during the unrecorded portion of the
interrogation:" °
Suspect: He said "Them assholes out there want to charge you
with second degree, or first degree murder." He goes,
"Their intentions are just to hang you." He goes, "But I
told them to give me a chance to talk to you and see
what we can come up with." I believe this is when he
starts, he was like, "If it was an accident, just," you
know, "if it was an accident, like say you all were hav-
ing rough sex or something and you just happened to,"
you know, "get into bondage and stuff and you acciden-
tally strangled her," you know, "not meaning to, then
it's all right." You know, "It's," you know, "it's hap-
pened before," you know ...
He goes, "Do you want them guys to come in here
and charge you with first degree murder?" And he goes,
"And then they'll have to tell your mom that you're a
killer, a cold-blooded killer. How would your mom feel
about that? How would you feel putting your mom
through this?" He goes, "If they come in here and
charge you with first-degree murder, it's going to be a
300. Id. at 43-44.
301. Although the detective denied explicitly threatening the suspect with the death penalty,
he described how he formatted a crime scenario that could not possible have been true, educated
the suspect to the various levels of homicide and their components, explained the penalties for
each, and pointed out that the suspect was the only person who was in the room and therefore the
only one who could really say what happened. The detective had been trained to use the Inbau,
Reid, and Buckley method.
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long time before you see the fucking sun again." He
said, "But if you say it was an accident, your future's
looking so much brighter already." He goes, "What you
need to start thinking right now is just accident. Acci-
dent. Just think accident."'
Even though this man told the two detectives that he confessed falsely in
response to the threat of a death penalty charge, the detectives continued the
interrogation, calmed him and then coerced the same false confession a second
time: 3
Suspect: What's going to happen to me?
Interrog. 1: Depends on what you tell me. If you tell me that you
planned on going over there and killing her and you did
all this planning and all that good stuff, well, then that
is first-degree murder. But I don't think you're that kind
of guy.
Interrog. 2: I don't think you're that. I don't think you're that cold-
blooded murderer, that premeditative murderer, the kind
of guy that's stalking these people and going out and
killing on purpose. Like Ray said, it was an accident.
We think it was an accident, but we need to hear you
tell us it was an accident. But we need to know in your
words what happened.'
It is not uncommon for a suspect-even in murder cases-to report that
an interrogator said he could go home once he confessed. This seems so bi-
zarre and improbable that it is difficult not to think that the suspect is lying.
If, however, the investigator used the maximization/minimization technique,
the suspect might quite reasonably come to believe that once he agrees to the
investigator's suggested story, he will be able to leave the police station. Be-
cause the maximization/minimization technique works to transform the actual
offense into a low level crime or a non-criminal act of self-defense, the inter-
rogator can plausibly intimate that the suspect will be released if he confesses.
The false confessor in the Boyton Beach, Florida, investigation recounted the
following:
Suspect: He goes, "If you'd just say it was an accident," he said
"you all were having rough sex," you know, "and just
got carried away and you accidentally killed her, they
won't charge you with first degree. They will charge
you with second-degree murder and then," you know,
"your future looks so much brighter," you know, he
goes," because you're a clean-cut, respectable man from
what I see. Your bosses think highly of you, and so do
302. Interrogation Transcript of Salazar, supra note 211, at 68-70.
303. The detectives had to have known that the death threat reports were true since they
watched the specialist do his work via hidden video recording and monitoring systems. The tape
of the specialist's session with the suspect has never been given to the defense.
304. Interrogation Transcript of Salazar, supra note 211, at 50-51.
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all the people I've talked to." He goes, "Now why
would you throw your life away for some drunken coke
whore who is nothing but a piece of white trash," you
know. And he goes, "Well, if you say it was an accident
I think I can possibly talk to these guys into letting you
go home. That's up to them, but," you know, "I can
probably get them to let you go." 3
The above-mentioned false confessor in Arcadia, Florida, reported that the
interrogator led him to believe that by agreeing to the minimized version of
the crime he'd be able to go home:
Suspect: All right. And I said, okay, I said, now, if I sit here and
lie in yall's face, yall going to think I'm telling you the
truth. But if I sit here and tell yall the truth, yall think
I'm lying, right? He didn't say nothing. I say, you know
what, man, I'm tired of you people, now, I'm fixing to
go and tell yall what yall want to hear, right? So, be-
cause I got to the point where I was mad, frustrated, I
know I didn't do nothing, right? But they can't accept
no for an answer, right?
So now I got to the point where I felt, if I just tell
them I did it, you know what I'm saying, maybe they'd
leave me alone. That's all I want them to do, is just to
leave me alone. I was fixing to go crazy, right? I ain't
never been put under pressure before. I been put under
pressure, but I always found when I get in front of a
person, I keep telling them, saying things, I always get
found true to what I'm saying, right? But them, they
didn't want to go, they kept saying I did it, I did it, I
did it, I did it, you did it, you did it, you did it, you did
it, that's all I been hearing, you did it, right?'
So I figured, well, I'm mad now, either way it
went-this the way I started thinking, either way it
went, I tell them the truth, I can't go nowhere, if I tell
them what they want to hear, maybe I can go some-
where. Maybe I can go home, right? He told me I can
go home, if I tell them what they wanted to hear.'
During the unrecorded interrogation of a mentally handicapped suspect,
Seattle, Washington, police threatened life imprisonment if the suspect did not
confess but suggested that they could help him out once he confessed. When
interviewed, he described this experience:
Interviewer Did, at any time when you were talking to the police,
did they tell you about how serious or not serious the
305. Interview of Salazar, supra note 165, at 70-74.
306. Interview of Louis, supra note 171, at 84.
307. Id. at 95.
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punishment might be for whatever happened in connec-
tion with Miriam?
Suspect: They told me that this is a small matter, urn, we can't
help you until you admit it. And then they stated.
Interviewer: How were they going to help you?
Suspect: I don't know. They just said that. And then ah, they
stated it would get a lot worse if I didn't admit it. They
stated ah, I could get.
Interviewer: How was it going to get worse?
Suspect: I could get in a lot of trouble if I didn't admit it, where
I could go to prison and on and on.
Interviewer. So if you didn't do it, you were going to go to prison
and what else?
Suspect: And they mentioned that I could get, basically, they just
mentioned mainly that I could go to prison for life if I
didn't admit it, and it would be a harsher punishment.
And if I admitted it, they could help me.
Interviewer: If you admitted it, was there any particular way you
were supposed to admit it that would allow them to help
you?
Suspect: No, they just stated that we think you're lying. You
really need to tell the truth. This would help us."
A young man in South Carolina similarly described his interrogation expe-
rience:
Interviewer: OK. What was it, if you remember, that finally got you
to the point where you said OK. What was your think-
ing?
Suspect: It was, after being there so long that day, I was literally
thought, cause they been telling me, I mean if you tell
us something we'll help you. So I literally thought if I
tell them something they were gonna help me. You
know, hey, I figured if I go and tell them something
now, you know, today, that I would be home, you know,
shortly.
Interviewer Did it occur to you that, that all of their offers to help
presumed that you had actually done the killing?
Suspect: No, I just, the only thing I was thinking about is, you
know, telling them what they want to hear when I could
get home.
Interviewer: So the, what did you think the consequences were going
to be?
Suspect: I thought I was going to get out of it. Thought they,
308. Interview of Kris Howe by Richard Ofshe in Seattle, Wash. 23 (Oct. 28, 1994).
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they told me when, you know, they'd go talk to the
judge. You know it wasn't like you were saying, you
know, I thought once I told them what they wanted to
hear, then it would be over.3"
The false confessor in Arcadia, Florida, spent nearly four and one-half
years in pre-trial detention before his coerced and demonstrably false confes-
sion was suppressed. He described his interrogation experience as follows:
Defendant: This is what I told him, though. I told him I did tell yall
everything, because I don't know nothing about it, right?
He said, no, that ain't good enough. So like I said, now,
I been in this place all day long, all right, I'm tired, I'm
sleepy, I'm hungry, right? I'm getting sick to my
stomach, right? Now, the thing about it was, in my mind
I know I didn't do it, right? But I been there all day and
they was telling me what happened and all this kind of
stuff, right?
Interviewer- Wait a minute, when was that? You mean, during the
day?
Defendant: Yeah, all day long they was telling me what happened
and you did this and you did that, and by the, it was
like a video camera coming in my mind that was putting
all these pieces together, right. Everything they tell me, I
was putting together, okay? Now I'm starting to, in my
head, they was running on me so much, I'm starting to
think, you did it which I know I didn't do it, right? And
I kept telling myself I didn't do it, and my mind knew I
didn't do it, but it's the way they kept saying you did
this, you did this, you know, I was under pressure. I was
being, other words, I felt I was being pressured. All
right, and I couldn't get out of it, so that's, that's when
I started thinking, I, ain't no other way, this what I
started thinking, ain't no other way I can get out of this.
I can keep telling them I didn't do it, tell them the truth,
right, I didn't do it. Then I told them, and I said it just
like this, I asked them, okay, am I under arrest? No.
Interviewer: He said that then.
Defendant: Yeah. And then I asked him, if I tell yall what yall want
to hear, can I go home? And he said yes."'
309. Interview of Register, supra note 105, at 45.
310. Interview of Louis, supra note 171, at 81-82.
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3. Persuaded False Confessions
a. Introduction
The tactics that yield coerced-compliant false confessions were illustrated
above. Because these confessions are elicited by threats of harm and offers of
leniency, they are simple to comprehend. Persuaded false confessions are more
complicated, but no more difficult to understand. Their cause is not the illegit-
imate use of interrogation methods relying on threat and promise, but rather
the inappropriate and uninformed use of powerful influence techniques. If
applied in a certain manner, psychological interrogation procedures are capable
of confusing an innocent person about his culpability, leading him to become
temporarily convinced of his guilt and yielding a false confession even though
the person has no actual knowledge of committing the crime. Persuaded false
confessions occur because the person has formed the opinion that it is more
likely than not that he is guilty.
Persuaded and compliant false confessors have similar interrogation expe-
riences up to the point at which the suspect concludes that his situation is
hopeless. The turn of events that leads to a persuaded false confession is a
small matter. Confronted with supposedly conclusive evidence of his guilt and
told that his alibi is contradicted by other facts, an individual may realize that
his only basis for claiming innocence is that he has no memory of having
committed the crime. Since virtually everyone assumes that he would remem-
ber committing a complicated crime, or for that matter even a simple murder,
an innocent person may verbalize the defense "I know I'm innocent because I
don't remember doing it." If he says this, he draws the investigator into an
attack on this denial-just as surely as the investigator was drawn to attack
every previous denial. This time the attack focuses on the reliability of the
suspect's memory.
Claiming no memory of committing the crime is not a response exclusive-
ly available to the innocent. Indeed, guilty parties make the equivalent claim
often enough that it is unlikely to surprise an experienced interrogator.3 ' In-
vestigators counter this claim by proposing a seemingly plausible explanation
for the suspect's ignorance, typically that the suspect suffers from some sort of
amnesia. An investigator can usually brush aside the disingenuous lie of a
guilty suspect since his claim of no memory is at best a weak defense and is
likely to be made late in the game. However, this tactic may lead a genuinely
confused innocent to adopt an amnesia explanation for his lack of memory of
having committed the crime. The task is especially easy if a suspect has had
alcoholic blackouts, amnesia caused by a head injury, or believes in the exis-
tence of repression or multiple personality disorder.
Once an investigator shatters a suspect's confidence in the belief that he
would remember committing the crime if he did it, the suspect will likely
reason that the only way he can know his own conduct is by relying on objec-
tive evidence.3t2 Working with this logic, he can only rely on the false evi-
311. See INBAU Er AL., supra note 20, at 47, 143.
312. See Darryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, 6 ADVANcES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PsY-
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dence that the investigator has created and will therefore conclude, as would
most similarly situated persons looking at the damning evidence, that he prob-
ably committed the crime. As one innocent suspect in a Connecticut investiga-
tion put it:
Suspect: I would say that you're right, but I don't remember





Relying on the false evidence, the person will conclude, in effect, that it is
more likely than not that he committed the crime. An individual who infers his
conduct from the alleged evidence rather than by relying on his memory will
express neither certainty of his guilt nor certainty of his innocence. The person
does not simply conclude that "I did it," as a matter of fact, but makes an
admission in tentative language that reflects and expresses his genuine uncer-
tainty. An innocent man who was led to believe that he had a "dry black-
out 31 4 and confessed falsely to Clearwater, Florida, interrogators put it this
way: "I still can't believe I did it. I guess all the proofs in.,3 5 He explained
additionally: "The only reason I believe I did it is if my hairs were in her car
and on her body and in her apartment."3 6 Another individual wrote in the
second of three statements he signed during an interrogation by Manchester,
Connecticut, police: "If the evidence shows I was there and that I killed her,
then I killed her, but I don't remember being there. 3 7
During the post-admission narrative phase of interrogation, an investigator
will be unable to elicit the kind of straightforward admission that can be ob-
tained from a guilty party. Despite proposing the amnesia ploy, the investi-
gator probably assumes that the suspect is fully knowledgeable of his in-
volvement and uses amnesia to overcome what he sees as the suspect's igno-
rance ploy. Therefore, when the investigator begins collecting the post-admis-
sion narrative of the crime he is unprepared for what follows. Although the
suspect has willingly admitted guilt, he is still unable to corroborate his actual
knowledge of the crime. As a result, an investigator may retreat from an open-
ended questioning style and start making suggestions. The investigator may
prompt the suspect to guess about how and why he committed the crime. For
example, Clearwater, Florida, interrogators prompted a suspect to conjure up
mental images of how he could have accomplished a "dry blackout":
Interrog. 1: What do you see?
Suspect: I don't, but I still say to myself, "No, you didn't do it."
Interrog. 2: That's alright, but you got a picture, so you must have
done it, right?
CHOLOGY 1 (1972).
313. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 129.
314. The investigator told him that someone who had once been an alcoholic might be subject
to "dry blackouts"--equivalents to a blackout caused by alcohol but supposedly affecting a person
who has no alcohol in his system.
315. Interrogation Transcript of Sawyer, supra note 74, at 204.
316. Id. at 217.
317. Second signed statement of Richard Lapointe, Hartford, Conn., Police Dep't. (Mar. 8,
1987); see also Ofshe, supra note 36.
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Interrog. 1: Is that what you're looking at when you describe it? Are
you looking at a picture and describe what you see?
Suspect: Yea, but I see it in my house.
Interrog. 1: Could it have happened in your house?
Suspect: I don't know how I'd get her over to her place?
Interrog. 1: Right out the door and into her place.
Interrog. 2: It's right there. It's the same cement slab. One door to
one door. It's only a couple feet.
Suspect: I don't remember anything what's inside her house.
Interrog. 1: Were the lights on?
Interrog. 1: Maybe that's why. Maybe the fuckin' lights were off
and you couldn't see nothing inside her house. Did you
ever think of that?
Suspect: No.
Interrog. 1: How did it start in your house? From the couch?
Suspect: That's the picture I get.
Interrog. 2: On the couch? Describe the picture.
Suspect: See I don't know if I'm making this up or not.
Interrog. 2: We want you to tell us.
Interrog. 1: Alright, you want to make this story up. Let the pictures
roll and let's hear the story. Let's hear the story. Let's
hear the story and then we'll ask at the end is this some-
thing that you remember.
Interrog. 2: One, two, three, go. Let's go, Tom.
Interrog. 1: Make up a story. Let's hear the story. You're at the
front door?3 '
Unlike voluntary or compliant false confessors, persuaded false confessors
couch their admissions of guilt in an inflated use of grammar that expresses
their uncertainty. Their expressions of guilt are tentative, speculative, and hy-
pothetical, such as "I would have done," "I probably did," "I could have
done," "I must have done," "Most likely I did," and "I guess I did."3"9 For
example, Oakland, California, investigators obtained the following post-admis-
sion narrative from a university student who had falsely confessed:
Interrogator. As she came out, uh, did you see her?
Suspect: I guess I must of...
Interrogator: Did you actually see her or did you drive down and see
her, could you see her from the road there.
Suspect: I think I saw her from the road...
318. Interrogation Transcript of Sawyer, supra note 74, at 206-07, 211.
319. See OFsHE & LEo, SociAL PSYcHoLoGY, supra note 1, at 218.
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Interrogator: Was she walking toward you or was she walking away
from you?
Suspect: I think she saw me and continued walking away...
Interrogator Did you talk to her at that point?
Suspect: I must have said something, I don't know ...
Interrogator. What happened then?
Suspect: I think she tried to kinda go away and I (long pause)
and I kinda pulled her around or something and it's,
think I backhanded her or something.
Interrogator What did, what'd she do at that point? Did she fall or
what?
Suspect: I think she fell down on her side, around the backside,
kinda around the tree. She fell by the tree.
Interrogator. Could you tell if she hit the tree at all?
Suspect: I think she just barely, I think she fell right about the
side of it. I don't think she
Interrogator All right. As, as you saw her there, did she appear in-
jured?
Suspect: I picture her unconscious there.
Interrogator Did you see any injuries like blood or anything like
that?
Suspect: (Sighs) She mighta had a bloody nose.32°
Despite agreeing to a memory blackout and concluding that he is guilty,
the false confessor lacks personal knowledge of the crime and therefore is
unable to volunteer previously unknown or accurate details of the crime. Per-
suaded of his guilt but ignorant of the crime facts, one suspect said, "I mean
I'm sure by what you've shown me that I did it, but, what I'm not sure of is
how I did it. It's still not all coming to me."32 '
b. Edgar Garrett's False Confession
The interrogation of Edgar Garrett illustrates how persuaded false con-
fessions arise. Though police in Goshen, Indiana, had no evidence suggesting
that Garrett was guilty, they believed that he killed his sixteen-year-old daugh-
ter, Michelle Garrett, who had disappeared one Sunday morning. During
Garrett's interrogation, detectives repeatedly confronted him with false evi-
dence: that multiple witnesses had seen him with his daughter shortly before
she disappeared; that they had provided statements implicating him and were
willing to testify; and that shoeprints, hairs, and blood evidence linked him to
his daughter's murder. The investigators also suggested that Garrett acted
suspiciously following his daughter's disappearance, and that he had given po-
320. Interrogation Transcript of Page, supra note 76, Tape 2, at 2-4.
321. Interrogation Transcript of Reilly, supra note 75, at 199.
322. See OFSHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1.
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lice inconsistent statements. Finally, one detective informed Garrett that he had
failed a polygraph test "worse than anybody I've ever seen," '323 a test that he
said was "100% reliable." '324 The evidence that Garrett murdered his daughter
was conclusive: "There's no question in anybody's mind about what hap-
pened,"3" they insisted.
Though he denied the accusations for hours, Garrett eventually became
confused and distressed. He resisted the false evidence until a detective sug-
gested that Garrett, who had previously experienced alcohol-induced blackouts,








Let me talk about something else here. Now, we know
you were far enough, now you might have had a black-
out, right? It's possible.
Possible.
Possible that you were down, well, we know that, you
were down at the river bank, down at the river bank.
Looking for my daughter.
Right, okay. The only question is what day were you
down at the river bank? Well, maybe you were in a
blackout. Maybe you were down there with your daugh-
ter at the river bank because you're in a blackout. I
don't know. But before I leave this room today there's
one thing that you and I are going to know, I'm going
to help you remember this shit so we can be done.3"
As his belief that he did not see his daughter the morning she disappeared
came under attack, Garrett's confidence in the certainty of his memory began
to break down, and he began to express doubts about what he knew.
Garrett: But I just don't remember if I went out, if I did talk to
Michelle Sunday morning or not.
Interrogator You did.
Garrett: I just don't, don't remember.32
Continuing to confront Mr. Garrett with fabricated incriminating evidence, the
investigator suggested the outline of the police theory of the case that had
been developed prior to commencing Garrett's interrogation:
Garrett: I can't remember fighting with Michelle on Sunday.
Interrogator You did. Not only did you fight but you thumped her.
You didn't mean to hurt her.
Garrett: What did I thump her with?
323. Interrogation Transcript of Garrett, supra note 53, at 25.
324. Id. at 50.
325. Id. at 44.
326. Garrett had not consumed any alcohol for more than 24 hours prior to his daughter's
disappearance.
327. Id. at 319.
328. Id. at 327.
1997] 1111
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Interrogator: I don't know.
Garrett: I don't know either.
Interrogator But you thumped her.
Garrett: Well, I killed my own daughter?
Interrogator. Yeah.
329
Garrett continued to insist that he knew nothing of the killing, until the inves-
tigator revisited the question of his memory and again suggested the possibili-
ty that he had amnesia. By emphasizing the blackout hypothesis, by exerting
intense pressure to comply with their demands and by neutralizing Garrett's
belief in his innocence, the investigators convinced Garrett that he may have
killed his daughter.







of it and I know that and you know that and you know
that I know that.
Maybe I did thump her on top of the head.
Okay. Where did this happen at?
Oh, man, I don't know.
Yes, you do. Yes, you do. You know exactly where it
happened at.
Well, apparently this happened out at Studebaker Park.
Tell me exactly where it happened at. There's, I know
there's, remember you're talking to a drunk. You're
talking to a guy that's blacked out himself. Okay. I
know how them damn things work. Because I am one.
I'm just like you, and that's why you and I are connect-
ed. Do you understand that?
Garrett: It must have been on that road there. I don't know
where, that's where most of the blood is, I guess.'"
Lacking knowledge of these circumstances, Garrett fed back to the police
what they knew about the location where Michelle's body had likely been
dumped in the river and accepted the investigator's wild speculation that
Michelle had been killed by a blow to the head. Once police laid out the
narrative, Garrett guessed answers to their specific questions (such as the loca-
tion of the murder weapon) and confabulated an account of the crime story
(such as why he argued with his daughter and what was said).
Because he had accepted as possibly true that he committed the crime,
Garrett confessed in language that was conditional, tentative, and conjectural.
He parroted back information that the investigator had introduced and inferred
from his leading questions and suggestions the investigator's theory of the
crime:
Interrogator How did you cross the river?
329. Id.
330. Id. at 332-33.
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Garrett: I must have went all the way to that school lot over
there. That must have been the only way I could have
gotten around, over there to get to the other side. of the
river.
Interrogator: Okay, then what happened next?
Garrett: I must have just left her there.
Interrogator: Okay.
Garrett: And I must have went home.
Interrogator: All right. What did you do with the stick.
Garrett: It's in the house. I must have took it back to the
house.33'
Pressing for details of the murder, the investigators had to manage
Garrett's uncertain belief in his guilt, counter his frequent backsliding, and
keep him convinced that he probably did murder his daughter. In response to
his denials and attempts to recant earlier admissions, the investigators forceful-
ly restated the evidence against him. When he fed back the investigators'
speculative theory of the murder and the few publicly known facts, they ex-
pressed approval. Since Garrett was unable to volunteer crime details, the
investigator suggested the correct answers through leading questions or simply
told him what they believed to be the crime facts. The investigator often asked
Garrett to answer questions that might have proven his guilt and led to cor-
roborating evidence, but his answers were apparent guesses, and none of them
ever produced corroboration.
Interrogator: I'm going to give you another hint. Detectives don't ask
questions unless they have pretty good reasons for ask-
ing that. You thought about blood being on your clothes,
right? Right?
Garrett: Yeah.
Interrogator: Okay. Where was the blood on your clothes?
Garrett: Probably on my jeans somewhere.332
The hallmark of a persuaded false confession is the suspect's uncertainty
in his conclusions. The persuaded false confessor typically alternates between
expressing minimal certainty in his guilt and minimal confidence in his inno-
cence. Confused and distressed at one moment, Garrett struggled to supply the
interrogators with the details they were seeking:
Interrogator So you think you may have carried her to the other side
of the river? How did you get across the river?
Garrett: I don't know (inaudible). I can't swim anyways (inaudi-
ble) that day old grass, lot between the school, and
Studebaker Park, there's a soccer field there.
Interrogator: Yeah. And then what?
331. Id. at 344-45.
332. Id.
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Garrett: I must have walked around (inaudible) trees or some-
thing. I don't know.
Interrogator: And where did you, where did you put her at?
Garrett: On the ground, I guess.333
Yet at the next moment he declared that he had no memory of the crime and
probably was innocent:
Interrogator- It's real important that you put everything together.
Garrett: I don't know if I even did this.
Interrogator: Listen to me.
Garrett: (Inaudible) admitting to things that I didn't even know if
I did, and I'm going to prison for something I probably
didn't even have nothing to do with it to begin with.3"
Exhausted, frightened, and unsure of himself, Garrett repeatedly told the inter-
rogators that he did not know or was not certain of his answers. By the end of
the fourteen-hour interrogation, Garrett had signed four increasingly detailed
statements describing how he murdered his daughter. Shortly after the interro-
gation, Garrett recanted his confession statements, and eventually a jury ac-
quitted him of capital murder.335
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the law requires that confessions be voluntary, a contradiction
lies at the heart of all psychological interrogation procedures. If police obtain a
confession by overbearing a suspect's will or impairing his rational decision-
making ability, the law requires it to be excluded from admission into evi-
dence at trial. However, if a suspect wishes to avoid arrest and punishment, it
is never in his rational self-interest to voluntarily confess.336 Depending on
what information and experience a suspect brings with him into an interroga-
tion room, he will be more or less well informed about the nature of the crim-
inal justice system and the case against him. A person with relatively complete
and accurate information about his circumstances would know the state of the
evidence against him, that a confession almost always leads to arrest, prosecu-
tion, and conviction, and that it inevitably weakens a defense attorney's posi-
tion in any plea bargaining negotiation.
Because it is not in a person's rational self-interest to admit guilt if he
understands his situation correctly, in order to obtain a confession from some-
one who prefers to avoid responsibility for an offense, investigators try to
determine the information available to the suspect, manipulate his perception
333. Id. at 355.
334. Id. at 356.
335. See supra text accompanying note 60.
336. As David Simon points out, "The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect's interest
to talk with police will forever be the catalyst in any criminal interrogation. It is a fiction propped
up against the greater weight of logic itself." SIMON, supra note 22, at 201. See also Richard A.
Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
259-88 (1996).
1114 [Vol. 74:4
THE DECISION TO CONFESS FALSELY
of his situation, and usually offer some form of incentive to elicit the decision
to confess. Because of the importance of controlling crime and because guilty
suspects typically seek to evade detection, courts permit investigators to lie to
suspects about the evidence against them, to manipulate their perception of the
significance of acknowledging culpability, and to emphasize the moral and
self-image benefits of confessing. Investigators are permitted to emphasize the
advantages of telling the truth and to express their desire to help the suspect.
Sometimes, however, in order to overcome a suspect's reluctance to confess,
investigators make statements that an intellectually normal individual would
reasonably conclude constitute an offer that, if accepted, will lead to signifi-
cantly less punishment but, if rejected, will lead to the most severe possible
punishment. Sometimes this is accomplished boldly and directly, but often it is
done indirectly and relies on human information processing and reasoning
abilities.
It appears impossible to satisfy the requirement that a confession be en-
tirely voluntary unless strict standards are imposed that limit an interrogator's
freedom to manipulate a suspect, and requirements of fairness and accuracy
are placed on what the police can tell a suspect. If such requirements were
imposed on the interrogation process and police were obliged to fairly and
accurately apprise a suspect of his situation and the consequences and relative
merits of the alternative they advocate, it is unlikely that someone who ini-
tially denied responsibility would reverse his choice and confess.
In the age of psychological interrogation, the situation of an innocent
citizen mistakenly exposed to modem interrogation procedures raises some
very troubling questions. Because psychological interrogation is an influence
process-each next step building on what has already been accomplished up to
that point-it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the single procedure
that should be proscribed. Although physical coercion is prohibited, psycholog-
ical coercion is more difficult to detect because it does not leave marks on the
body. The modem equivalents to the third-degree practice of threatening harm
and finding ways to injure the person without leaving marks have also devel-
oped. The modem equivalent to the rubber hose is the indirect threat commu-
nicated through pragmatic implication.
Because false confessions come about from the inept and/or improper use
of interrogation as a whole, no single procedure can be proscribed and thereby
adequately protect the innocent. Because the impulse to deviant conduct by
some citizens and some police is as immutable as the survival ability of the
cockroach, it is unlikely that deviance in the interrogation room will soon
disappear. How then can the danger of eliciting and acting upon false confes-
sions from the innocent be diminished without damaging the ability of the
police to obtain reliable confessions from the guilty, and without changing
what is presently accepted as a tolerable degree of departure from the ideal of
an entirely voluntary confession?
The constitutional law of criminal procedure provides police with general
guidelines about the line between permissible and impermissible practices.
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Currently, the Fourteenth,337  Sixth,33  and Fifth amendments339  provide
little protection against the admission of unreliable or false confessions into
evidence at trial.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment due process test may have once
focussed on the reliability of a confession in determining its voluntariness, this
is no longer the case.3" The Fourteenth Amendment due process test protects
a suspect from coercive and/or fundamentally unfair police questioning meth-
ods. If an unreliable confession is excluded under the Fourteenth Amendment
due process test, it is only because the confession is judged to be involuntary
or because police tactics are judged to be so unfair as to shock the judicial
conscience. In the event that standard interrogation methods or procedures are
not judged to be legally coercive or fundamentally unfair, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process test does not prevent unreliable or false confessions
from being admitted into evidence.
The Sixth Amendment's entirely procedural concern with post-indictment
questioning also offers little or no protection against the admission of false
confessions since virtually all police interrogations occur prior to indictment.
Like the Fourteenth Amendment due process test, the Sixth Amendment is
concerned entirely with the procedural fairness that occurs during the process
of police interrogation, but not at all with the substantive reliability of the con-
fession statement that is the outcome of police interrogation.
The Fifth Amendment also offers little or no protection against the admis-
sion of unreliable statements. For all its fanfare, Miranda is concerned only
with the procedural fairness of the interrogation process-whether a suspect
retains his rational and voluntary decision-making ability in the face of inher-
ently compelling police pressures-not with the substantive truth of the inter-
rogation outcome. While it may prevent some suspects from speaking to police
or allow suspects to terminate an intolerable inquisition, Miranda offers little
or no protection against the elicitation of false confessions from innocent
suspects or their admission into evidence. Typically innocent suspects waive
Miranda before the accusatory phase of interrogation begins. Once police issue
warnings and obtain a waiver, Miranda is virtually irrelevant to the problem of
337. According to current interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, a
confession is inadmissible if police interrogation methods overbear the suspect's will and thus
cause him to make an involuntary confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
Under this standard, the voluntariness (and hence admissibility) of a confession is evaluated case-
by-case based on the totality of the circumstances (i.e., the facts of the case, the suspect's person-
ality characteristics, the specific police interrogation methods, etc.). Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966). The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause additionally permits
courts to exclude as "involuntary" confessions obtained by fundamentally unfair police methods,
regardless of the confession's voluntariness. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see
also Yale Kamisar, What is an Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's
CRIMINAL ITERROGATiONS AND CONFESSIONS, 17 RuTGERs L. REV. 728-59 (1963).
338. According to the Sixth Amendment, a confession may be excluded from evidence if after
a suspect has been indicted he is questioned outside the presence of a lawyer. Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
339. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination permits judges to exclude
confessions from evidence if police did not properly recite the Miranda warnings or if they did
not obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
340. See White, supra note 5.
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false confessions"" since few suspects subsequently invoke their Miranda
rights.342 At the moment when an innocent suspect is most likely to feel the
inherently compelling pressures of police questioning, he is least likely to
invoke his constitutional right to end interrogation. If he has been exposed to
improper threats and promises, he is likely to believe that terminating the
interrogation will result in his arrest, while continuing to interact with the
interrogator may correct the mistake in which he is trapped. When the inno-
cent suspect reaches the point at which he recognizes that continuing to resist
is futile, the choices before him reduce to silence coupled with the most se-
rious charge versus false confession and minimizing his punishment.
Oddly, the constitutional law of criminal procedure has no substantive
safeguards in place to specifically prevent the admission of even demonstrably
false confessions. 4a But, the more general problem is that the constitutional
law seems concerned only with the procedural fairness of police questioning,
so much so that it currently lacks any rules to guarantee the reliability of con-
fession statements. Yet it is not uncommon for suspects-especially highly
suggestible ones such as the mentally handicapped, juveniles, and individuals
who are unusually trusting of authority-to give false confessions in response
to police inducements that do not legally qualify as coercive or fundamentally
unfair.
344
There are two types of false confessions that interrogators may elicit with-
out relying on threats of the most extreme punishment and promises of prose-
cutorial leniency: the stress-compliant false confession and the non-coerced
persuaded false confession.345 Some psychologically vulnerable individuals,
such as the intellectually impaired or phobic, will knowingly give a stress
compliant false confession to escape an interrogation experience which for
them is aversive and punishing, but not necessarily legally coercive. 31 Simi-
larly, a psychologically and intellectually normal individual can be equally
motivated to end an interrogation if it is allowed to become too punishing in
its intensity or duration or through some other facet of the process. And some
suspects give a non-coerced persuaded false confession after they have been
convinced that it is more likely than not that they committed an offense de-
spite no memory of having done so. 347 Since neither type of false confession
is elicited in response to coercive or "fundamentally unfair" police methods,
the law currently offers little or no protection against their admission into evi-
dence.
341. See generally Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in RICH-
ARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS H, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAw, JUSTICE AND POLICING
(forthcoming 1998).
342. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 26; Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 4.
343. The Supreme Court has recently stated that assessing a confession's lack of reliability "is
a matter to be governed by the evidentiary law of the forum... and not by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). See
generally White, supra note 5.
344. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 5; OFsHE & LEO, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1; Leo
& Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
345. For a discussion of the various types and logic of police-induced false confession, see
supra Parts 11.F.1-3.
346. See id.
347. See supra Part I.B.3.
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The most common type of false confession is elicited through tactics that
depend on communicating obvious or implied threats of harm or promises of
leniency. Since investigators understand that such coercive tactics are imper-
missible, they are more likely to employ them when the interrogation is not
being recorded or in an indirect and subtle manner that may slip by judicial
scrutiny. When this occurs, the interrogator is likely to deny any wrongdoing,
while the suspect insists that he was threatened harm and/or promised lenien-
cy. State actors typically prevail in such "swearing contests,"3" and when
this occurs, a coerced false confession may be admitted into evidence.
To prevent the admission of false confessions (regardless of how they
were elicited) courts should evaluate the reliability of confession statements.
To accomplish this courts need not create any new rules or rely on any cum-
bersome procedures. Rather, consistent with the judge's role as a gatekeeper
responsible for excluding untrustworthy evidence that has a strong tendency to
mislead the jury, the judge should not admit confessions without finding that
the confession meets minimal standards of reliability. For example, judges
routinely apply a minimum standard of reliability when deciding whether to
admit hearsay testimony. It has been shown that placing a confession before a
jury is tantamount to an instruction to convict, even when the confession fails
to accurately describe the crime, fails to produce corroboration, and is contra-
dicted by considerable evidence pointing to a suspect's innocence.349 Even a
demonstrably unreliable confession is likely to greatly confuse, mislead, and
prejudice jurors against a defendant and should not be admitted into evidence.
Interrogations that fail to produce a good fit between the post-admission
narrative and the crime facts are highly suspect because they may have been
induced from an innocent party. When no complete record of the interrogation
is available, it is impossible to objectively demonstrate that the confession has
not been coerced or produced by extraordinary persuasion. The suspect's "I
did it" admission has little to no trustworthy probative value absent indepen-
dent corroborating evidence, a confirming confession, or a record demonstrat-
ing that the admission was made voluntarily.
Both admissions and confession statements are nothing more than two
pieces of proposed evidence that, correctly interpreted, point either to a
suspect's guilt or innocence. No piece of evidence really speaks for itself, and
even a photograph can be doctored. Answering the question of whether a piece
of evidence is valid and appropriate for the purpose for which it will be used
by a juror is fundamental to the reasoning behind rules governing the exclu-
sion of potential evidence. A judge would never knowingly admit into evi-
dence a doctored photograph that is the product of modem computer graphic
techniques and depicts a scene that never happened. A false confession is
analogous to a doctored photograph. The mechanism for creating it is the
ancient technology of human influence carried forward into the interrogation
room.
348. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 n.6 (Alaska.1985) (noting that "[wihile [this]
observation may be an overstatement in absolute terms, it is probably generally valid") (citing
Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397 (Alaska App. 1984)).
349. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
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It is possible to establish a standard of minimum reliability for a confes-
sion so that true confessions, like real photographs, can be separated from the
doctored frauds constructed through the techniques of psychological interroga-
tion. Police can be better trained to obtain statements that satisfy the legal
definition of the word confession. Most investigators currently operate within
legal constraints, but all could be trained to elicit more reliable confessions. A
confession that fully describes the circumstances of a crime should and could
be crafted to always permit the confession to be corroborated. Corroboration is
the key to erecting a standard of minimum reliability for confession evidence.
Assuming that it is possible to control for the contamination that arises
when an interrogator suggests crime fact information previously unknown to a
suspect, the reliability of a confession statement can usually be objectively
determined by evaluating the fit between a post-admission narrative and the
crime facts. A guilty confessor necessarily has personal knowledge of the
crime, while an innocent confessor (who did not witness the crime) will be
ignorant of the crime facts unless educated by the press, community gossip or
the police. The guilty confessor will be able to supply information that only
the police know, to provide dramatic and mundane crime scene information
that the offender should know, and to provide an explanation for unusual and
anomalous crime scene facts. His post-admission narrative should match the
crime scene details and will very often corroborate the crime facts by report-
ing provable facts that the police did not know, thus verifying his actual
knowledge of the crime and his guilt.
By contrast, the innocent confessor lacks personal knowledge of the crime
facts. As a result, he can only repeat information given to him or provide
guesses to the interrogators' questions. A well-developed post-admission narra-
tive by a false confessor is likely to be riddled with demonstrable factual er-
rors, and thus casts substantial doubt on the validity of the confession. If a
suspect's post-admission narrative fits poorly with the facts of the crime, pro-
duces no corroboration, and is disconfirmed by the suspect's wrong answers to
questions about major issues (such as the weapon used, how the victim was
kept silent, etc.), the confession should be considered inadmissible because it
lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. By focusing on the substantive accuracy
of the suspect's statement rather than exclusively on the procedural fairness of
the interrogation process,35° courts can test for a minimum standard of reli-
ability before admitting a confession into evidence.
If the courts did this, police would improve their practices and false con-
fessions would be far less likely to occur. Those that did occur would be far
less likely to be admitted into evidence, and there would be far fewer instanc-
es of the costly, lengthy, and unjust deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of
350. Although the constitutional law of criminal procedure currently offers no substantive
safeguards against the use of false confession evidence at trial, the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause could be interpreted to forbid the admission of unreliable confession evidence inde-
pendent of the interrogation procedures used to elicit confessions. For more general suggestions
about possible constitutional safeguards against the admission of unreliable confession evidence,
see White, supra note 5.
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justice that false confession needlessly spawn."'
Training police to obtain adequately corroborated, reliable confessions
would both improve the fact-finding practices of criminal justice officials and
save scarce judicial resources. If police and prosecutors recognized that the
mere admission "I did it" is not necessarily a true statement, they would be far
less likely to arrest and prosecute suspects who give false confessions. As a
result, the time and expenseass .o.tedwih t e tials and incarcerai os fu.
innocent would diminish. Moreover, if police were trained to make certain that
all confessions included detailed descriptions of the crime and thereby pro-
duced a basis for evaluating their internal reliability and the possibility of
locating new corroborating evidence, guilty defendants would be more likely
to plead out rather than require the state to prove its case in costly and some-
times drawn-out trials. If judges had the advantage of working with a clearly
articulated standard to help them to decide whether to suppress or admit a
confession, miscarriages of justice arising from police-induced false confes-
sions would diminish greatly in the American criminal justice system."2
To further improve interrogation practices and the truth-finding function
of the criminal justice system, mandatory taping of interrogations should be
adopted. The supreme courts of Alaska and Minnesota have already estab-
lished this requirement.353 As many commentators have pointed out,354 re-
cording requirements create an objective and reviewable record of the interro-
gation process that enhances the truth-finding function of the criminal process;
that protects custodial suspects from potential police abuses; that protects
interrogators from potentially frivolous claims of misconduct; that helps the
prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and jury carry out their tasks more effi-
ciently and effectively; and that saves precious judicial time and resources.355
This article has demonstrated an additional reason why police should be
required to record all interrogations. In little more than fifty years, American
interrogation practices have undergone a remarkable evolution: where once
police routinely relied on third-degree practices, today interrogation tactics are
more psychological. As American investigators have abandoned the use of
force, they have articulated, developed, and refined increasingly subtle and
sophisticated interrogation methods and strategies. 56 Although police are
351. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
352. When judges do in fact suppress false confession statements, prosecutors almost always
dismiss all charges against the innocent suspect because they lack any other evidence linking him
to the crime. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1.
353. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156
(Alaska 1985); Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980).
354. See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTRROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND
POLICY (1980); Heather S. Berger, Let's Go to the Videotape: A Proposal to Legislate Videotap-
ing of Confessions, 3 ALB. U. Sci. & TECH. 165; Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996); Leo, Miranda Revisited, supra note 79;
White, supra note 5; Glanville Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Police, 1979
CRIM. L. REv. 6; Ingrid Kane, Note, No More Secrets: Proposed Minnesota State Due Process
Requirement That Law Enforcement Officers Electronically Record Custodial Interrogation and
Confessions, 77 MINN. L. REV. 983 (1993); Geller, Police Videotaping supra note 11.
355. See Leo, Miranda Revisited, supra note 79; Geller, Police Videotaping, supra note 11.
356. See Leo, From Coercion to Deception, supra note 14.
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trained in the constitutional law of criminal procedure, they have developed
and implemented strategies that circumvent the well-established legal prohi-
bitions against the use of threats and promises to motivate statements against a
suspect's self-interest. Investigators communicate promises of prosecutorial
leniency and threats of greater punishment through maximization and
minimization strategies that vary in their degree of explicitness. Rather than
relying on overt threats and promises, investigators have discovered, or have
been taught, how to communicate promises of leniency and/or threats of harm
by "pragmatic implication." ' 7 As Kassin and McNall have demonstrated
with laboratory data,3"' and as this article has demonstrated with field data,
maximization and minimization techniques reliably communicate that a suspect
will receive substantially less punishment if he confesses to the version of the
facts an interrogator suggests but will be punished most severely if he contin-
ues to deny guilt.
Because maximization and minimization strategies are so subtle that they
depend on a reasonable inference from an investigator's words, and because
human memory is reconstructive, suspects cannot reasonably be expected to
recall the exact words with which police communicated differential sentencing
expectations. A suspect's inference may be completely justified and the infer-
ence may, in fact, be precisely the one that the investigator intended him to
make. The suspect's inference may be reasonable even if manual writers,
police trainers, and investigators do not realize that these strategies can coerce
false confessions from the innocent. If a suppression hearing does not occur
until months after an interrogation, suspects will certainly not be able to re-
member the precise language through which an investigator implemented the
maximization/minimization strategy. The investigator will be equally unable to
recall exactly what he said. Because of the subtlety of the language used to
deliver maximization and minimization strategies and the limitations of human
memory, neither investigators nor suspects can reasonably be expected to
accurately recall the entire sequence of questions and answers that happened
during an interrogation. The only way to insure that potentially crucial evi-
dence is not lost forever is for it be collected and preserved.359
Not only is it beyond human ability to remember just what happened
during an interrogation, there is also the problem of bias. Investigators are
often committed team players whose desire to win is overriding, and the best
evidence will sometimes show investigators to be acting improperly. It is
therefore foolhardy to assume that any procedure that leaves the decision
about what evidence to collect to police will always produce a complete and
fair record of the interrogation.' To decide whether an investigator directly
357. See Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations, supra note 6.
358. See id.
359. Interrogators are trained to make no notes while extracting a confession statement. See
INBAU Er AL., supra note 20, at 173. They are also advised to engage in activities that will con-
taminate innocent suspects' knowledge of crime facts. See id. at 171, 189.
360. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995). The court was addressing a prosecutor's
"responsibility for failing to disclose favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance
. ...." Id. The state's defense was that the prosecutor did not withhold-he did not know, because
the police did not tell him. The court noted that "no one doubts that police investigators some-
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or indirectly elicited a coerced statement or whether he obtained a voluntary
and uncontaminated admission, it is imperative to have the entire record of
questioning available.
The protection of the innocent is paramount in a criminal justice system
whose ideology and rules are predicated on the belief that there can be no
worse harm than wrongful conviction and incarceration. Researchers have
repeatedly documented the existence of numerous and inexcusable miscarriag-
es of justice arising from police-induced false confession. 6 We need not
tolerate these injustices. If courts institutionalized a reasonable standard of
confession reliability and required police to record the entirety of all felony
interrogations, the suppression hearing would offer significant protection
against the admission of false confessions into evidence and the number of
miscarriages of justice attributable to false confession would be significantly
reduced.
times fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know." Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
361. See GUDJONSSON, PsYcHoLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, supra note 5; HUFF Er AL., supra
note 2; WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 5; YANT, supra note 2; Bedau & Radelet, supra note
2; Kassin, supra note 3; Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 1; Ofshe, supra note 36; Radelet
et al., supra note 2.
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BALANCED APPROACHES TO THE FALSE CONFESSION
PROBLEM: A BRIEF COMMENT ON OFSHE, LEO, AND
ALSCHULER
PAUL G. CASSELL"
The editors have offered me a chance to provide a brief comment on two
disparate but intriguing papers on coercion during policy interrogation-one by
Professors Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo,' the other by Professor Albert
Alschuler.2 A short comment cannot possibly do justice to all of the valuable
insights in these articles or tie all their divergent strands neatly together. The
papers undeniably offer important perspectives on, respectively, the psycholog-
ical processes involved in police questioning and the legal doctrine surround-
ing it. No doubt they will be-and should be-widely read and discussed. But
the expected role of a commentator is not to praise articles but critique them,
so my observations will be confined to the most important practical strand of
the arguments: that police questioning should be restricted to prevent frequent-
ly occurring miscarriages of justice from false confessions.
At least as presented here,3 a gap in the articles' arguments is that they
appear to reason "dramatically, not quantitatively," as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once put it.4 Proceeding from a few dramatic examples of false con-
fessions that led to wrongful convictions, the authors suggest substantial
changes in current confession doctrine. Those inclined to oppose such propos-
als, however, will suggest that policy reforms must be justified with more
careful thinking about both the frequency of false confessions and any offset-
ting-and potentially larger--costs that might follow from the restrictions.
After all, devising appropriate rules governing the coerciveness of police inter-
rogation requires striking a balance between the competing concerns of pro-
tecting suspects and securing public safety. In assessing the Supreme Court's
* Professor of Law, Univ. of Utah College of Law. B.A., 1981, J.D., 1984, Stanford Uni-
versity. I thank Professors Ofshe and Leo for gracious access to prepublication drafts of their
various articles and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for inviting me to participate
in this symposium. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploi-
tation, and the Law, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
1. Richard Ofshe and Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 979 (1997).
2. Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 957 (1997).
3. Professors Ofshe and Leo have another paper on this subject that will be published short-
ly. Richard A. Leo & Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1997) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association, St. Louis, Missouri, May 30, 1997) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False
Confessions].
4. OLIvER WENDELL HOLMEpS, Law and the Court, in CoLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 293
(1920).
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decision in Miranda v. Arizona,5 for example, Professor Wertheimer chides
both Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion and the views, of the dissenting
Justices for failing to forthrightly discuss the conflicts between the rights of
suspects to be free from improper coercion and society's "interest in securi-
ty." Perhaps in recognition of such critiques, in later opinions the Court has
been more candid about the tradeoffs. The Court now openly describes the
Miranda doctrine as a "carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both
the defendant's and society's interest."7 While doubts have been raised about
whether the Court has really undertaken such balancing' and whether its prop-
er role is to do so,9 academic commentators proposing restructuring of police
interrogation on normative grounds should certainly consider such factors.
Moreover, these calculations involve largely empirical judgments. Again, as
Professor Wertheimer has demonstrated, the moral problem involved in unin-
tentionally punishing the innocent is one to be resolved on utilitarian judg-
ments, rather than a priori considerations of justice: "The numbers do count,
and in virtually all moral problems in which we sense a conflict between
justice and utility, we are prepared to concede that there is some point at
which utility will take precedence."'"I
To prevent misunderstandings before going any further, let me make clear
my personal view that each miscarriage from a false confession is a grave
tragedy; indeed, I am on record pushing for measures to reduce their inci-
dence.' But in the public policy world, concern about miscarriages from
false confessions is no substitute for logical thinking about their frequency and
about any offsetting costs that might stem from restrictions on police interro-
gation. Failing to think carefully about such issues creates, as I suggest be-
low, 2 the grave danger of inhibiting reform, by producing politically infeasi-
ble suggestions while overlooking more realistic and cost-beneficial alterna-
tives. Without close attention to what Professor Wertheimer calls "the num-
bers," the articles' policy suggestions will not be taken seriously by those who
actually have the power to implement them.
The first question that comes to mind while reading these articles is
whether wrongful convictions from false confessions are pervasive or isolated?
To briefly set the stage, recall that Professor Alschuler recommends at least
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 113 (1987).
7. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986).
8. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 921 (1996).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (replacing Miranda with voluntariness test); JOSEPH D.
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRuTH AND THE LAW (1993) (attacking Miranda as an "illegitimate" de-
cision).
10. Alan Wertheimer, Punishing the Innocent--nintentionally, 20 INQuIRY 45, 61 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's De-
fenders, 90 Nw. U L. REV. 1084, 1121 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Man-
date: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ.
L. REv. 299, 311 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty
Year Perspective on Miranda's Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAr. L. REv. (forthcoming
1998); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
387, 488-89 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Social Costs].
12. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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one additional restraint on police interrogation. While the bulk of his paper is
a superb demonstration that constitutional "voluntariness" doctrine must focus
on police methods-not the psyches of criminal defendants' 3 -Alschuler de-
tours briefly into the conclusion that courts "should forbid falsifying evidence
and misrepresenting the strength of the incriminating evidence against a sus-
pect.""4 Alschuler would have the courts adopt this rule as a matter of consti-
tutional principle," relying on a cross reference to his brilliant article about
the historical origins of the Fifth Amendment. 6 This recommendation stems
not (at least as I understand it) from any overarching moral queasiness about
police deception. Alschuler keenly observes that American law on confessions
"sometimes seems to rest on an etiquette more refined than Mrs. Astor's."' 7
Given the pressing need for police to develop evidence to support criminal
convictions, he suggests that police perhaps "should be allowed to express
false sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, [and] play on the suspect's
religious feelings, ' ' "a among other things. But misrepresentations about evi-
dence stand in a different category largely because of Alschuler's empirical
premise such tactics are "likely to generate false confessions," especially
"when suspects are retarded or easily suggestible."' 9
Ofshe and Leo take a similar tack. After developing a detailed psycholog-
ical model of the decision to confess (with fascinating and generally unavail-
able insights into what really happens during modem policy interrogation),
they conclude with policy proposals. Based on the premises that "false con-
fessions still occur regularly,""0 that psychological police interrogation tactics
are "apt to cause an innocent suspect to confess,2' and that false confessions
are "likely to cause the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of an innocent
person,"22 Ofshe and Leo recommend a series of reforms: including judicial
screening of the "reliability" of confessions,23 greater police training to avoid
eliciting false confessions,24 and videotaping of police interrogations.25 The
important point, for present purposes, is that the recommendations in both arti-
cles hinge directly on the empirical claim that certain police tactics are apt to
produce false confessions leading to miscarriages of justice.
My reading of these articles is that the empirical linchpin for their propos-
13. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 960-967.
14. Id. at 974.
15. Id. at 957 (noting that the article focuses on "constitutional" requirements).
16. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 958 n.6 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625 (1996)).
17. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 971.
18. Id. at 973.
19. Alschuler also relies on several other alleged consequences of police misrepresentations
in support of his proposal. These appear to be of less importance in his argument and are dis-
cussed infra note 57).
20. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 983.
21. Id. ("interrogation manual writers ... persist in the self-serving and misguided belief that
contemporary psychological methods are not apt to cause an innocent suspect to confess-a fiction
that is flatly contradicted by all of the scientific research on interrogation and confession").
22. Id. at 984.
23. Id. at 1117.
24. Id. at 1119.
25. Id. at 1120.
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als is simply missing. Professor Alschuler reports little evidence on this point,
relying primarily on a few general references to Professors Ofshe and Leo's
articles to support the claim.26 Ofshe and Leo, in turn, argue that wrongful
convictions from false confessions are "numerous."" But burrowing through
the footnotes attached to these claims, it appears that their primary empirical
support is a soon-to-be published paper where these matters are discussed at
greater length. 8 The reader of the current article is essentially left a promis-
sory note that this proof will be supplied in the future. Because that future
paper will be published shortly in another journal where I will be writing a
detailed response,' I will not address the frequency of miscarriages from
false confessions any further here. But it should be noted that the frequency
claim is not proven in Ofshe and Leo's current article. While bearing the title
"The Decision to Confess Falsely," the article turns out (on reading of the
footnotes) to discuss not solely the dramatic subject of those who confess
falsely. The reader will have difficulty knowing which topic is under discus-
sion as Ofshe and Leo explain that "[w]e often choose not to indicate whether
the quoted material was taken from the interrogation of an innocent or a guilty
party." The article thus cannot be cited (as Proiessor Alschuler may have
uncritically done) to support propositions about false confessions, because
Ofshe and Leo have chosen-rather unhelpfully, in my view-not to separate
the two here.
Even apart from the issue of the frequency of false confessions, however,
Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler's justification of their proffered remedies appears
incomplete. Ofshe and Leo's centerpiece proposal is that courts should careful-
ly evaluate the reliability of a confession by ensuring that it fits with the facts
of the crime and is otherwise credible. Rather than "create any new rules or
26. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 969 n.60 (citing Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False
Confessions, supra note 3); Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUDIES IN LAW,
PoLmcs & Soc'Y 185, 198 (1997) [hereinafter cited as Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology of Inter-
rogation]). Alschuler also cites Professor White. Alschuler, supra, at 26 n.66 (citing Welsh S.
White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 108-09 & nn.26 & 30 (1997)). White, however, concedes that a
determination of the frequency of false confessions "is difficult to make accurately"; White will
venture only (without any further definition of terms) that false confessions are "likely in a small
but significant number of cases." White, supra, at 109, 111. Alschuler also refers to the dubious
"study" by Professors Bedau and Radelet. See Alschuler, supra, at 26 n.66 (citing Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN L.
REv. 21 (1987)). Cf. Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response
to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 128 (1988) (concluding that article gives the
impression "it is more an argumentative tract than a fair-minded inquiry"). The reference to Bedau
and Radelet seems misplaced, because they most frequently discuss "coerced" false confessions,
Bedau & Radelet, supra, at 57 tbl.6, produced by physical brutality or police perjury, not the
psychologically-induced false confessions that form the basis for the policy recommendations of
Alschuler and Ofshe-Leo.
27. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1121.
28. See, e.g., id. at 983 n.16 (citing Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra
note 3).
29. Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confes-
sions-And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLoGY (forthcoming 1997).
30. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 984 n.32 (emphasis added).
31. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 969 n.60.
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rely on any cumbersome procedures,"32 they propose that courts should con-
duct this review under existing rules.
The examples in the article must be put into some perspective. Ofshe and
Leo discuss transcripts of police interrogation of roughly 35 different sus-
pects-both innocent and guilty-primarily from a ten-year period, 1987 to
1997,"3 although some of the examples are nearly a quarter of a century
old.34 Even looking solely to the last ten years, police officers around the
country interrogated approximately 23 million suspects for index crimes.35
The 35 interrogations discussed in the Ofshe-Leo paper are quite literally a
few drops in this very large bucket.
Evaluating the proposal is quite difficult because Ofshe and Leo do little
to explain how it would work in practice. For example, a regrettable omission
from the article is even a single illustration of how their proposed test would
have applied to any of the confessions they discuss. Their proposal may, there-
fore, either have too little "bite" or too much-that is, it may do nothing to
solve any false confession problem or it may "solve" that problem at the ex-
pense of producing more serious unintended consequences.
Turning to the first possibility, Ofshe and Leo seem unaware that evi-
dence rules conventionally admit relevant evidence and cannot be used as a
basis for courts to screen out evidence they find to lack credibility. 6 A typi-
cal case is Ballou v. Henrie Studies, Inc." There the Fifth Circuit reviewed a
district court decision excluding a blood alcohol test in a civil case alleging
negligent driving.3' The district court had viewed the test result skeptically,
excluding it because it lacked credibility. 9 The Fifth Circuit, following what
is clearly the conventional approach in these matters,' would have none of it
32. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1118.
33. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 981 n.I.
34. See, e.g., id. at 1000 n.75 (discussing interrogation of Peter Reilly in 1973).
35. Each year during the period, police arrested roughly 2.9 million persons for the FBI
index crimes of non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, vehi-
cle theft, and larceny. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 208 tbl.29 (1996) (reporting 1995
arrest totals). About 80% of these arrestees will be interrogated. See Cassell & Hayman, supra
note 8, at 854 (finding 79% of suspects in sample questioned); see also id. (collecting evidence
from other studies that about 80% of all suspects are questioned). This produces a total of about
2.3 million interrogations per year (2.9 million x 80%), for a ten-year total of 23 million. Looking
behind index crimes to all crimes would produce a total number of interrogations about five times
as high. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra, at 208 tbl.29 (reporting estimated total ar-
rests five times higher than arrests for index crimes only).
36. Cf Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules
Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 833-36 (discussing effect
of Utah rules of evidence on court-created exclusionary rules).
37. 656 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. Id. at 1149-50.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVI-
DENCE § 5214, at 265-66 (1978 & 1996 Supp.) ("It seems relatively clear that in the weighing
process under Rule 403 the judge cannot consider the credibility of witnesses."); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403:
Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 886-
87 (1988) ("Mhe overwhelming majority of courts asserts that a judge cannot pass on credibility
in assessing probative value.").
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and reversed the district court's decision to exclude.4' The Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that credibility determinations are not permitted under the rules, dis-
cussing Rule 403 (the best "hook" for the Ofshe-Leo proposal):
[W]e have recently held that Rule 403 does not permit exclusion of
evidence because the judge does not find it credible. Weighing proba-
tive value against unfair prejudice under Rule 403 means probative
value with respect to a material fact if the evidence is believed. not to
the degree the court finds it believable. Rather than discounting the
probative value of the test results on the basis of its perception of the
degree to which the evidence was worthy of belief, the district court
should have determined the probative value of the test results if true,
and weighed that probative value against the danger of unfair preju-
dice, leaving to the jury the difficult choice of whether to credit the
evidence.'
Applying this reasoning to disputed confession evidence, it is clear that Rule
403, among other rules, can virtually never serve as the basis for exclusion.
The confession "if true" (as the Fifth Circuit put it) provides powerful evi-
dence of guilt and therefore has high "probative value." Rule 403 permits
exclusion only if this high probative value is "substantially" outweighed by
unfair prejudice, a balance that weighs heavily in favor of admitting evidence.
Moreover, the unfair prejudice the rule refers to does not mean the effect on
the jury from hearing evidence that might be untrue. Such concerns, as the
Fifth Circuit and many other courts have phrased it, go "to the weight and not
the admissibility of the evidence." '43 In short, the rules-as conventionally
interpreted--offers little chance for a defendant to exclude disputed confession
evidence.
Perhaps Ofshe and Leo could reformulate their proposal by devising
something other than existing approaches as the basis of exclusion-although
this would involve creating (in their words) "new rules" and "cumbersome
procedures." But even if the courts could somehow be empowered to substi-
tute their own credibility determinations for that of jurors, Ofshe and Leo will
surely need to further develop their argument. They do not discuss how judges
should decide cases in which the prosecution and defense legitimately view the
confession differently. They instead focus on the almost trivial case of a "de-
monstrably unreliable confession," arguing it is likely to confuse the jury.'
But if a confession is truly "demonstrably" unreliable, one would assume that
this "demonstration" could be made for the benefit of the jury, which (given
the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard) would promptly acquit the
defendant, particularly where there was no other evidence against the defen-
dant. Juries do not automatically convict defendants who have reportedly "con-
fessed"-even looking solely at the cases featured here by Ofshe and Leo.45
41. Ballou, 656 F.2d at 1150.
42. Id. at 1154 (internal citations onitted) (first emphasis added).
43. Id. at 1154.
44. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1118.
45. See, e.g., id. at 996 (noting acquittal of Richard Bingham after false confession); id. at
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To make their argument fly, Ofshe and Leo need to demonstrate both that
courts can accurately exclude false confessions while properly admitting the
true ones and, further, that it is appropriate to divest juries of decisionmaking
power on such a critical issue. If Ofshe and Leo attempt such a demonstration,
they will need to confront the argument nicely made by Professor Alschuler,
who in general sees little reason to take the reliability issue from the jury. As
he explains, in our system "the trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury,"'
and therefore "permitting a jury rather than a judge to assess the evidentiary
value of an appropriately obtained confession seems fully compatible with due
process."'4 Indeed, the idea of allowing the judge to exclude supposedly in-
credible evidence would, leading authorities have commented, be "a remark-
able innovation"' and "invade the jury's province and usurp its function."'49
Professor Alschuler would seemingly abandon this long-standing general
principle, however, when police resort to false claims to obtain a confession.
Unlike Ofshe and Leo (who would allow "credible" confessions obtained
through such tactics to go to the jury), Alschuler would require the courts to
exclude all confessions obtained through police deception about incriminating
evidence, even when the confessions are indisputably truthful. Given that
Alschuler would create yet another exclusionary rule for defendants, he needs
to explain specifically how courts across the country would adjudicate what
are sure to be numerous claims that police questioning involved some sort of
"false" evidence, a cost that in itself promises to be considerable.0 For in-
stance, the leading police interrogation manual recommends that, at the start of
each interrogation, "the interrogator should finger though the case folder to
create the impression that it contains material of an incriminating na-
ture ... ."' Is that a prohibited "misrepresentation" of the strength of the
evidence? Nor is it clear that Alschuler's proposed rule would do much to
solve any false confession problem that might exist. Ofshe and Leo (who
provide what empirical support exists for Alschuler's recommendations) spe-
cifically disclaim any such approach, explaining that because false confessions
come from the "improper use of interrogation as a whole, no single procedure
can be proscribed and thereby adequately protect the innocent.
'52
Alschuler also fails to explore how many truthful confessions would be
lost or later suppressed under his proposal in the quest to prevent a false one.
1024 (noting arrest of women who was apparently not tried).
46. U.S. CONST. art. mI, § 2.
47. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 3; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)
("The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false") (internal quotation
omitted).
48. 22 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 40, at 266.
49. Imwinkelried, supra note 40, at 887.
50. Cf. Fred E. Inbau & James P. Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-4s it Worth the Costs? (A
Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort), 1 CAL. W.L.
REV. 185 (1988) (discussing consumption of court time as the result of Miranda issues); Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
51. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 84-85 (3d ed.
1986).
52. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1115.
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The available data raise some concern on this point. Professor Leo's interest-
ing study is the only recent observational research on what actually happens
during police interrogation in this country. In 30% of the interrogations he
watched, police confronted suspects with "false evidence of guilt."53 If we
can generalize from his sample, three out of every ten police interrogations in
this country would have to be restructured to comply with Alschuler' proposal.
Moreover, the Leo data strongly suggest that this restructuring would be costly
to society. Leo found that, while confronting suspects with false evidence was
apparently not among the most successful tactics in every case,54 for suspects
with prior felony records or below middle class status such tactics led to con-
fessions at rate higher than the norm.5 While Leo's figures do not permit
exact quantification, they plainly suggest that such tactics are particularly
useful in obtaining truthful confessions when dealing with hardened criminals
or lower social class suspects.
This conclusion is supported by one of the few existing observational
studies of police interrogation in Britain. The study reported that while officers
generally tried to stick "as close to the truth as pqssible.... [i]nformational
bluffs are understood and used in a more sophisticated manner than any other
single kind of interviewing tactic. When properly used their effectiveness in
obtaining confessions is beyond doubt, and much of the preparation for an
important interview is aimed at providing a basis for their use."'56 As the pro-
ponent of change (indeed, a virtually unprecedented change), Alschuler has yet
to meet his burden of explaining why the benefits of his proposal outweigh the
tangible costs of preventing police from using this valuable questioning tech-
nique. 7 Indeed, even focusing exclusively on innocent suspects, it is not clear
whether the restriction would be justifiable. Any restraint that reduces the
53. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
of Contemporary American Police Practices, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 279 (1996).
54. Such a tactic was associated with a confession or admission in 83% of the cases where it
was used, a result that was no a statistically significant improvement over that base success rate of
76%. Id. at 294 tbl.14.
55. For these groups, confessions resulted at rates of 96% and 88%, respectively. Id. at 295
tbl. 15.
56. BARRY IRVING, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. PROC., POLICE INTERROGATION: A CASE
STUDY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 145 (1980) (Research Study No. 2).
57. Perhaps recognizing that the prevention of false confession cannot alone justify a ban on
police trickery, Alschuler also justifies his proposal with other intrinsic and empirical consequenc-
es from such representations. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 974. However, it is not clear that these
factors add much support for his proposal. With respect to the intrinsic evil of lying, even the phi-
losopher that Alschuler relies upon most heavily (Sissela Bok) provides no justification for a ban
on misrepresentation. See Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
Police, 76 OREGON L. REv. (forthcoming 1997) (analyzing police deception from a framework
"[rielying principally on the work of noted moral philosopher Sissela Bok" and concluding that
"under Bok's framework ... a good case can be made for the proposition that post-arrest trickery
[of suspects] is permissible"). With respect to more pragmatic concerns, it is clear that a balancing
of interests is called for. Yet Alschuler, having not discussed at any length the possible harmful
consequences from his proposal, is in a weak position to claim that the balance of advantage tips
in its favor. Indeed, Alschuler concedes in a disarmingly candid sentence that "[a]dmittedly, many
of the harmful consequences produced by misrepresenting the strength of the evidence are also
produced by deceptive interrogation practices that I do not disapprove" and "[tihese troublesome
consequences are in fact risked by every form of undercover investigation." Alschuler, supra, at
975 n.88. Alschuler seems to simply leave these pregnant observations hanging.
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number of confessions from guilty criminals creates the risk that innocent
persons might be erroneously charged in their stead.58
Professors Ofshe and Leo similarly fail to consider offsetting costs in
arguing that courts should undertake "credibility" determinations of confes-
sions. If their proposal is fleshed out to frequently prevent the admissibility of
"false" confessions, then it may have too much "bite"-that is, it may exclude
so many truthful confessions that it would be undesirable. Again, a thorough
assessment of this possibility is difficult because Ofshe and Leo spend virtual-
ly no time discussing any possible negative effects from their proposal and
citations to explanatory legal authorities are few and far between. Yet courts
no less than police investigators can err and, when the errors involve the ad-
missibility of evidence critical to the prosecution of criminal cases, costs to so-
ciety are sure to follow in train. If their proposal is to make any real inroads
on false confessions, it seems likely that a good number of truthful confes-
sions would have to be excluded as well. Some sense of the potential risks
comes from a study by Britain's Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. The
Commission concluded that a rule requiring corroboration of a confession for
a conviction would reduce convictions of apparently guilty defendants by as
much as 3.1%.59 If Ofshe and Leo hope to have policy proposal seriously
considered, they will have to explicitly address such concerns.
The apparent failure of Professors Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler to consider
offsetting costs to their proposals' seems to be a common feature of sugges-
tions from academics that police interrogation needs to be reined in. In the law
reviews and psychological journals, one can read a veritable stream of new
ideas for restricting---or even eliminating-police interrogation.6 Academics
58. See Cassell, supra note 29 (developing at length the argument about truthful confessions
protecting the innocent); see also AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITrlTONAL AND CRIMINAL PRO-
cEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 48 (1997) (criticizing current doctrine because "courts cripple innocent
defendants while the guilty wrap themselves in the self-incrimination clause and walk free");
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REv. 671, 680-81 (1968) (criticizing the Fifth Amendment because "[a] man in suspicious
circumstances but not in fact guilty is deprived of official interrogation of another whom he
knows to be the true culprit ...."); William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deceptions, and Evidence Gath-
ering, 79 VA. L. REv. 1903,. 1931 (1993) (concluding "it seems likely that making government
investigation easier improves the welfare of innocent defendants").
59. See ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORROBORATION AND CONFESSIONS: THE
IMPACT OF A RULE REQUIRING THAT No CONVICTION BE SUSTAINED ON THE BASIS OF CONFES-
SION EVIDENCE ALONE 86 (1993) (deriving this estimate although cautioning that it might be too
high for several reasons).
60. In fairness to Professor Alschuler, it should be noted that a good part of his article is
devoted to defending the current doctrine that confessions should only be excluded if caused by
offensive government conduct, a proposition leading to greater admissibility of confessions. On
balance, however, his proposals would most likely produce a net reduction in the admissibility of
confessions. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (concluding that 30% of all confessions in
America would need to be restructured to comply with Alschuler's proposals).
61. See, e.g., Margaret L. Paris, Faults, Fallacies, and the Future of our Criminal Justice
System: Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 44 (1995) (proposing a rule
against police lies in interrogation because, inter alia, "the community will have lost a valuable
opportunity to teach the very value that it finds so objectionably lacking in the suspect");
Slobogin, supra note 57 (proposing restrictions on non-custodial police interrogations because of
lack of judicial determination of appropriateness for interview); White, supra note 26 (proposing
restrictions to prevent false confessions); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in In-
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generally advance such suggestions not from historically-based constitutional
principles, but rather policy-based normative ones.62 But persuasive normative
argument requires attention to not only the pros and but also the cons and
striking a reasonable balance between contending interests. Modem academics
give the impression of having little time to tarry over mundane concerns that
guilty criminals might escape justice; most academics prefer to move immedi-
ately to a one-sided assessment of the risks that innocent persons might be
convicted or defendants treated unfairly.63 Professor Caplan's observation
about the police interrogation literature ten years ago continues to ring true
today, with regard to the articles in this Symposium and many others else-
where: "Unlike the discussions of perceived police abuse, in which passion
abounds, the passing references to the possibility of uncaught murderers and
rapists are flat."
Perhaps the academics will be successful in advancing such one-sided
policy proposals for reforming police interrogation, but I have my doubts. This
fact can be confirmed by the actions of the elected representatives of the peo-
ple, who seem to be more interested in freeing the police from restrictions
than imposing new ones.' Indeed, even unelected and unaccountable judges
(frequently drawn from the ranks of the academics) seem generally reluctant to
impose the wisdom of the law journals on everyday police operations.
While the failure of scholarly proposals to advance is no novelty, there is
something troubling about the failure in this area. If wrongful convictions from
false confessions are frequently occurring, then something should be done
about it. Yet the one-sided approach of academics gives short shrift to more
balanced suggestions that have a more realistic chance of adoption. For exam-
ple, there seems to be virtual unanimity among those who have reviewed the
problem that videotaping interrogations is an effective solution to the false
confession problem.' But videotaping as a "stand-alone" proposal is unlikely
to get far.67 Rather than piling it on top of existing rules, videotaping should
be imposed as a substitute for other restrictions on police-both to make it
terrogations, 28 CONN. L. REv. 425, 477 (1996) (proposing elimination of lying in police inter-
rogations to allow to help police regain the trust of "the people"); see also Charles J. Ogletree,
Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REv.
1826, 1842 (1987) (proposing that all suspects should receive a lawyer before any custodial ques-
tioning is allowed, a proposal that would effectively end most custodial police interrogation). For
refreshing exceptions to the rule, see AMAR, supra note 58; GRANO, supra note 9.
62. Modern day academics, indeed, seem to invariably conflate the two. See GRANO, supra
note 9, it i.
63. Even here, the academics' analysis is decidedly incomplete. See Cassell, supra note 29.
64. Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1426 n.47 (1985).
65. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (overruling Miranda and substituting pre-Miranda
voluntariness test); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (con-
cluding that § 3501 "is a provision of law .... reflecting the people's assessment of the proper
balance to be struck between concern for persons interrogated in custody and the needs of effec-
tive law enforcement"); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3988 (1978) (adopting statute mod-
eled on § 3501).
66. See, e.g., Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 11, at 488-89 (recommending videotaping to
prevent false confessions); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1118; Alschuler, supra note 2, at 977;
White, supra note 26, at 153-54.
67. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 977 (concluding "most police departments resist" video-
taping); Cassell, supra note 38.
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attractive to police and legislators and to reasonably accommodate society's
interests in effective police interrogation. Previously I have explained such a
plan at length, arguing for videotaping of custodial police interrogations cou-
pled with abolition of Miranda's waiver and questioning cutoff require-
ments.' This proposal has the virtue of both reducing false confessions from
the innocent and increasing truthful confessions from the guilty. Videotaping is
the best remedy for the false confession problem because it allows reconstruc-
tion of what happened during interrogation and identification of suspects who
have been induced to spout back information supplied by the police.' At the
same time, relaxing the Miranda requirements eliminates very real costs from
the decision.° The relaxation will not enlarge any false confession problem
as exists. Persons susceptible to false confessions are particularly unlikely to
be helped by the Miranda rules because they trust the police" and are very
likely to waive their Miranda rights to convince the police of their inno-
cence."2 If anyone doubts this point, recall that all of the false confessions
cited by Ofshe and Leo occurred under the Miranda regime.
As Justice Holmes might have put it, the videotaping and scaled-back
Miranda proposal has both dramatic and quantitative appeal-which is what
academic suggestions need to actually become real world policy reform.
Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler should support this balanced idea or, at the very
least, explain where they stand on its merits. But instead they maintain a studi-
ous silence on the idea, focusing single-mindedly on their own plans to elimi-
nate such false confessions may exist. Time will tell whether their proposals
will go anywhere, but my sense is that they will languish. Without much of a
nod to competing concerns, the proposals simply will not advance in fora
concerned not only about the treatment of criminal suspects but also about the
conviction of guilty criminals. If this prediction is accurate, then the innocent
persons at the heart of the Ofshe-Leo and Alschuler articles will not be helped.
The innocent, of course, would support my more balanced proposal (and oth-
ers like it) over the status quo. Why won't the academics?
68. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 11, at 486-98.
69. See id. at 488-89; see also Ofshe & Leo, supra note 1, at 1118; Alschuler, supra note 2,
at 977.
70. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 11, at 492-97.
71. See GisLi H. GUDJONSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND
TESTIMONY 232 (1992) (noting common personality factor of false confessors of "good trust of
people in authority").
72. See, e.g., id. at 226 (discussing case of Peter Reilly, who did not exercise his Miranda
right to a lawyer because "I hadn't done anything wrong"); Roger Parloff, 1993: False Confes-
sions, AM. LAw., Dec. 1994, at 33, 34 (reporting that suspect who would later give false confes-
sion waived rights because "I had nothing to hide"). See generally, Corey J. Ayling, Comment,
Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safeguards Against False Confes-




MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES: A RESPONSE TO




In his Comment,' Paul Cassell ignores what our article' is about: the de-
velopment and illustration of a decision model that analyzes and explains how
modem methods of psychologically-based interrogation lead both to true con-
fessions from the guilty and false confessions from the innocent. Our central
point is that false confessions come about when commonplace interrogation
methods are used improperly, inappropriately or ineptly. Rather than address
the subject of our article, Cassell narrowly limits his commentary to the last
eight pages of our 143 page paper, principally criticizing the assertion that
wrongful convictions based on false confessions are numerous and declaring
our policy recommendations unsound.
In this brief response, we will argue (1) that it is presently not possible to
quantify the number and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which
they lead to miscarriages of justice; and (2) that Cassell misunderstands our
suggestions for improving the quality of contemporary interrogation practices
and increasing the reliability of confession evidence. We commend Cassell for
endorsing mandatory taping of interrogations,3 and we agree with him that
each miscarriage of justice arising from a false confession is a grave tragedy.
However, the bottom line for Cassell appears to be that if the pervasiveness of
false confessions cannot be demonstrated, then it is really not that important of
a policy problem. Consequently, Cassell need not address the content of our
article or worry about the predictable effects of psychological coercion inside
contemporary interrogation rooms.
* Assistant Professor of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine.
Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1994; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1994.
t Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. Ph.D., Stanford University,
1968. We thank Stanley Fisher, George Thomas and Welsh White for helpful comments. We also
thank Paul Cassell for graciously providing pre-publication drafts of his Comment.
1. Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief Com-
ment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1123 (1997).
2. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 979 (1997).
3. Cassell, supra note 1, at 1133.
4. Id. at 1124.
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I. ARE FALSE CONFESSIONS PERVASIVE OR ISOLATED?
Because Cassell's comments can be insightful, we are disappointed that he
chose not to address the substance of our article. Our aim was to explicate
with unimpeachable data (i.e., excerpts from recorded interrogations) how
modem interrogation tactics influence the decision-making of the guilty and
the innocent. By illustrating our theoretical analysis with excerpts from interro-
gations that produced both true and false confessions, we sought to analyze the
methods of modem psychologically based interrogation in a manner that has
never before been done. Our goal here was to describe how interrogations in
America today are conducted and to explain why they sometimes produce
false confessions.'
Instead of addressing the topic we chose to analyze, and instead of cor-
recting any mistakes or developing the argument in ways that we may have
missed, Cassell first criticizes us by fastening onto the fringe question of
whether false confessions are pervasive or isolated and then criticizes our
policy recommendations. Accusing us of "reason[ing] dramatically, not quanti-
tatively," Cassell asserts that we do not adequately support our statement that
wrongful convictions stemming from false confessions are numerous. Cassell
declares that "the frequency claim is not proven,"7 even though our article did
not seek to establish any frequency claims.' While we will take these issues
up with Cassell in more depth in another forum,9 several points are worth em-
phasizing here.
There are at least three reasons why at present it is not possible to devise
an empirical study to measure, quantify or estimate with any reasonable degree
of certainty the incidence of police-induced false confessions or the number of
wrongful convictions they cause.
5. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation:
The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L. & Soc'Y, 189
(1997). We have also sought to examine the consequences of false confessions on the adminis-
tration of justice. Examining 60 cases occurring after June 13, 1966, we have documented that: (1)
contemporary American interrogation methods are sufficiently powerful to induce false confes-
sions from the factually innocent; (2) confession evidence is sufficiently powerful to produce
arrests and convictions, even when there is no corroboration evidence of a suspect's guilt and
there is compelling evidence of his innocence; (3) police-induced false confessions often lead to
unjust deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice. Of the false confessors whose cases
proceeded to trial, 73% were convicted and only 27% were acquitted-despite the absence of any
credible evidence supporting the confession. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Con-
sequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1997).
6. See Cassell, supra note 1, at 1123.
7. Casseli, supra note 1, at 1126.
8. Cassell's implication that we fail to think carefully about the numbers is a non sequitur
since our article did not address the incidence or prevalence of false confessions. Elsewhere we
have discussed this issue. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 5, at 191-194. Cassell's assertion that a
failure to think carefully about the numbers risks "the grave danger of inhibiting reform by pro-
ducing politically infeasible suggestions while overlooking more realistic and cost-beneficial alter-
natives" is merely speculative because Cassell falls to identify any "grave dangers" linked to our
policy proposals or that our proposals are "politically infeasible" or that any other proposals are
more "realistic" or "cost-beneficial."
9. For more articles and exchanges between us and Cassell, see 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY (forthcoming 1997).
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First, American police typically do not record interrogations in their en-
tirety. When they do record, only the confession statement is likely to be
memorialized. Without a record of the interrogation process, it is difficult to
evaluate how an initially resistant suspect was motivated to confess. It is also
difficult to assess the reliability of a confession statement because of the possi-
bility that a careless investigator educated the suspect about the facts of the
crime. Any attempt to reconstruct what occurred during an interrogation and
what a suspect independently knew is necessarily undermined by the lack of a
record: human memory for conversation is limited and recall is selective due
to the position bias of the participant. In many disputed confession cases, then,
it may not be possible ever to ascertain whether the confession was voluntary
and/or reliable with any reasonable degree of certainty.
Second, because no criminal justice agency keeps records or collects
statistics on the number or frequency of interrogations in America, no one
knows how often suspects are interrogated or how often they confess, whether
truthfully or falsely. It is untenable to randomly sample interrogations to find
out how many lead to false confessions not only because it is currently not
possible to identify the universe of cases under study, but also because it may
not be possible to determine the ground truth (i.e., what really happened) in a
particular case. Nor is it possible to extrapolate the number of interrogations
occurring annually from a single non-random study in one non-representative
jurisdiction. Unless and until a criminal justice agency begins to collect such
statistics, it simply will not be possible to estimate or provide an answer even
to the elementary question of how often interrogations occur, much less how
often they lead to false confessions.
Third, many cases of false confession are likely to go entirely unreported
and therefore unacknowledged and unnoticed. There are no central databanks
or yearly criminal justice handbooks documenting the annual numbers even of
detected false confessions. Typically the only public record is in local court
papers and perhaps in the local press, sources not easily accessible to most
scholars. Even when such records documenting a disputed confession case are
available, it is often difficult to unequivocally establish the ground truth about
the crime, especially since most confessors will be arrested, charged, prosecut-
ed and/or convicted."0 Because it is not possible to reach valid or reliable
estimates of the incidence of false confessions, it is also not possible to es-
timate how often false confessions lead to wrongful convictions.
Nevertheless, the empirical record does not caste doubt on the likely oc-
currence of false confessions. Rather, there is compelling and abundant evi-
dence that false confessions occur regularly. Cassell overlooks much of the
empirical record when he suggests that readers of our article are "left with a
promissory note that this proof will be supplied in the future."" In fact, so-
cial scientists, researchers and journalists have documented numerous cases of
psychologically induced false confession in recent years.2 They have also
10. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5.
11. Cassell, supra note 1, at 1126.
12. For a partial list of case examples of the numerous false confessions that have been
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documented in this decade alone, see EDWARD CONNORS Er AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, ExONER-
ATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL (Research Report: National Institute of Justice, 1996); KEVIN DAVIS, THE WRONG
MAN: A TRUE STORY (1996); RONALD C. HUFF Er AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); JIM FISHER, FALL GUYS: FALSE CONFESSIONS AND THE
POLrICS OF MURDER (1996); GisLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS, AND TESTIMONY (1992); STEVEN LNSCOrr, MAXIMUM SECURITY (1994); ROBERT
MAYER, THE DREAMS OF ADA (1991); PAUL A. MoNES, STALKING JUSTICE (1995); ROGER
PARLOFF, TRIPLE JEOPARDY: A STORY OF LAW AT ITS BEST-AND WORST (1996); ROBERT
PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH RETARDATION OR OTHER
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM (1991) LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (1993); MARTIN YANT,
PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991); CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A
"WRONG MAN" (Donald Connery ed., 1996); Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington's Confession:
Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471 (1995); Gail Johnson,
False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997); Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5; Mickey McMahon,
False Confessions and Police Deception: The Interrogation, Incarceration and Release of An
Innocent Veteran, 13 AM. J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1995); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 5;
Richard J. Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis During Interrogation: False Confession Due to Dissocia-
tive State; Mis-Identified Multiple Personality and the Satanic Cult Hypothesis, 40 INT'L J. CLINI-
CAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 125 (1992); Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners Released From
Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907
(1996); T.N. Thomas, Polygraphy and Coerced-Compliant False Confession: 'Serviceman E'
Redevivus, 35 SCI. & JUST. 133 (1995); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997); June
Arney, Joseph M. Giarratano Bloody Boot Prints Led Him To Doubt His Own Confession, VIR-
GINIAN-PILOT, June 26, 1994, at A15; William Booher, Wrongly Imprisoned Man Will Get
$605,000 New Castle, Henry County and State Must Pay for 18 Months Behind Bars, INDIANAPO-
US STAR, Mar. 21, 1995, at COI; Ginny Carroll, True Confessions--Or False?, NEWSWEEK, SepL
13, 1993, at 41; Glen Chase, Expert Picks at Confession Says Errors Suggest Misskelley Lied,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZEITE, Feb. 2, 1994, at IA; Carolyn Colwell, Defense, DA: Scrap Murder
Indictment, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1991, at 23; Claire Cooper, False Confessions Ring True Under
Questioning, Suspects Fall Victim to Their Own Imaginations, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 7, 1990, at
Al; Joe Darby, Prosecutors Reject Murder Confession, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 4,
1994, at B2; Mike Folks, Man Charged With Murder Released; Fingerprints Didn't Match Ones
Found at Scene, FORT-LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, OcL 12, 1996, at Bi; Matt Lait & Michael
Granberry, Charges Dropped in Laguna Arson When 'Confession' Is Proved Bogus, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1994, at Al; Tom Held, Justice Gets 2nd Chance in Murder Case: Victim's Son Wants
Fair Trial, No Death Penalty Threat for Accused Outlaws, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 12,
1997, at 1; Bob Herbert, Prosecutor's Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at A5; Darlene
Himmelspach, Murder Charge Dismissed Against Caregiver in Death of Her 76-Year Old Patient,
SAN DIEGO-UNION TRIB., May 6, 1995, at B3; Jolayne V. Houtz, Murder Confessions False; Man
Released, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at BI; Carlos Lozano, Ex-Ranch Foreman Acquitted of
Murder Despite a Confession Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at B1; Jack Page, A Question of
Justice: A Father's Plea for Bradley Page, EAST BAY EXPRESS, Oct. 12, 1990, at 1; Roger
Parloff, False Confessions: Standard Interrogations by Arizona Law Enforcement Officials Led to
Four Matching Confessions to the Murders of Nine People at a Buddhist Temple, AM. LAW.,
May, 1993, at S8; Jim Phillips, Man Who Said He Killed Friend Gets Probation for Scaring Her,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 9, 1990, at B3; David Rossmiller & Glen Creno, City to Probe
Police on False Confession; Mom's Other Sons Returned to Family, PHOENIX GAZE'rE, Mar. 31,
1993, at B4; Mark Sauer, Some Strange Cases Examined of Innocents Who Confess to Murder,
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., July 27, 1996, at B10; Joseph P. Shapiro, Innocent, But Behind Bars,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept 19, 1994, at 36; Pete Shellem, Jailed Man Set Free After False
Confession, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al; Barry Siegal, A Question of Guilt When
Taunja Bennett was Killed in 1990, Portland, Oregon, L.A. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1, 1996, at 15;
Barry Siegal, A Peek at Back Alley Justice, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at AI; Robert P. Sigman,
The Tragedy of False Confessions, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 19, 1995, at B4; Bryan Smith,
Suspects' Confessions May Hide Truth, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 23, 1997, at DOI; Rob War-
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demonstrated that police-induced false confessions often lead to lengthy and
unjust deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice. 3 Because false con-
fessions are likely to go unnoticed, however, it is reasonable to assume that
the reported cases represent only the proverbial tip of the false confession
iceberg.
In sum, it is presently not possible to know, estimate or quantify the fre-
quency of false confessions or the annual rate or number of miscarriages of
justice they cause. It appears, however, that police induced false confessions
occur often and are highly likely to lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution,
conviction, and/or incarceration of the innocent. 4 In some instances, police-
induced false confessions have led to the execution of the innocent, the ulti-
mate miscarriage of justice. 5
Even if it were possible to quantify the rate at which police-induced false
confessions occur and the rate at which they lead to wrongful conviction,
Cassell does not provide any meaningful theoretical context within which to
understand the importance of such figures. Because not all facts are created
equal, social scientists typically work from paradigms that order and give
meaning to the facts. Without a paradigm, though, it is not possible to ascer-
tain from which base population the rates of false confession and confession-
driven miscarriages of justice should be computed and how they should be
interpreted. Should the base population, for example, be the number of interro-
gations police conduct annually? The number of index crimes? The most seri-
ous index crimes, such as murder and rape? And what would such figures tell
us? Without a theory or paradigm to inform us which numbers are important
and why, it may not be worth the effort and expense necessary to overcome
the formidable barriers to quantification, especially since there appears to be
widespread agreement that false confessions and miscarriages of justice occur
sufficiently often to warrant the abiding concern of legal scholars, jurists, and
legislators.
Our experience with a few hundred cases of false confession leads us to
conclude that it is far more important to study the conditions under which they
occur, the characteristics of such cases and why they lead to deprivations of
liberty and miscarriages of justice than it is to attempt to quantify what cur-
rently cannot be known. Our research indicates that the phenomenon of false
confession in America today is, for the most part, explained by the inappropri-
ate, inept and/or illegal use of contemporary interrogation methods, not the
dispositions or attributes of particular individuals. In virtually all of the cases
den, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Criminal Justice System Does Not Protect the Innocent,
CHI. TIMES MAG., January/February 1990, at 34; Confession at Gunpoint? (ABC News 20/20
broadcast, Mar. 23, 1991).
13. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5.
14. See id.
15. See id.; Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Jus-
tice]. But see Stephen Marlinan & Paul Cassell, Comment, Protecting the Innocent: A Response
to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988). See also Hugo Bedau & Michael
Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Marknan and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1988)
[hereinafter cited as Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility].
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we have studied, the crime under investigation was murder, the police were
under enormous pressure to solve it; they had not been able to identify a sus-
pect based on solid detective work or forensic evidence, but instead relied on
pseudoscientific interpretations of behavior, gut hunches, and/or the suspect's
relationship to the victim (e.g., spouse, boyfriend, etc.); there existed little or
no credible evidence against the suspect, either before or after the confession;
and police resorted to inappropriate and/or illegal interrogation methods such
as the maximizationlminimization technique to elicit the false statement(s). 6
If our analysis is correct, then the important question is not whether false
confessions are pervasive or isolated. Rather, it is: In high profile murder
cases, why do police investigators so often select the wrong suspect, resort to
inappropriate and illegal interrogation tactics, and automatically consider a
case closed once they have elicited a confession? Why do police, prosecutors,
judges and juries so readily assume that a confession must be true when it was
obtained by psychologically coercive methods, is internally inconsistent, does
not lead to corroboration and/or is contradicted by the facts of the case? Why
do police, prosecutors, judges and juries so readily presume a suspect's guilt
based on a questionable confession statement when the sum of evidence
should lead them to conclude that the suspect is innocent beyond any reason-
able doubt? And what can be done to prevent police-induced false confessions
in high profile cases and their admission into evidence?
Legal scholars, jurists and legislators seeking answers to these questions
will be disappointed by Cassell's "balanced approach" to the false confession
problem.
II. ARE THE PROPOSED REMEDIES SOUND PUBLIC POLICY?
Cassell appears to misunderstand our suggestions for improving contem-
porary interrogation practices and the quality of confession evidence. He states
that we advocate that "police questioning should be restricted to prevent fre-
quently occurring miscarriages of justice from false confessions"'7 and sug-
gests that we fail to consider "a carefully crafted balance designed to fully
protect both the defendant's and society's interest."" These assertions are
incorrect.
While we have argued for better police training, better pre-interrogation
selection procedures and better analysis of the probative value of post-admis-
sion narratives, we have not suggested any restrictions on police interrogation
procedures. Cassell recognizes this when criticizing Professor Alschuler for
suggesting prohibitions on interrogators' ability to lie to and trick suspects, 9
16. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 5; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 2; Saul Kassin & Karlyn
McNall, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmat-
ic Implication, 15 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 233 (1991).
17. Cassell, supra note 1, at 1123.
18. Id. at 1124 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986)).
19. "Ofshe and Leo... specifically disclaim any such approach, explaining that because
false confessions come from the 'improper use of interrogation as a whole, no single procedure
can be proscribed and thereby adequately protect the innocent."' See Cassell, supra note 1, at
1129.
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something we do not propose. A careful reader of our article will be
hardpressed to find any suggestion that the Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments-the current doctrine's regulating American interrogation practices-be
employed to restrict the investigative powers of police.
Cassell also suggests that we fail to take into account society's interest.
This too is incorrect. It goes without saying that police interrogation is an im-
portant and legitimate criminal investigation strategy in America. Cassell does
not fully appreciate that our research here is neutral with respect to whether
the rules of interrogation should be modified to advantage the state or the sus-
pect. Our analysis of the causes and consequences of false confessions should
not be misconstrued as either pro-prosecution or pro-defense. Instead, we take
the existing legal rules as given, and suggest how police can improve the
quality of interrogation practices, obtain more reliable confession evidence,
and detect false confessions early on while staying within these rules. We also
empirically illustrate the dangers of violating prescriptions that were written
into law to reduce false confessions and protect the innocent. For example, we
have criticized the maximization/minimization technique as inherently coercive
because, as laboratory and field researchers have demonstrated,' it relies on
threats of harm and promises of leniency for its efficacy and is likely to elicit
false confessions.
We make two simple policy recommendations: mandatory electronic tap-
ing of the entirety of the interrogation process in all felony cases,21 and a re-
quirement that a confession demonstrates its reliability before being admitted
into evidence.' These are hardly controversial proposals. Indeed, Cassell has
also recommended taping interrogations, though he suggests that this will be
acceptable to law enforcement only if it is coupled with scaled back Miranda
warnings (i.e., eliminating waiver and questioning cut-off requirements).23
While we neither endorse nor reject Cassell's proposal, a taping requirement is
logically independent of whether to keep, scale back or eliminate Miranda's
warning and waiver requirements. The two issues need not be conflated and
should not be confused. Cassell offers this proposal as a kind of political horse
trade24 that, he believes, represents a reasonable compromise to all sides.'
There is no evidence, however, that the law enforcement community and crim-
inal justice policy-makers will accept taping requirements only if pitched as an
alternative to Miranda.'
20. See supra note 16.
21. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 2, at 1118.
22. Id. at 1114.
23. Cassell, supra note 1, at 1133.
24. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 556-60 (1996).
25. Cassell criticizes us for failing to state where we stand on his "balanced" proposal to
swap Miranda for recording. requirements, Cassell, supra note 1, at 1133, but our article was not
about Paul Cassell's policy proposals.
26. When the Supreme Courts of Alaska and Minnesota mandated recording requirements,
there were no reports of massive police resignations, unrest or protest. See State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). Nor did this happen in
England after the legislative mandating of recording requirements. See Police and Criminal Evi-
dence Act, 1984 (Eng.). A significant number of American police departments have voluntarily
1141
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Cassell also misunderstands our second policy recommendation: that con-
fession statements should be evaluated with respect to their degree of reliabili-
ty before they are admitted into evidence. We are not suggesting that confes-
sion statements should be admitted only if they are corroborated by indepen-
dently obtained evidence. Rather, we are suggesting that since a suspect's
admission that "I did it" can be either true or false, the confession that follows
may turn out to be either evidence of guilt or evidence of innocence. To deter-
mine which, courts should examine the fit of the details (both dramatic and
mundane) of the suspect's post-admission narrative with the facts of the crime
to make an evaluation of whether the suspect appears to possess or lack the
personal knowledge that would be expected from the true perpetrator. If the
confessor's description of the crime fits the verifiable crime facts and is not
inconsistent with the physical evidence, the confessor must possess the person-
al knowledge that would be known to the perpetrator and thus his post-admis-
sion narrative provides sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission
into evidence. If, however, the suspect's answers fit poorly with the known
crime facts and therefore demonstrate an apparent ignorance of the crime (e.g.,
his answers about missing evidence are proven wrong, he inaccurately de-
scribes verifiable crime facts, etc.), then the post-admission narrative has failed
to provide sufficient indica of reliability to warrant its admissibility.
In making this recommendation we are not suggesting that judges decide
whether a particular confession is true or false. Rather, because confession
evidence is so exceptionally persuasive-so prejudicial-it should be assessed
to determine whether its probative value outweighs its immense prejudicial ef-
fect.27 No evidence can be judged to have probative value if it lacks reason-
able indicia of reliability. We propose that there should be a standard of de-
monstrable reliability below which no confession statement should be admitted
into evidence. To possess sufficient indicia of reliability, a confession state-
ment must fit the facts of the crime to a reasonable degree. Indeed, American
law enforcement routinely acts on this principle when screening volunteered
confessions; judges routinely act on this principle when deciding whether to
admit hearsay testimony. If it is not sufficiently reliable, a confession's preju-
dicial effect will likely be high and may greatly confuse and mislead the ju-
ry.' Accordingly, consistent with the judge's traditional role as gatekeeper to
exclude untrustworthy evidence that has a strong tendency to mislead the jury,
the judge should not admit confessions without finding that the confession
meets a minimum standard of reliability.
chosen to record interrogations. See WILLIAM GELLER, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTER-
ROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (Report to the National Institute of Justice, 1992).
27. False confessions have such a biasing effect on juror's decisions that introducing one
into evidence at trial is tantamount to an instruction to convict. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5.
28. See JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, vol. 3 (1970); G.R. Miller & F.J. Boster, Three Images
of the Trial: Their Implications for Psychological Research, in B. SALES, PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
LEGAL PRoCESs 16 (1977); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 5.
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Il. CONCLUSION
Paul Cassell's Comment avoids the heart of our article and instead criti-
cizes our assertions about the frequency of false confessions and our policy
recommendations. These criticisms are unwarranted. It is well-established that
false confessions occur regularly and thus with troubling, if unquantifiable,
frequency. The policy recommendations that Cassell attacks would not restrict
interrogation practices or disadvantage police investigators. Rather, the manda-
tory taping of interrogations in their entirety and the minimal reliability re-
quirements that we propose should improve the quality of police practices and
therefore result in better confession evidence. These proposals would benefit
both law enforcement and innocent defendants.29 More importantly, they
would improve the truth finding function of the criminal process.
It is well-documented that false confessions lead to significant depriva-
tions of liberty and miscarriages of justice.0 In some instances, false confes-
sions have even led to the wrongful execution of innocents. 1 The conven-
tional wisdom that people do not confess to crimes they did not commit and
that the American criminal justice system does not wrongfully convict inno-
cents permits these injustices to occur. The first step toward preventing wrong-
29. As one of the authors has noted elsewhere:
By creating a record of the entire interrogation session, videotaping improves the
ability of police to assess the guilt or innocence of a suspect. Videotaping, for example,
allows detectives to review the entire interrogation as the case unfolds and in light of
subsequent evidence; videotaping also preserves the details of a suspect's statement that
may not have been initially recorded in a detective's notes but may subsequently be-
come important; and videotaping permits other officers to evaluate the plausibility of
statements made by a suspect. In addition to aiding police in their assessment of guilt
and innocence, detectives may use videotaped admissions against co-conspirators more
effectively than written statements, which suspects (especially ex-convicts who are likely
to be well aware of deceptive physical evidence ploys) might otherwise think are fabri-
cated.
Not surprisingly, according to Geller, police departments already using video-
taping reported that videotaped interrogations and confessions led to more guilty pleas
by suspects. [See GELLER, supra note 26, at 263-64]. They did so not only by undermin-
ing false claims of police coercion during interrogation, but also by demonstrating the
questionable moral character and demeanor of the suspect to a judge and jury, according
to the officers surveyed.
The salutary effects of videotaping custodial interrogation on effective crime con-
trol extends beyond the police. Prosecutors reported that by capturing details that would
otherwise remain missing from written interview notes or reports, videotaped interroga-
tions provided them with a more complete record with which to better assess the state's
case against the accused, to make more informed charging decisions, and to prepare for
plea bargaining and trial more effectively. Because videotaped interrogations provided
them with better knowledge of the case-including the demeanor and sophistication of
the suspect--prosecutors believed that videotaping assisted them in negotiating a higher
percentage of guilty pleas and obtaining longer sentences ... Geller further reports that
judges and juries favor videotaping because it allows them to determine more accurately
a defendant's state of mind as well as the sincerity of his remorse for any wrongdoing.
In short, videotaping interrogations can only assist the cause of crime control and, not
surprisingly, is widely favored by virtually all criminal justice practitioners.
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRiMtNoLOGY 621, 683-84
(1996).
30. See supra note 12.
31. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 12; Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note
15; Leo & Ofshe supra note 5.
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ful deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice is to acknowledge that
the conventional wisdom is wrong. Rather than dispel this myth, Paul
Cassell's "balanced approach" to the false confession perpetuates it.
COERCION AND MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT"
BRUCE J. WINICKt
I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING COERCION
Any discussion of coerced mental health treatment must begin with a def-
inition of the term "coercion." In its most basic meaning, the term coercion
connotes force or duress, or at least the threat of force. In the context under
consideration, civil commitment and court-ordered treatment are the paradigm
cases. But coercion extends beyond the use of overt legal compulsion. Coer-
cion may occur when individuals experience a loss of control over decisions
that they would like to make for themselves through threats, pressure, persua-
sion, manipulation, or deception on the part of another Much coercion oc-
curs in the shadow of the law. People impaired by mental illness may be
especially vulnerable to suggestiveness and to official and familial pressures
that those without such impairment would be better able to resist? Clinicians
and family members often pressure patients with mental illness to accept vol-
untary admission to the hospital or needed treatment, sometimes threatening to
invoke civil commitment, court-mandated treatment, and even criminal arrest
if they decline.' In addition, in the mental health context, as in other legal
contexts--contract law and plea bargaining, for example-proposals or offers
may sometimes be regarded as coercive.'
* Copyright © 1997 by Bruce J. Winick. This article was prepared for a Symposium on
Coercion and Exploitation at the University of Denver College of Law held on March 14-15,
1997, and presented to the Bioethics and Health Law Working Group at the University of Miami
School of Law in April of 1997. I appreciate the helpful comments of colleagues at the
presentations, and the research assistance of Alina Perez, Alphus Harris, and Tricia Shackelford.
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida. A.B.,
Brooklyn College, 1965; J.D., New York University, 1968.
2. See John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis of Co-
ercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAv. Sc. & L. 129, 131-36 (1991) (analyzing types of coer-
cion applied in the mental health process).
3. BRUCE J. WiNICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH
LAW 401 (1997).
4. See, e.g., SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 179-80
(3d ed. 1985); RALPH SLOvENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 202-04 (1973); John Monahan et
al., Coercion to Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Assertive Treatment in
the Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN
MENTAL HEALTH LAW 251 (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996) [hereinafter A NEW
FRONTIER]; WINICK, supra note 3, at 395-96 n.108; Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, "Volun-
tary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 429, 433 (1971); David B. Wexler,
The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns, Pressures, and Interactions in Mental Health Legis-
lation, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 5 (1983); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 169, 209-10 (1991).
5. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202-41 (1987); Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophic
Examination of Coercion for Mental Health Issues, I 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 239, 244-46 (1993);
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The term coercion is not an entirely descriptive one, and it does not have
an entirely objective and universally applicable meaning. Rather, it is a "con-
textually dependent, moralized phenomenon." In many respects, coercion has
a significant normative content. Coercion is a pejorative label that judges in-
voke to condemn behavior that they find objectionable or to permit the invali-
dation of choices that they deem unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances."
Moreover, coercion may have a significant subjective component. Al-
though the law tends to define coercion based exclusively on the actions of the
person who applies pressure to another, ignoring the subjective response of the
recipient, this exclusive focus on the coercer seems artificial. The same actions
may be perceived as coercive by one patient, but as not coercive by another.
Significant numbers of patients who are involuntarily committed to psychiatric
hospitals perceive their commitment to have been voluntary, whereas signifi-
cant numbers of voluntary patients perceive coercion in the admission pro-
cess.8 Thus patient perceptions of coercion are often incongruent with their
official legal status. Furthermore, patient perceptions of coercion often differ
from the perceptions of others who observe the patient in the hospital admis-
sion process, such as clinical staff and family members.9
What constitutes coercion, in short, may lie largely in the eye of the be-
holder." This subjective character of coercion does not argue that the law
should avoid reliance on an objective definition of the term. People who are
coerced in a legal sense may mistakenly believe that they were not coerced,
and those whose actions were not coerced as a matter of law may feel co-
erced. But the law should take account of what makes people feel coerced in
fashioning legal standards and procedures in this area.
Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mecha-
nism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1991) (discussing behavioral
contracting).
6. WERITEIMER, supra note 5, at 206; Monahan et al., supra note 4, at 13; Charles W.
Lidz et al., Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1034 (1995); Wertheimer, supra note 5; Charles W. Lidz et al., The Validity of Mental Patients'
Accounts of Coercion Related Behaviors in the Hospital Admission Process (1996) (unpublished
manuscript on fie with the author).
7. See David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Regulation of Behavior Modification in Institu-
tional Settings, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 132, 133 (1975); Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations on Correc-
tional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331, 391-92 (1981). For a discussion of the nor-
mative nature of coercion, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM 148-57 (1986);
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 211-17; Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1443, 1446 (1989).
8. Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of Coer-
cion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295 (1993); Deborah L. Dennis & John
Monahan, Introduction, in A NEW FRONTIR, supra note 4, at 3; William P. Gardner et al., Two
Scales for Measuring Patients' Perceptions for Coercion During Mental Hospital Admission, 11
BEHAV. Sd. & L. 307 (1993); Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 433; Virginia A. Hiday et al.,
Patient Perceptions of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
(1997); John Monahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental Hos-
pital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1995); Monahan, supra note 4, at 23-27; Anne
Rogers, Coercion and Voluntary Admission: An Examination of Psychiatric Patient Views, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 259 (1993).
9. Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 300-01; Gardner et al., supra note 8, at 308; Hiday et al.,
supra note 8; Monahan, supra note 8, at 252.
10. See infra Part VI (discussing research on patient perceptions of coercion).
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Absent fraud or mistake, when people subjectively experience their choic-
es as voluntary, the issue of coercion ordinarily will not be raised. People who
do not feel coerced are unlikely to commence legal proceedings to complain
about the actions of others that might have contributed to their choice, nor to
seek judicially to void choices they have made. When people feel coerced,
however, they are more likely to complain about it, and it is more probable
that judges will need to resolve the issue.
In cases in' which patients raise the issue of coercion, courts are faced
with the question of whether to characterize the actions of governmental offi-
cials or others as coercive or to characterize patient choices as coerced. In
such cases courts will need to decide that either there was coercion or there
was not. Although courts therefore will view coercion as a dichotomous inqui-
ry-in which the patient is either coerced or not-coercion can be better un-
derstood as existing on a continuum-"from friendly persuasion to interper-
sonal pressure, to control of resources to use of force."" Very few choices in
life are wholly free of at least some degree of coercion.'2 In addition to the
compulsion of the law, a variety of economic, social, familial, occupational,
and psychological pressures inevitably impinge on individual decision making,
sometimes leading individuals to experience their choices as coerced.
There are degrees of coercion falling along a continuum, and where the
law chooses to place the dividing line between coercion and voluntariness is
essentially a normative judgment." Once this normative character of the con-
cept of coercion is recognized, we should strive to identify and weigh the var-
ious values that might be affected by differing legal standards defining the
category and procedures governing its determination. These values include
respect for individual autonomy and self-determination, our notions of the
limits of governmental power over the individual, the desire to protect indi-
viduals from harm or unfair treatment, and in the case of medical and mental
health treatment, the desire to foster the efficacy of such treatment. This last
concern-the therapeutic-focuses attention on the relationship between per-
ceived coercion and treatment outcome, a question that remains substantially
unexplored empirically.'4 Although our knowledge concerning this relation-
ship remains incomplete, psychological theory would suggest that coercion
may undermine treatment success and that its opposite-voluntary
choice-may serve to promote it. After briefly examining the asserted justifi-
cations for coercion in the mental health context and considering some special
problems raised by the application of coercion standards to the situation of
institutionalized patients, this article will analyze this relationship and explore
11. Ronald J. Diamond, Coercion and Tenacious Treatment in the Community: Applications
to the Real World, in A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 55. For a discussion of coercion as in-
volving a continuum, see JOEL FEINBERO, HARM To SELF 255-56 (1989); see also Robert D.
Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment
of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1169, 1172 (1997).
12. Winick, supra note 5, at 770; see also Robert D. Miller, supra note 11, at 1170-71.
13. Id.
14. BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT (1997);
WINICK, supra note 3, at 78; see Virginia A. Hiday, Coercion in Civil Commitment: Process,
Preferences and Outcome, 15 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHIATRY 359, 359 (1992).
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how legal rules governing coercion and its determination, and the application
of those rules, might affect therapeutic values.
1H. WHEN THE LAW PERMITS INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION AND
COERCIVE TREATMENT
All jurisdictions permit the civil commitment to psychiatric hospitals of
those suffering from mental illness. 5 Commitment of those dangerous to
themselves or others is a traditional exercise of the state's police power. 6
Commitment of those who are incompetent to engage in rational hospitaliza-
tion decisions for themselves and who otherwise would be gravely disabled is
an application of the state's historic parens patriae power. 7 Although volun-
tary hospitalization is encouraged, those who refuse it and who meet statutory
criteria may be hospitalized involuntarily. 8
When patients are subjected to civil commitment, and sometimes even
when they are not, they may be treated on an involuntary basis. Although the
law has increasingly recognized a qualified right of mental patients to refuse
various types of mental health treatment, 9 the courts have recognized situa-
tions in which the government's interests in compelled treatment may out-
weigh the individual's right to refuse it.2' For example, when an institutional-
ized patient or prisoner is dangerous to institutional staff, other patients, or in-
mates as a result of mental illness, the state may involuntarily administer psy-
chotropic medication as long as it is medically appropriate for the individual
and (in non-prison contexts) the least intrusive means of dealing with the
problem.2' Similarly, courts have permitted forced treatment under the state's
parens patriae power when mental illness has rendered patients incompetent to
make treatment decisions for themselves.22 Another example involves crimi-
nal defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial who may be adminis-
tered involuntary treatment designed to restore and maintain their competence,
as long as it is medically appropriate and the least intrusive means of accom-
plishing this goal.23
15. See, e.g., BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 4, at 34, 76-81 (table 2.1); 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CivIL AND CRIMINAL (1989); Note, Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974). For an analysis of the mental ill-
ness requirement for civil commitment, see WmNCK, supra note 3, at 93-199.
16. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 375; 1 PERLIN supra note 15, at 37-45; WINICK,
supra note 3, at 162-66; Joseph M. Livermore et a., On the Justifications for Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968) (discussing the public policy justifications for involuntary commit-
ment); Note, supra note 15, at 1222-45.
17. See BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 4, at 428-29; 1 PERLIN, supra note 15, at 37-45; WNICK,
supra note 3, at 166-71; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 16-18 (1991); Note, supra note 15, at 1207-
22.
18. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 24; WINICK, supra note 3, at 201-13.
19. See WINICK, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 269-309.
21. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (dictum); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 225 (1990); WINIcK, supra note 14, at 285-88, 294-308.
22. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and re-
manded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cit. 1980), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); WiNICK, supra note 14, at 289-94.
23. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127; WINICK, supra note 14, at 276-83; Bruce J. Winick, Psycho-
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In addition to contexts involving institutionalized mental patients and
criminal offenders, coercive mental health treatment has increasingly been ap-
plied in the community.14 Such treatment has been mandated as part of invol-
untary outpatient commitment, preventive commitment, conditional release,
and as a condition of parole, probation, or diversion from the criminal pro-
cess.' Also, court-ordered treatment may be imposed in a variety of criminal
and family court contexts. 6 Other than to offer the above brief outline of
when the law authorizes involuntary psychiatric hospitalization and mental
health treatment, this article does not attempt an analysis of the conditions
under which coercion in the mental health context should be justified."'
III. LEGAL STANDARDS OF COERCION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR
SATISFACTION BY THOSE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
A number of situations thus exist in which involuntary commitment is
permitted and in which clinicians in public facilities and in the community will
be authorized to administer mental health treatment coercively. In those cir-
cumstances in which the law authorizes coercive mental health intervention,
the usual requirements of the informed consent doctrine will not need to be
followed. Indeed, in these situations, clinicians will rarely discuss hospitaliza-
tion and treatment options with their patients, but will make treatment deci-
sions unilaterally and order that hospitalization and treatment be imposed in-
voluntarily, even over objection. Although some judicial and legislative clar-
ification has occurred concerning when patients have a right to refuse treat-
ment and when they do not, many issues remain unresolved.'
In situations in which involuntary hospitalization or coercive treatment is
not permitted, the law will need to define the concept of coercion. Typical
definitions incorporate the standard of coercion adopted in the Nuremberg
Code, requiring "the knowing consent of an individual or his legally autho-
rized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or
other form of constraint or coercion."'" Patients institutionalized because of
mental illness may be particularly vulnerable to coercive pressures, and their
consent to treatment delivered within the institution cannot always be accepted
at face value. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the fact of
tropic Medication in the Criminal Trial Process: The Constitutional and-Therapeutic Implications
of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. Sci. J. HuM. RTS. 637, 646-51 (1993).
24. See A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4.
25. Id.
26. For extensive treatment of this issue, see WhcK, supra note 14 (involuntary treatment);
WINICK, supra note 3, at 93-199 (involuntary hospitalization and treatment).
27. Id.
28. See WINICK, supra note 14.
29. The Medical Cases, in 1 & 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRmNALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILrIARY TRIBUNALS (1948), reprinted in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS
292, 305-06 (1972). The principles set forth in the judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal
in the case of United States v. Karl Brand--the trial of twenty-three German physicians for war
crimes involving experiments with prisoners of war and civilians--have come to be known as the
Nuremberg Code. See aLso 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1996) (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services
regulations concerning the protection of human subjects).
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institutionalization per se renders treatment choices involuntary."
Prisoners face similar institutional pressures, and it is useful to consider
the related question of whether prisoners should be considered able to make
free choices. In its report entitled Research Involving Prisoners, the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research considered "whether prisoners are, in the words of the
Nuremberg Code, 'so situ.atedas to able o.,.0.,,.; .,.  po. er of
choice"--that is, whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to partic-
ipate in research.3" Some of the commissioners argued that prisons, by their
very purpose and character, make sufficiently free consent to research impos-
sible.32 Similarly, several participants at a National Minority Conference on
Human Experimentation held under the auspices of the National Commission
objected in principle to the notion of truly voluntary consent by prisoners.33
The National Commission, however, ultimately rejected the idea that prisons
are so inherently coercive that voluntary consent is impossible, and concluded
that at least some prison research could be undertaken with appropriate safe-
guards.34 The Commission proposed a number of requirements to ensure "a
high degree of voluntariness on the part of the prospective participants," in-
cluding "adequate living conditions, provisions for effective redress of griev-
ances, separation of research participation from parole considerations, and
public scrutiny."3 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regu-
lations, initially adopted as a result of the Commission's work, include an ad-
ditional protection for prisoners subjected to biomedical and behavioral re-
search. The regulation requires an assurance that parole boards not take into
account a prisoner's participation in such research in making parole decisions,
and that prisoners be "clearly informed in advance that participation in the
research will have no effect on his or her parole."'
In the Kaimowitz Michigan psychosurgery case,37 the court considered
the impact on voluntariness of institutionalization and of the inducement creat-
ed when release is tied to consent. The court held that involuntarily confined
mental patients are unable as a matter of law to consent to experimental psy-
chosurgery. The court's analysis has broad implications for the ability of all
30. The analysis that follows is drawn in part from my discussion of the requirement of
voluntariness under the informed consent doctrine contained in WINICK, supra note 14, at 363-68.
31. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 5 (1976) [hereinafter RESEARCH].
32. Roy Branson, Prison Research: National Commission Says "No, Unless.. .", HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Feb. 1977, at 15, 17 (quoting remarks of Commissioner King).
33. RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 42, 44. This was also the view of the American Correc-
tional Association. See American Correctional Ass'n, Position Statement: The Use of Prisoners
and Detainees as Subjects of Human Experimentation, Feb. 20, 1976, in RESEARCH, supra note
31, at 22-1 to 22-2 app.
34. Larry I. Palmer, Biomedical and Behavioral Research on Prisoners: Public Policy Issues
in Human Experimentation, in RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 14-21 app.; see Branson, supra note
32, at 16.
35. RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 16.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(6) (1996).
37. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (D. Mich. July 10,
1973), reprinted in ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYS-
TEM 902, 913-14 (1974).
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institutionalized mental patients to provide informed consent, and therefore
deserves careful analysis. The court stated that:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may have sufficient
I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his circumstances... the very
nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to psy-
chosurgery.
The fact of institutional confinement has special force in under-
mining the capacity of the mental patient to make a competent deci-
sion on this issue, even though he be intellectually competent to do
SO.
It is impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to be
free of ulterior forms of restraint or coercion when his very release
from the institution may depend upon his cooperating with institution-
al authorities and giving consent to experimental surgery.
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coer-
cive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coer-
cion has a profound effect upon the patient population.... They are
not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent
inequality of their position.38
The sweeping approach of Kaimowitz, however, has not been followed by
other courts. The Kaimowitz court sought to limit its holding to experimental
psychosurgery by stating that consent could be given to conventionally accept-
ed procedures.39 The logic, however, of the court's approach to coercion goes
considerably beyond experimental treatment.
Although the Kaimowitz court may have reached the right result on the
facts of that case,' the potential breadth of the court's holding concerning the
effects of institutionalization and the promise of release on the capacity to give
informed consent could give rise to absurd and constitutionally dubious results.
Institutionalization may substantially diminish the ability of some patients to
decide freely on therapy, and the lure of release or of avoiding hospitalization
may be so potent that, for at least some patients, refusal to consent is virtually
impossible. These factors, however, should not preclude all patients from
being considered capable of making these decisions voluntarily. If institution-
alization per se diminishes decision-making abilities so that patients are in-
competent to elect psychosurgery, how can patients be considered competent
to make other important decisions? Can they decide to have elective surgery
or other medical treatment when needed, to choose particular recreational or
therapeutic opportunities, or to agree to accept certain conditions of condition-
al release? Moreover, if the prospect of release renders confined individuals
38. Kaimowitz, No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 25-29; BROOKS, supra note 37, at 913-15.
39. Kaimowitz, No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 40; BROOKS, supra note 37, at 920.
40. See Robert Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners From The Doctors, HASTINGS CENTER
REP. , Feb. 1975, at 25.
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incompetent to elect psychosurgery, how can patients be permitted to elect the
variety of other hospital programs that are likely to result in early release?
The absurdity of a per se rule based upon the impact of institutionaliza-
tion or the lure of release is demonstrated by its extraordinarily sweeping ef-
fect. An example drawn from the analogous context of the prison illustrates
the difficulties with the Kaimowitz approach. A common example of use of the
early release lure to modify prisoner behavior is the virtually universal practice
of providing "good time" credit. As the Supreme Court noted in McGinnis v.
Royster,1 "the granting of good-time credit toward parole eligibility takes
into account a prisoner's rehabilitative performance." 4 The state statute in-
volved in Royster authorized such good time credit "for good conduct and
efficient and willing performance of duties assigned."43 Under a U.S. Bureau
of Prisons rule, an award of "extra good time" may be made for, among other
things, "[v]oluntary acceptance and satisfactory performance of an unusually
hazardous assignment."" Under the Kaimowitz approach, these common and
largely unobjectionable features of prison life would be deemed coercive.
Although the lure of release from institutional confinement may make the
voluntary choices made by patients in favor of treatment suspect, it would be a
mistake to regard all such choices as inherently coerced even though they
predictably may bring about earlier release from the hospital.
In the analogous situation of plea bargaining, the courts have rejected the
notion that the opportunity or even the assurance of a shorter sentence neces-
sarily renders a guilty plea involuntary. In Brady v. United States,5 the de-
fendant attacked the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that it was entered to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Under the statute involved, the death
penalty could be imposed following a jury determination of guilty but could
not be imposed when a defendant waived trial and pled guilty. Stressing that
"[t]he voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all
of the relevant circumstances surrounding it,"' the Court rejected the coer-
cion claim:
Even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except
for the death penalty provision. .. ,this assumption merely identifies
the penalty provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute
caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea
was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act....
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by
actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the will of the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this
41. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
42. McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 271.
43. Id. at 266-67 n.5 (quoting Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1971)).
44. 28 C.F.R. § 523.16 (1996); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.60(a), (b) (1996) (rule of U.S. Parole
Commission permitting advancement of presumptive release date for "superior program achieve-
ment" in "educational, vocational, industry, or counselling programs").
45. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
46. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
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case.... Brady's claim is of a different sort: that it violates the Fifth
Amendment to influence or encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or
promise of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and invalid if
influenced by the fear of a possible higher penalty for the crime
charged if a conviction is obtained after the State is put to its proof.
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty ... . '
Not all pressures that succeed in inducing a plea will be deemed coercive.
The Brady Court adopted as its standard of voluntariness the rule that a guilty
plea "must stand unless induced by threats ... misrepresentation . . . , or per-
haps by promises that are by their nature improper," such as bribes.' The
Court thus recognized that while certain plea offers could be coercive, an offer
of leniency alone, however enticing, would not be deemed coercive. Even an
offer that is difficult to refuse will be permitted absent improper threats or
promises or some form of misrepresentation. Under the standard adopted by
the Court, "a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty." 9
If avoidance of the possibility of a death sentence is not so inherently
coercive as to invalidate a guilty plea, then it is difficult to see how the possi-
bility or promise of early release from the hospital could be considered so
inherently coercive as to invalidate a patient's choice of therapy. There was no
suggestion in Brady that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, using his charging
discretion improperly to lodge a baseless charge against Brady of an offense
carrying the death penalty in order to engineer a guilty plea. Offering to dis-
miss a baseless charge in exchange for a guilty plea would have been an "im-
proper" promise, and hence coercive.' Similarly, if the conditions of institu-
tional confinement that would be avoided by the agreement of a hospitalized
patient to accept treatment are inconsistent with the minimum standards man-
dated by the Constitution,"1 an offer of potential release also would constitute
an improper promise that would be coercive under the Brady standard.
47. Id. at 750-5 1.
48. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cit. 1957)).
Brady did not actually involve plea bargaining. The statute under which Brady was charged made
the death penalty unavailable in the case of a guilty plea. The pressure that Brady asserted had
induced his plea was a product of the statutory scheme itself. The Supreme Court, however, subse-
quently applied the Brady standard in the context of plea bargaining. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). Indeed, Brady's concept of offers or proposals as coercive only when
improper has emerged as a general legal approach to considering when offers are coercive. See
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308; Winick, supra note 5, at 770 & n.107;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981) (standard of duress limited to
physical compulsion or improper threats).
49. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Either case-the offer to dismiss a baseless charge or to remove legally
inadequate conditions of confinement in exchange for a guilty plea-would
constitute a coercive offer which would render unenforceable the defendant's
plea made in response. Such an offer is objectionable because the conditions
from which the individual is offered relief if he or she accepts the proposal are
themselves improper. If rejected, the individual would be worse off than he or
she has a right to be. The offer thus violates the individual's moralized base-
line, rendering the pressures it creates coercive." By contrast, if the con-
ditions of institutional confinement are not unconstitutional or otherwise im-
proper, the promise of future release conditioned on acceptance of treatment
would seem no different than a promise not to seek the death penalty or to
dismiss capital charges that are appropriate in the circumstances in exchange
for a guilty plea.
Of course, there may be cases in which the forces of institutionalization
render a particular patient incapable of making truly voluntary choices. And
there may be cases in which threats or promises are so potent that the particu-
lar patient's consent is virtually assured. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
institutionalization or the opportunity of early release or of avoidance of con-
finement renders voluntary consent impossible.
Virtually no choice is totally free of at least some degree of psychological
coercion.53 Psychologist Israel Goldiamond has performed a useful behavioral
analysis of voluntariness and coercion, defining situations of coercion and
noncoercion through the use of a contingency analysis.54 In this model, coer-
cion is most severe when there are no genuine choices and the consequences
contingent on behavior are critical.5 Certainly plea bargaining is coercive un-
der this model,56 sometimes extremely so. Nevertheless, courts have accepted
the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining, deeming this degree of coercion con-
stitutionally tolerable.57 The psychological pressures inherent in a particular
situation will not alone render choices coerced for legal purposes. It is only
52. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 210.
53. Israel Goldiamond, Protection of Human Subjects and Patients: A Social Contingency
Analysis of Distinctions Between Research and Practice, and its Implications, 4 BEHAVIORISM 1,
27 (1976) ("Coercion is not absolute; there are degrees of coercion as well as of freedom."); see
Louis L. Jaffee, Law as a System of Control, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBIEcrs 203,
216 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1969). For philosophical analyses of the concept of coercion, see RAZ,
supra note 7; WERTHEIMER, supra note 5; REPRESENTATION: YEARBOOK FOR THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY FOR POLMCAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1-328 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1968); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 (1981);
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al.
eds., 1969); Wertheimer, supra note 5; Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation,
74 DENv. U. L. REV. 889 (1997).
54. Goldiamond, supra note 53, at 20-34; Israel Goldiamond, Singling Out Behavior Modifi-
cations for Legal Regulation: Some Effects on Patient Care, Psychotherapy and Research in Gen-
eral, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 121-25 (1975).
55. Goldiamond, supra note 53, at 23.
56. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CI. L. REV. 3, 12-13
(1978); Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 675-78 (1980).
57. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Blacklede v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). The Supreme Court
even has suggested that plea bargairiing, properly conducted, is worthy of encouragement. See
Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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when improper pressures are brought to bear that courts will find coercion.
Most patients should be deemed, in principle, capable of consenting to
even the most intrusive of treatment programs-programs that they otherwise
would have a constitutional right to refuse. Because the inherent psychological
pressures faced by institutionalized patients choosing treatment are simply not
avoidable, courts should seek only to protect against additional or related
pressures that are unfair or improper." An analogy to plea bargaining is
again useful. The inherent coerciveness of plea bargaining is mitigated by the
presence and advice of counsel during the plea bargaining process, 9 and by
the practice of giving pleas in open court where the judge is required to con-
duct a review of the extent of the defendant's knowledge of the rights about to
be waived and the voluntariness of their waiver.' Similar protection could
easily be fashioned in the context of consent to at least the more intrusive
forms of mental health treatment. Indeed, some type of pretreatment hearing
and independent review may be required by the guarantee of procedural due
process.6 ' With these procedural qualifications, it seems likely that courts
would uphold the validity of consent given by patients in connection with
mental health or correctional therapies. Although institutionalization and the
lure of release may provide pressures that render some choices made in re-
sponse legally coerced, most patients will be able to satisfy the requirement of
voluntariness notwithstanding these pressures, and to provide informed consent
to treatment.
IV. A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPROACH TO COERCION
Although the pressures inherent to institutionalization or the potent lure of
release from hospital confinement will not by themselves render treatment
choices coerced, in those contexts in which the law prohibits coerced hospital-
ization or treatment, there is need for further clarification concerning when
persuasion and pressure to accept voluntary hospitalization or treatment cross
the line into coercion. This is not an easy line for the law to draw, particularly
in the mental health treatment context where persuasion and coping with pa-
tient resistance to change are essential parts of the therapeutic process. In this
connection, it is important to understand the kinds of persuasion and pressure
that patients perceive as coercive and offensive and those that they perceive as
noncoercive and acceptable. Moreover, it is important to understand the rela-
tionship between these patient perceptions of coercion and noncoercion and
therapeutic success or failure.
58. WINIcK, supra note 14, at 363-68; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possi-
bility of Consent to Organic Therapies 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 25, 38 (1975); David B. Wexler, Reflec-
tions on the Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARIz. L. REV.
132, 133 (1975).
59. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758. Compare Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973),
and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), with Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S.
213, 215 (1973).
60. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-44 (1969); McCar-
thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
61. See WINICK, supra note 14, at 371-89.
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Even when mandatory treatment or hospitalization is permitted by the law,
it is important for both legal actors and clinicians involved in the treatment
process to understand when patients subjectively perceive coercion, and the
relationship between such perceptions and treatment outcome. Because the
purpose of treatment delivered on an involuntary basis is to ameliorate the
patient's psychopathology, it is crucial to inquire concerning what kinds of
persuasion and pressure are conducive to the therapeutic mission and those
which may undermine it. Legal actors and clinicians functioning within the
coercive treatment context should therefore view the question of coercion
through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence.62
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the law as a therapeutic agent.
Whether we appreciate it or not, the law is a social force that frequently im-
poses therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences on the people it affects.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law
that calls for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of law on
individuals' psychological health and functioning. By examining law in this
way, therapeutic jurisprudence can generate a wide array of empirical and pol-
icy issues, many of which have not previously been raised, that can enrich our
understanding of law and identify new and creative law reform proposals.63
Law's therapeutic consequences are not the only ones worth studying or con-
sidering, of course, but they should not be neglected in any sensible policy
analysis of law. When legal rules or procedures or the roles played by various
legal actors (such as judges, lawyers, and clinicians) create antitherapeutic
consequences, we should consider whether changes in law or in the way law is
applied can be accomplished in a manner that will minimize these consequenc-
es consistent with considerations of justice and other relevant normative val-
ues.
Applying the therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the context of coercive
mental health treatment allows us to identify a number of issues that are ripe
for empirical research, the results of which will be crucial to legal decision
making in this area. When the law permits coercive treatment in various con-
texts, it does so based on the assumption that such treatment is effective. But
is such treatment effective when imposed coercively? Can coercion impose
negative effects on the treatment process? How should clinicians deal with
their patients when coercive treatment is authorized? How can legal rules
permitting coercive treatment be structured in order to further and not diminish
the potential for a successful treatment outcome? Even in the absence of em-
pirical research on these issues, the need exists to apply psychological theory
to speculate about the effects of coercion in the mental health process. The
62. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1991) (analyzing and illustrating law's role as a therapeutic agent); LAW IN A THER-
APEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1996) (illustrating application of therapeutic jurisprudence to a wide spectrum of
legal issues and containing commentary on this emerging approach to legal policy analysis) [here-
inafter LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY]; WINCK, supra note 3 (applying the approach of therapeutic
jurisprudence to analyze the field of mental health law); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1997).
63. See LAW IN A THERAPEUrIC KEY, supra note 62 (anthology of therapeutic jurisprudence
of theoretical and empirical work on a wide variety of legal issues).
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remainder of this article will address these issues, conducting a therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis of legal and clinical approaches to coercive treatment.
The first question for analysis is whether coercive treatment works.
V. DoEs CoERcIvE TREATMENT WORK?
To the extent that the law permits involuntary treatment in order to im-
prove mental health or restore a level of functional capacity, there is a need
for social scientists to examine whether the law's objectives are accomplished.
There have been various anecdotal reports of successful treatment in coercive
situations. ' There is a paucity of empirical research exploring the efficacy of
involuntary treatment, however.' An extensive review of the literature on
psychotherapy and psychotropic medication, the two most prevalent forms of
treatment for those suffering from mental illness, found no persuasive evi-
dence that coercive application of these two techniques to involuntarily com-
mitted patients was effective.' In recent years, there has been increased inter-
est in the efficacy of aggressive community-based treatment.6' Several re-
searchers have conducted quasi-experimental studies of outpatient civil com-
mitment, and have concluded that it is effective in reducing the length and
number of hospitalizations, and in increasing patient continuance in treat-
ment.' These studies, however, are preliminary and suffer from serious
methodological difficulties-small sample sizes, use of retrospective data, lack
of control groups, and failure to control for potential confounding variables,
including the selection criteria used and the effects of informal coercion.'
Some of these methodological difficulties may be inherent to the task of
studying the efficacy of coerced treatment. A true experiment employing ran-
dom assignment of patients thought to be in need of coerced treatment raises
ethical dilemmas and may not be feasible."0 Moreover, there is lack of agree-
ment concerning proper outcome measures for judging the efficacy of treat-
ment. For example, such factors as rehospitalization or recidivism, or in-
creased continuation in treatment, may not adequately capture the effectiveness
of treatment.
64. GROUP FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, FORCED INTO TREATMENT: THE ROLE
OF COERCION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 22-24, 81, 99-101 (1994) (including anecdotal reports of
successful treatment in coercive situations, including treatment of children and adolescents, sex
offenders, and employees treated for alcoholism or drug addiction when coercion is perceived by
patient as fair and appropriate).
65. Phyllis Solomon, Research on the Coercion of Persons with Severe Mental Illness, in A
NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 129, 142-43.
66. Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary
Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RIrGERs L. REv. 303, 351-
56, 367-68 (1988).
67. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 2-3.
68. 'See, e.g., Virginia A. Hiday & Theresa L. Scheid-Cook, A Follow-Up of Chronic Pa-
tients Committed to Outpatient Treatment, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 52 (1989); Rob-
ert A. Van Putten et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment in Arizona: A Retrospective Study, 39
HosP. & CoMMuNIrY PsYCHIATRY 953 (1988); Guido Zanni & Leslie de Veau, Inpatient Stays
Before and After Outpatient Commitment, 37 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 941 (1986).
69. Solomon, supra note 65, at 135; M.S. Swartz et al., New Directions in Research on In-
voluntary Outpatient Commitment, 46 HOsP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 381, 382 (1995).
70. Monahan et al., supra note 8.
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VI. THE PERCEPTION OF COERCION
We thus know very little about the efficacy of coerced treatment. More
research plainly is needed.7 However, before we can properly study coercion
as an independent variable in treatment outcome, a significant prior issue must
be examined-coercion as a dependent variable, that is, what makes people
feel coerced." As indicated earlier, the concept of coercion has a significant
subjective component. " The issue of when people feel coerced-the determini-
nants and correlates of perceived coercion-has been the subject of important
recent research conducted under the auspices of the MacArthur Research Net-
work on Mental Health and the Law.74 This research examined attitudes of
patients at the time of admission to mental hospitals. The preliminary results
indicated that patient perceptions of coercion do not necessarily correlate with
whether they have been subjected to formal legal compulsion, such as occurs
in civil commitment, and that it is possible to study patients' perceptions of
coercion independent of the formal legal status of voluntary or involuntary
admission."
The MacArthur coercion study concluded that a number of important
variables correlated with patient perceptions of coercion.76 One of these was
the motivation of the clinician or state actor-the extent to which the treat-
ment provider was perceived as acting out of concern for the patient's well-
being. Another was respect--the degree of respect with which the treatment
provider dealt with the patient. Others included what in the psychology of
procedural justice has come to be known as voice-the extent to which the
patient was afforded an opportunity to express his or her opinion on the ad-
mission decision-and validation-the extent to which what the patient had to
say was taken seriously.' Patients desire to be included in the process of de-
termining whether they will be admitted to the hospital, and experience coer-
cion to the extent they are excluded from that process.
71. Solomon, supra note 65.
72. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 14; Bennett et al., supra note 8; Gardner et al., supra
note 8.
73. See supra Part I.
74. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4; Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 297-99; Gardner et al.,
supra note 8.
75. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4; Lidz et al., supra note 6.
76. A NEW FRoNTIER, supra note 4.
77. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE 26-34 (1988); JOHN TIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Hiday et al., supra
note 8, at 229-30, Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participation and Observer Satisfaction with
Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1531
(1978); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolu-
tions of Conflicts of Interest, '39 J. PERSONALrrY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 643, 652-53 (1980); E. Allan
Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns
in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 952 (1990); Norman G. Poythress,
Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW &
Hum. BEHAv. 361 (1994); John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REv.
1271 (1974); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications
for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, (1992); see also Tom E. Hughes & Lon N.
Larson, Patient Involvement in Health Care: A Procedural Justice Viewpoint, 29 MED. CARE 297
(1991).
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Another important variable was the patient's perception of fair-
ness-whether he or she was treated fairly and whether trickery or deception
was used in the admission process. Finally, the extent to which pressure was
applied in the admission process was deemed significant, that is, the degree of
persuasion, inducement, threats, or force. Very high levels of perceived coer-
cion were present when treatment providers used the negative pressures of
threats and force, whereas positive approaches involving persuasion and in-
ducement were associated with no increase in perceived coercion.78
Patients in the admissions process who reported that others acted out of
concern for them, treated them fairly, in good faith, with respect, and without
deception, provided them with an opportunity for voice, and took what they
said seriously were much less likely to experience coercion.79 When these
moral norms reflecting patient attitudes about how they should be treated are
adhered to, many apparently coercive acts seem to be accepted by the patient
as morally legitimate. 0 In any future research on the efficacy of coercive
treatment, these findings must be taken into account in designing studies to
measure the relationship between perceived coercion and treatment outcome.
But they also should be taken into account in considering how clinicians
should act toward their patients in involuntary hospitalization and treatment
contexts.
VII. BALANCING THE POsrrIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFEcTs OF COERCION
To the extent that coercive treatment is effective, it must count, of course,
as a positive therapeutic consequence of legal rules permitting coerced treat-
ment. At least in some circumstances, coercion can improve the quality (or at
least stability) of a client's life.' Undoubtedly some patients who otherwise
would reject treatment needed to reduce suffering and promote healthy
functioning may benefit immensely from treatment provided on an involuntary
basis.
Against these potentially positive effects of coercive treatment, however,
must be weighed its potentially negative consequences. Patients may experi-
ence feelings of alienation and disaffection if they feel improperly coerced,
with potentially negative effects on treatment compliance and efficacy. 2 Even
if patients comply with treatment when coerced to do so, long-range therapeu-
tic outcomes may become tenuous because patients may be unlikely to adhere
voluntarily to needed medication or psychosocial therapy once coercive condi-
tions are removed. 3 Treatment imposed over objection reveals a failure of
the therapeutic relationship that can produce negative effects on the therapeutic
process that may be long-lasting. 4 Moreover, if coerced treatment is permit-
78. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 23.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 304.
81. Diamond, supra note 11, at 59-60.
82. A NEw FROrmIR, supra note 4, at 14; Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 296; Hiday et al.,
supra note 8, at 237-38; Rogers, supra note 8.
83. Hiday et al., supra note 8. at 237-38.
84. Andrea K. Blanch & Jacqueline Parrish, Reports of Three Roundtable Discussions on In-
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ted, the patient, as well as other patients, might be deterred from seeking
treatment voluntarily out of fear that they might be committed. 5 Indeed,
studies show that fear of involuntary hospitalization has kept patients from
seeking treatment voluntarily at least once when they thought it was needed. 6
Because coercion diminishes and sometimes even negates choice, a thera-
peutic jurisprudence analysis of coercive treatment should probe the relation-
ship between patient choice and therapeutic outcome. My own theoretical
work on the psychology of choice suggests the existence of considerable psy-
chological value in allowing individuals to exercise choice concerning a wide
variety of matters, including decisions affecting their health. 7 Treatment im-
posed over objection may not work as well. In general, unless people them-
selves see the merits of achieving a particular goal, they often do not pursue it
or do so without the degree of commitment necessary to attain it.
Research in the area of medical treatment generally suggests that when
physicians do not allow patients to participate in treatment decisions and do
not explain treatment to them, patients often do not comply with medical ad-
vice. 8 In general, treatment adherence increases when the patient is given
choice and the ability to participate in the selection of treatment alternatives
and goals.89 Coerced hospitalization and treatment may make it less likely
that the client will be willing to stay connected with the treatment system or
continue to take medication after discharge from the hospital.' ° When patients
exercise choice in matters of treatment, this may bring a degree of commit-
ment, which mobilizes the self-evaluative and self-reinforcing mechanisms that
facilitate goal achievement.91 A patient given the freedom to refuse hospi-
talization or treatment has a corresponding ability to choose to accept it. To
the extent that a patient's agreement to accept a course of treatment recom-
voluntary Interventions, 1 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT MONOGRAPH
1 (1993); Diamond, supra note 11, at 61; see also DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK,
FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE-BOOK 20, 76-79 (1987); Hiday
et al., supra note 8, at 236.
85. LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 62, at 146-47; A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4,
at 14; Monahan et al., supra note 8.
86. Hiday et al., supra note 8, at 236; Lidz et al., supra note 6; Alicia Lucksted & Robert D.
Coursey, Consumer Perceptions of Pressure and Force in Psychiatric Treatments, 46 PSYCHIAT-
RIC SERVICES 146 (1995);
87. WINICK, supra note 3, at 87-91; WiNICK, supra note 14, at 327-44; Winick, supra note
17 at 46-52; Winick, supra note 4; Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competency
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137 (1996); Bruce J.
Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1755-68
(1992).
88. PAUL S. APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT. LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRAC-
TICE 28 (1987); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84, at 20, 76-79; BILL D. MOYERS, HEALING
AND THE MIND 50 (1993); see Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of
Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 341 (1980).
89. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84, at 157, 159, 175; Fredrick H. Kanfer & Lisa
Gaelick, Self-Management Methods, in HELPING PEOPLE CHANGE 334-47 (Fredrick H. Kanfer &
Arnold P. Goldstein eds., 1986).
90. Diamond, supra note 11, at 63.
91. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COG-
NITIVE THEORY 338, 363, 368, 468-69, 470-71, 475-76, 478-79 (1986); SHARON S. BREHM &
JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 301
(1981); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84, at 156-57; Carroll, supra note 2, at 137-38.
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mended by a therapist constitutes an affirmative expression of choice by the
patient in favor of treatment, such choice itself may be therapeutic. Compli-
ance with a treatment regimen may be indispensable to treatment success.
92
Yet compliance may be negatively correlated with coercion.
For many types of mental health treatment in particular, the effectiveness
of treatment "is proportional to the degree of cooperation that is pres-
ent..... ."' Several strands of psychological theory help to explain why pa-
tient choice in treatment decision making is likely to increase treatment effica-
cy. A conscious, voluntary agreement to accept a course of treatment consti-
tutes the setting of a goal. The goal-setting effect, a well-accepted psychologi-
cal principle, posits that the setting of explicit goals is itself a significant fac-
tor in their achievement.94 Indeed, the setting of a goal may be indispensable
to the achievement of change. 9 When patients voluntarily agree to treatment
recommended by a therapist, their agreement constitutes the setting of a goal
that both they and their therapist predict can and will be accomplished. The
setting of a goal that seems achievable sets up expectancies of success that
themselves help to bring about favorable treatment outcomes.' Predictions
and expectations of goal achievement stimulate feelings of self-efficacy in the
patient, which in turn spark action and effort in furtherance of the goal.'
Psychological theory therefore would support the prediction that choice in
matters of treatment and hospitalization will work better than coercion. Self-
determination promotes commitment, intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, and
effective functioning.98 By contrast, if the individual feels coerced to accept
hospitalization or treatment that is not truly desired, motivation to succeed is
likely to be reduced. Indeed, imposing treatment over objection may produce
feelings of resentment and psychological reactance that reduce patient compli-
ance and the likelihood of treatment success.99
A persistent criticism of the mental hospital is that it fosters a form of
92. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84.
93. Council of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy
of Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458, 1459 (1967).
94. Donald J. Campbell, The Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Performance of a
Complex Task, 37 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 23, 23 (1984); Vandra L. Huber, Comparison of Mone-
tary Reinforcers and Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PsYCHOL. REP. 223 (1985); Daniel
S. Kirschenbaum & Randall C. Flanery, Toward a Psychology of Behavioral Contracting, 4 CLINI-
CAL PSYCHOL. REv. 598, 603-09 (1984); Edwin A. Locke et al., Goal Setting and Task Perfor-
mance 1969-80, 90 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 125, 125-31 (1981); James R. Terborg & Howard E. Miller,
Motivation, Behavior, and Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal Setting and Monetary
Incentives, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29, 30-31 (1978).
95. BANDURA, supra note 91, at 469.
96. Id. at 412-13, 467; Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of
Intrinsic Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39, 59 (1980).
97. BANDURA, supra note 91, at 413; Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying
Theory of Behavior Change, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 191 (1977).
98. EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 208-10 (1980); see also
CHARLES A. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT: EXPERIMENTS LINKING BEHAVIOR TO
BELIEF 164-67 (1971) (finding that the most effective method for behavior therapists to obtain
desired results with patients was to give patients the perception that they had freedom and con-
trol).
99. JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966); BREHM &
BREHM, supra note 91, at 300-01.
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institutional dependence that may prevent future adjustment in the communi-
ty."° Mental hospitals too often have conditioned passivity and helplessness
by reinforcing it and by discouraging assertiveness and autonomous behavior.
Mental patients have been infantilized by the treatment they received from
institutional clinicians and staff. Treating patients as incompetent objects of
paternalism may strongly reinforce feelings of incompetency and hopelessness,
destroying intrinsic motivation and feelings of self-efficacy, and even produc-
ing the syndrome of learned helplessness.'"' When decisions that significant-
ly affect the individual, such as those relating to treatment, are made by others
without the individual's participation, the resulting disuse of decision-making
powers may lead to further degeneration of existing capabilities and behav-
iors."'2 Coercion undermines feelings of self-efficacy, which may be essential
to the recovery process.' °3
Treating patients as incompetent to make hospitalization or treatment de-
cisions for themselves, which legal rules that permit coercion rather than re-
quiring voluntary choice reinforce, therefore actually may promote psychologi-
cal dysfunction. Exercising self-determination is a basic human need."°
Studies show that allowing individuals to make decisions for themselves is
intrinsically motivating, whereas denying choice "undermines [their] motiva-
tion, learning, and general sense of organismic well-being.""'5 Indeed, the
stress of losing the opportunity to be self-determining may cause "severe so-
matic malfunction and even death.""'6 For a number of reasons, therefore,
coercion may produce dysfunctional effects and other antitherapeutic conse-
quences.
The above analysis of the psychological value of voluntary choice and the
potentially dysfunctional and countertherapeutic effects of coercion, although
consistent with much clinical experience, is based largely on principles of
psychological theory derived from studies with more "normal" populations.
More research is needed concerning the effects of choice and coercion on
treatment outcome. This is particularly true for individuals suffering from seri-
ous mental illness, such as schizophrenia. A patient in a florid state of schizo-
phrenia, for example, who is disoriented and hallucinating, may not possess a
sufficient degree of competence to make a meaningful choice in favor of treat-
100. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3-74 (1962); CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBULKIN,
MENTAL HosPrrAIzATION: MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 148 (1987); WINICK,
supra note 2, at 35 n.81; Richard Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doctors' Rights: Which Should Take
Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS: VALUES IN CONFLICr 59 (A.
Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982); Edmund G. Doherty, Labeling Effects in Psychi-
atric Hospitalization: A Study of Diverging Patterns of Inpatient Self-Labeling Process, 32 AR-
CHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 562 (1975).
101. ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 53 (1989); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS:
ON DEPRESSION, DEvELOPMENT AND DEATH (1975); HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLI-
CATIONS (Judy Garber & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., 1980); WINICK, supra note 3, at 28-36.
102. Bruce D. Sales & Lynn R. Kahle, Law and Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill, 3 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391, 392 (1980).
103. Diamond, supra note 11, at 61-63; Solomon, supra note 65, at 143.
104. DECI, supra note 98, at 208-09.
105. Id. at 209.
106. Id.
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mentY.' How much understanding and volition are necessary to engage the
psychological mechanisms discussed earlier that can contribute to positive
treatment response? Will choice by such a patient have the effect of producing
the positive expectancies and intrinsic motivation that seem to be related to
favorable treatment outcome? Because theoretical explanations for the rela-
tionship between patient choice and treatment success are based on studies
with significantly less impaired populations, we should ask whether these
findings can be generalized to more impaired patients suffering from at least
severe cases of major mental illness. These questions remain largely unexam-
ined empirically.
Even if many patients suffering from mental illness do not possess suffi-
cient competence to enable their choices to trigger these positive psychological
effects, however, allowing them as great a degree of choice as circumstances
permit may still be therapeutic. The aim of treatment interventions for acutely
psychotic patients is to ameliorate severe symptomatology and restore the
patient to as great a degree of competence as is possible. After a brief period
of medication, for example, most seriously disturbed patients will be suffi-
ciently competent that their choices about future treatment presumably will
have positive therapeutic value. Even if coercion is necessary for a patient
suffering acute symptoms, whose mental illness might prevent rational deci-
sion making about treatment and who otherwise would refuse it, once the pa-
tient can participate in decision making and experience the psychological value
of making treatment choices, the justifications for coercion will cease. Even
when the law allows clinicians to impose treatment coercively, they should
proceed in a manner that is sensitive to the psychological value of allowing
patients to exercise the maximum degree of decision-making authority of
which they are capable. Although there are situations in which coercive treat-
ment may be both legally permissible and therapeutically appropriate, clini-
cians should be aware that too much coercion, and coercion applied after it is
no longer necessary, may be antitherapeutic.
Apart from the psychological value of allowing patients to participate in
treatment decision making to the maximum extent to which they are capable,
legal rules in this area will have an inevitable effect on the therapist-patient
relationship in ways that itself can have either positive or negative therapeutic
consequences."n Will legal rules permitting coercive treatment be more or
less conducive to the therapeutic mission of the therapeutic relationship than
those that require the patients' voluntary informed consent? How should thera-
pists act in regard to the issue of coercive treatment so as to maximize the
professional relationship's potential as a therapeutic agent in its own right?
There is increasing recognition that, at least in psychotherapy, the thera-
peutic relationship itself plays an essential role in producing positive out-
107. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (finding patient with schizophrenia assent-
ing to voluntary admission to hospital incompetent to consent to hospitalization). For a detailed
analysis of Zinermon and of the concept of competence to consent to voluntary hospitalization, see
Winick, supra note 17.
108. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 83-90 (discussing effect of a right to refuse treatment on
the therapeutic relationship); WINICK, supra note 14, at 338-42.
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comes.' The effectiveness of psychotherapy is heavily dependent on the
quality of the therapeutic relationship. " ° The most effective therapeutic rela-
tionships are those in which mutual trust and acceptance are established and
maintained, and in which the patient perceives that the therapist cares about
and is committed to pursuing his or her interests."' Patients improve as a re-
sult of therapeutic relationships that generate the perception that the therapist
is interested in and dedicated to the patient's well-being." To succeed, the
therapist must establish his or her credibility and trustworthiness at an early
time in the relationship. A relationship in which the therapist is permitted to
treat the patient as an object of paternalism whose participation in therapeutic
decision making is unnecessary and undesirable will not inspire such trust and
confidence and therefore may be counterproductive. Indeed, a relationship in
which the therapist ignores the patient's expressed wishes concerning treat-
ment may produce the perception that the therapist is more concerned with the
welfare of the institution than with that of the patient, and is not truly com-
mitted to the patient's best interest. Rather than producing trust and confi-
dence, a coercive approach by the therapist, particularly if not perceived as be-
nevolently motivated, can inspire resentment and resistance.
Therapists, particularly those in public institutions, too often seem to
misperceive the importance of the therapist-patient relationship. Not only do
these therapists thereby forego therapeutic opportunities, but by their actions
they may actually create a harmful division between therapist and patient. Too
often, there is not a real connection or sense of community between therapist
and patient. As a result, no real sense of trust and confidence develops on the
part of the patient. Yet such trust and confidence may be a prerequisite for
engaging those positive attitudes and expectancies that play an important role
in producing a successful treatment response. The therapist-patient relationship
is especially important in the context of psychotherapy, but it also may play a
significant role in all areas of medical practice. "'
109. BREHM & BREHI, supra note 91, at 151-55, 300-01; WEXLER & WiNiCK, supra note 62,
at 173; WINICK, supra note 3, at 83; Deci & Ryan, supra note 96, at 70; Michael L. Lambert et
al., The Effectiveness of Psychotherapy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR
CHANGE (Sol E. Garfield & Allen E. Bergin eds., 1986) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHER-
APY].
110. WINICK, supra note 3, at 83.
111. See supra note 107.
112. BREHM & BREHM, supra note 91, at 151-52, 300-02; WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 62,
at 173; Larry E. Beutler et al., Therapist Variables in Psychotherapy Process and Outcome, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, supra note 109, at 280-81; David E. Orlinsky & Kenneth I.
Howard, Process and'Outcome in Psychotherapy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, supra note
109, at 311.
113. NORMAN COUSINS, HEALTH FIRST: THE BIOLOGY OF HOPE AND THE HEALING POWER
OF THE HuMAN SPIRIT (1990); Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 88, at 341; see also Stephen. A.
Eraker & Pam Polistser, How Decisions are Reached: Physician & Patient, 97 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 262 (1982); Hughes & Larson, supra note 77, at 302; Edward J. Speedling & David N.
Rose, Building an Effective Doctor-Patient Relationship: From Patient Satisfaction to Patient
Participation, 21 Soc. SQ. MED. 115 (1985). A 1983 longitudinal study demonstrated a relation-
ship between patients' sense of personal control over their health, fostered by the doctor-patient
relationship that encouraged patient participation, that correlated with positive treatment outcomes.
Melvin Seeman & Teresa E. Seeman, Health Behavior and Personal Autonomy: A Longitudinal
Study of the Sense of Control in Illness, 24 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 144, 144 (1983). Patients
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Legal rules that broadly authorize coercive treatment will shape the thera-
pist-patient relationship quite differently from those that generally require vol-
untary and informed consent. Legal rules requiring voluntariness will inevita-
bly increase the likelihood that therapists will respect the dignity and autono-
my of their patients, and recognize their essential role in the therapeutic pro-
cess. Legal rules emphasizing voluntariness compared to those that broadly
authorize coercion can reshape the therapists' role so as to increase the poten-
tial for a true therapeutic alliance in which therapists treat their patients as
persons."' The result can be more patient trust, confidence, and participation
in decision making in ways that can cause patients to internalize treatment
goals. A therapeutic relationship that stresses voluntariness--one in which the
patient sees the therapist as his agent, assisting him to accomplish goals that
the two of them define-rather than as a paternalistic director of the process
or as the agent of the institution in which the patient is held-is more likely to
create the atmosphere of trust and openness that is necessary for the therapeu-
tic relationship to bring about healing and change.
A legal system in which the therapist needs the informed and voluntary
consent of the patient is thus more conducive to allowing the relationship itself
to realize its potential as a therapeutic agent. An informed consent require-
ment, by encouraging a therapist-patient dialogue, can create a significant
therapeutic opportunity. Discussion and negotiation about a patient's objections
to treatment can provide an important context for probing conscious and un-
conscious resistance, for forming a positive transference, and for earning the
patient's trust and confidence."5
These considerations favoring therapeutic relationships based on
voluntariness rather than coercion obviously have special force in the context
of verbal psychotherapy." 6 They also seem applicable, however, in the con-
text of behavior therapy, many of the techniques of which, in order to succeed,
require patient cooperation and involvement as well as trust and confidence in
the therapist. "' Moreover, although to a considerably lesser extent, these
considerations may apply as well even in the context of administration of
psychotropic medication."' Choosing the appropriate medication, for exam-
ple, and maximizing the potential that it will be used appropriately, will often
require communication with the patient and a high degree of cooperation." 9
In addition, psychotropic drugs are not administered in isolation, but are part
of an integrated treatment program that involves verbal psychotherapy as well
as psychosocial therapy approaches. Even if psychotropic medication would be
effective in reducing severe symptomatology when administered coercively,
with "a low sense of control [are] significantly associated with (1) less self-initiated preventive
care; (2) less optimism concerning the efficacy of early trealment; (3) poorer self-rated health; and
(4) more illness episodes, more bed confinement and greater dependence upon the physician." Id.
at 152.
114. PAuL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1970).
115. WtNICK, supra note 3, at 85-88.
116. See WINocK, supra note 14, at 29-40 (discussing psychotherapy).
117. See id. at 41-59 (discussing behavior therapy).
118. See id. at 61-85 (discussing psychotropic medication).
119. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 88, at 341.
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the verbal therapy that should follow the reduction in symptoms would seem
to be more effective to the extent that the individual chooses it voluntarily.
Whatever the treatment approach, therefore, allowing the patient to exercise
choice will predictably enrich and improve the quality of the treatment deci-
sion-making process and the treatment program."' Successful treatment plan-
ning and implementation require a thorough analysis of the patient's problems,
of the social context that often perpetuates them. and of the patient's strengths
and weaknesses. Patient trust, cooperation, and full and open communication
are essential if the therapist is to obtain this information from the patient.
For several reasons, therefore, involuntary hospitalization and coercively
imposed treatment may have antitherapeutic effects. Voluntary approaches in
general would seem more conducive to long-range treatment success and to
greater patient satisfaction. Although empirical investigation is needed to fur-
ther explore the relationship between coercion and treatment outcome, a con-
siderable body of theoretical work supports much clinical experience suggest-
ing that coercion does not work as well as treatment undertaken voluntarily.
VII. APPLYING THE LAW THERAPEUTICALLY IN COERCIVE CONTEXTS
Although there undoubtedly are situations in which a degree of coercion is
both therapeutically appropriate and legally acceptable, clinicians should use
coercion sparingly and involve the patient in the decision-making process to
the fullest extent possible. Even when coercion is necessary, clinicians should
seek to apply it in ways that minimize the patient's perception of coercion. In
this respect, the research on coercion performed under the auspices of the
MacArthur Research Network for Mental Health and the Law described earlier
has special significance.'.
Although empirical research has not as yet extensively probed the rela-
tionship between the perception of coercion and treatment outcome, the theo-
retical analysis contained in this article strongly suggests that patients who feel
coerced do not respond as well as those who do not feel coerced. Therefore,
clinicians who find it necessary to impose treatment coercively should heed
the admonitions of the MacArthur research and interact with their patients in
ways that minimize patients' subjective perceptions of coercion even though,
in an objective sense, coercion is being applied The MacArthur research sug-
gests that positive approaches such as persuasion be used as a strategy of
choice to attempt to convince people to accept treatment. 2 Negative ap-
proaches such as threats should be used "only as a last resort to secure needed
care. '"'2 Furthermore, in all circumstances (but especially when negative
pressure has been used), patients should be given a sense of inclusion in the
120. See CousINs, supra note 113, at 55 ("[F]ull communication between the patient and phy-
sician is indispensable not just in arriving at an accurate diagnosis but in devising an effective
strategy for treatment."); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCrOR AND PATIENT 102-03 (1984)
(analyzing the informed consent doctrine as furthering the doctor-patient relationship).
121. See supra Part VI.
122. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 26.
123. Id.
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hospital admission and treatment decision making processes and afforded as
much process--"voice" and "validation"--as possible."4 Clinicians should
convey to their patients the notion that they are acting out of concern for their
well-being. They should treat their patients fairly, with respect and without
deception, give them an opportunity to tell their side of the story, and serious-
ly consider their views in the hospitalization and treatment decision-making
processes.'" Clinicians finding it necessary to impose treatment coercively
who heed these admonitions can thereby minimize the risk that coercion will
have antitherapeutic effects.
IX. CONCLUSION
Coercion may sometimes be necessary, particularly in the treatment of
severely ill patients. However, in light of the potential antitherapeutic conse-
quences of coercion, clinicians should resort to it only when truly necessary
and should involve the patient in the hospital admission and treatment deci-
sion-making processes to the greatest extent possible. As soon as coerced
treatment has had the hoped-for effects, the clinician should cede to the patient
increasing measures of treatment decision-making autonomy. Whenever possi-
ble, clinicians should use persuasion, education, negotiation, and inducement in
preference to coercion, threats, negative pressure, and deception. Even when
coercion is deemed necessary, clinicians should act toward their patients in
ways that minimize the perception of coercion and maximize the patient's
sense of voice and inclusion and the patient's appreciation that the treatment
imposed is benevolently motivated and administered in good faith.
While more research is needed on the issue of the effectiveness of coer-
cive treatment, we know enough to reshape clinical practice in the imposition
of involuntary hospitalization and treatment to reduce coercion's
antitherapeutic consequences. In defining "coercion" for legal purposes, and in
specifying the procedural due process protections that must be accorded before
coercion may be applied, the law also should take these findings into account.
The civil commitment hearing and hearings relating to involuntary treatment,
for example, should be reshaped to foster patient perceptions that involuntary
hospitalization or treatment is being proposed by clinicians for benevolent rea-
sons and to provide the patient with a sense of "voice" and participation.'26
Involuntary hospitalization and treatment can be structured and implemented in
ways that permit many patients to "feel like they have voice and validation"
and to "avoid force even in the absence of choice.""' Even when hearings
may not be required as a matter of procedural due process, there may be ther-
apeutic value in providing them as a means of increasing patient perception of
choice and participation in treatment decision making, with likely positive
therapeutic effect.'28 "The challenge is to try to extend to all patients at the
124. Id. at 27.
125. Id.
126. See Tyler, supra note 77.
127. Hiday et al., supra note 8, at 235.
128. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (stating that one of "the central
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time of their admission [or involuntary treatment] a demonstration in word and
action that they are persons with opinions, desires, rights and dignity, and not
just mental patients in an acute crisis." 29 Even when a hearing seems point-
less because the criteria for involuntary hospitalization or treatment seem
clearly met, the process values of providing patients with "voice", and their
likely impact on therapeutic response, alone argue for affording the patient a
hearing.' 3
Apart from legal rules governing coercion and the application of coercive
treatment and hospitalization, the codes of professional ethics of clinicians
engaging in the treatment process should also reflect these insights. Because
such professional ethics are based on principles of beneficence and
nonmalfeasance,' 3 ' clinicians should recognize that the way they act in ap-
plying the authority that the law may give them has an inevitable impact on
the health and welfare of their patients and the clinical professions should
develop appropriate guidelines in this area.
Legal rules governing coercion should protect individual autonomy re-
garding matters that vitally affect the individual, including health care decision
making. Individual autonomy is at the root of our political and philosophical
traditions,"2 but in addition, the psychological value of self-determination
should help to shape law and policy in this area."' Although autonomy and
therapeutic values may at times conflict, they often will converge. To achieve
the full promise of individual autonomy, legal rules and clinical practices
relating to involuntary hospitalization and coercive mental health treatment
thus should reflect a therapeutic jurisprudence orientation.
concerns of procedural due process" is "the promotion of participation and dialogue by two affect-
ed individuals in the decision making process"); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 636 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); JERRY L. MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80 (1985) (discussing "the claim that the digni-
ty and self-respect of the individual can be protected only through processes of government in
which there is meaningful participation by affected interests"); John J. Ensminger & Thomas D.
Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential,
6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978).
129. Hiday et al., supra note 8, at 225.
130. See Tyler, supra note 77 (discussing the therapeutic value of civil commitment hearings);
Jack Susman, Resolving Hospital Conflicts: A Study on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 22 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 107 (1994). Even when the result of the hearing does not appear to reflect what the
individual had to say, the opportunity for voice alone may have therapeutic value. See Tyler,
supra note 77, at 440 & nn.64-65.
131. TOM L. BEAucHAMp & JAMS F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 106
(3d ed. 1989); ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS
28 (2d ed. 1982); RuTH FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 10 (1986); WNICK, supra note 14, at 400.
132. Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 ViL. L. REV.
1705, 1707-55 (1992).
133. See id. at 1755-68.
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THE CONTINUUM OF COERCION: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF
MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS
ROBERT D. MILLER*
One dictionary defines coercion as the use of restraint, hindrance, compul-
sion, or force, but does not differentiate between internal and external coer-
cion.' Furthermore, this definition does not resolve the differences between
critics from the legal and mental health communities, the extreme (and typical-
ly most vocal) members of which tend to simplify the issues to the point that
no meaningful dialogue is possible.
Coercion does not exist in a vacuum; it exists on a continuum upon which
bright lines are arbitrarily placed to delineate acceptable uses of physical or
psychological force. The perception of coercion by the various parties involved
in the mental health and legal systems is similar to the fable of the elephant
and the blind men: one's concept of coercion depends on one's perspective.
This article discusses coercion in the context of the public system of
mental health care. While most law review articles limit their discussion of
coercion to external physical control, this article considers both external and
internal coercion from various sources as it affects all the actors in the system,
and argues that all aspects of coercion must be considered before appropriate
policy decisions can be made.
The introduction discusses the traditional legal rights driven concept of
coercion. The second part discusses coercion experienced by mentally disor-
dered persons, beginning with external clinical coercion, the most common
subject of concern. A discussion follows of external legal coercion on patients
(Part Ill), and then a discussion of external social coercion on patients (Part
IV). The last section addressing patient issues discusses internal coercion
experienced by mental patients (Part V).
The sixth part explores coercion of mental health professionals, a subject
virtually ignored, at least in those terms, in the literature. The categories listed
are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that considerable overlap exists among
them. Nevertheless, I believe that teasing them apart is essential if we are to
develop a more comprehensive understanding of those overlaps, and of the
* Professor of Psychiatry and Director, Program for Forensic Psychiatry, University of
Colorado Health Sciences Center, Lecturer in Law, University of Denver College of Law; Director
of Research & Education, Institute for Forensic Psychiatry of the Colorado Mental Health Institute
at Pueblo. B.S., Davidson College, 1964; Ph.D., Duke University, 1972; M.D., Duke University,
1973.
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(often unintended) effects of pressures brought to bear on all the actors in the
mental health system. This article attempts to do so, albeit briefly, in Part VII.
I. INTRODUCTION
This discussion begins with the assumption that ours is a nation founded
on principles of individual liberty and autonomy, with a Constitution and laws
crafted to protect those individual legal rights from infringement by govern-
ment. As Stephen Morse states, courts today demonstrate "a preference for
liberty,"2 but the problem comes in defining "liberty." John Stuart Mill's vir-
tual anthem for civil libertarians, if taken at face value, seems to say it all.
Mhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant.3
But in the next paragraph Mill continues:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties ....
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others
must be protected from their own actions as well as against external
injury."
Another passage often cited in support of the libertarian position with little
recognition of the necessary correlation between rights and competence is
Benjamin Cardozo's 1914 decision in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital:5 "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body .... ."
Coercion, and its perceived inverse, liberty, are not absolutes to be di-
vined through abstract ideological dialogues but, rather, concepts that lack
meaning out of context. Procedures evaluated in isolation reveal little about
their potential as real alternatives in any given person's situation, taking all
factors into account. These factors include prevailing cultural, social, and
economic forces, in which homelessness, abuse, and suicide are very real
possibilities.
Arguably the most important liberty speech in this nation's history was
Patrick Henry's exhortation to the Virginia Assembly in 1775 to "[g]ive me
liberty or give me death!" Fewer may know, though, that as Henry spoke
those words, his mentally disordered wife was chained in his attic, as was the
prevailing custom in Revolutionary America.! Similarly, while Abraham Lin-
2. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54, 55 (1982).
3. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapapport ed., 1978) (1859).
4. Id.
5. 211 N.Y. 125 (1914).
6. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129 (emphasis added).
7. See HENRY MAYER, A SON OF THUNDER: PATRICK HENRY AND THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 245 (1991).
8. Id. at 171.
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coin is hailed as the signer of the Emancipation Proclamation, few remember
that after his death, Lincoln's son, Robert, had Mary Todd Lincoln committed
in a proceeding which included the testimony of two doctors who had never
met the woman.9
Today we do not routinely chain mentally disordered persons in attics:
involuntary civil commitment procedures entail complex economic and legal
restrictions which have significantly changed the number and character of
mentally disordered persons hospitalized or treated against their professed
wishes.' o Libertarians widely hail legal protections as victories for the rights
of the mentally disordered, but are they victories in a larger sense? The in-
creasing legalization of the way society deals with the mentally disordered
may appear to be in conflict with the clinical needs of the patient.
The law governing the mentally disordered, both civil and criminal (and
the distinction between the two is becoming increasingly blurred"), is based
on constitutional theories and implemented by attorneys trained in the criminal
defense model. 2 The criminal justice model is a poor fit for cases involving
mentally disordered persons. 3 Criminal defense attorneys are trained to rep-
resent the express wishes of their clients, and not to second guess those wishes
unless they appear so irrational that competency to proceed must be ques-
tioned. Attorneys need not consider the consequences of their actions, either
for their clients or for others. Their roles are clearly defined as adversarial,
rather than as acting in the best interests of their clients.
This adversarial role of the criminal defense attorney has been crafted
over centuries, but is based on several assumptions that are not always correct,
even when applied to defendants who are not mentally disordered. First, the
criminal defense model assumes that defendants will wish to avoid punishment
for their actions. 4 More generally, the adversarial system assumes the partici-
pation of opposing attorneys, each vigorously arguing their positions, with
"justice" the goal of the process.
While criminal prosecutions generally satisfy these assumptions, they
rarely apply in civil cases involving mentally disordered persons. Most crimi-
nal defendants do in fact want to "get off," but the motivations of mentally
disordered persons are much more complex. Clinicians are trained to look for
every motivation in their patients, while attorneys are not. In addition, the
9. Carol D. Rasnic, America's First Woman Lawyer: The Biography of Myra Bradwell, 4
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 236-37 (1995) (book review).
10. See generally ROBERT D. MILLER, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTAL-
LY ILL IN THE POST-REFORM ERA (1987).
11. See infra Part HI.C.
12. Few law schools have courses in mental health law, and most of the courses that do exist
are taught by legal professionals who lack any direct experience in the provision of mental health
care.
13. ALAN A. STONE, Psychiatric Abuse and Legal Reform: Two Ways to Make a Bad Situa-
tion Worse, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALrrY 133 (1984).
14. See generally Kenneth Appelbaum, Criminal Defendants Who Desire Punishment, 18
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 385 (1990); Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, Evalu-
ation of Competency to Stand Trial in Defendants Who Do Not Want to Be Defended Against the
Crimes Charged, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHmATRY & L. 371 (1987).
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criminal defense attorney model ignores the consequences of a "successful"
defense to persons other than the defendant, and also ignores the problems
facing an acquitted defendant. This narrow scope of representation is not a
luxury afforded clinicians. The criminal justice system, while vigorously pro-
tecting client privilege to ensure "justice," is only minimally concerned with
continuity of care, while mental health professionals must ensure that treat-
ment continues once a patient leaves a treatment facility. 5 Clinicians, particu-
larly in inpatient settings, must provide a safe and therapeutic environment for
all their patients, and cannot ignore the effects of a given patient's behavior on
other patients.
There are other significant differences in the ways in which legal and
clinical professionals approach problematic situations. Since constitutional law
typically deals with principles rather than individuals, it is often a crude in-
strument with which to deal with individual mentally disordered persons. The
law frequently abolishes a procedure or system, but rarely will the law attempt
the difficult task of modifying or establishing new and more effective systems.
In addition, legal thinking and decision-making are much more influenced by
"horror stories;"" legal arguments tend to be ideological while clinicians tend
to be concerned with all the effects of actions, and to rely more on scientific
data than on anecdotal evidence. 7 A further distinction, particularly between
legal and clinical writing, is that authors in the legal literature tend to criticize
by comparing the practices of systems they do not like with the principles of
systems of which they approve. 8
The following discussions attempt to illuminate the different sources of
coercion, types of coercion, and effects of coercion, so that the legal and clini-
cal communities can better see how to collaborate and improve the system.
II. EXTERNAL CLINICAL COERCION EXPERIENCED BY THE MENTALLY
DISORDERED
A. Hospitalization
The most often discussed aspect of the coercion of mentally disordered
persons is that of external coercion by mental health professionals. Despite the
fact that clinicians who hospitalize or treat mentally disordered persons against
their express wishes do so under color of authorizing statutes,"9 and the fact
15. See generally STONE, supra note 13; see also Leona L. Bachrach, Continuity of Care for
Chronic Mental Patients: A Conceptual Analysis, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1449 (1981); Nicholas
Stratas et al., The Future of the State Mental Hospital: Developing a Unified System of Care, 28
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 598 (1977).
16. For a collection of "horror stories," see generally BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSY-
CmATRY (1972); JONAS B. ROBrrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1980); and Robert
Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 461 (1977).
17. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
18. See STONE, supra note 13.
19. For a detailed (if now somewhat out-of-date) review of the provisions of state civil com-
mitment statutes, see SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL Er AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d
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that most states empower law enforcement officers to initiate involuntary
hospitalization without clinical involvement, many still perceive the process as
a clinical one. Involuntary hospitalization or treatment takes place in clinical
facilities, and judicial authority is delegated to clinicians to carry out court
orders.
The perception of commitment as a primarily clinical function is valid.
Clinicians, for all practical purposes, had the sole authority for confining and
treating mentally disordered persons until the 1970s, when courts assumed
control of the process2 0 Despite the provision of most of the protections and
procedures of the criminal justice system, in practice trial court judges contin-
ue to defer to clinical judgment in many cases.2' Courts serve as gatekeepers
for involuntary commitments of mentally disordered persons in both civil and
criminal systems, but once they have determined that a person meets the com-
mitment criteria, judges relinquish day-to-day control over the conditions faced
by patients to the treating clinicians.
Historically, clinicians paid relatively little attention to the effects of clini-
cal coercion, other than to acknowledge that an adversarial relationship be-
tween clinicians and patients interfered with the trust necessary for successful
psychotherapy.' More recently, however, the MacArthur Foundation has
sponsored a series of studies on patients' perceptions of the coerciveness of
their hospitalizations.23 At a number of sites, researchers asked newly admit-
ted patients a series of questions about their experiences. Not surprisingly,
involuntary patients were more likely to feel coerced, but a significant number
of legally voluntary patients expressed similar feelings.2" A major and some-
what surprising conclusion of the studies was that many of the study subjects
expressed more concern with their perceived treatment than with the outcome
ed. 1985).
20. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to
its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the
state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dan-
gerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.
Id.; see also MILLER, supra note 10.
21. In one case in which I testified, the trial judge opined, on the record, that competency to
proceed was a clinical decision, and became upset that I wouldn't answer the difficult question in
that case for him.
22. See generally WIuxoRD OvERHoLsER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); Marc
Amaya & W. V. Burlingame, Judicial Review of Psychiatric Admissions: The Clinical Impact on
Child and Adolescent Inpatients, 20 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 761 (1981); Henry
Davidson, Mental Hospitals and the Civil Liberties Dilemma, 51 MEN. HYGIENE 371 (1966).
23. See generally Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation and Good Faith: The Mo-
rality of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sd. & L. 295 (1993); Steven K.
Hoge et al., Patient, Family, and Staff Perceptions of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: An
Exploratory Study, 11 BEHAV. SI. & L. 281 (1993); Charles W. Lidz et al., Coercive Interactions
in a Psychiatry Emergency Room, I I BEHAV. Sd. & L. 269 (1993); Charles Lidz et al., Perceived
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1034 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental
Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion to
Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Aggressive Treatment in the Community,
in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH
LAW (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996).
24. See supra note 23.
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of the commitment proceedings.' The central thesis of the procedural justice
approach, as demonstrated in the studies reported, is that participants in formal
decision-making processes are often more concerned with the perceived fair-
ness of the processes than with the results. The more active a part-they are
permitted to play in the decision making, the more satisfied participants are
with the outcome.
One pr.lm .. , g...li,,, h- most of these studies is that they
involved newly admitted patients who presumably still suffered from acute and
untreated mental disorders. Positive perceptions may have resulted, in part,
from what Alan Stone has called the "thank-you" theory of treatment. Accord-
ing to Stone, patients, once treated (even against their stated wishes), acknowl-
edge that they had been sick, and thank those who had treated them.2 Stone
based his theory on clinical experience, but others-both clinicians and sociol-
ogists-have tested it, and found that the great majority of successfully treated
patients do in fact agree that involuntary hospitalization and treatment best
served their interests.' The majority of patients who did not respond well to
treatment' continued to feel negatively about their experiences.'
Voluntary hospitalization appears to be the consensus choice to avoid
coercive hospitalizations, but a number of authors argue that to describe any
such hospitalization as "voluntary" is at best misleading and, at worst, fraud.
For instance, Reed and Lewis describe the situation that arose in Chicago's
state hospitals when staff felt pressured to avoid involuntary commitment to
ensure rapid patient turnover.' In 1985, involuntary admissions to four area
hospitals constituted only one percent of total admissions, in part because staff
usually persuade patients admitted involuntarily to sign in voluntarily before
their court hearings.3
25. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUsTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evalu-
ations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 953 (1990); E.
Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Con-
cerns in Fairness Judgments, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYCHOLOGY 952 (1990); Tom Tyler,
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433 (1992).
26. See generally ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
(1975).
27. Sociologist Weinstein reviewed 18 quantitative studies of retrospective patient satisfac-
tion with treatment. A rather large majority of patients voiced favorable attitudes toward mental
hospitals in general as well as their own institution, and claimed that they had benefitted from
treatment. See generally Raymond Weinstein, Patient Attitudes Toward Mental Hospitalization: A
Review of Quantitative Research, 20 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAV. 237 (1979). Subsequent au-
thors have confirmed these findings. See, e.g., Virginia Aldige Hiday, Coercion in Civil Commit-
ment: Processes, Preferences, and Outcome, 15 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359 (1992); Thomas
Kalman, An Overview of Patient Satisfaction with Psychiatric Treatment, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNI-
TY PSYCHIATRY 48 (1983); J. Toews et al., Patients' Reactions to Their Commitment, 26 CANA-
DIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 251, (1981).
28. Bad responses typically involved treatment with psychiatric medications, which can be
effectively administered involuntarily.
29. See Hiday, supra note 27.
30. See generally Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission
in Chicago's State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137 (1990).
31. Id. at 143. Staff use persuasion/coercion (threatening commitment, despite statutory pro-
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Anne Rogers reports that "voluntary" patients in England can be retained
after requesting discharge if staff file commitment petitions, with the result
that nearly half the patients who signed in voluntarily stated that they did not
feel that their admissions were truly voluntary.32 While some patients report-
ed that they felt internally coerced by their disorders, others said that they
signed in "voluntarily" after being threatened with commitment, and/or were
threatened with commitment if they tried to sign out before the staff thought
that they were ready. Gilboy and Schmidt report that in a majority of cases
studied, voluntary admission was used to hospitalize persons already in some
type of official custody. They argued that voluntary procedures were used
primarily for the convenience of the professionals, and enforced by threats of
commitment. Because of staffing shortages, the admitting clinician did not
have time to go through the required procedures for involuntary admission for
all patients.3 The most extreme view is that of Thomas Szasz, who argues
simply that hospitalization is not voluntary when patients are forced to sign in
under threat of commitment, or when they are not free to leave the hospital on
demand.34
While these critics argue that legally voluntary hospitalizations are in
reality coerced, they do not consider the inverse-that some legally involun-
tary admissions may in fact be voluntary: some patients have found that get-
ting themselves committed presents advantages. Many hospitals have been
forced to reduce the rate of voluntary admissions, and the lengths of stay for
those patients admitted voluntarily, frequently for purely economic reasons.
Indeed, a little-noted result of dangerousness criteria and reductions in volun-
tary admissions is that some patients now have to deliberately do something
dangerous in order to be hospitalized.33 If patients commit "dangerous" acts
that satisfy the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, they are assured admis-
sion, and get free transportation to the hospital and longer stays. Sometimes
the motivation to get oneself committed is unconscious; at other times it is
quite conscious.36 In addition, some patients recognize their need for hospital-
hibitions against such coercion); bartering (promising privileges for signatures), and stalling (ask-
ing the court for continuances to stall so that persuasion, coercion, and bartering have longer time
to work-sometimes long enough so that the patient can be discharged). "Voluntary" patients can
be retained if they request discharge by filing commitment petitions.
32. See generally Anne Rogers, Coercion and "Voluntary" Admission: An Examination of
Psychiatric Patient Views, 11 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 259 (1993).
33. See generally Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Thomas Szasz, Voluntary Mental Hospitalization: An Unacknowledged Practice
of Medical Fraud, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 277 (1972).
35. See generally John Monahan et al., supra note 23. In my experience as an admitting
clinician, I have seen patients commit crimes deliberately in order to gain hospital admission. One
patient, realizing that her borderline personality disorder was deteriorating, arranged for herself to
be committed to prevent her from harming herself and to ensure effective treatment. Her ad-
versarial attorney argued with her to "fight" her commitment at her hearing, but (fortunately, from
the clinical from the clinical standpoint) she was still in sufficient control to reject that advice.
Such situations have been likened to "Ulysses contracts." See generally Robert Miller, Voluntary
"Involuntary" Commitment: The Briar Patch Syndrome, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
305 (1980).
36. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35. I have received calls from mentally disordered persons
asking what crimes they should commit in order to be hospitalized.
1997] 1175
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ization, but also realize that if their conditions deteriorate, they are likely to
demand discharge and may not meet the state's criteria for commitment. I
have had patients arrange for involuntary hospitalization as a "Ulysses con-
tract,"37 to ensure that they receive the required treatment. Finally, some per-
sons will use hospitalization to avoid criminal arrest, or to build a case for
mitigation if they are arrested.
B. Seclusion and Restraint
Another major form of external coercion on mentally disordered persons
involves seclusion and restraint. Seclusion (also called "isolation") is the re-
moval of a patient from the general milieu on a ward, into a single room, with
or without a locked door. Restraint is physical restriction of movement; it is
most commonly used to restrain limbs on a specially designed bed ("four-
point" or "five-point" restraint), but can also be used to restrain a person to a
chair, or to limit movement of arms or legs ("ambulatory restraint').
The American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Seclusion and
Restraint lists three indications for using seclusion and restraint together. 1) to
prevent imminent harm to the patient or other persons where other means of
control are not effective or appropriate; 2) to prevent serious disruption of the
treatment program or significant damage to the physical environment; and 3)
to assist in treatment as part of ongoing behavior therapy. Two additional
indications exist for seclusion alone: 1) to decrease the stimulation a patient
receives; and 2) to comply with a patient's request.3s Once a patient's behav-
ior is well known to staff, restraint and/or seclusion may be used to prevent
loss of control, rather than waiting until the patient has become actively ag-
gressive.39 The Task Force cautions that seclusion should not be used when
medical conditions exist that require close monitoring, organic conditions exist
that would be exacerbated by sensory deprivation, or merely for the conve-
nience of staff.' Full (four- or five-point) restraint should not be used with-
out seclusion, to protect a patient's dignity and safety.
4'
Seclusion and restraint may also be used as part of a carefully designed
individualized treatment plan, to weaken or eliminate inappropriate aggressive
37. When Ulysses sailed past the Sirens, whose songs no man could resist, he had his men
bind him to the mast so that he could not be enticed. See THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 186 (Rich-
mond Lattimore trans., 1965). The name "Ulysses contract" has come to refer to situations in
which persons subject themselves to coercion in advance, to prevent themselves from acting
against their interests.
38. Thomas Gutheil & Kenneth Tardiff, Indications and Contraindications for Seclusion and
Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 12 (Kenneth Tardiff ed.,
1984).
39. Patients often recognize at some level that they are out of control and need to have ex-
ternal controls administered, but because of their disorders are unable to articulate those realiza-
tions. One patient that I treated kept destroying curtains in the ward day room. After each episode,
the staff secluded and briefly restrained him, which quickly calmed him down. When this pattern
became apparent, I suggested to the patient that he felt out of control at those times. He readily
agreed, and thereafter was able to ask to be secluded briefly when those feelings came on him
again.




behaviors.4 ' They are used in conjunction with reinforcing strategies for ap-
propriate behaviors, and along a continuum of less restrictive approaches.
Clinicians refer to this as "time out" rather than seclusion. In addition, physi-
cal restraint is used to prevent debilitated patients from harming themselves,
by falling out of beds or chairs, for instance. Such physical support should not
be confused with the use of restraints for behavioral control.
Since the character of the inpatient populations (particularly in public
hospitals) has changed with the dangerousness criteria,43 the commitment pro-
cess now selects for dangerous persons. Therefore a higher proportion of hos-
pitalized patients is likely to be aggressive or out of control, and thus require
some type of physical restraint. Although clinicians continue to feel that seclu-
sion is necessary, both for physical control and as part of treatment, several
studies indicate that the majority of patients who have been secluded and/or
restrained did not feel that the experience was beneficial." Those studies
must be evaluated in light of the fact that many committed patients deny ill-
ness and, thus, would also deny the need for restrictions to prevent behavior
caused by those illnesses.
Critics of the use of seclusion and restraint argue that they are used chief-
ly for the convenience of the staff or to intimidate patients. It has been dem-
onstrated '5 that when staffing is increased to more adequate levels, when staff
are given appropriate training in behavioral techniques,' and when facility
policies and external regulations are made stricter,' the use of seclusion and
restraint decreases, generally without a concomitant increase in aggression or
other behavioral problems. The fact that seclusion and restraint can (and cer-
tainly have been) abused does not mean, however, that they are not appropri-
ate when less restrictive techniques have failed. Again, one must evaluate their
use in the context of the realistic alternatives. For example, ambulatory re-
straints are still restrictive and may reduce the wearer's sense of dignity,'
42. See Robert P. Liberman & Stephen E. Wong, Behavior Analysis and Therapy Procedures
Related to Seclusion and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 35
(Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1984).
43. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Renee Binder & Susan McCoy, A Study of Patients' Attitudes Toward
Placement in Seclusion, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1052 (1983); Kathleen Hammill et
al., Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patient Views About Seclusion, 50 1. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 174
(1989); Robert Plutchik et al., Toward a Rationale for the Seclusion Process, 166 1. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 571 (1978); Stanley Soliday, A Comparison of Patient and Staff Attitudes To-
ward Seclusion, 173 J. NERvOus & MENTAL DISEASE 282 (1985); Harriet Wadeson & William
Carpenter, Impact of the Seclusion Room Experience, 163 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 318
(1976).
When allowed to speak directly, ex-patients have been particularly negative about having
been secluded. See, e.g., Judi Chamberlain, An Ex-Patient's Response to Soliday, 173 J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 288 (1985).
45. See Paul H. Soloff, Historical Notes on Seclusion and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC
USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 5 (Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1984).
46. See Gary Maier et al., A Comprehensive Model for Understanding and Managing Ag-
gressive Inpatients, 2 AM. J. CONTINUING EDuC. NURSING 89 (1987).
47. See, e.g., STATE OF CoLo. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERv., RULES AND REGULATIONS NOS.
108, 109 (setting forth several pages of restrictions on the use of seclusion and restraint).
48. Ambulatory restraints consist of belts attached with adjustable length leather straps lead-
ing to padded wrist cuffs. Ankle hobbles can also be used. See, e.g., Gregory Van Rybroek et al.,
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but they certainly permit more freedom and autonomy than seclusions and
four-point restraints.
C. Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medications
A third treatment approach for both voluntary and committed patients
involves the use of psychotropic medications. Before the civil rights reforms
of the late 1960s and 1970s, involuntarily hospitalized patients had no say
about their treatment with medications. As one federal judge said,
"Nonconsensual treatment is what commitment is all about." Before the
reforms, committed psychiatric patients automatically lost virtually all their
civil rights. They could not marry, divorce, enter into contracts, vote, or make
treatment decisions. 5 In the 1970s, however, a series of courts began to rec-
ognize that a decision that patients met criteria for involuntary hospitalization
(i.e., lacked competency to make decisions about hospitalization) did not also
determine that they lacked competency to make decisions about treatment in
the hospital.5
While patients already had, at least in theory, a right to refuse nonpsy-
chiatric medications, with the reforms, courts identified a qualified right for
involuntarily hospitalized patients to refuse psychiatric medications as well.
Courts differed on the constitutional basis for the right, but they agreed that
patients competent to make treatment decisions could not be forced to take
psychotropic medication.52 A few states53 acknowledge patients' rights to re-
fuse antipsychotic medication, but permit clinicians to determine patients'
competency.
Although these court decisions and the legislative enactments that codified
them would appear to provide significant protections for involuntary patients
(voluntary patients have an absolute right to refuse treatment, absent an emer-
gency54), in practice judges are extremely reluctant to second guess
Preventive Aggression Devices (PADS): Ambulatory Restraints as an Alternative to Seclusion, 48
J. CLINicAL PsYCHIATRY 401 (1987). In fact, in the author's experience some patients wear ambu-
latory restraints as badges of how "tough" they are.
49. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wisc. 1985) (Shabaz, J.).
50. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1198-99 nn.19-28 (1974).
51. In two early cases, Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D. NJ. 1978), and Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), federal district court judges found that competent
patients had a constitutional right to give informed consent before being treated with ant'psychotic
medications, although they differed on the constitutional bases for the new right, and on the
procedures required to override refusal. See Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, "Rotting with
Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric
Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979).
52. With the exception of the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct.
1028 (1990), the overwhelming majority of state and lower federal courts have found a constitu-
tional right for competent patients to refuse nonemergent treatment. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at
1368. The Supreme Court, in a case involving mentally disordered prison inmates, however, held
that even competent inmates could be involuntarily medicated for their own good or for the secu-
rity needs of the prison, as long as professional judgment had been exercised (i.e., that they had
been prescribed by a physician). Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
53. See Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1131;
Large v. Superior Ct., 714 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1986).
54. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), which not only recognized a
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psychiatrists' decisions and permit involuntary patients to refuse prescribed
treatment.5 Interestingly, contrary to the protestations of civil libertarians that
clinicians cannot make unbiased decisions in such cases, 6 one study from a
jurisdiction that permitted clinical decisionmaking revealed that clinicians al-
lowed significantly more patients to refuse medications than did tribunals in
jurisdictions requiring judicial hearings."
In addition to the purely constitutional bases for decisions to permit pa-
tients to refuse medications under certain circumstances, many legal scholars
(and some nonmedical mental health professionals as well) are convinced that
medications are unnecessary at best and poison at worst; and their views have
found their way into many court opinions.5" Much of the heat that this debate
has generated stems from erroneous concepts of what the medications do, and
from horror stories of their inappropriate use.59 A second (and also errone-
ous) assumption underlying many legal criticisms of forced medication is that
patients refuse medication chiefly because of the medications' side effects; the
research data demonstrate, however, that the majority of patients who refuse
medication do so because they deny that they are ill, rather than because of
side effects or for other reasons.'
A final legal question concerning the involuntary administration of medi-
cation is whether medications are more or less restrictive than seclusion and
restraint. There is no judicial or legislative consensus on this question, and
legal scholars also disagree.6 What is clear, unfortunately, is that few courts
constitutional right for voluntary patients to refuse medications in nonemergency situations, but
explicitly held that the hospital could not discharge voluntary patients merely because they refused
treatment considered essential by their treaters. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1368.
55. Studies report that in between 90% and 100% of cases, judges override patients' refusals.
See Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient
Population: Six-month Review, 17 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989).
56. In Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976), the court opined that "the
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness leave too much to subjective choices by less than neutral
individuals" to serve as the basis for the loss of liberty involved in civil commitment Id. at 1135.
57. Julie M. Zito et al., The Treatment Review Panel: A Solution to Treatment Refusal?, 12
BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 349 (1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Price v.
Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63 (1976), ultimately rejected clinical decision-making and re-
quired judicial hearings. Fewer patients were then permitted to refuse medications. Personal Com-
munication with William H. Routt, M.D. (Apr. 24, 1984).
58. See Plotkin, supra note 16; Thomas Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: Big Brother by Injec-
tion?, 5 J. PSYCHATRY & L. 55 (1977).
59. For an antidote to the misinformation that characterizes much of the legal literature on
the subject, see generally Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic
Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsy-
chotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983).
60. See generally Xavier Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and
Schizoaffective and Mood Disorders, 51 ARCIUVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 826 (1994); William
Michaux, Side Effects, Resistance and Dosage Deviation in Psychiatric Outpatients Treated with
Tranquilizers, 133 J. NERvoUS & MENTAL DISEASE 203 (1961); Allen Raskin, A Comparison of
Acceptors and Resistors of Drug Treatment As an Adjunct to Psychotherapy, 25 J. CONSULTING
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 366 (1961); Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse
Treatment: Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCMIA-
TRY 1049 (1988); Theodore Van Putten et al., Drug Refusal in Schizophrenia and the Wish to Be
Crazy, 33 ARcHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1443 (1976); Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophren-
ic Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHUVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1974).
61. Law professor George Dix feels that medication is the more restrictive. George Dix,
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have considered the therapeutic effects of either treatment modality. Clinicians,
as well as the majority of patients, prefer medications unless the time neces-
sary for them to become effective is too long to manage an acute crisis. There
is a correlation between the two approaches, however; studies demonstrate that
when patients are granted the right to refuse medication, the use of seclusion
and restraint goes up, at least initially.62
Ill. EXTERNAL LEGAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
The types of coercion discussed in the previous section exist under the
authority of law, but in these cases, courts delegate the implementation of the
law to clinicians, the majority of whom accept the responsibility in order to be
able to provide treatment for severely disordered patients. This section discuss-
es situations in which social and/or economic pressures, as implemented
through laws, coerce mentally disordered persons. As the coercion is indirect,
it generally goes unnoticed, particularly by libertarians, who focus chiefly on
direct governmental coercion. And unlike the types of clinically motivated
coercion discussed in Part II above, mental health professionals do not support
much of this coercion, considering it antitherapeutic.
A. Involuntary Commitment
As discussed above, mental health professionals have utilized involuntary
hospitalization, and more recently involuntary commitment to outpatient treat-
ment,63 to provide effective treatment to patients whose mental disorders pre-
vent them from seeking treatment on their own. But there are a growing num-
ber of situations in which the law coerces mentally disordered persons in non-
therapeutic ways which clinicians generally oppose.
The first such change was the advent of dangerousness requirements for
involuntary hospitalization. In reaction to the perception that clinicians exerted
too much control over the involuntary commitment process-which utilized
clinical criteria-courts and legislatures in the 1970s added a requirement that
patients be dangerous to themselves or to others before they could be hospital-
ized against their stated wishes. Immediately, critics of involuntary hospital-
Legal and Ethical Issues in the Treatment and Handling of Violent Behavior, in CLINICAL TREAT-
MENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 178 (Loren Roth ed., 1984). Clinician Paul
Soloff disagrees. Paul Soloff, Physical Control: The Role of Seclusion and Restraint in Modern
Psychiatric Practice, in CLINICAL TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON, 119
(1984).
62. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric
Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340 (1980); Miller et al., supra note 55.
63. See geneially ROBERT MILLER, ET AL., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK
FORCE REPORT No. 26, INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO OUrPATIENT TREATMENT (1987); see
also Gustavo A. Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on
the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1001
(1990);' Virginia Aldige Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with
Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215 (1987); Robert
Miller, Outpatient Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: An Overview and an Update, 6 BEHAV.
Sd. & L. 99 (1988).
64. See generally MILLER, supra note 10. While no final court has required dangerousness as
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ization or treatment, who had been notably responsible for the added criteria,
reacted by attacking mental health professionals for their lack of ability to
predict future dangerousness.'
The advent of dangerousness criteria has had an impact on the character
of persons committed, but not necessarily in the way intended by their cre-
ators. While a number of mentally disordered persons who would previously
have been committed no longer are,' a number of demonstrably dangerous
but questionably mentally disordered persons, who would not have been com-
mitted before the "reforms," are now being committed. With commitment
based largely on dangerousness, psychiatric facilities, particularly public hospi-
tals, are filling up with aggressive and frequently untreatable "patients."67 Not
only do such persons require more restrictive measures that take staff time
away from treatable patients, but they frequently intimidate the more tradi-
tional psychiatric patients and directly interfere with their treatment. Thus, the
laws that were intended to protect mentally disordered persons have actually
forced many of them to be hospitalized in facilities that are less safe and less
therapeutic than prior to reforms.
Another unforeseen complication introduced by the dangerousness criteria
was noted by the Supreme Court in a 1990 case, Zinermon v. Burch.' In
considering the necessity for informed consent for voluntary psychiatric hospi-
talization, the Court majority held in dicta that "[p]ersons who are mentally ill
a criterion for involuntary commitment, a number of judges have rejected the existing need-for-
treatment criteria as being too vague and too broad, and have approved dangerousness criteria.
See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum, Is the Need for Treatment Constitutionally Acceptable as a Basis for
Civil Commitment?, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 144 (1984).
65. The most colorful of such attacks is Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
A more balanced assessment can be found in the writings of Professor Monahan. See, e.g., JOHN
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981).
Monahan points out that dangerousness cannot be accurately predicted without considering the
context in which the person acts. See generally, John Monahan, Prediction Research and the
Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 198 (1978). Most early studies involved predicting community behavior of patients who
had been hospitalized for years; those studies demonstrably overpredicted violent behavior. The
American Psychiatric Association, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981), argued that while psychiatrists could accurately predict short-term danger-
ousness, they could not predict the type of very long-term behavior called for in capital sentencing
hearings. Id. at 472 (citing, among others, brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Ami-
cus Curiae 11-17). The Supreme Court rejected this argument on policy grounds, ignoring the re-
search data presented. Id. at 472-73. More recently, short-term studies during the initial period of
hospitalization have proved significantly more accurate. See generally Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al.,
Psychiatrists' Accuracy in Predicting Violent Behavior on an Inpatient Unit, 39 HOSP. & COMMU-
NrIY PSYCHIATRY 1090 (1988); Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judg-
ments of Dangerousness in Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197 (1987);
Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Relationship Between Preadmission Threats and Later Vio-
lent Behavior by Acute Psychiatric Inpatients, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PsYCHIATRY 605 (1989);
Steven P. Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: . The Assessment
of Dangerousness by Emergency Room Clinicians, 45 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1988); Ken-
neth Tardiff, A Model for the Short-term Prediction of Violent Potential, in CURRENT APPROACH-
ES TO THE PREDICTION OF VIOLENCE (David A. Brizer & Martha Crowner eds., 1989).
66. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
67. See generally John Oldham & Andrew E. Skodol, Personality Disorders in the Public
Sector, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNIrY PSYCHIATRY 481 (1991).
68. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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and incapable of giving informed consent to admission would not necessarily
meet the statutory standard for involuntary placement." Under the current
rule of law, patients seeking hospitalization, but incapable because of their
mental disorders of giving truly informed consent and not dangerous enough




Marc Abramson coined the term "criminalization of the mentally ill" in
1972."' He observed that as a result of more restrictive civil commitment
laws, more mentally disordered persons are arrested and placed in the criminal
justice system. Some have used the term to refer to the application of the pro-
cedural protections of the criminal justice system to persons at risk for civil
commitment.72
Taking the latter defimition first, in addition to the grafting of dangerous-
ness criteria onto the substantive criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the
same reforms addressed procedural issues as well. Commitment hearings,
although held in court, rarely provided any of the protections afforded other
groups facing loss of liberty. Federal courts required that respondents facing
involuntary hospitalization be provided with all the protections provided to
criminal defendants who also face loss of liberty.7" The most significant com-
ponent of these changes was the requirement for active, adversarial attorneys
representing respondents.
Concerning the first definition, there continues to be controversy about
whether, in fact, mentally disordered persons are increasingly likely to be pro-
cessed through the criminal justice system rather than the mental health sys-
tem. 74 One problem is that most studies lack a baseline-i.e., most reports of
69. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133.
70. See Robert Miller, Zinermon v. Burch: No Entrance?, 15 NEWSL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHi-
ATRY & L. 37 (1990).
71. Marc Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side
Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOsP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCMIATRY 101, 101 (1972).
72. See generally John Monahan, The Psychiatrization of Criminal Behavior: A Reply, 24
Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY 105 (1973) (responding to Abramson's article).
73. The first major decision was Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wisc.
1972). Another decision highly critical of the existing clinical dominance in involuntary hospital-
ization was Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976).
74. Sociologist Linda Teplin has done much of the methodologically sound research in this
field; her data support the hypothesis that more mentally disordered persons were being arrested
after passage of reform commitment laws, although not to the extent reported by others. See gen-
erally Linda A. Teplin, The Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: Speculation in Search of Data, 94
PSYCHOL. BULL. 54 (1983); Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative
Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794 (1984) [hereinafter Teplin,
Criminalizing Mental Disorder]; Linda A. Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Danger-
ous Misconception, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 593 (1985); see also Jennifer C. Bonovitz & Jay S.
Bonovitz, Diversion of the Mentally Ill into the Criminal Justice System: The Police Intervention
Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 973 (1981); M. Borzecki & J. Wormith, The Criminalization
of Psychiatrically Ill People: A Review with a Canadian Perspective, 10 PSYCHIATRIC J. U. OTrA-
WA 241 (1985); Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites": Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, 3 HILLSIDE J.
CLINICAL PsYCHIATRY 123 (1979). But see Virginia A. Hiday, Civil Commitment and Arrests: An
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significant numbers of mentally disordered persons in jails and prisons do not
have data predating the advent of restrictive civil commitment laws. Regard-
less of etiology, however, large numbers of mentally disordered persons are in
fact being jailed, often for misdemeanors which would have led to hospitaliza-
tion rather than arrest before commitment required overt dangerousness.75
Police officers, frustrated at the refusal of the mental health system to accept
responsibility for mentally disordered misdemeanants, have learned to "go
straight to jail," rather than even taking such persons to hospital emergency
rooms.76 As a result of these policies, the largest collection of incarcerated
mentally disordered persons in history is now the Los Angeles County Jail
system, with nearly 20,000 such admissions a year, far more than the largest
state hospital ever held.' Table One demonstrates the distribution of mentally
disordered persons who are currently involuntarily detained in Colorado.
TABLE ONE
COMMITED/INCARCERATED MENTALLY ILL ADULTS IN COLORADO
Site Legal Status Census
Colo. MHI Ft. Logan Civil Certification 91
Denver General Civil Certification 22
Univ. of Colorado Civil Certification 24
Colo. MI Pueblo Civil Certification 107
Colo. MHI Pueblo Forensic 308
Jails Correctional 980
Dep't of Corrections Correctional - SMI 734"
Dep't of Corrections Correctional - on meds 945
' based on projected increases since 1993 Fuller-Torrey report of 534.
When the mentally disordered break the law and their arrests and convic-
tions involve the full panoply of procedural protections, their incarcerations
Investigation of the Criminalization Thesis, 180 J. NERvOUS & MENTAL DiSEASE 184 (1992).
Professor Hiday's data, from following 1,226 involuntarily hospitalized patients, demonstrated that
those patients who were arrested were not generally charged with the minor crimes that the
criminalization hypothesis predicts. Id.
75. See Abramson, supra note 71; see also H. Richard Lamb & Robert William Grant, The
Mentally III in an Urban County Jail, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 17 (1982); Steve Stelovich,
From the Hospital to the Prison: A Step Forward in Deinstitutionalization?, 30 HOSP. & COMMU-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 618 (1979). Several authors have explained the increased arrest rates for men-
tally disordered persons on the basis of overrepresentation by a small number of patients with
prior histories of arrests. See Larry Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Recon-
sidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 AM. J.
PsYcHIATY 33 (1978); Henry Steadman et al., Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Men-
tal Patients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (1978).
76. See Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder, supra note 74.
77. In 1955, there were 559,000 patients in state mental hospitals (virtually the only hospi-
tals for involuntarily committed patients at that time). It has since fallen to under 100,000, al-
though many psychiatric patients are in general hospitals or in nursing/rest homes. See GERALD N.
GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIErY 1875-1940 316 (1983).
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appear justified under the state's police power. Civil libertarians would seem-
ingly have little cause for concern. But what is the effect on the mentally dis-
ordered persons themselves of this "protection"? Despite the evidence that at
least some prefer jail to hospitals,78 few jails have the resources with which
to provide adequate treatment for mental disorders.79 Patients in prisons fare
somewhat better than their counterparts in jails, chiefly as a result of law suits,
and because lamer systems can provide more resources. But mentally disor-
dered inmates are at a significant disadvantage in correctional facilities. Their
behavior exposes them to ridicule at best and abuse at worst, from both other
inmates and from guards. They are more frequently placed in maximum secu-
rity facilities, are systematically denied placements at minimum security facili-
ties, and are denied the opportunity to reduce their sentences significantly by
participation in boot camp programs.80
Placement in correctional facilities drastically compromises continuity of
care for such persons. The majority of community mental health centers do
not, as a matter of policy, provide mental health services to inmates in local
jails, although there is evidence that this situation is changing gradually.8
When mentally disordered persons are released from jails and, especially, from
prisons, local treatment facilities frequently refuse to provide aftercare services
for them. This refusal, in turn, often delays release, because parole boards are
reluctant to release such inmates unless effective treatment is available to con-
trol mental disorders, and thus minimize recidivism.
An apparent paradox should be noted here. The criminal justice system is
antitherapeutic for most patients whose serious mental disorders prevent them
from being able to control their behaviors. However, patients with personality
disorders are able to exercise such control, albeit with more difficulty than
nondisordered persons. Several authors have argued that prosecuting or credi-
bly threatening to prosecute such persons is actually therapeutic, by setting ex-
ternal limits that reinforce the appropriate assumption of responsibility. 2
When clinicians, particularly those practicing in hospitals, attempt to use this
approach, however, they are typically met with massive resistance from the
78. Most preferences for jail are due to denial of illness, but some are due to realistic esti-
mates of the time that will be spent incarcerated. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
79. For a methodologically detailed survey of selected jails, see generally HENRY J.
STEADMAN ET AL., THE MENTALLY ILL IN JAIL: PLANNING FOR ESSENTIAL SERvIcES (1989). For
a more polemic account that reports data from every state, see E. FULLER TORREY ET AL.,
CRIuMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS
(1992).
80. See, e.g., Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional Facil-
ities, 22 BULL. AM. ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY & L. 621 (1994).
81. See generally STEADMAN Er AL., supra note 79.
82. See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, A Model Hospital Policy on Prose-
cuting Patients for Presumptively Criminal Acts, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1233
(1991); S. Kenneth Hoge & Thomas G. Gutheil, The Prosecution of Psychiatric Patients for As-
saults on Staff. A Preliminary Empirical Study, 38 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 44 (1987);
Robert D. Miller & Gary J. Maier, Factors Affecting the Decision to Prosecute Mental Patients
for Criminal Behavior, 38 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 50 (1987); Linda Phelan et al.,
Prosecuting Psychiatric Patients for Assault, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 581 (1985);
Leonard I. Stein & Ronald J. Diamond, The Chronic Mentally Ill and the Criminal Justice System:
When to Call the Police, 36 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 271 (1985).
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criminal justice system. Many prosecutors apparently believe acting out pa-
tients are "right where they belong" and decline to press charges. 3
C. Forced Evaluation and Treatment in the Criminal Justice System
The public perceives that criminal defendants who "plead" incompetence
to proceed, or plead insanity, have gotten away with something, 4 and the
tensions between legal and therapeutic interests are quite evident in three
settings within the criminal justice system. First, criminal defendants may be
incompetent to proceed, in which case the appropriate length of commitment
presents problems. Second, the relationship between the insanity defense and
the length of commitment or imprisonment has not been resolved. Third, re-
cent attempts to tie incarceration to the successful completion of treatment
programs raised even more questions.
The criminal law permits (indeed requires) defendants whose competency
to proceed is in question for any reason to be psychiatrically evaluated before
trial. Historically, defendants found incompetent to proceed could be (and fre-
quently were) hospitalized indefinitely, regardless of the nature of the criminal
charges against them; as a result, the issue of incompetence was generally
raised by prosecutors rather than defense attorneys. After the Supreme Court's
1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana,"5 most states limited the length of con-
finement to the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime(s) charged.
With prosecutors charging the most severe crimes, and given no opportunity to
plea bargain charges until a defendant is found competent to proceed, the
maximum period of commitment is typically tied to that of the most serious
crime charged." In addition, the majority of pretrial forensic evaluations are
still carried out in inpatient facilities, so that defendants who would otherwise
be free on bond are incarcerated during the evaluation period, which can be a
number of months. That incarceration, in most states, is effected in maximum
security forensic hospitals, in which the environment and clientele are largely
indistinguishable from those found in jails, in spite of the fact that the staffing
reflects a hospital rather than a correctional facility."
Insanity is conceptualized legally as an affirmative defense in those forty-
83. See supra note 82.
84. See generally HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPE-
TENT TO STAND TRIAL (1979).
85. 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
86. For this reason, Professor Norval Morris, among others, has argued that when significant
procedural issues exist, or when a defense on the merits has a high probability of success, states
should permit incompetent defendants to proceed to trial. If convicted, then the trial judge should
conduct a retrospective determination of the effects of the defendant's incompetency on the con-
viction. See generally Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incom-
petency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66 (1972). The American Bar Association (ABA) does not go so
far, but has recommended that "Ithe fact that the defendant has been determined to be incompe-
tent to stand trial should not preclude further judicial action, defense motions or discovery pro-
ceedings which may fairly be conducted without the personal participation of the defendant."
AMERICAN BAR Assoc., CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.12
(1984).
87. See generally Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, Inpatient Evaluation of Compe-
tency to Stand Trial, 9 HEALTH L. IN CANADA 74 (1989).
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seven jurisdictions in the United States that retain the defense.8 While other
affirmative defenses, such as duress, must in practice be entered by competent
defendants on their own behalves, at least seventeen jurisdictions permit insan-
ity defenses to be entered over the active objections of defendants; in twelve
of those jurisdictions it can be imposed on defendants who are judged compe-
tent to proceed. 9 Since, contrary to popular belief, commitment of defendants
found insane frequently exceeds the terms of imprisonment which would have
been imposed with a guilty verdict," such legal coercion, which by definition
can only be imposed on mentally disordered defendants, sacrifices the rights
and autonomy of competent defendants to protect the dignity of the law.
While mental health professionals are of necessity involved in the evalua-
tion and treatment of defendants found incompetent to proceed and not guilty
by reason of insanity, these systems were created by the law, not by mental
health professionals, who have opposed the use of mental health commitments
for purposes other than the provision of treatment. Unlike the situation with
involuntary hospitalization, in which clinicians have the authority (and often
are required) to discharge patients when they no longer require hospitalization
for treatment, patients hospitalized under the criminal laws can generally be
discharged only by courts, who are under increasing political pressure not to
release mentally disordered persons who have committed serious crimes, re-
gardless of the current mental status of the perpetrator.'
Another legal innovation, crafted in response to public outrage at the
insanity defense, is the verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Under this
verdict, defendants adjudged mentally ill at the time of commission of the
criminal act, but not sufficiently ill to meet the criteria for the insanity de-
fense, can be found GBMI. Such defendants are sentenced to criminal punish-
ment, just like any other convicted person. These defendants are supposed to
88. See, e.g., Barbara A. Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56
CM.-KENT L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1980).
89. See Robert D. Miller et a., Forcing the Insanity Defense on Unwilling Defendants: Best
Interests and the Dignity of the L.aw, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 487 (1996).
90. The research data conflict on this point. The earliest studies, before due process reforms
affected the commitments of insanity acquittees, indicated that insanity acquittees and felons con-
victed of the same crimes spent comparable periods of time incarcerated. See generally MARK
PANTLE Er AL., COMPARING INDIvIDuAL PERIODS AND SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS OF INSANITY
ACQUITFEEs AND CONvICTED FELONS (1980) (analyzing data from 1965-197 1). Later studies, after
the libertarian reforms, indicated that convicted felons were locked up longer, see, e.g., Richard A.
Pasewark et al., Detention and Rearrest Rates of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
and Convicted Felons, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 892 (1982) (analyzing data from 1971-1973);
Betty L. Phillips & Richard A. Pasewark, Insanity Plea in Connecticut, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
cmATRY & L. 335 (1980) (analyzing data from 1970-1972). As the "law and order" mentality
gained ascendancy, the trends in many states changed back to longer commitments for insanity
acquittees. See generally Grant T. Harris et al., Length of Detention in Matched Groups of Insani-
ty Acquittees and Convicted Offenders, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 223 (1991) (analyzing data
from 1975-1981); Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 237 (1986) (analyzing data from 1980-1983).
91. See generally Abraham L. Halpem et al., New York's Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1980: A Forensic Psychiatric Perspective, 45 ALB. L. REV. 661 (1981); see also Robert D. Miller
et al., Judicial Oversight Over Release of Patients Committed After Being Found Not Competent




receive mental health treatment, but courts have held that they are entitled to
no more treatment than any other inmate. 92
Michigan initially created the GBMI verdict in response to a state court
decision that freed a number of insanity acquittees.93 The verdict was specifi-
cally designed as an alternative to the insanity defense, with the hope that
many mentally disordered defendants would be imprisoned rather than hospi-
talized (and subsequently released sooner than if they had gone to prison).94
Eleven other states followed suit, most following the Hinckley verdict.9 Al-
though there is some evidence that the verdict has in fact reduced the number
of insanity defenses in two states," the overwhelming majority of the data
indicate that there is little change in the overall number of insanity acquittals.
Most authors have been critical of the defense, reporting that it does not re-
duce insanity defenses, and disadvantages those found GBMI relative to those
simply found guilty.'
92. See INGO KEILITZ ET AL., THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY 1-50 (1984).
93. In People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511 (1974), the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the state must release defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity unless they met criteria for
involuntary hospitalization at the time of sentencing. After that ruling, trial courts determined that
a number of acquittees did not meet this requirement, and thus released them. See Lynn Blunt &
H. Stock, Guilty but Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SC1. & L. 49 (1985).
94. Many authors have been critical of the Michigan experience. See, e.g., Lynn W. Blunt &
Harley W. Stock, Guilty but Mentally III: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 49 (1985);
John Klofas & Ralph Weisheit, Pleading Guilty but Mentally Ill: Adversarial Justice and Mental
Health, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 491 (1986); Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, Evaluating
Michigan's Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77
(1982). These authors report that insanity defenses did not decrease, that GBMI inmates did not
receive increased mental health services (and indeed did not need them), and that GBMI inmates
were not paroled as early as defendants convicted of the same crimes without the GBMI label.
Petrella and his colleagues criticized these conclusions, pointing out that the McQuillan
decision, and the change from McNaghten to ALl criteria for insanity, might have combined to
increase the number of insanity pleas and, therefore, the fact that the actual number of successful
pleas remained constant after introduction of the GBMI plea indicates that the number would have
gone up but for the new verdict. These detractors acknowledge Smith and Hall's observation that
the guilty but mentally ill inmates did not resemble insanity acquittees, but attempt to explain it
away by noting that no data indicate what percentage of those pleading guilty but mentally ill
would have pled insane in the absence of the alternative verdict. See Russell C. Petrella et a.,
Examining the Application of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HOSP. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 254 (1985).
95. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-47 (Supp.
1983) (repealed 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 401(b), 408 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-
131 (Supp. 1993); 38 ILL. CoMp. STAT. § 5/115-2(b) (West 1993); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (Supp.
1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.120 (Michie Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie
Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFED LAws § 23a-7-2
(Michie Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983). Nevada recently abolished its
insanity defense and replaced it with a GBMI statute. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.041 (Michie
1995).
96. See generally R.D. MacKay & J. Kopelman, The Operation of the "Guilty but Mentally
Ill" Verdict in Pennsylvania, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 247 (1988). Insanity defenses in Alaska
dropped from six to one in the year following enactment of a GBMI statute, but at the same time
the insanity criteria were made more restrictive. See, e.g., INGO KEILrTZ ET AL., THE GUILTY BUT
MENTALLY ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1984).
97. See generally KEiL ET AL., supra note 96, Linda C. Fentiman, "Guilty but Mentally
Ill": The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. REv. 601 (1985); Klofas & Weisheit, supra note 94;
Donald W. Morgan et al., Guilty but Mentally Ill: The South Carolina Experience, 16 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 41 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An
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Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in another state method
of incarcerating allegedly mentally disordered persons---the mentally disor-
dered sex offender (MDSO) laws. In the 1950s, a number of states passed
MDSO laws, but as alternatives to criminal imprisonment. Commitment under
these laws was initially indeterminate, because it was tied to treatment rather
than to an arbitrary fixed term of punishment. The laws were attacked in the
1970s on civil rights grounds, as well as because of lack of evidence of treat-
ment effectiveness, and most were repealed or fell into disuse.98 In the late
1980s, however, public fears about criminals in general and sex offenders in
particular resulted in the passage of new MDSO laws in several states."
Unlike the previous laws, however, the new wave of statutes provides for
"civil" commitment of sex offenders after they have served criminal sentences
for the same crimes that serve as the basis of predictions that they will commit
future sex crimes. Two of these laws are currently before the federal courts.
Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator statute was upheld by its state
supreme court,"m but found to be unconstitutional by the federal district
court.' ' Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator law"m was found unconsti-
tutional by its state supreme court,"°3 but on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed." The third, Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, was upheld by its





Unlike the insanity defense and commitments for treatment to restore
competency to proceed, mental health professionals have opposed sexual pred-
ator laws, recognizing them for what they are: a return to indefinite commit-
ments in a (not so) covert attempt to alleviate public fear of sex offenders, not
to provide adequate time for treatment;' 6 an incapacitation of offenders,
cloaked in the appearance of beneficence. The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion and its district branches have provided amicus briefs to the courts in all
three states opposing the laws." If the duty to protect third parties turns cli-
nicians into cops, sexual predator statutes turn them into gaolers,"M and ulti-
mately the system selects for the kinds of clinicians who are comfortable in
being gaolers.
Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494 (1985); The Insanity De-
fense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DIsABILITY L. REP. 136 (1983).
98. See Barbara A. Weiner, Sexual Psychopath Laws, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 739-43 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
99. John G. LaFond, Washington's Novel Sexual Predator Commitment Law, 18(1) NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 4 (1993).
100. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1(1993).
101. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
102. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29(a)(01) to 29(a)(15) (1995).
103. In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246 (1996).
104. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072 (1997).
105. State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252 (1995), cert. denied sub nom., Schmidt v. Wiscon-
sin, 117 S. CL 2507 (1997); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279 (1995), cert. denied sub nom., Post v.
Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997).
106. The Kansas statute defines MDSOs as untreatable. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995).
107. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1996).
108. The obsolete form of this word is used here on purpose, to suggest the regressive think-
ing that supports sexually violent predator laws.
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D. Paternalistic Advocates and Attorneys
Mental health professionals have been (accurately) accused of being pater-
nalistic towards their patients,"m believing that the provision of effective
treatment11° justifies temporary restriction of external physical liberty for
those patients incompetent to make treatment decisions." Less discussed in
the literature, however, is that many self-appointed advocates for the mentally
ill are just as paternalistic, valuing liberty and due process at the expense of
treatment.'12
Just as clinicians utilize the existing laws to impose treatment on patients,
these advocates frequently use their authority to undermine it. Many advo-
cates, particularly when hospital-based advocacy programs were in their infan-
cies, took the position that clinicians were their enemies, and adopted a strictly
adversarial posture toward hospital staffs. Appalled at the conditions in some
hospitals, concerned only that their clients-who had no more choice about
their advocates than about their treaters-be granted "freedom" from physical
restraint, and rejecting the proposition that psychiatric treatment conferred any
benefit, many argued against the use of involuntary hospitalization or treat-
ment under any circumstances." 3 Few of these early advocates had any clini-
cal training or sophistication, and they operated from the criminal defense at-
torney model, which teaches concentration on one client at a time, to the ex-
clusion of all others. As a consequence, protection of the legal rights of one
patient often resulted in loss of the same rights for others. Mental health pro-
fessionals do not have the luxury of such tunnel vision; they are responsible
for the safety and treatment of all their patients.
Patricia Wald and Paul Friedman have classified advocates into "rights-
oriented" and "treatment-oriented."' " The former are those who concentrate
only on patients' legal rights (as interpreted by the advocates), while the latter
use their advocacy skills to improve patients' access to effective treatment.
The rights-oriented advocates would prefer to abolish all involuntary treatment,
109. See generally Robert D. Miller, Involuntary Civil Commitment: Legal Versus Clinical
Paternalism, in LEGAL ENCROACHMENTS IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR MEN-
TAL HEALTH SERVICES (Stephen Rachlin ed., 1985).
110. A plethora of studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication.
Most significant, several studies demonstrate that this efficacy is the same for voluntary and invol-
untary patients. See Donald R. Gorham & Lewis J. Sherman, The Relation of Attitude Toward
Medication to Treatment Outcomes in Chemotherapy, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 830 (1961); Gerard
Hogarty & Solomon Goldberg, The NIMH Collaborative Group, Drug and Psychotherapy in the
Aftercare of Schizophrenic Patients: One-Year Relapse Rates, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 54
(1973); National Inst. of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Serv. Ct. Collaborative Study
Group, Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246
(1964).
111. See supra notes 51-52; see also Miller, supra note 109. The sociological data reported
supra note 27 also supports the view that after effective treatment, the majority of patients feel
that the temporary restriction of their rights was justified.
112. See generally Morse, supra note 2.
113. See generally H. Richard Lamb, Securing Patients' Rights-Responsibly, 32 HosP. &
COMMuNirrY PSYCHIATRY 393 (1981); Alan Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 HosP. & CoMMu-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 819 (1979).
114. See generally Patricia Wald & Paul Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy
in the United States, I INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137 (1978).
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but understanding that they are unlikely to accomplishing this goal, they fre-
quently use litigation as a means to implement their covert agendas. A leading
example can be found in the landmark "right-to-treatment" law suit, Wyatt v.
Stickney,"5 in which lead counsel for the plaintiff made it plain that he was
not particularly interested in improving treatment in Alabama's substandard
hospitals for the mentally ill and mentally retarded, but rather hoped to force
the state to discharge as many "inmates" as possible."6 Activist attorneys
have not only tried to close hospitals, but also to prevent mentally disordered
persons from seeking to stay in them voluntarily or to gain access to them.
The majority of attorneys who actually represent persons facing civil
commitment in court do not share the activist agenda of the hospital-based
advocates and members of the national mental health bar."7 In fact, many
are quite reluctant to adopt a full adversarial stance with respect to their cli-
ents, preferring a "best interests" role because of the obvious mental disorders
from which their clients suffer."s One example of this paternalism is the use
of plea bargaining techniques learned from criminal defense work. Many attor-
neys, convinced that their clients will be hospitalized as a result of their hear-
ings, argue for a less restrictive alternative-commitment to outpatient treat-
ment--even if neither their clients nor the hospital staff approve of that alter-
native. Unlike the situation in criminal court, such attorneys frequently enter
such compromise pleas over the strenuous objections of their clients." 9 Some
advocates have actually filed suit to prevent their "clients" from receiving
potentially effective treatment. 2
115. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
116. The lead plaintiff's attorney in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
wrote:
Indeed the strategy in a case like Wyatt is to make it too expensive to run large mental
institutions and encourage the development of non-institutional alternatives.... In re-
cent years, right-to-treatment litigation has emerged as a potent new tool to attack the
system by which the mentally ill are confined against their will and incarcerated indefi-
nitely.
Lawrence Schwartz, Litigating the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 25 Hosp. & CoMMU-
Nrry PSYcHIATRY 460, 461 (1974).
117. See Lawrence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned
to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J. PsYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1978). Norman Poythress, an expen-
enced forensic psychologist, attempted to train attorneys to represent commitment respondents
effectively, but reported that his efforts had little impact on their "best interests" philosophy. Nor-
man G. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise of Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with
Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 1 (1978).
118. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1982), a federal district court held
that individuals facing commitment were constitutionally entitled to counsel acting in an adver-
sarial role and as advocates for freedom. Id. at 1090 ("Mhe interests in avoiding civil commit-
ment are at least as high as those of persons accused of criminal offenses.") One attorney has ex-
pressed his frustration with the adversarial role in civil commitment hearings in print. See Law-
rence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned to Hate the Adver-
sary System, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1978).
Poythress and colleagues have attempted to train attorneys to represent respondents facing
commitment in an adversarial fashion, but found little change from the usual "best interests" role
after the training. Norman G. Poythress Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training
Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM: BEHAv. 1 (1978).
119. See generally Robert D. Miller, The Use of Plea Bargaining in Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 395 (1984).
120. In Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
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Recently, David Wexler and Bruce Winick, two law professors experi-
enced in both mental health law and practice, have been advocating a concept
they call "therapeutic jurisprudence."'' Professor Wexler has written that
"[t]he task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to exam-
ine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and therapeutic out-
comes."' 22 He goes on to state that it involves four overlapping areas of in-
quiry: 1) the role of the law in producing psychological dysfunction; 2) the
therapeutic aspects of legal rules; 3) the therapeutic aspects of legal proce-
dures; and 4) the therapeutic aspects of judicial and legal roles. He assumes
that the law seeks expressly to promote therapeutic objectives, such as a mean-
ingful right to treatment, but that the law often does not recognize the
antitherapeutic aspects of even that concept in practice. 23 It would seem that
this approach, which continues to be rejected by extremists in both the legal
Cty., Mich. 1973), a mentally disordered sex offender gave consent to experimental psychosur-
gery, in order to help him control his violent behavior. He had been told that he would never be
released from maximum security as long as his aggressive behavior continued, and he had not
responded to any other treatment. A libertarian attorney filed suit, without support from his "cli-
ent," to block the treatment. The trial court held that because the treatment was experimental,
irreversible, and affected the brain, no incarcerated person was capable of giving informed con-
senL
Although this decision has no technical precedential value, it has been cited by attorneys to
prevent willing patient/clients from accepting nonstandard treatment. For example, when the au-
thor developed a voluntary treatment procedure for committed sex offenders involving the use of
anti-androgen medication to reduce (but not eliminate) abnormally high sex drive, the attorney for
a state advocacy program objected, citing Kaimowitz to support her contention that no incarcerated
person could give consent to the experimental (and reversible) use of an FDA-approved medica-
tion. Letter from Dianne Greenley, Project Director, Advocacy for Institutionalized Persons, Wis-
consin Coalition for Advocacy, to Robert D. Miller (May 3, 1985) (on file with the author). Had
her objections been voiced in court, they might well have prevented patients from receiving the
only treatment that would permit them to gain sufficient control over their sexual arousal to be
released.
Another example of overreaction to past abuses involves research with institutionalized
populations. There is no question that such populations have been abused in the past---the
Tuskeegee syphilis experiments come to mind. But the current guidelines of the American Cor-
rectional Association, the standards for practices in prisons and jails, prohibit all medical research
with inmates, whether the treatment may be life-saving or not. "Written agency policy prohibits
inmates/juveniles/residents from participating in medical or pharmaceutical testing for experimen-
tal or research purposES." AMERiCAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOC., STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORREC-
TIONS/INSTITUTIONS, Std. 2-CO-IF-14 (Mar. 1, 1996).
121. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE (1991); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
A New Approach to Psychology and the Law, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF
THE DISCIPLINE 211 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research,
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991).
122. David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, in DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 8
(1991).
123. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DAVID B.
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1991). Attorneys can
tell patients the same things that their treaters tell them, but are heard differently. See generally
Robert D. Miller et al., Litigiousness as a Resistance to Therapy. 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 109
(1986). This approach requires treatment-oriented advocates who can see the whole picture and
who know something about mental disorder. Since few attorneys receive adequate experience with
mentally disordered persons in law school, and the legal literature is heavily biased against psychi-
atric treatment, I am not arguing here for co-option of attorneys, but for attorneys operating based
on accurate information rather than ideology.
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and mental health camps, represents the best hope for reconciliation, which
would remove the supposed clients of both from the current crossfire between
them.
E. Coercion in Correctional Facilities
This article has discussed the increased incidence of mentally disordered
persons in the criminal justice system. Rights-oriented advocates have not
complained vociferously about this situation, in part because the civil rights of
criminal defendants are scrupulously protected. Unfortunately, however, most
advocates lose interest once defendants are convicted and incarcerated." 4 Of
course, correctional systems are all about coercion; what concerns us here are
the additional problems that exist for inmates because they are mentally disor-
dered. For example, although correctional inmates are the only population in
this country that have a constitutional right to treatment,"2 including mental
health treatment,'26 inmates are also the only group of mentally disordered
persons officially and openly discriminated against( because of their status.
Courts have required correctional systems to develop effective screening'27
and tracking systems for their mentally disordered inmates' 2 and to provide
adequate treatment for those with serious mental illnesses. 9 But those in-
mates so identified are concomitantly disadvantaged by their very classifica-
tion.
In a national survey of all state correctional systems,'" forty-eight of
fifty-one responded that they use psychiatric diagnosis in placement decisions;
twenty of fifty-one states use maximum security placements for seriously
mentally ill inmates, regardless of their actual behavior. Some states bar seri-
ously mentally ill inmates from many, if not all, minimum security facilities.
Twenty-two of the thirty states that have them prohibit inmates with major
mental disorders, or those who are taking psychotropic medications, from
participating in boot camp programs, perhaps the most significant advantage a
124. Most of the legal advocacy programs concentrate their efforts in the civil system, and
correctional systems-especially prisons-have been more successful in fending off attempts to
place advocates or ombudspersons in their facilities. The chief exception is the National Prison
Project, affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union, that directs all its efforts toward state
prison systems. Since it is a private organization, it is not subject to the cutbacks and restrictions
that have increasingly prevented federally-funded advocacy programs from filing class action suits,
and its efforts have led to major improvements in over half the nation's prison systems. It does
not restrict itself to mental health issues, but those issues are invariably litigated as part of class
action suits. See Robert D. Miller, Current Status of Prison Mental Health Litigation, 20 NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHtATRY L. 57 (1995).
125. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
126. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
127. Jeffrey Metzner et al., Mental Health Screening and Evaluation Within Prisons, 22
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 451 (1994).
128. See, e.g., Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1451, 1457,
1460 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
129. See Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47.
130. See generally Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional
Facilities, 22 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 621 (1994).
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corrections system can confer on an inmate. Many of these policies, to be
sure, are based on lack of mental health resources to monitor the effects of
medication at many facilities. Not discrimination per se, but the effect is the
same. At a time when the incidence of mentally disordered inmates is growing
rapidly,131 such discrimination is particularly problematic.
3
1
IV. EXTERNAL SOCIAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
A. Stigma
In addition to the legal coercion discussed above, mentally disordered
persons are increasingly exposed to more diffuse social pressures which are
more difficult to protect against. Despite a plethora of educational programs
aimed at the general public, the stigma associated with being mentally disor-
dered continues unabated. Since the effects of social coercion are often not
direct acts of the state, legal advocates tend to ignore them, except to list the
existence of stigma as a factor militating keeping mentally disordered persons
out of the mental health system altogether. But because of the stigma, mental-
ly disordered persons have difficulty obtaining the specialized housing that
they require,' and also have difficulty in obtaining employment. 34
131. See generally Henry J. Steadman & Stephen A. Ribner, Changing Perceptions of the
Mental Health Needs of Inmates in Local Jails, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1115 (1980). Approxi-
mately 670,000 mentally ill inmates are admitted to jails each year, or nearly eight times the num-
ber admitted to state mental hospitals. See CENTER ON CRIME, COMMUNrrIEs & CULTURE, RE-
SEARCH BRF. MENTAL ILLNESS IN U.S. JAILS: DIVERTING THE NONVIOLENT, Low-LEVEL OF-
FENDER (1996).
132. In Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), inmates challenged a California
prison's blanket policy of prohibiting HIV-positive inmates from working in food service. The
trial court held that the policy violated section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that while Iv-positive status was a disability under the ADA and,
therefore, the Rehabilitation Act, Id. at 1446, and the prison's acceptance of federal funds placed it
under the Act, Id., the Rehabilitation Act was not specifically designed to apply to prisons, and
inmates do not possess the same rights as noninmates. Ild. at 1446-47. It accepted the prison's
argument that because of the fact that many inmates believed (however falsely) that they would be
placed at risk by having to eat food prepared by HIV-positive inmates, the prison had a legitimate
security reason to deny food service jobs to HIV-positive inmates. Id. at 1447-48.
133. Since zoning laws are governmental actions, the courts have been willing to address their
alleged discrimination against the mentally disabled. The Supreme Court ruled in City of Edmonds
v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995), that Edmonds' zoning ordinance requiring occupants
of a single-family dwelling to be "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of
five or fewer [untelated] persons," violated the 1988 Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prevents
housing discrimination based on disability. The Court held that since an unlimited number of
related people could live together under the ordinance, it was intended to discriminate against
unrelated people, and thus did not fall under the "maximum occupancy" exception to the FHA. Id.
at 1781-82.
Lower courts have subsequently denied housing permits for facilities for disabled persons,
however, when the ordinances in question were more carefully crafted to avoid the problems
found in City of Edmonds. A federal district court in Maryland, see Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v.
Howard Cry., Md., 911 F. Supp. 918, 931 (D. Md. 1996), and the Eighth Circuit, see Oxford
House v. St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996), both held that maximum occupancy ordi-
nances expressed legitimate governmental interests in regulating traffic and other problems.
134. This article does not discuss the burgeoning literature on the application of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act to mentally disordered persons in the workplace. It is interesting to
note, however, that at least two federal courts have held that questions concerning past mental
disorder on applications to take bar examinations may constitute impermissible discrimination. See
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Perhaps the most telling example of the stigma associated with being
mentally ill comes as the result of a 1966 Supreme Court case, Baxstrom v.
Herold.3 That decision led to the discharge or transfer of 989 patients hos-
pitalized in a New York maximum security correctional facility."3 Henry
Steadman and his colleagues followed the patients' progress for ten years. As
part of the study, researchers collected newspaper articles about the patients,
all of whom were both ex-mental patients ("mad") and ex-convicts ("bad"). in
every one of the hundreds of articles Steadman reviewed, the subject was de-
scribed as an ex-mental patient-never an ex-convict.
B. Economic Coercion
Economic factors have been inadequately studied as indirect but powerful
sources of coercion upon mentally disordered persons. When asylums were
first built in this country in the 1800s, a major argument in legislatures for
hospitalizing mentally disordered persons was that the facilities would be self-
sustaining and, in fact, many were in those early years. The larger institutions
grew their own food, made their own clothes, and generally operated as self-
contained communities, largely on (free) patient labor. This practice depended,
of course, on keeping the higher-functioning patients for long periods of time
(the seriously mentally ill patients in the back wards were of no economic
value, which was why many of them had been committed in the first
place).1
37
With the increased dumping of dysfunctional persons into asylums, the
basic costs of running the institutions increased to the point that they became
economic liabilities to the administrating governments. During the civil rights
revolution of the 1960s and '70s, unpaid patient labor was attacked as "insti-
tutional peonage," and states were forced to pay minimum wages to patients
for their work."3 When the lack of resources and even minimally adequate
treatment programs was litigated, federal courts mandated significant im-
Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va., 1995); Ellen S. v. Florida
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994). In response, the American Bar Associ-
ation approved a compromise resolution that rejected existing practices of detailed inquiry into an
applicant's past mental health history, but permitted inquiry into an applicant's current function-
ing. Similar suits have been filed against medical licensing boards, and the American Medical
Association has recommended that inquiries be permitted only as to disabilities that require reports
concerning competence to be made to the board, or that may reasonably be expected to affect a
physician's current practice. See Robert D. Miller, Licensing and Mental Disability, 20 NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCFATRY L. 21 (1995). It also stressed the importance of confidentiality in these
matters. See id.
135. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
136. See generally HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. CocozzA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINAL-
LY INSANE (1974).
137. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE AsYLUM AND ITS ALTER-
NATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 346-50 (1980).
138. As an unfortunate result of this appropriate determination, patients were subsequently
denied the opportunity to perform truly therapeutic work, because state departments of mental
health would not provide the necessary funds in their budgets. See ANDREw T. SCULL,
DECARCERATION: COMMUNrrY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT-A RADICAL VIEw 139 (2d ed.
1984). Scull also argues that another purpose of the civil rights litigation was to force discharges
from hospitals by making it economically infeasible to hold patients. Id.
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provements in staffing and other resources,39 thus further increasing the
costs of operating state mental hospitals.
States responded by supporting advocates' efforts to limit admissions to
state hospitals, and to "deinstitutionalize" those patients who were already
there. 4" The original plan had been to take money saved from down-sizing
state hospitals and transfer it to community-based treatment facilities-the
"money follows the patient" plan. 4 For many reasons, this plan never
worked in practice. The major reason was that while the census in state facili-
ties has dropped by over eighty-five percent over the past forty years, im-
provements in court-mandated conditions and staffing have increased the cost
per patient to the extent that relatively little actual savings have occurred. In
addition, civil rights advocates filed suits to block needed improvements in
hospitals, fearing states would merely divert funds so utilized from essential
programs for community-based treatment. 42 In addition, the due process
protections mandated by the courts took much needed funds from clinical
resources. 1
43
Another initial economic incentive for deinstitutionalization was the influx
of federal money into community mental health centers beginning in the
1960s, giving state governments the opportunity to cost-shift by transferring
patients to those facilities. Some states passed laws requiring local govern-
ments to reimburse the state for their*residents who were hospitalized in state
facilities.'" When the federal monies that had supported treatment of the
chronically mentally ill dried up, however, local governments felt the financial
pinch, and their community mental health centers had to look to paying or
insured clients to continue operating."
One beneficiary of the deinstitutionalization movement was the nursing
139. The leading case is Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For a discus-
sion of subsequent cases, see Stephen Rachlin, Litigating a Right to Treatment: Woe is Me, 58
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 182 (198).
140. See Lawrence H. Schwartz, Litigating the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 32
HOSe. CoMm. PSYCHIATRY 460, 462 (1981).
141. Id.
142. From 1964 until 1980, costs per patient per day at Bryce State Hospital rose from $3.50
to $65. See Conference Report, Wyatt v. Stickney: Retrospect and Prospect, 32 Hosp. COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 123, 125 (1981) [hereinafter Conference Report]. Morton Birnbaum, the creator of
the concept of a right to treatment, see Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J.
499 (1960), continued to pursue his creation in the courts for nearly 30 more years. His litigation
through the state and federal courts, primarily Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986), ulti-
mately resulted in the accreditation by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations of all New York's state mental hospitals, at a tremendous cost to the state. See
Stephen Rachlin, Litigating a Right to Treatment: Woe Is Me, 60 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 182 (1988).
143. Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil, Aftermath of the Rogers Decision: Assessing the
Costs, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348, 1351 (1990) (reporting that the budget of the Massachusetts
Department of Mental Health increased by over a million dollars during an 18-month period fol-
lowing Rogers). The cost of compliance includes, of course, the costs to the judiciary and others
in the judicial system, as well as the thousands of hours of clinical time taken away from patients
in order to prepare and testify in involuntary treatment hearings.
144. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 51.42(3)(as) (1976); see also Robert D. Miller, Economic Factors
Leading to the Diversion of the Mentally Disordered from the Civil to the Criminal Commitment
Systems, 15 INT'L J.L. & PsYcHIATRY 1 (1992).
145. See generally FRANKLIN CHU & SHARLAND TROTTER, THE MADNESS ESTABISHMENT:
RALPH NADEt's STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE NATIONAL IIsTrrm oF PUBLIc HEALTH (1974).
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home industry. A large number of mental patients that had been hospitalized
for years were "transinstitutionalized"' to these facilities, which were sup-
ported in part by federal money. Because these were not state facilities, many
civil rights activists were not concerned, despite the fact that many chronically
mentally ill patients had been better off in hospitals which had programs spe-
cifically designed for their needs-programs almost totally lacking in nursing
homes. Once the federal government caught on to what was happening, it
threatened to cut off all funding to nursing homes with above a certain per-
centage of chronically mentally ill residents, because its support of medically
ill home inhabitants did not include those with mental illnesses.47 As a re-
sult of patients being thrown out of hospitals and then out of nursing homes,
patients who would have been hospitalized in the past had nowhere to live.
Again, since this is not the direct result of state action, patients' constitutional
rights were not violated, and their injuries are difficult to articulate in tort
litigation."u
This latter discrimination against mentally disordered persons is not the
sole province of the federal government, however. Most private insurance
companies, and now managed care corporations, have always refused to pro-
vide equal coverage for persons with mental disorders, as compared with
146. See generally H. Richard Lamb & Roger Peele, The Need for Continuing Asylum and
Sanctuary, 35 HosP. & COMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 798 (1984); Leonard J. Schmidt et al., The
Mentally Ill in Nursing Homes: New Back Wards in the Community, 34 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCH-
ATRY 687 (1977); William R. Shadish & Richard R. Bootzin, Nursing Homes and Chronic Mental
Patients, 7 SCHIZOPHRENIA. BULL. 488 (1981); Darold A. Treffert, Sane Asylum: An Alternative to
the Mental Hospital, 17 CURRENrT PsycnAmIc THERAPY 309 (1977).
147. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 105 S. Ct. 2210 (1985).
148. The majority of legal efforts to require the provision of community mental health servic-
es have resulted in consent decrees. See Michael S. Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees:
Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 MENTAL DISABILrY L. REP. 69 (1976). Courts have been reluctant
to create a right to treatment for voluntary patients in the community, and many of the decisions
have been based on state laws that guarantee such services or guarantee services in the least re-
strictive environment. Id. Enforcing such orders has proved problematic in many instances, and
courts have had to continue their monitoring for years in some cases (e.g., Wyatt is still under
court supervision after 26 years). Id.
For a discussion of specific consent decrees, see Barbara Armstrong, St. Elizabeths Hospi-
tal: Case Study of a Court Order, 30 Hosp. & CoMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 42 (1979); Jeffrey L.
Geller et al., Second-Generation Deinstitutionalization, 11: The Impact of Brewster v. Dukakis on
Correlates of Community and Hospital Utilization, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 988 (1990); and
Stonewall B. Stickney, Problems Implementing the Right to Treatment in Alabama: The Wyatt v.
Stickney Case, 25 HosP. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY 452 (1974).
One frequent consequence of court decisions based on statutory rights to treatment is a
legislative attempt to thwart the decision (or preempt future ones) by removing the rights. When
the Colorado Supreme Court held, in Goebel v. Colorado Dept. of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785
(Colo. 1988), that the state Act for the Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 11 CoLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 27-10-101 to 129 (1982 & Supp. 1988) created a statutory right to appropriate treatment
in the community for patients who had been voluntarily or involuntarily hospitalized, the state
legislature amended the Care & Treatment Act by inserting "subject to available appropriations" in
sections 27-10-101, -108, -109, and -116, and 27-10.5-101, -103, -105, -106 and -206. The legisla-
ture subsequently introduced further legislation (Senate Bill 94-221) that would have made it
explicit that voluntary patients have no right to mental health services. That bill was defeated,
largely through organized opposition by advocacy groups (including the Colorado Alliance for the
Mentally Ill Forensic Network Taskforce, the Colorado Mental Health Association, and the Colo-
rado Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Program), but has continued to
be introduced in subsequent legislative sessions.
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"medical" illnesses. 49 "Parity" in insurance coverage has become a major
political agenda for the American Psychiatric and American Psychological
Associations. ' While the self-serving nature of such agendas is apparent,
the ultimate effect is on the mentally disordered persons, many of whom are
no longer provided with treatment from any source. Parity legislation has
passed the U.S. Congress, and is currently before a number of state legisla-
tures.'5  Other similar forms of discrimination include the recent exclusion of
persons convicted of drug-related felonies from social security payments,'52
and the exclusion of alcoholics from Veterans' Administration educational
benefits.'53 The public mental health system, including state hospitals and
local community mental health centers, used to provide the safety net for those
with serious mental illnesses, most of whom can not obtain private insurance.
Now that capitation plans are sweeping the country, that net is becoming as
riddled with holes as is the private system.
An attempt in Wisconsin to use economic pressure to force change in the
delivery of mental health services backfired badly; as part of the reforms in
civil commitment following the Lessard decision, the state legislature made
counties financially liable for the costs of hospitalizing their severely mentally
disordered citizens in state facilities. This legislation did have the desired
effect of forcing counties to develop their own local inpatient facilities, but as
the legislation did not affect the state's responsibility for forensic patients
(those being evaluated for competency to proceed and those found either in-
competent or insane), the result was an increase in the numbers of patients
admitted through the criminal justice system, the majority of whom were
charged with misdemeanors. 54
149. See Two Presidents Agree to Work Together for Parity, 31(18) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1
(1996).
150. See Capitol Hill Continues to Hear About Need for Parity, 31(21) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1
(1996).
151. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) provides parity for yearly and lifetime caps
between mental disorders and other medical disorders. The Colorado House debated House Bill
1192 during the 1997 Legislative Session, which would provide complete parity for specified
mental disorders--schizophrenias, affective disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and post
traumatic stress disorder.
152. Pub. L. 104-12, § 105(a), 110 Stat. 851, 852 (enacted Mar. 29, 1996), denies SSI and
SSDI benefits to anyone disabled by substance abuse if convicted of a substance abuse related
felony.
153. In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Veteran's
Administration's irrebuttable presumption that all primary alcoholism is attributable to willful
misconduct did not violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 551. The Court did not
find it necessary to decide whether alcoholism is a disease. Id. at 552.
154. See generally Miller, supra note 144; see also Walter Dickey, Incompetency and the
Non-dangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L. BuLL. 22 (1980); Stephen Rachlin, Incompetent
Misdemeanants-Pseudocivil Commitment, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 23 (1986);
Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites": Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, 3 HILLSIDE J. CLINICAL PSY-
CHIATRY 123 (1979).
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V. INTERNAL CLINICAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
A. Capacity to Give Informed Consent and Denial of Illness
Many civil rights activists behave as if mental disorders don't exist. De-
riving sustenance from the voluminous (and repetitive) works of Thomas
Szasz, which denied the very existence of mental disorder,'" and the more
sophisticated writings of Stephen Morse's' and Ennis and Litwack,' who
did not deny the existence of mental disorder, but argued that psychiatrists
could not adequately diagnose or treat it. These advocates rejected clinicians'
arguments that mentally disordered persons could not make competent deci-
sions about their treatment because of their disorders, and also rejected the
possibility that mentally disordered persons' expressed wishes might be due to
their disorders and thus not represent their true feelings. Clinicians, who fol-
low their patients over long periods of time rather than at specific points along
a time line, recognize that serious mental disorders significantly affect
patients' abilities to understand and accept that they are ill and, thus, that they
need treatment.'
5
The right to refuse psychiatric treatment-which is more accurately char-
acterized as the patient's right to make treatment decisions to either accept or
refuse proposed treatment-has often centered around the legal concept of
informed consent. For such consent to be accepted, the clinician must provide
adequate information upon which a patient can base a decision: the patient
must have the capacity to make a decision; and the decision must be free from
external coercion.
Mental health and legal professionals have often differed in their interpre-
tations of the capacity issue. Loren Roth' and Laurence Tancredi'" have
discussed the spectrum of levels of capacity displayed by patients in informed
consent paradigms, displayed in Table Two.
155. See generally THOMAS S. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); THoMAs S. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CoNDuCT (1961).
156. See Morse, supra note 2. Morse argues that mentally disordered persons are no more
incompetent than other groups that exhibit poor judgment, such as smokers and overeaters; and
that nonmentally ill persons with poor judgment are as treatable as those with mental illnesses. Id.
at 61. He simply asserts these propositions without the evidence that he expects mental health
professionals to provide for their arguments; and he ignores the powerful effects of some mental
disorders on reality testing and cognitive functioning. While treatment (such as smoking cessation
clinics, diet programs and Alcoholics Anonymous) do have beneficial effects for some addicted
persons, their success rates do not begin to compare with the effects of medication on psychotic or
severely depressed patients. A good comparison can be made with the behavioral treatment of
volitional obesity versus the biological treatment of obesity secondary to metabolic disease.
157. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 65.
158. See, e.g., Loren H. Roth et al., The Dilemma of Denial in the Assessment of Competency
to Refiuse Treatment, 138 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 910 (1982).
159. See generally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); see also Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doc-
trine of Informed Consent, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977).
160. Laurence R. Tancredi, Competency for Informed Consent: Conceptual Limits of Empir-




LEVELS OF INFORMED CONSENT
1. The Capacity to Evidence a Choice
2. The Capacity to Base a Choice on "Rational" Reasons
3. The Capacity to Understand Information Relevant to the Choice
4. The Capacity to Apply that Understanding to One's Own Situation
For many advocates, Level One is sufficient---that is, they accept their clients'
stated wishes without further inquiry as to the bases of those decisions, since
advocates do not acknowledge the internal conflicts experienced by seriously
mentally disordered persons. Clinicians, on the other hand, look to the reasons
for the decisions. Patients who are capable of accurately reciting the objective
risks and benefits of a proposed treatment are still not considered competent
either to refuse or to accept the treatment unless they accept that they are
suffering from the disorder for which the treatment is proposed. Cognitive
knowledge alone, or a "factual" understanding in the Dusky model, is insuffi-
cient to serve as a basis for meaningful informed consent.
This approach assumes great significance because the clinical research
literature demonstrates that denial of illness is the most common reason for
refusal of clinically appropriate treatment by psychiatric patients. 6' Thus,
serious mental disorders-which are the ones for which psychiatric medica-
tions are prescribed-rob patients not only of their abilities to function au-
tonomously, but also of their capacities to make truly informed choices about
treatments that would restore their capacities and autonomy.
Alan Wertheimer distinguishes between negative freedom (absence of
external constraints) and positive freedom (in which one can act autonomous-
ly). 6' He agrees that mental disorders can rob patients of positive freedom.
The consequentialist position would be that if coerced treatment is the best
objective alternative, it should be employed regardless of the patient's wishes.
The rights position is that patients cannot be coerced for their own good.
Wertheimer suggests that advocates often base this position on their own dis-
trust of the therapeutic establishment, rather than on their clients' wishes. He
cautions that paternalism can be justified only if patients are not capable of
autonomous or voluntary action. Wertheimer further argues that Stone's "thank
you theory"'63 does not replace initial consent, but does suggest the reason-
ableness of the coercive action taken. In addition, while it may be, and certain-
ly has been, argued that society can coerce a person only to protect others,'6
161. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
162. Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophical Examination of Coercion for Mental Health Issues, I I
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 239 (1993).
163. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
164. This argument is a central tenet of libertarian philosophy, most eloquently expressed by
John Stuart Mill: "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 9 (1978). Those
citing Mill, however, generally ignore the subsequent statement that "[ilt is, perhaps, hardly neces-
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it could also be argued that a person who is temporarily irrational may be pre-
vented from harming his "normal self," and thus can be coerced under the
danger-to-others rationale.
B. Judicial Concepts of Voluntariness and Consent
Although the courts have not provided comprehensive discussions of the
capacity prong of the test for informed consent, they have discussed
voluntariness at some length, albeit not in the context of informed consent.'"
Most of the decisions have come from criminal cases, particularly in the con-
text of capacity to waive constitutional rights.'" Before the current ascendan-
cy of conservatives on the Supreme Court, the Court defined voluntariness in
subjective terms, i.e., what defendants themselves experienced in the situation,
with their own unique capacities. 67 Former Chief Justice Burger recognized
in 1979 that "[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in
need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty or free of stigma."'"
More recently, however, the Court has rejected its own precedents and
allowed police to use deceit to obtain confessions." More significant, it has
changed from a subjective to an objective test of voluntariness, at least in the
criminal system. In its recent decision in Colorado v. Connelly, 7° the majori-
ty not only defined voluntariness to mean solely the lack of intentional police
misconduct, but rejected the entire concept of free will, at least in the context
of police interrogations.' 7' This result suggests that the legal system is sim-
ply unprepared or unwilling to tackle the problem of voluntariness as applied
to mentally disordered persons. By focusing on the conduct of others, the
individual's autonomy may simply be ignored.
VI. EXTERNAL COERCION OF CLINICIANS
Discussions of coercion rarely concern themselves with service providers.
It is assumed that providers have chosen their professions and can, therefore,
leave their jobs if the conditions become unpleasant. This view was unfortu-
nately reinforced by the president of the American Psychiatric Association in
1958, when he called for psychiatrists to abandon the state hospital system
because of its (admitted) deficiencies."
sary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their facul-
ties." Id.
165. See generally Robert D. Miller, The U.S. Supreme Court Looks at Voluntariness and
Consent, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYcinATRY 239 (1994).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
169. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the Court upheld a confession obtained
through police deception, stating that "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception." Id.
at 297.
170. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
171. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169. In ruling admissible a confession obtained from an obviously
psychotic person who said that he confessed under the commands of auditory hallucinations, the
court concluded that "notions of 'free will' have no place [in this area of constitutional law]." Id.
172. Harry Solomon, Presidential Address to the American Psychiatric Association, 115 AM.
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It is true that good clinicians can always elect to leave bad facilities or
systems. Many, however, choose to remain in the public systems that provide
mental health services to the most severely disordered patients, and continue to
treat the majority of involuntarily committed patients. The focus here is not
the coercion that they experience themselves, but rather the effects of that
coercion on the patients they treat.
A. Legal Constraints on Clinicians
1. Negligent Release and the Duty to Protect Third Parties
In the past several decades, the law has characterized clinicians as under-
cover law enforcement officials. As mental health professionals adapted to
changes in involuntary civil commitment laws and began to offer the required
predictions of dangerousness in court in order to be able to provide their ser-
vices to severely mentally disordered persons, the law has taken them at their
word, and held them responsible for such predictions in other areas. Mental
health professionals practicing in inpatient settings have for years been held
responsible for not discharging involuntary patients considered to still be dan-
gerous, and for petitioning for commitment of voluntary patients they consider
dangerous but who request discharge. The fact that they had assumed legal
custody of those patients placed upon them a concomitant burden to maintain
custody until the patients were no longer felt to be dangerous. "'
What is new is the law holding psychotherapists increasingly responsible
for controlling or reporting outpatients' behavior. The ground-breaking case
was Tarasoff,74 in which the California Supreme Court held that the special
relationship exception in the Second Restatement of Torts applied to the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship, and that when patients make threats of vio-
lence to identifiable victims, therapists have an obligation to protect those
victims. 75 Most other states have reached similar conclusions, although not
always on the same legal rationale." 6 Many clinicians predicted the death of
psychotherapy as we know it," but the research data, indirect though they
are, have not supported those predictions." One result that has been demon-
strated anecdotally but not, to date, through methodologically sound research,
is that clinicians feel compelled to initiate involuntary commitment and to
delay release of patients who they likely would have released before Tarasoff
and its progeny.
J. PsYCHIATRY 1 (1958).
173. See, e.g., Robert D. Miller et a]., Emerging Problems for Staff Associated with the Re-
lease of Potentially Dangerous Forensic Patients, 16 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 309
(1988).
174. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) (Tarasoff 11).
175. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431.
176. See generally ALAN R. FELTHOUs, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN OR PRO-
TECT (1989); CONFIDENTIAtrrY VERSUS THE DUTY TO PROTECT: FORESEEABLE HARM IN THE
PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (James Beck ed., 1990).
177. ALAN STONE, The Tarasoff Case and Some of Its Progeny: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALrrY (1984).
178. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private
Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 497 (1984).
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2. Requirements to Report Child, Domestic, and Therapist Abuse
Two types of reporting laws designed for primary care physicians rather
than psychotherapists have also led to some concern. The earlier and more
common type is the child abuse reporting laws. While versions in the fifty-one
jurisdictions vary, most require a variety of professionals to report if they have
"reason to believe" that child physical or sexual abuse has occurred.'" More
recently, several states have added a requirement to rotsexual abuse b,
previous psychotherapists," ° and domestic abuse as well.'
The child abuse reporting laws are relatively noncontroversial, as they
apply to clinicians such as pediatricians and emergency physicians who see the
victims. The problems arise when therapists treat the perpetrators, or treat
adults who were abused as children. Few child abuse reporting laws have
statutes of limitations, so the laws may mandate reporting even when the
perpetrator is dead.
Instead of serving society by treating abusers, these laws force clinicians
to betray their patients by making reports to the police, and in most states
subsequently testifying against their patients in criminal court." 2 Some treat-
ing therapists even feel compelled to give Miranda-type warnings to patients
at the onset of therapy, warning them about all the situations in which con-
fidentiality must be breached. Such warnings hardly provide the environment
179. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (Supp. 1990):
Any person specified in subsection (2) who has reasonable cause to know or suspect that
a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect or who has observed the child being
subjected to circumstances or conditions which would reasonably result in abuse or
neglect shall immediately report... such fact to the county department or local law
enforcement agency.
Subsection (2) includes physicians, nurses, and mental health professionals. Id. §§ 19-3-304(2)(a),
(i), (n). Several authors argue that mandated reporting of child abuse may give therapists leverage
with resistant patients, at the cost of upsetting the balance even more away from patients and
toward therapists. See Elizabeth Anderson et al., Coercive Uses of Mandatory Reporting in
Therapeutic Relationships, 11 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 335 (1993). Anderson and her co-authors inter-
viewed 30 therapists who had made child abuse reports concerning children or families already in
treatment with them during the previous 12 months. They found that therapists had mixed feelings
about the mandate to report many therapists resented the forced role of policeman, were con-
cerned about their legal liability, and/or blamed the patient for the predicament; other therapists
welcomed the authority under the law to effect changes in dysfunctional family systems. Id. at
342-44.
180. California requires only that psychotherapists who become aware that a patient has sexu-
al contact with a previous therapist provide the patient with a brochure prepared by the state
which describes, among many other things, administrative, civil, and other complaint procedures
and remedies. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 337, 728 (1990). Wisconsin requires that a therapist
who has reason to believe that a current client had sexual contact on or after May 16, 1996, with
a previous therapist, ask the client if he or she wants the contact reported. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.22(3)(a) (West 1996). Reports cannot be made without client consent, and clients can decide
whether to have their identities revealed in the report. Id. Immunity from liability for good faith
reporting is provided. Id. at § 940.22(5). Failure to follow the statute's requirements is a Class A
misdemeanor. Id. at § 940.22(3)(d).
181. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135(1) (West 1996) (requiring reporting of domes-
tic abuse as well as gunshot wounds and other injuries or illnesses that appear to result from crim-
inal behavior).
182. See generally Robert D. Miller & Robert Weinstock, Conflict of Interest Between Ther-




of safety and trust so essential to successful psychotherapy.
In cases in which therapists are treating adult victims of child or domestic
abuse, mandatory reporting can force patients to deal with their histories of
abuse publicly before they have been able to resolve their feelings in therapy.
The same is true in those states that require therapists to make reports when
patients tell them of abuse by previous therapists." 3
3. Antitrust Litigation
Courts had traditionally stayed out of the regulation of intraprofessional
disputes, basing their position on the "learned professions" exception.84
More recently, however, courts have decided that since medical facilities re-
ceive equipment and supplies through interstate commerce, the federal courts
have jurisdiction under antitrust law.'85 This change of policy has been used
by clinicians, including psychiatrists and psychologists, to overturn disciplinary
actions by hospital credentials and peer review committees, as well as by li-
censing boards. Sanctioned clinicians, particularly those who lost privileges or
licenses, have argued successfully, and sometimes unfortunately, that their
disciplinary actions had economic bases, to reduce competition with estab-
lished clinicians in the field. This use of antitrust litigation for covert purposes
subverts those legitimate efforts to improve the quality of clinical practice, and
the public has been justifiably concerned that internal regulatory agencies in
all professions do not adequately police their professions. Even where litiga-
tion does not overturn a disciplinary action, regulatory boards-especially
hospital-based boards, whose member clinicians are understandably reluctant
to spend their time in court rather than treating patients-are increasingly
intimidated and less willing to implement their professional judgment.
Another type of institutional coercion of both clinicians and their patients
involves competency to be executed. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment to proscribe execu-
tion of the incompetent."' This raised the issue of which methods states
could use to restore a death row inmate's competency so that the state could
execute him. Clinicians who evaluate death row inmates for competency for
execution, particularly those required to treat incompetent inmates, are placed
in an ethical dilemma,' although one can argue that for physicians to refuse
183. See generally Larry Strasburger et al., Mandatory Reporting of Sexually Exploitative
Psychotherapists, 18 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYcHIATRY & L. 379 (1990).
184. Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982) (explaining that chal-
lenged conduct of professionals is subject to "the rule of reason" versus a per se analysis under
the Sherman Act where acts are "premised on public service or ethical norms"); Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (finding that while the professions were not immune
from prosecution under the Sherman Act, the "public service aspect" versus "a pure business
aspect" of a profession justified treating acts which technically violate the law "differently').
185. Robert D. Miller, Recent Developments in Antitrust: Challenges to Medical Autonomy, in
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HosprrAL PoLiciEs AND PRACIcEs 70-71 (Robert D. Miller ed., 1989).
186. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
187. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent
for Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L.
297 (1988); see also Robert D. Miller, Evaluation of and Treatment to Competency to Be Execut-
ed: A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 67 (1988).
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to evaluate inmates who may be incompetent for execution denies the inmates
the chance to be found incompetent and avoid execution.", Professor Barba-
ra Ward argues that treating incompetent death row inmates perpetuates their
suffering, denies those who would prefer execution that right, and denies those
few who might have the ability to make substantial contributions to postcon-
viction procedures. 89
One osition statement, co-authored by physician and antideath penalty
groups, refers to involvement in the physical aspects of execution (inserting
intravenous lines, pronouncing death, etc.), but there is a section on psychiatric
participation that holds evaluation of competence for execution to be unethical
and treatment to restore competence for execution unethical except for cases
of "extreme suffering or immediate danger to life. '' "m The International
Academy of Law and Mental Health, the world's largest interdisciplinary
mental health organization, adopted the position as its own in June of
1994. 9
Some courts and legislatures have dealt substantively with the issue of
competence for execution. In Perry v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court re-
manded the case of an incompetent inmate who the state wanted to forcibly
medicate back to the Louisiana Supreme Court to consider the case in light of
Harper.93 The Louisiana court subsequently held that the state may not in-
voluntarily medicate a prisoner to render him competent for execution.'94
The court found that such practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment
under Louisiana's constitution, and violated an inmate's right to privacy.' 9
The court stated that "forcing a prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs to facili-
tate his execution does not constitute medical treatment but is antithetical to
the basic principles of the healing arts."'" Citing the Hippocratic Oath, the
court argued that forcing a physician to medicate an incompetent death row
inmate forces him to act unethically and contrary to the goals of medical treat-
ment."'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also held that forced medication
violates inmates' privacy rights,'98 and in addition two state legislatures have
also addressed the issue. The Maryland legislature stated:
If the court finds [an] inmate to be incompetent [to be executed] it
shall stay any warrant of execution.., and remand the case to the
court in which the sentence of death was imposed, which shall strike
188. See generally Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psy-
chiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35 (1986).
189. Id.
190. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ET AL., BREACH OF TRusr. PHYSICIAN PARTICIPA-
TION IN EXECUTONS IN THE UNITED STATES 31, 33 (1994) (emphasis in original).
191. Personal Communication with Gregg Bloche (July 15, 1994).
192. 498 U.S. 38 (1990).
193. Perry, 498 U.S. at 38.
194. Perry v. Louisiana, 610 So. 2d 746, 758 (La. 1992).
195. Id. at 761.
196. Id. at 751.
197. Id. at 752.
198. Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 2d 75, 87-90 (1993).
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the sentence of death and enter in its place a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole.'"
Montana law does not provide for automatic commutation of a death sentence
upon a finding of incompetence for execution, but does state that "[i]f... the
court is of the view that so much time has elapsed since the commitment of
the defendant that it would be unjust to proceed with execution of the sen-
tence, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence and may order the
defendant to be discharged."'
Regardless of a particular state's approach to execution of incompetent
inmates, however, the process is fundamentally a powerful example of clini-
cians being coerced to be agents of the state, with their "patients" again the
ultimate sufferers.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
While it is apparent that involuntary civil commitment coerces the patient,
it is less often recognized that it also coerces therapists. That can serve a
positive purpose-patients who have fears of abandonment report that they are
reassured when they are committed to treatment by a particular therapist.2"
But it can also place additional burdens on outpatient therapists, particularly in
the post-Tarasoff era. Courts are more likely to hold outpatient therapists
responsible for patients that are committed to their care than to purely volun-
tary patients.' For this, as well as ideological reasons, a significant number
of outpatient therapists do not accept committed outpatients, with the usual
result being an involuntary hospitalization that could in most cases have been
avoided if the therapist had accepted the challenge in spite of the increased
risk of liability. °3
C. Economic Coercion
This article considered direct economic coercion on patients above;'
but pressures that affect patients are increasingly applied to their treaters. As
state mental hospitals became economic liabilities, and as the private psychiat-
ric hospitals and psychiatric units in general hospitals rejected indigent pa-
tients, public hospitals assumed the character and function of warehouses.
Clinicians were still responsible for providing adequate treatment with dwin-
dling resources, and assumed the liability when it was not provided.'
199. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 75A(d)(3) (1996).
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-202(3) (1995).
201. See generally Katherine Schneider-Braus, Civil Commitment to Outpatient Psychothera-
py: A Case Study, 14 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 273 (1986).
202. See, e.g., Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or. 706 (1986).
203. See Robert D. Miller & Paul B. Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the
Least Restrictive Environment, 45 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 147 (1984).
204. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
205. See generally Robert Gibson, The Rights of Staff in the Treatment of the Mentally Il, 27
HosP. & COMMUNrrY PsycinATRY 855 (1976); Stephen Rachlin, One Right Too Many, 3 BULL.
Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 99 (1975).
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Just when the right to treatment suits appeared to have effected significant
improvements in public hospitals, however, states found ways to create new
classes of "patients" without providing the resources to provide even minimal
treatment. One example comes from Wisconsin, previously hailed for its atten-
tion to patient rights and its willingness to provide sufficient resources to
ensure adequate treatment. Recognizing that some insanity acquittees were in
effect political prisoners, and others were refusing to participate in any treat-
ment, the state mental health authority proposed legislation that would classify
acquittees as either "patients" or "detainees." "Patients" would be provided
with the full range of appropriate treatment, while "detainees" would be ware-
housed. The clinicians at the forensic facility initially supported the concept,
as the plan allowed them to concentrate their resources on treatable patients.
But when staff learned that the mental health authority, without consultation
with the staff responsible for treatment, had classified seventy-five percent of
the 200 acquittees as "detainees" (the staff put the number at twenty-five
percent) in order to cut costs, the staff openly opposed the proposed classifica-
tion. They were able to convince advocacy groups (which had also initially
supported the proposal) to oppose the legislation, and it was defeated.
More troubling is the fact that the legislatures that have created the new
sexual predator laws have not attempted to provide adequate funding for
meaningful treatment. 6 These programs place clinicians in the conundrum
of having to provide treatment to a population which engenders, arguably, the
most public and political concern, without providing the resources necessary to
effect any changes-a virtual guarantee that treatment will fail. Predictions
that sex offenders are inevitable treatment failures become self-fulfilling
prophecy, seemingly justifying indefinite commitments.
An allied offensive against sex offenders that attempts to legitimize its
punitive intent by involving psychiatrists is forced "chemical castration" of
child molesters. California Assembly Bill No. 3339, signed by Governor Wil-
son on September 17, 1996, authorizes judges to require convicted child mo-
lesters to take medroxyprogesterone acetate (Depo-Provera),' a medication
that reduces the level of testosterone, the male hormone, in a dose-dependent
fashion. The FDA has not approved the medication for use with male sex
offenders. The California law requires no medical evaluation to determine if
the medication is safe to administer, or clinically indicated. Depo-Provera has
been shown to be effective with perhaps ten percent of sex offenders-those
with abnormally high sexual arousal or sexual fantasy levels.'
206. Washington State opened its unit with virtually no staff. See Young v. Weston, 898 F.
Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). One of the reasons that the Kansas Supreme Court rejected its
state's law, see Matter of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), was because when the first "pa-
tient" was committed, there was no program at all in place. See American Psychiatric Ass'n, Posi-
tion Statement on the Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1468 (1967). Proposed
legislation in Colorado also has woefully inadequate funding.
207. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The law mandates treatment for
parolees convicted of a second offense involving a child under 13. Id. § 645(b).
208. See, e.g., David Barry & J. Richard Ciccone, Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of
Aggressive Sexual Offenders: Preliminary Report of Three Cases, 3 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 179 (1975); John M.W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual Offenders, I1
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The Colorado legislature is currently debating a bill based on the Califor-
nia law. It adds a number of medications as possible alternatives to Depo-
Provera, none of which are FDA-approved for male sex offenders, most of
which have not been shown to have any efficacy with such patients, and one
of which is not even legal to prescribe in the United States. Like the Califor-
nia law, it requires judges to sentence child molesters to treatment without




In similar circumstances, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v.
Gauntlet 21 0 overturned a judge's sentence of forced Depo-Provera treatment
as a condition of probation, finding the condition punitive, unlawful, and coer-
cive, " as well as virtually impossible to perform with informed "con-
sent." ' Further, the court held that "Depo-Provera treatment fails as a law-
ful condition of probation because it has not gained acceptance in the medical
community as a safe and reliable medical procedure. 2 3 Apparently this
court's reasoning did not impress California or Colorado legislators.
Luckily, few mental health professionals will fall into the legal quagmire
of determining "competence" to "consent" to Depo-Provera treatment. Many
more, however, will face issues of providing adequate care in the world of
managed care. Parity for insurance coverage was discussed above,2"4 but here
I am concerned with the pressures that many managed care corporations place
on employee/clinicians and the concomitant inferior care received by the sup-
posed clients of the corporation. Managed care, in its single-minded attention
to the bottom line, has "deprofessionalized" mental health care to an unprece-
dented degree. Front line mental health services are typically provided by
therapists with bachelor's or at best master's degrees, with access to psychia-
trists (who remain the only practitioners capable of diagnosing biological
mental disorders and providing medications and other physical treatments that
such patients require) severely limited by financial penalties for "excess" refer-
rals.
215
Edward Hanin and Harold Schwartz cite data on medication reimburse-
BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159 (1983); John Money, Use of an Androgen-depleting
Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offenders, 6 J. SEx RES. 165 (1970). These articles are
representative of the literature which fails to condone using anti-androgen medication for "chemi-
cal castration." Note that a California parolee can avoid Depo-Provera treatment by voluntarily
undergoing a "permanent, surgical alternative." CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(e).
209. See Robert D. Miller, The Forced Administration of Sex-drive Reducing Medications to
Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, in PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW (forthcom-
ing 1998).
210. 134 Mich. App. 737 (1984).
211. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 747-50.
212. Id. at 751.
213. Id. at 750.
214. See supra note 151 and accompanying texL
215. See, e.g., Edward Hanin, The Regulating Effect of the Managed Care Movement, in PSY-
CHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA AND SPECIAL
INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THERAPIES 147-69 (Harold Schwartz ed., 1994); Harold Schwartz, The
Impact of Cost-Containment Measures on Somatic Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER
FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GovERNmENr, THE MEDIA AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THER-
APIES 135-46 (Harold Schwartz ed., 1994)..
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ment caps, capitation, prospective drug use review, restricted formularies,
preferred pharmacy networks, copayment plans, "economic credentialling," and
the use of nonmedical professionals to screen mentally disordered patients. 16
Although comprehensive data are not yet available, Dr. Schwartz presents data
from a number of studies that suggest that these practices limit the appropriate
use of psychiatrists and psychiatric somatic treatments on nonclinical bas-
es." 7 Psychiatrists who have actively Opposed Such rati arcrt
motivated in part by their own economic self interests, but they chose their
professions in larger part to provide service to mentally disordered persons,
and are systematically being prevented from doing so by purely economic -
factors. But psychiatrists often find themselves in the dilemma of obeying their
masters on possible penalty of losing their jobs, while simultaneously risking
malpractice suits for delivering care that they themselves know is inade-
quate.
218
A number of cases have addressed the responsibility of managed care
organizations to provide adequate medical care. In Wickline v. State,2 9 the
California Court of Appeals held that Medi-Cal was not liable when a physi-
cian discharged a patient too soon and post-operative complications en-
sued,' but it did observe that "[tihird party payers of health care services
can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result
from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mecha-
nisms." In Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California,"' Blue Cross retro-
spectively denied payment for several hospitalizations, arguing that the hospi-
tal had not provided adequate records to justify the hospitalizations. 2 The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's verdict for the plaintiff,
including punitive damages, holding that Blue Cross failed to make reasonable
efforts to obtain adequate information.? In Harrell v. Total Health Care,
Inc.,224 the Missouri Court of Appeals found that a state statute exempting a
managed care entity from liability for negligence was constitutional, and that
the legislature could distinguish between hospitals, which are liable for negli-
gence in selecting and supervising staff, and managed care entities, which are
not.m
216. Id.
217. Schwartz, supra note 215.
218. Id.; see also Paul Appelbaum, Legal Liability and Managed Care, 48 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 251 (1993).
219. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
220. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672. The court stated:
This court appreciates that what is at issue here is the effect of cost containment pro-
grams upon the professional judgment of physicians to prescribe hospital treatment for
patients requiring the same. While we recognize, realistically, that cost consciousness
has become a permanent feature of the health care system, it is essential that cost limita-
tion programs not be permitted to corrupt medical judgment We have concluded, from
the facts in issue here, that in this case it did not.
Id.
221. 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1988).
222. Hughes, 245 Cal. Rpr. at 276-77.
223. Id. at 279.
224. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
225. Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 62-64.
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D. Internal Moral Coercion on Clinicians
The legal concept of rights under which legal activists operate is a rela-
tively recent historical phenomenon, but it *has become so dominant in the
United States that it is taken for granted. Although individual rights have lost
some of their preeminent status recently, attempts to utilize different concepts
of rights have met with rejection by the prevailing culture. Under the Greek
theory of natural rights,' which established the original basis for the prac-
tice of medicine, the "wise man," a category which included the physician,
had the duty to restore patients to physical and mental health so that they
could fulfill their obligations as citizens. Those afflicted with mental or physi-
cal illnesses had a concomitant responsibility to cooperate with their physi-
cians by following their orders.
Talcott Parsons, in his discussion of the "sick role,"' followed the
Greek concept by arguing that there are four aspects of the social expectation
system relative to the sick role: 1) an exemption from normal social role re-
sponsibilities, with such exemption requiring legitimization, ultimately by
physicians, and imposing obligations on the patient; 2) no expectation that the
sick person can get well by an act of decision or will; 3) definition of the
illness as an undesirable state, and desire by the patient to get well; and 4) a
requirement that the patient seek technically competent help and cooperate
with the helper in trying to get well. Because of "secondary gain," a patient
may be motivated to continue the privileges and exemptions of the sick
role."5 Just as it is the patient's obligation to cooperate in getting well, it is
the physician's obligation to "do his part" in helping the patient to get well.
Parsons did not explicitly consider the societal obligations of the physician to
restore his patients to health, so that they may (in Parsons' words) become
"functional" again.'
Physicians, including psychiatrists, continue to be socialized in their train-
ing to be responsible for the health of their patients, although the sense of
responsibility is usually so covert as to be almost subliminal. When they ac-
cept patients-particularly patients that are legally committed to their
care-who refuse the prescribed treatment-especially if they do so because
they deny the very disorder for which treatment is being recommended-it
places physicians in a considerable, if usually unexamined, ethical and profes-
sional bind.
226. See Leonard Kaplan & Robert D. Miller, Law, Psychiatry and Rights, presented at the
15th International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Jerusalem, Israel (June 26, 1989) (on file
with author).
227. TALcOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-79 (1951).
228. Goffman first discussed impression management by apparently mentally disordered per-
sons. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
Subsequent controlled research studies verify that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia are quite
capable of varying their behavior and reported thinking, depending on their goals in the situation.
See Benjamin Braginski & Dorothea Braginski, Schizophrenic Patients in the Psychiatric Inter-
view: An Experimental Study of Their Effectiveness at Manipulation, 31 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL.
543 (1967); Mark Sherman et al., Impression Management in the Psychiatric Interview: Quality,
Style, and Individual Differences, 43 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 867 (1975).
229. PARSONS, supra note 227.
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Nonmedical mental health professionals are socialized in different ways
and are, as a result, demonstrably less authoritarian in their relationships with
their clients.230 Nonpsychiatric physicians are subject to the same profession-
al pressures as are psychiatrists; but they have several escape clauses not
available to psychiatrists. Most important, with rare exceptions, patients are
not legally committed to nonpsychiatric physicians. Those doctors, therefore,
have the option of terminating the physician-patient relationship with patients
that refuse to accept their recommendations. Nonpsychiatric physicians also
frequently will not treat mentally disordered patients even for their
nonpsychiatric illnesses, referring them instead to psychiatrists.
VII. DIscussIoN
We live in a society in which coercion-governmental and private, overt
and covert, subtle and dramatic-impacts on everyone in some way or anoth-
er, but mentally disordered persons are perhaps subject to more coercion than
most other groups. In order to utilize the benefits of coercion while minimiz-
ing the negative, socially unproductive effects, it is essential that all types of
coercion be considered. It is not sufficient to examine part of the elephant and
conclude that the problems are understood, much less solved. Legal rights are
certainly important, but they remain only one small part of the picture. Single-
minded attention to legal rights has led to increases in other types of coercion
of mentally disordered persons that are at times arguably worse than the abol-
ished or modified coercion.23'
Before the civil rights litigation of the 1960s and '70s, psychiatrists large-
ly called the shots in dealing with mentally disordered persons. They resisted
intrusion by the courts into what they considered areas of clinical expertise.
They resented restrictive civil commitment statutes, the recognition of a right
to refuse treatment, and various reporting dutiesY2 By staking out a narrow
230. See Frank Baker & Herbert Schulberg, The Development of a Community Mental Health
Ideology Scale, 3 COMMUNrrY MENTAL HEALTH J. 216 (1967); Robert Langston, Community
Mental Health Centers and Community Mental Health Ideology, 6 CoMMUNrrY MENTAL HEALTH
J. 387 (1970). Even the terms by which different mental health professionals refer to the mentally
disordered persons whom they treat demonstrate significant conceptual differences: medically-
trained clinicians (psychiatrists and nurses) use the term "patient," while nonmedical clinicians
(psychologists, social workers, and other therapists) prefer "client."
231. In a classic paper, Penrose argued that the distribution of "socially undesirable" persons
in prisons or mental hospitals depends on the availability of hospitals and the thoroughness of the
psychiatric evaluations. See generally L.S. Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Com-
parative Study of European Statistics, 18 BRrr. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 1 (1939). His observations have
come to be called the "hydraulic theory," which holds that societal tolerance for deviant behavior
is limited, and that if one repository for such persons is reduced (e.g., limiting involuntary psychi-
atric hospitalization,) another (e.g., incarceration in the criminal justice system) will expand to
respond to the social need. While the situation he described is certainly unfortunate, it is also the
reality that must be fully considered in analyzing coercion.
232. In the Council of the American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the Ade-
quacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1967), the Council rebuffed judicial efforts to
establish a right to treatment, stating, "The definition of treatment and the appraisal of its adequa-
cy are matters for medical determination. Final authority with respect to interpreting the law on
the subject rests with the courts." The American Psychiatric Association for years steadfastly op-
posed court inquiry into such matters, and in fact refused to submit a brief to the court in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), recommending clinical standards when requested to
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territory, attorneys and advocates wrested hegemony over those aspects of
mental health care that impinged on civil rights. Activist patient groups have
rejected the goals of both clinicians and advocates in favor of just being left
alone. 3 Groups representing families of mentally disordered persons, such
as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, have supported easier access to
treatment, and have generally sided with the psychiatrists. The National Men-
tal Health Association has supported legal rights in some situations and clini-
cal rights in others.
Addressing unproductive coercion effectively will require collaboration
among all the groups concerned with mentally disordered persons. The ex-
tremists in each camp must moderate their positions and be willing to com-
promise or they remain a major part of the problem, rather than the solution.
Adversarial roles will continue to be important in individual cases, but as they,
by definition, ignore the larger systemic issues, they do not contribute to sys-
tem solutions. 34 Litigation will still be necessary in individual situations in
which the legislative and executive branches of government are unwilling to
provide adequate resources. It is not, however, sufficient to deal with
multisystem problems, especially with the "hands off" policies currently in
vogue in federal courts. Legislative action will be essential, and legislators are
more responsive when all the interest groups concerned are in accord.
There must be some common ground among those groups for progress to
be made. One axiom that must be accepted is that mental illness is not a myth,
and that at least some mental disorders are biological diseases that respond to
do so. Fortunately, the APA has changed its position significantly since those days, and now reg-
ularly submits amicus briefs to the Supreme Court on issues involving mentally disordered per-
sons, and assists local chapters of the Association in state and lower federal court cases.
233. The problem, of course, is that if "left alone" by the mental health system, their behavior
will not allow the mentally disordered to be left alone by the many other systems of social con-
trol, such as the police, social services, etc. If they choose the latter course competently, then that
choice should certainly be respected. The conflict arises when the mentally disordered make self-
destructive choices based on treatable mental disorders. The issue is not merely an individual's
right to privacy, because most mentally disordered persons who are not committed to psychiatric
treatment, or who are committed but not required to take medication, consume governmental re-
sources that would not be required if they were to be treated effectively, even against their stated
wishes.
234. When the author served as director of the admissions unit at a state mental hospital, he
organized regular meetings with the chief judge, sheriff, police chief, district attorney's office,
public defender's office, community mental health center director, and social services liaison for
the hospital's major catchment area, to coordinate plans for a small but very difficult population of
mentally disordered persons who bounced back and forth among all the social systems in the area.
Before the meetings, no system would accept responsibility for these patients, and there was noth-
ing resembling continuity of care. At the meetings, individual treatment plans were developed for
each person. Outpatient and inpatient mental health services, as well as correctional and social
service involvement, were apportioned according to the behavior and degree of mental disorder of
each person. As a result, the systems were able to.work together with these very difficult patients,
rather than dumping them back and forth amongst themselves. The severity of mental disorder and
the criminal behaviors both decreased significantly, and remained at a low level over time.
235. The parity legislation discussed above in note 151 passed despite significant dissention
among the various mental health professional groups. Psychiatrists (who had the most to gain,
since the disorders covered are those usually treated with psychotropic medications) supported the
legislation, while other clinical organizations either abstained or opposed the legislation. Such
guild-based dissention highlights the various mental health professions' economic interests in
parity and similar legislation, and thereby significantly weakens the credibility of its advocates.
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treatment with medications and other organic methods.2" Another is that
mental disorders vary significantly in their severity and in their effects on
individual patients' autonomy. A third is that the goal of treatment must be to
restore patients' autonomy, and that patients' wishes must be respected as
much as possible, as the more voluntary and collaborative the treatment, the
more effective it is likely to prove.237 It is here that the findings of procedur-
aljustice research are particularly important-psychiatrists have not tradition-
ally been trained to listen to their patients' wishes in areas of biological treat-
ment; when they do so, many of the problems disappear.
23S
Planning groups must consider the ripple effects of litigation and legisla-
tion, and avoid disasters such as deinstitutionalization which resulted in pa-
tients being "involuntarily communitized 239 before adequate resources in the
community were available. One current example of similar problems is the
movement to reverse the criminalization of mentally disordered persons
through jail diversion programs.2' As with the deinstitutionalization of civil
psychiatric hospitals, there is considerable consensus that many mentally disor-
dered inmates charged with minor crimes do not belong in jail. It is not diffi-
cult to remove mentally disordered persons from jails; what is difficult is to
find a place to send them. Those diversion programs that are effective work
because there are community mental health facilities willing to accept the
responsibility of treating those diverted.241
The placement of mentally disordered prison inmates is even more diffi-
cult. Many inmates committed crimes in part because they could or would not
236. Psychotherapy is not usually as effective as medication under coercive conditions,
though Katherine Schneider-Braus would disagree. See Schneider-Braus, supra note 201. Dr.
Schneider-Braus reported that her patient became more invested in treatment after being commit-
ted, because she felt that the therapist was also committed to her under the court order, and thus
would not abandon her. Id.
237. Medications are effective with noncooperative-but not with non-compliant-patients.
Hiday and Scheid-Cook have reported that patients involuntarily committed to outpatient treat-
ment, including court orders for medication, were highly compliant with the medication, but long-
term treatment necessitates that patients accept their need for medication and take it because they
know that it helps them, not because of a court order. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 63.
238. A careful reading of Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. NJ. 1978), indicates that
Rennie was not so much refusing treatment as he was specific medications that the psychiatrist
was prescribing for him. It is possible that had the psychiatrist been more receptive to Rennie's
preferences, there might never have been a legal case.
239. Stephen Rachlin, With Liberty and Psychosis for All, 48 PsYCHIATRIC Q. 410, 410
(1974).
240. See STEADMAN Er AL., supra note 79.
241. See id. Steadman and his co-authors make a persuasive case that jails are part of the
community, and therefore inmates should receive mental health care from community mental
health centers. Where the centers accept the responsibility to provide treatment to persons involved
with the criminal justice system, diversion is quite effective. Even when community centers are
willing to become involved, however, obstacles remain. For example, many states indemnify local
service providers from liability that arises from treatment of such patients; but the Colorado state
constitution prohibits such protections:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township or school district shall lend or
pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of,
any person, company or corporation, public or private, for any amount, or for any pur-
pose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any person,
company or corporation, public or private, in or out of the state.
COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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receive treatment in the community. As difficult as it is to obtain treatment
before a felony conviction, the convicted felon is even less likely to receive
treatment, in part because community mental health centers justifiably fear lia-
bility if the future parolee commits additional violent acts. As a result of these
obstacles, the sad reality is that many mentally disordered persons receive
better mental health care in prisons than they do in the community, and the
lack of community facilities willing to accept parolees prolongs their incarcer-
ations. Approaches to this problem require cooperation between the local and
state correctional systems, the state and community mental health systems, and
often the legislature as well. When all elements work together, diversion pro-
grams are demonstrably effective.
Areas in which interdisciplinary cooperation can reduce unnecessary coer-
cion of mentally disordered persons include providing relevant information to
legislatures and state bureaucracies concerning requirements to report confi-
dential information about patients (such as the duties to protect third persons,
and to report child, elder and domestic abuse) and other legislation affecting
mentally disordered persons such as sexual predator acts, chemical castration,
and changes in civil commitment law. Further, professional licensing boards
should be furnished current data in areas such as the medically appropriate use
of anti-anxiety, psychostimulant, and narcotic medications.
A combination of the concepts of procedural justice and therapeutic juris-
prudence would seem to provide the best hope of stimulating the interdisci-
plinary and cross-system collaboration which is essential if meaningful an-
swers to the problems of coercion in all its guises are to be successfully ad-
dressed.
VIII. SUMMARY
Those genuinely concerned with mentally disordered persons can no lon-
ger afford to specialize in one part of the problem. The majority of coercion
currently experienced by mentally disordered persons does not come from
direct state action, and efforts to convince the federal courts to create new
legal rights to community-based treatment are not meeting with the success
that earlier suits against hospitals did. Thus, the adversarial approach (even
when the clinician defendants actually agree with the complaints) 2 is not
only divisive, but has lost much of its effectiveness in reducing total coercion.
The social and economic problems responsible for most coercion in practice
can be dealt with only through interdisciplinary cooperation.
The apparent conflict between legal and clinical rights is more illusory
than real; observation of legal rights does not need to interfere with the provi-
sion of clinical rights. In fact, the two can work together as long as each side
considers the broader systemic issues discussed in this article. It is only when
extremists on either side ignore the rest of the elephant that problems occur.
Appropriate recognition of the civil rights of mentally disordered persons has
led to greater autonomy, as well as better treatment, for patients. But when
242. See Conference Report, supra note 142, at 124.
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ideologues refuse to listen to other viewpoints, and act as if their positions are
the only acceptable ones, problems will and do occur. Libertarians cannot
continue to use legal methods as covert abolitionist techniques to coerce their
ideological opponents (and even their supposed "clients" at times); and clini-
cians cannot continue to undermine the observation of legitimate patient rights.
This is not a plea by a clinician to return to the "good old days" before
the courts began to take an active interest in mental health issues. Judicial
oversight is important symbolically as well as practically, even where judges
defer to clinical judgments. The major problems with the current due process
protections is not that they prevent needed treatment, but that they delay it
excessively.243 As with justice, "treatment delayed"2" may be better than
no treatment at all; but that should not be the choice.
243. The time period between clinicians' requests for court hearings on involuntary medica-
tions vary, but are usually measured in weeks to months. See Miller et al., supra note 55.
244. Pierce County v. Western State Hosp., 97 Wash. 2d 264, 270 (1982) (stating that
"[tireatment delayed and inadequate must surely be better than no treatment at all," and ordering
Washington State Hospital to cease its moratorium on admissions in spite of severe overcrowding
which resulted in patients sleeping on cots in halls).
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EXPLOITATION AND COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
ALAN WERTHEIMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial surrogacy has been criticized on many grounds. It has been
argued that surrogacy is baby-selling, that it is harmful to the children born to
surrogates, that it is harmful to many other children whose sense of security is
undermined by the practice, and that it is harmful to women as a class.' An-
other line of argument maintains that surrogacy involves the wrongful
"commodification" of procreational labor, or that it violates the Kantian max-
im that persons should never be treated merely as means but always as ends in
themselves.2
In addition to and often intermixed with these (and other) arguments, it is
frequently said that surrogacy exploits the surrogate mothers. "[O]nce money
enters into the arrangement [the] possibilities of exploitation are everywhere."3
"One of the most serious charges against surrogate motherhood contracts is
that they exploit women.' '. "The prohibition on payments may be understood
as protecting... women-especially poor, single women-from being ex-
ploited.., paid 'breeding stock."' 5 Despite the frequency with which these
claims are made, they are typically advanced without much analysis or argu-
ment. In this paper I examine commercial surrogacy in light of some of the
* John G. McCullough Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont B.A.,
New York University, 1964; Ph.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1968. This paper is an ab-
breviated and slightly rewritten version of Chapter Four. Commercial Surrogacy, of my book
ExPLOrrATION (1996) (Copyright © 1996 by Princeton University Press).
1. For an argument which focuses on the effects of surrogacy on women as a class, see
Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1992). Apart
from other effects on women as a class, the legitimation of surrogacy might impose psychic costs
on many women, especially poor women, who would then have to treat the decision not to be a
surrogate as a constant foregone opportunity to earn additional income for their family. See Henry
Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 57 (1989).
2. Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990).
For a critique of this view, see Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 132 (1992).
3. PETER SINGER & DEANE WE. s, THE REPRODUCiE REVOLUION 125 (1984).
4. MARTHA FEWD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25 (1988).
5. Alexander M. Capron & Margaret J. Radin, Choosing Family Law Over Contract as a
Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLrrMCS AND PRIVACY 59,
62 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). "But the core reality of surrogate motherhood is that it is both classist
and sexist: a method to obtain children genetically related to white males by exploiting poor wom-
en." George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POL1-
TICS AND PRIVACY 43, 43 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). "Mhe danger of exploitation of one human
being by another appears... to outweigh the potential benefits in almost every case." MARY
WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE 46 (1985).
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distinctions advanced in my introductory paper. I ask whether surrogacy is a
case of harmful exploitation or mutually advantageous exploitation and wheth-
er there are good reasons to think that surrogacy arrangements are typically
nonconsensual. The discussion of commercial surrogacy will also allow us to
sharpen the distinction between the truth conditions of an exploitation claim
and the moral force of exploitation. For even if surrogacy is exploitative, we
must ask whether such exploitation provides good reasons for prohibiting or
refusing to enforce surrogacy contracts.
I. IS SURROGACY EXPLOITATIVE?
Putting aside the possibility that surrogacy is not exploitative at all, there
appear to be two possible answers. On one view, surrogacy is a case of harm-
ful exploitation. The intended parents gain from the transaction while the
surrogate makes a "grave self-sacrifice."' On a second view, surrogacy is a
case of mutually advantageous exploitation. Both the intended parents and the
surrogate gain from the transaction but the distribution of those gains is unfair
to the surrogate There is, however, a third view, one which is difficult to
locate in terms of the distinction between harmful exploitation and mutually
advantageous exploitation. On this view, surrogacy is exploitative because the
intended parents gain from a transaction that is fundamentally immoral. For
want of a better term, call this moralistic exploitation! Because I believe that
moralistic objections to surrogacy must involve some sort of harm to the sur-
rogate if they are to ground a claim of exploitation, I shall consider harmful
exploitation under the rubrics of nonmoral harm and moral harm before going
on to consider mutually advantageous exploitation.
Ill. SURROGACY As HARMFUL EXPLOITATION
Nonmoral harm
It has been argued that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate in straight-
forward nonmoral terms.' But here we must be careful. In deciding whether
surrogacy is harmful, we must adopt an all-things-considered and ex ante
conception of harm. There are, after all, negative elements in virtually all
6. Anderson, supra note 2, at 87.
7. For example, it has been argued that surrogacy is exploitative because "the interests of
wealthy contracting couples are better served than those of the surrogates." Baby M and the Surro-
gate Motherhood Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 1013, 1024 (1987).
8. 1 do not mean "moralistic" in its derisive sense, in which it connotes a narrow moral
attitude, but to refer to arguments that go to the intrinsic immorality of a practice rather than the
gains and losses to the parties.
9. "Since there is evidence that surrogacy arrangements ... harm contracted mothers ... a
ban on commercial surrogacy needs to rely only on the harm principle [as opposed to legal moral-
ism]." Rosemarie Tong, The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Sur-
rogacy Arrangements, 21 J. Soc. PHIL. 40, 47 (1990). As it stands, this is a non sequitur. After
all, if surrogacy is harmful but consensual, a ban on commercial surrogacy cannot rely only on
some version of the Millian harm (to others) principle; it would need to rely on a principle of
paternalism. But the present question is not whether the surrogate is harmed with her consent, but
whether she is harmed at all.
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uncontroversially beneficial transactions. Paying money for a good that is
clearly worth the price is still a negative element in the transaction. It would
be better to get it for free. So the question is not whether surrogacy has harm-
ful elements, but whether it is harmful, all things considered, or a net harm.
We know that some surrogates, such as Mary Beth Whitehead, have regarded
their experience as a surrogate as harmful, all things considered. '° But this is
largely irrelevant to a general assessment of surrogacy even if we assume that
retrospective judgments are accurate indicators in an individual case. For the
question is not whether surrogacy is a net harm in a given case, but whether it
is typically or ex ante a net harm.
Surrogacy presents a particularly difficult context for making an all-
things-considered judgment because some of the crucial benefits and harms are
difficult if not impossible to measure and vary substantially from person to
person. On the positive side of the ledger, we have to put the value of the
monetary compensation and whatever psychological gratification the surrogate
obtains from the process. These benefits may or may not be considerable.
There is much that might appear on the debit side of the ledger: the risk of
physical harm or death resulting from the pregnancy or delivery, the inconve-
niences and discomfort associated with a normal pregnancy, and perhaps most
important, the psychic cost of the surrender of the baby to the intended par-
ents."1
At this point, the defender of surrogacy might reply that the ex ante value
of the surrogacy arrangement simply could not be negative, for, if that were
so, women would not agree to serve as a surrogates. But that is false. That a
woman agrees to serve as a surrogate does not show that the ex ante value of
surrogacy is positive; it only shows that she thought it would be positive. She
may have miscalculated, perhaps because surrogates are unable to make accu-
rate predictions of their future psychological reactions. Thus, it is possible that
surrogacy is harmful to most surrogates even though most surrogates believe it
will be beneficial.
In addition, it might be argued that most surrogates are objectively
harmed by their experience, even if they do not feel harmed. It is a common-
place that B's interests-as B defines them-can be harmed even if B is un-
aware that the harm has occurred. For example, B's self-acknowledged interest
in her reputation or the fidelity of her spouse can be damaged by libel or
infidelity, even if she is unaware that either has occurred. More controversial-
ly, it may be argued that a person's objective interests can be harmed even if
she does not now and never will regard these interests as her interests.
Given all this, is surrogacy ex ante harmful, all things considered? In view
of our limited factual knowledge and unresolved theoretical controversies over
10. See ELIZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER (1988); MARY BETH WHrrEHEAD, A MOTHER'S
STORY-THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989).
11. A surrogacy contract may stipulate that the surrogate agrees to refrain from alcohol,
tobacco, illicit drugs, and other risky activities. Although these restrictions are not independent
harms to the surrogate--they may be beneficial-they do represent restrictions on her freedom and
in that sense can be understood as costs.
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what counts as objective harm, I am inclined to think that we should now
remain agnostic.
Suppose that most surrogates are worse off for the experience, all things
considered. Could surrogacy be made advantageous, all things considered, if
the monetary compensation were higher? If we are operating in the territory of
the surrogate's nonmoral interests, I think it is entirely possible, nay inevitable,
that a sufficiently large increase in compensation would convert a net harm
into a net benefit for many women. Moreover, if surrogacy is typically mutu-
ally advantageous but unjust, this unfairness can be remedied in the same way.
Yet, and unlike other contexts in which it is uncontroversial that exploitation
can be negated by increasing the value received by the exploited party, it is
rarely argued that surrogacy would be less exploitative if the surrogate were
paid more. In fact, unpaid surrogacy is often thought to be less exploitative
than paid surrogacy. Among the critiques of surrogacy, higher pay is the dog
that doesn't bark.
Moral harm
Why does the higher pay dog not bark? I suspect that a wage increase is
rarely advanced as a solution to the alleged exploitativeness of commercial
surrogacy because it is thought that procreative labor should not be exchanged
for money, because the commodification of procreative labor is immoral."
And if procreative labor should not be exchanged for any money, it will not
improve things to exchange procreational labor for more money. But if, as I
have argued, the wrong of exploitation always involves a defect in the values
exchanged, the task is to see whether this perspective can be related to exploi-
tation. There are two ways in which the connection might be drawn: one fo-
cuses on the incommensurability of the values exchanged; the other focuses on
commodification.
For present purposes, I shall focus on the second idea. The
commodification argument maintains that whereas some goods and services
(for example, automobiles, houses, books, and at least some forms of labor)
are appropriately exchanged for money, other goods and services (for example,
citizenship, human beings, criminal justice, marriage rights) should not be
exchanged for money. 3 On this view, surrogacy is exploitative not because it
comes too cheap, but because it commodifies a form of labor that should not
be exchanged for money at all. 4
12. It is also possible that higher pay is not advanced as a solution because the very receipt
of monetary compensation may actually cause some of the psychological harm experienced by
surrogate mothers, for example, because they feel that they are doing something "sleazy." If so,
increasing the compensation may only make things worse on this score.
13. They should be treated as "blocked exchanges." See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JusTIcE 100 (1983).
14. Elizabeth Anderson states:
Commercial surrogacy attempts to transform what is specifically women's labor-the
work of bringing forth children into the world-into a commodity. It does so by replac-
ing the parental norms which usually govern the practice of gestating children with the
economic norms which govern ordinary production processes. The application of com-
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Now I suspect that some of the rhetorical force of the commodification
argument derives from linguistic aesthetics. Who could support something as
ugly as the com-mod-i-fi-ca-tion of procreational labor? But even if we as-
sume, arguendo, that it is wrong to commodify procreational labor, it does not
follow that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate. That is a different claim. So
on the assumption that the commodification of procreational labor is wrong,
we must ask whether the commodification of the surrogate's labor is: (1)
harmful to the surrogate's objective nonmoral interests, (2) harmful to the
surrogate because she is participating in an immoral activity, or (3) wrong but
not harmful to the surrogate.
It might be thought that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate because
being treated as a commodity injures one's self-respect. It might also be
claimed that a person can lose the respect of others or be degraded in their
eyes even if she does not lose self-respect or become degraded in her own
eyes. But that raises at least two points. First, it is not clear that surrogacy
actually does have these effects. Second, to the extent that these effects stem
solely from the way surrogacy is regarded by the society-as a matter of fact
and without separate normative justification-it is not clear that it represents a
basis for condemning the practice rather than a basis for condemning society's
reaction.
Still, it might be argued that surrogacy harms the surrogate's objective
interests because it violates her rights, independent of any other physical,
economic, psychological, or social harm. If a woman has a right not to have
her labor commodified, then surrogacy is harmful precisely because it is a
violation of her rights. The problem here, of course, is that many acts that
would violate B's rights if done without B's consent do not violate B's rights
if done with B's consent. To put the point in Kantian terms, we do not treat a
person merely as a means rather than an end-in-herself if she consents to be
treated in that way. So the commodification of procreational labor is no obvi-
ous violation of the Kantian maxim if the commodification of the surrogate's
labor is consensual-absent some additional argument, for example, that the
rights involved are inalienable or that the consent is defective in some impor-
tant respect.'5
Suppose that we grant that the commodification of procreational labor
constitutes an objective harm to the surrogate. Still, it would not follow that
surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate, all things considered. Surrogacy would
produce a net harm to the surrogate only if the degree of harm that results
from the commodification of her procreational labor is greater than the ben-
efits that she received from the commodification of her labor and that has not
mercial norms to women's labor reduces the surrogate mothers from persons worthy of
respect and consideration to objects of mere use.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 80.
15. It might be argued that surrogacy commodities-and violates the Kantian maxim with
respect to--the child who, after all, does not consent to the arrangement. Although I do not see
how surrogacy could be harmful to the child who, after all, would not otherwise exist but for the
surrogacy arrangement, the present discussion is confined to the claim that surrogacy is harmful to
the surrogate mother.
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been shown. Moreover, increasing the compensation would arguably offset
such harm.
It may be argued, at this point, that surrogacy is injurious to the surrogate
not because she is treated badly, but because she participates in something
wrong. On this view, surrogacy is bad for the surrogate because it is bad for
her character. But here we must be particularly careful. It does not follow thatJust IMcas it.. is 1°  *_a ... +; ; " hn
jutbcas .tisbdt parti ate in something wrong that it is bad for the
person's interest to participate in something wrong. Still, to the extent that one
does have an interest in one's moral character, then participating in an im-
moral activity may be harmful to that person. 6 But, and once again, even if
we accept this line of argument, it is not clear that the harmful moral elements
necessarily outweigh the beneficial nonmoral elements, at least if we also
assume that surrogacy is otherwise advantageous to the surrogate. 7 Unless it
is assumed that the moral aspect of well-being always trumps the nonmoral
aspects of well-being, it is possible that the nonmoral aspect in which the
immoral choice is beneficial to the chooser's well-being is more weighty than
the moral aspect in which it is not.'
In the final analysis, I am inclined to think that it is very difficult to argue
that surrogacy is harmful to the surrogate because surrogacy is wrong qua
commodification. Commodification may be better understood as a basis for
thinking that surrogacy is wrong for reasons unrelated to the interests of the
surrogate and, therefore, unrelated to worries about exploitation of the surro-
gate.
Suppose that I am wrong. Suppose that the commodification argument
does support the claim that surrogacy is exploitative. The moral force of that
argument would still have to be resolved. For if surrogacy is wrong and ex-
ploitative because it commodifies that which should not be commodified, it
does not follow that surrogacy should be prohibited or that surrogacy contracts
should not be enforceable.
IV. SURROGACY AS MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS EXPLOITATION
Suppose that the typical surrogate is not harmed by surrogacy or would
not be harmed if the compensation were higher. All things considered, surro-
gacy is or would be a mutually advantageous transaction. Still, surrogacy
might be a case of mutually advantageous exploitation if the transaction were
16. Now even if this sort of moral harm is possible, it is not clear to whom it applies. On
the one hand, we might say, with Plato, that all persons have an interest in being moral whether or
not they themselves believe they have such an interest. Or we might say, with Feinberg, that only
those who desire to be good persons have an interest in being good persons and can therefore be
morally harmed. See JOEL FEiNBERG, HARM TO OTHERs 65-70 (1984).
17. It is also not clear whether an increase in compensation to the surrogate would yield an
increase in the amount of moral harm or whether the degree of moral harm is inelastic with re-
spect to price.
18. We could think that moral considerations trump nonmoral considerations with respect to
what B should do without thinking that moral considerations tump nonmoral considerations with
respect to what is good for B. See THOMAs NAGEL, THE VIEw FROM NOwHERE 189-207 (1986)
(discussing the connection between "living right" and "living well").
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unfair to the surrogate. The problem, of course, is that if we are going to say
that a transaction is exploitative because it is insufficiently beneficial to the
exploited party, we may reasonably be asked to specify the criteria by which
we are making this assessment. This is a difficult matter.
It is, for example, frequently said that a fair transaction is one in which
both parties gain (roughly) equally. On that account, we can say that a surro-
gate is exploited if she receives less value from the transaction than the in-
tended parents. Unfortunately, this definition of a fair transaction is clearly
wrong. If a physician performs a procedure (for a normal price) that saves a
patient's life, we do not say that the physician has been exploited because the
patient has gained far more from the transaction than the physician. 9 In any
case, and notwithstanding that I do not have an alternative account to propose
at this point, I see no reason to think that a mutually advantageous transaction
cannot be unfair. So I prefer to suppose that the surrogate may be exploited
even if surrogacy provides a net benefit to her. On the other hand, if the com-
pensation is (or could be made) adequate, then we will have to conclude that
the surrogate is not (or would not be) exploited, whatever else we may want to
say about surrogacy.
Choice
I suspect that there is another reason why the higher pay dog doesn't
bark, and that relates to its effect on the quality of the surrogate's consent. If
the lure of compensation compromises the surrogate's consent by coercing her
to enter into the transaction or by distorting her judgment about the effects of
surrogacy on her well-being, increasing the compensation will only make
things worse.
Now resolving the question as to whether the surrogate gives appropriate-
ly voluntary consent may not be crucial to resolving the question as to wheth-
er she is exploited if, as I have argued, consensual exploitation is possible. But
it would still be of importance to determine whether there is a defect in con-
sent. It will be easier to justify the prohibition or nonenforcement of surrogacy
agreements if they are nonconsensual.
Coercion
On one familiar view, poor women are coerced (or forced) to become
surrogates because surrogacy represents an improvement over an unacceptable
status quo.2" The equally familiar response maintains that surrogacy offers
19. We also cannot say that a person is not exploited just because they receive more value
from the transaction than the other party. For if a physician charges an exorbitant price for the
procedure, we might say that the physician exploits the patient even though the patient receives
more value from the transaction than the physician.
20. "[A monetary offer) may be difficult for a person of little financial means to refuse and
would, in that case, be coercive." Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Mother-
hood?, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: PoLITcs AND PRIVACY, supra note 5, at 136, 146. "To
portray surrogacy contracts as representing meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of
the contracting surrogate mother, rather than to see her as driven by circumstances.., falls to
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women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and the addition
of options to one's menu of choices is always freedom enhancing rather than
coercive.
Which view is correct? On any standard account of coercion, surrogacy is
simply not coercive. In general, A coerces B to do X only if A proposes
(threatens) to make B worse off with reference to some baseline condition
unless B does X, and whatever else we might want to say about the intended
parents' proposal (offers can be unseemly without being coercive), they do not
propose to make the potential surrogate worse off if she turns it down."'
True, she might decide that becoming a surrogate is more attractive than her
other options. But that is true for all decisions in which one accepts an offer.
It may be thought that the preceding view fails to acknowledge that some
offers are simply "too good to refuse," and that nonrefusable offers are coer-
cive even if they add to one's present menu of options.' An offer may be
nonrefusable for two reasons, only one of which is problematic. If A offers B
an opportunity (a new job) that would render her so much better off than her
eminently acceptable status quo that it would be frrational for B to refuse,
there is no reason to refer to such offers as coercive or to think that they
compromise the voluntariness of B's choice. In other cases, however, the
short-term benefits contained in A's offer may be so tempting or irresistible
that they cause B to overlook the long-term harms. A does not threaten any
adverse consequence if B declines the offer, but A's offer serves to distort B's
judgment. I am inclined to think that this kind of offer is not best described as
coercive, but it may well compromise the voluntariness of B's choice by intro-
ducing cognitive errors into B's decision. Let us bracket worries about cog-
nitive errors. Still, it might be said that if B's status quo is highly unsatisfacto-
ry, as in The Drowning Case,23 then A's offer may be coercive even if B
makes a perfectly rational choice in accepting A's offer. But the model of
coercion exhibited in The Drowning Case is of no help to the argument that
surrogates are coerced. For, unlike A in The Drowning Case, the intended
parents have no special obligation to help potential surrogates without demand-
ing anything in return.
It seems, then, that the intended parents' proposal is an offer, and offers
do not coerce. And that, I think, is the truth. But it is not the whole truth. Let
us assume what is often alleged but has not been shown by the critics of sur-
take account of realities." FIELD, supra note 4, at 27. "To say that a woman 'chooses' to do
this ... is simply to say that when a woman is forced to choose between poverty and exploitation,
she sometimes chooses exploitation as the lesser of two evils." Tong, supra note 9, at 45. For
present purposes, I ignore the distinctions between being coerced, or forced, or acting under du-
ress.
21. Specifying the appropriate baseline against which to measure the proposal can be a com-
plicated question. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERcION 202-41 (1987).
22. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 233 (arguing that a proposal can be both coercive and "free-
dom-enhancing"); see WERTIIMER, supra note 21, at 232-33.
23. A comes upon B, who is drowning. A proposes to rescue B if B agrees to pay A
$10,000. A and B know that there are no other potential rescuers. ALAN WERTHEImER, EXPLorrA-
TION 110 (1996) (taking this example from Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,
AND METHOD (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969)).
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rogacy, namely, that women choose to serve as surrogates only because they
are in dire economic straits. It may be argued that when background condi-
tions provide an inadequate range of opportunities, the moral quality or signifi-
cance of one's choice is diminished, even if the background conditions do not
compromise the "voluntariness" of the choice, strictly speaking.24 But even if
this is so, it is arguable that it is the background conditions that are the prob-
lem and not the offer that allows B to improve on those background condi-
tions. The offer is still a positive good. If a woman can reasonably regard sur-
rogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has unjustly limited
her options, it is-arguable that it would be adding insult to injury to deny her
that opportunity. Whatever label we use to describe her choice, we must still
decide whether she should be allowed to make such a choice. And referring to
such choices as "coerced" will not resolve that substantive moral question.
Cognitive Errors
Considerations of coercion aside, I suggested that a woman's decision to
serve as a surrogate may not be appropriately consensual if the lure of the
financial gain motivates her to make a decision that she will regret or would
regret if she thought objectively about its effect on her life. Given that we do
not know whether surrogacy is typically harmful or advantageous, I do not
think that we can say whether the typical surrogate makes this kind of cogni-
tive error. Also, do not say that a woman's judgment cannot be appropriately
consensual just because she cannot fully anticipate what it will be like to give
up the child. People can voluntarily consent to sterilizations, sex change opera-
tions, abortions, and plastic surgery, and (shall we add?) marriage-where one
cannot or frequently does not have any experience with the consequences of
the decision. By comparison with some such decisions that we do allow, the
problem of miscalculation in surrogacy may be relatively small and more
amenable to preventive measures: restricting surrogacy to women who have
given birth and therefore have personal knowledge of the bonding process
(which would not have excluded Mary Beth Whitehead) and careful psycho-
logical screening (which might have excluded her).'
The claim that the surrogate makes a cognitive error would be more con-
troversial if her error derives from her failure to take proper account of objec-
tive or moral harms to her interests. But even if we correctly believe that the
surrogate's choice is nonconsensual for just this reason, it is less clear what
would follow. Here we return to the moral force of exploitation.
24. See Thomas Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES (1987).
25. It appears that an infertility center had performed a psychological evaluation of Mrs.
Whitehead and that she had "demonstrated certain traits that might make surrender of the child
difficult." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (NJ. 1988). Unfortunately, it also appears that
neither she nor the Stems were given this information.
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V. THE MORAL FORCE OF EXPLOITATION
What follows from all this with respect to societal intervention with com-
mercial surrogacy? If surrogacy is a case of harmful exploitation, we need to
ask whether paternalistic restrictions would be justified, although here our task
will be relatively easy, particularly if we have reason to think that there are
defects in the quality of the surrogate's consent. If surrogacy is a case of
harmful cum moralistic exploitation, we need to ask whether restrictions can
be justified on grounds of moral paternalism. That question would be at least
somewhat harder. It is a commonplace that a liberal democracy is not justified
in prohibiting transactions just because the transactions are morally suspect or
fail to incorporate the best conception of human flourishing. This is not be-
cause we lack confidence that the transactions are truly wrong, but because
there are reasons-good moral reasons-to prefer a political regime that does
not regard such wrongness as a sufficient justification for invoking the coer-
cive powers of the state.
If surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploita-
tion, then it certainly does not follow that just because it is wrong for A to
exploit B, -that we should prohibit A from exploiting B. If exploitation is to
serve as an independent basis for social restraints, we would need to explain
how the exploitativeness of a transaction justifies interfering with a transaction
from which she benefits, particularly if prohibition is the only viable option.
Reducing Exploitation
But prohibition may not be the only viable option. Suppose that surrogacy
would be less exploitative (or nonexploitative) if the compensation were higher
or the contract terms were somewhat different. Might this justify societal
intervention?
It might, but unlike some other contexts of alleged exploitation, I see no
reason to believe that the compensation received by surrogates reflects a struc-
tural inequality of bargaining power.26 It seems to me that the potential surro-
gate should be in a very strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the intended
parents. I suspect that surrogates receive rather low compensation precisely
because surrogacy is viewed with such moral skepticism. Information and
competition are low. And unlike many other bargaining contexts, in which
bargainers believe they can legitimately press for a better deal, social norms
may suggest that it is inappropriate for a surrogate to hold out for a higher
wage. Somewhat ironically, the widespread acceptance of the moral norms to
which the critics of surrogacy often appeal may contribute to this-low com-
pensation-dimension of its exploitativeness.
In any case and for whatever reason, it is possible that left to their own
devices, most potential surrogates might be able to negotiate an agreement that
is less desirable than would be negotiated under a form of minimum wage.
26. But see Allen Wood, Exploitation, 12 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y. 136, 144 (1995) (maintaining
that prospective adoptive couples are typically in a "significantly stronger bargaining position").
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Some agreements would not occur. Some intended parents would be unwilling
or unable to pay the higher price. But many would." We would then face a
problem of moral trade-offs. We would need to weigh the moral importance of
reducing the exploitation of those who would be helped by this form of mini-
mum wage legislation against the cost to those who would be excluded from
the market because people refuse to purchase their services for the higher
minimum wage.
Yet the latter point highlights a moral consideration that many critics of
surrogacy have ignored. Any restrictions that discourage surrogacy arrange-
ments hurt those who would have benefitted from such arrangements and
arguably also interfere with their autonomy. If we are to respect the autonomy
of potential surrogates in the world in which they find themselves, it is impor-
tant that we not automatically apply to them the moral principles that define
our conception of an ideal world.2'
Autonomy
The question arises then as to whether considerations of autonomy would
preclude using exploitation as grounds for restricting mutually advantageous
and consensual surrogacy arrangements. An adequate answer to this question
would require a more fully developed theory of autonomy than I can of-
fer-for lack of a theory as well as space. But I do want to argue that two
strategies--one conceptual, one legal-that have been advanced as solutions to
this problem are less than fully satisfactory.
The conceptual strategy maintains that since a woman's "true" freedom or
autonomy is violated by surrogacy contracts, the prohibition of such contracts
does not constitute a violation of her freedom or autonomy.' I do not want
to deny that there is something to the notion of positive freedom or, perhaps
more accurately, to the values it attempts to capture. But even if we say that
"true" freedom includes proper self-development, and if we think that surroga-
cy "would detract from the ideal of human flourishing that society should seek
to foster," it remains an open question whether the right to choose not to be
positively or truly free is itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy."
It might be objected at this point, that appeals to autonomy ignore the fact
that surrogacy "takes advantage of motivations-such as self-effacing
'altruism'-which women have formed under social conditions inconsistent
with genuine autonomy.' 31 And, the argument goes, we do not interfere with
a woman's genuine autonomy if we prohibit decisions that result from non-
27. Indeed, it is possible that there would be more surrogacy agreements at the higher price,
because it would increase the supply of potential surrogates.
28. For the distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, see JOHN RAwLS, A TH-
ORY OF JusTicE 8 (1971).
29. Prohibiting surrogacy contracts does not violate the autonomy of women because "the
content of the surrogate contract itself compromises the autonomy of surrogate mothers." Ander-
son, supra note 2, at 91.
30. Capron & Radin,'supra note 5, at 64.
31. Anderson, supra note 2, at 91.
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autonomously acquired motivations. But even if the surrogate's motivations
are not autonomous in this sense, it is not clear what would follow. We cer-
tainly do not think that we can justifiably prevent religious organizations from
soliciting or accepting donations just because we (even rightly) believe that the
motivations that give rise to those donations may have been formed under
social conditions inconsistent with genuine autonomy.32 Respect for a
person's autonomy sometimes requires that we respect choices that reflect
values that she presently accepts, even if we are rightly worried about the way
she acquired those values.
So much for the conceptual strategy. A popular legal strategy for resolv-
ing the tension between respecting autonomy and prohibiting surrogacy agree-
ments is to permit surrogacy transactions, but to "make the arrangement per-
formable or not at the option of the mother."" It might be thought that this
strategy would give us the best of both worlds: it would preserve the freedom
of women to enter into surrogacy arrangements, but would also preserve their
freedom to keep the child if they so wish. 4
Now it is entirely possible that the "unenforceaple contract" solution will
turn out to be the preferred public policy.35 Even so, it would not entirely
resolve the autonomy problem. There are two related ways in which it fails to
do so. First, it fails to acknowledge that the ability to enter into a binding
agreement is itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy and that the "unen-
forceable contract" solution will deter some potential intended parents from
making agreements that potential surrogates would want to be able to make.
Second, it may be argued that in trying to protect women from having to
surrender a child against her strong maternal desires, we do not express the
appropriate respect for women as autonomous and responsible persons.'
Whether or not this line of argument is ultimately decisive, it suggests that the
unenforceable contract solution does not fully resolve the tension between
32. I have in mind contributions to "normal" religious organizations, not contributions which
are clearly the product of fraud. Interestingly, to the extent that surrogacy takes advantage of
altruistic preferences, it does not represent a problem of commodification. After all, it is one thing
to maintain that surrogacy does not represent a "gift" relation, and another thing to assume that it
does, but that women have been involuntarily socialized into giving such gifts.
33. FIELD, supra note 4, at 78.
34. Martha Field states:
One attractive feature of this solution is that it helps avoid resolution of the debate,
which is currently dividing feminists, about whether surrogacy exploits women or liber-
ates them. It recognizes the truth of both positions. Surrogacy is still available when the
surrogate mother desires ultimately to carry out the ontract .... But it avoids one of the
most troubling features-a contract severing the maternal bond when the mother is un-
willing to relinquish her child.
Id.
35. See Michael Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family
Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO LJ. 533 (1991).
36. Carmel Shalev states:
Her state of mind at the moment of agreement is not to be taken seriously because it is
subject to change during the performance of her undertaking, due to the nature of preg-
nancy. The insinuation is that it is unreasonable to expect her to keep her promise be-
cause her faculty of reason is suspended by the emotional facets of her biological con-
stituency.
CARMEL SLLEv, BIRTH PowER 121 (1989).
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protecting surrogates from decisions that they may come to regret and respect-
ing the autonomy of women.
Justice
Finally, I wish to consider a set of arguments for interfering with surroga-
cy contracts that appeals to considerations of justice. I say the set of argu-
ments "appeals to" considerations of justice, because these arguments variably
assert that surrogacy instantiates injustice, that surrogacy derives from injus-
tice, that surrogacy symbolizes injustice, that surrogacy reinforces injustice.
Note that some of these verbs suggest that surrogacy has a causal impact on
the social world, whereas others do not, and it may be crucial to establish just
which verb is most apt." Surrogacy could, of course, derive from injustice or
symbolize injustice without causing the world to be more unjust. By contrast,
the claim that surrogacy reinforces or creates injustice is to claim that the
world would be less unjust if surrogacy were prohibited.
There are at least three different lines of justice-based arguments that we
might consider. First, it might be argued that we should prevent transactions
that instantiate unjust distributions even if the transactions are beneficial to all
concerned. On this view, it is wrong to allow unjust transactions to occur,
even when (as contrasted with the world in which they do not occur) these
particular transactions are not bad for anyone. Now I do not think it unrea-
sonable for an individual to refuse to participate in a transaction that will
improve her welfare on the grounds that the transaction is unjust. But the
question is not whether an individual can herself reasonably refuse to partici-
pate in a beneficial transaction because it is unjust, but whether society can
justifiably prevent her from participating in such a transaction on the grounds
that it is unjust. And it is not clear that it can.
A second justice-based argument focuses on the relational dimension of
surrogacy. On this view, the problem is not that surrogacy results in different
"holdings," but that surrogacy instantiates highly asymmetrical and unjust
personal relations. Now relational inequality is a serious matter, and it must be
included in any all-things-considered assessment of whether a woman would
be benefitted or harmed by entering into a surrogacy transaction. But if a
woman can still plausibly maintain that she would benefit by such an arrange-
ment, it is hard to see why such transactions should be prohibited on the
grounds that the relation is unjust-at least if the welfare of the potential
surrogate is the focus of our concern.
That gives rise to a third line of argument, one that focusses on the nega-
tive externalities of commercial surrogacy. Just as it is often argued that por-
nography has harmful effects on virtually all women, it may be argued that
surrogacy has harmful effects on women as a class, because it reinforces in-
37. "[Dlistributive justice requires that society's benefits and burdens be distributed fairly
among different social classes .... Since women who are less well off will almost always be the
ones to serve as surrogates for wealthier or professional women, the distribution is not fair."
Macklin, supra note 20, at 147; see Annas, supra note 5, at 43.
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equalities of gender, although it might not be harmful, all things considered, to
the surrogates themselves, who are compensated for their services. 8
I want to make three points about this line of argument. First, if we argue
that a (potential) surrogacy arrangement between A and B should be prohibit-
ed because a policy of allowing such arrangements would have harmful effects
on third parties, then we are not claiming that it is the exploitation of B that
Justifies its prohibition. Second, even if the prohibition of surrogacy has egali-
tarian consequences, we would be imposing a burden on one class of women
(those who would be benefitted by serving as surrogates) in order to benefit a
larger class of women. We are, of course, often justified in imposing costs on
some persons in order to realize gains to other (present or future) persons. But
it is harder to justify imposing such costs when they are incurred by those
who are thought to be among the least well-off.
That brings me to the third point, namely, that we have no empirical
evidence to support the claim that the prohibition of surrogacy actually has
egalitarian consequences. Or, what amounts to the same thing, that the permis-
sibility of surrogacy would reinforce or perpetuate social inequalities. For all
we know, the legitimation of commercial surrogacy might serve to empower
women in their relations to men.39 Indeed, it is arguable that prohibiting sur-
rogacy might simply shield our eyes from the background inequalities from
which it derives, while allowing surrogacy would forcefully bring those in-
equalities to our attention and motivate us to change them.
V. CONCLUSION
Let us be clear as to what the previous arguments do and do not show. If
commercial surrogacy is a case of harmful and nonconsensual exploitation,
then there is a strong prima facie case for prohibiting commercial surrogacy
and for refusing to enforce commercial surrogacy contracts. If commercial
surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation, then
there is a strong prima facie case for allowing commercial surrogacy and for
enforcing commercial surrogacy contracts. I have examined several arguments
for the view that commercial surrogacy contracts should be prohibited or un-
enforceable because they are exploitative, even if commercial surrogacy is
mutually advantageous and consensual. I have suggested that several argu-
ments against that position are problematic at best.
I have decidedly not argued for the stronger position that commercial
surrogacy contracts should be allowed or enforced as a matter of public policy,
for that would require a determination as to whether commercial surrogacy is,
in fact, harmful and nonconsensual or mutually advantageous and consensual.
It would also require attention to reasons for prohibiting or refusing to enforce
commercial surrogacy contracts that are beyond the scope of this article. I
38. "[Surrogacy] contracts will turn women's labor into something that is used and con-
trolled by others and will reinforce gender stereotypes that have been used to justify the unequal
treatment of women." Satz, supra note 1, at 123-24.
39. See SHALEV, supra note 36.
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have argued that it does not follow that surrogacy contracts should be prohibit-
ed or unenforceable just because they are exploitative-if the transaction is
consensual and mutually advantageous.

THE TWIN FACES OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION:
EXTORTION AND BRIBERY
IAN AYRES*
Men won't do much for a shilling.
For a pound they may be willing.
For twenty pounds the verdict's in the sack.'
INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 1990, I stood in a Cook County Circuit Court and accused
the presiding judge, the Honorable Thomas J. Maloney, of extortion. I was
filing a final amended post-conviction petition on behalf of Dino Titone.2
Titone had been convicted and sentenced to death in bench trials by Judge
Maloney for participating in the murders of Aldo Fratto and Tullio Infelise.3
My post-conviction petition alleged that Titone's own lawyer had solicited
money from Titone on behalf of Judge Maloney, and that Titone with the help
of his father had ultimately paid Judge Maloney $10,000." The petition al-
leged that after Judge Maloney received the money, an FBI investigation of
judicial corruption in Cook County-code name "Operation
Greylord"--became public and that Judge Maloney convicted and sentenced
Titone to death in order to cover up Maloney's felonious conduct.5
Accusing a sitting judge frightened me.6 And I brought my own counsel,
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. J.D., Yale University, 1986; Ph.D. in
Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. Akhil Amar, Jennifer Brown, Tom Ger-
aghty, Gideon Parchamovsky, and Susan Rose-Ackerman provided helpful comments.
1. BERTOLT BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE 102 (1947).
2. Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that "a lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents .... " Titone
has given me "permission to write, discuss and/or publish for any media any description, account,
opinion or other information or material about and relating to my prosecution or his subsequent
representation of me-except information covered by the attorney client privilege." Letter from
Dino Titone to author (Feb. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
3. People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 300 (IIl. 1986) Two codefendants, Robert Gacho and
Joseph Sorrentino, were convicted in severed trials. Id.
4. The petition was based on affidavits of Titone and his father. The affidavits alleged that
money was paid to Titone's lawyer, Bruce Roth, who was to pass it along to Judge Maloney's
bagman, Robert McGee. People v. Titone, Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Ind. No. 83-127 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct., Jan. 25, 1990).
5. Id.
6. The requirement that post-conviction petitions (the Illinois analog to habeas corpus peti-
tions) must be heard before the original judge itself has an interesting history. The Illinois legis-
lature in its wisdom determined that post-conviction petitions should be heard before a new judge,
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 122-8 (1984 Supp.), but the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down this statute as violating the state constitution's separation of powers
limitation and held that the courts will determine the venue for post-conviction petitions without
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Tom Geraghty, in case Judge Maloney held me in contempt. When he read the
allegations,7 Maloney went ballistic. He forced me to answer a series of per-
sonal questions regarding my age and place of birth.
The case was ultimately transferred to another Circuit Court judge who
vacated Titone's death sentence8 but refused to grant Titone an evidentiary
hearing to establish his claim of judicial corruption. I unsuccessfully appealed
the latter ruling to the Illinois Supreme Court 9 -which brings me to the sub-
ject of this essay.
Even though I repeatedly characterized the deal between Judge Maloney
and my client as "extortion," the Illinois Supreme Court insisted on referring
to the underlying transaction as a "bribery conspiracy."' So which was it:
bribery or extortion? And should the characterization of a conspiracy as "brib-
ery" or "extortion" determine whether a convicted defendant earns a new trial?
My answers to these questions are straightforward. First, it will often be
impossible to distinguish "bribery" and "extortion," because conspiracies will
routinely combine elements of both deals. Second, deciding whether to grant a
new trial should not turn on this characterization. Any defendant who can
show that a judge accepted money (or negotiated for money) should be grant-
ed a new trial-regardless of whether the conspiracy seems more like bribery
or extortion.
The Titone case squarely presents this "convicted payor" prob-
lem"-whether a convicted payor should receive a new trial? But judicial
corruption creates at least two related problems: the "acquitted payor" problem
is whether an acquitted payor should be able to avoid a new trial (because of
the double jeopardy prohibition) and the "convicted non-payor" problem is
whether a convicted non-payor should receive a new trial (because of judicial
incentives to unfairly convict non-payors).'2
Unfortunately, Maloney's pattern of corrupt practice has raised all three of
these hypothetical problems not just in actual cases-but in murder cases. 3
legislative interference. People v. Joseph, 495 N.E.2d 501, 506 (IlI. 1986).
7. Along with the petition I simultaneously filed a motion to place the court papers under
seal, and a motion that Judge Maloney be removed for cause. Judge Maloney-without reading
any of the papers-initially resisted placing any of the documents under seal. He repeatedly asked
me to state in open court why I wanted the proceedings private. When I finally succeeded in get-
ting him to read a crucial paragraph of the complaint alleging judicial corruption, he then kept me
standing before him for twenty minutes as he carefully read the paper.
8. The judge found that Titone's own lawyer, Bruce Roth, intentionally sought the death
penalty for his client (in order to induce appellate courts to review the underlying conviction more
seriously). The judge found that this all-or-nothing strategy represented an abnegation of the ad-
versary process and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. People v. Titone, 600 N.E.2d 1160 (El. 1992).
10. Titone, 600 N.E.2d at 1164.
11. Even though this article describes Dino Titone as a "convicted payor," evidence suggests
that Titone's father was in fact the payor. Affidavit of Salvator Titone (Oct. 12, 1994).
12. Although this essay is focused on the issue of judicial corruption, the ideas also apply to
issues of juror or prosecutor corruption. Because jurors are not repeat players it will be more
difficult for them to establish a credible pattern of accepting bribes or extorting money. But the
actions of jurors (and the decision of prosecutors not to prosecute) are less reviewable than many
judicial decisions and hence may give these other actors more opportunity for corruption.
13. Maloney is one of 18 judges from the Cook County Circuit Court who have been con-
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Before taking the bench, lawyer Maloney facilitated the payment to a judge
who subsequently acquitted Harry Aleman of murder.' 4 In People v.
Aleman,"5 an Illinois district court struggled with the acquitted payor prob-
lem-whether the double jeopardy clause prohibited Aleman's retrial.' The
court held that double jeopardy protection did not apply in part because
Aleman faced no risk of conviction in the initial trial." This article, however,
will argue that Aleman's logic is incomplete. At a minimum, a court would
need more fact finding to conclude that double-jeopardy should not apply.
The United States Supreme Court is now grappling with the convicted
non-payor problem created by Judge Maloney's pattern of corruption. William
Bracy and Roger Collins were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
a jury trial over which Judge Maloney presided. 8 Although "Itihere is no
suggestion that Bracy and Collins bribed or offered to bribe [Maloney],"'9 the
defendants seek a new trial arguing that Judge Maloney's corruption in other
cases gave him an incentive to be biased against defendants who did not pay
him-in part "to avoid suspicion that he was on the take."' ° Judge Richard
Posner rejected the defendants' substantive claims and even denied defendants'
claim for limited discovery to prove Judge Maloney's bias.2 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari in the case and at this writing has just
heard oral argument on the limited question of discovery. 2 The convicted
non-payor problem is admittedly vexing, but Judge Posner's opinion is unchar-
acteristically unnuanced-piling on arguments against the defendants' position
without seeing the benefit of at least granting limited discovery.
This essay is divided into three parts. In the first, I extend Jim Lindgren's
useful analysis of the difference between bribery and extortion. 3 Part II then
examines how courts should respond to motions for new trials when there is
an allegation of judicial corruption. Part I11 analyzes the acquitted payor prob-
lem raised in Aleman. And Part IV briefly analyzes the convicted non-payor
victed of corruption in the last decade. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Rovner, J. dissenting), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997), cert. granted sub nom. Collins v. Welborn,
117 S. Ct. 2450 (1997). Maloney "has the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever
convicted of fixing a murder case." Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1795 (1997).
14. People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 671 N.E.2d 734
(1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 986 (1997), habeas corpus denied sub nom., United States ex rel.
Aleman v. Circuit Court, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
15. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615.
16. Id. at 623-25.
17. Id. at 626.
18. Bracy, 81 F.3d 684.
19. Id. at 688.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Bracy, 117 S. Ct. 941. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider How the Taint of a
Corrupt Judge Should Be Measured and Remedied, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A18 (noting
that the Court granted certiorari only to consider whether petitioners were entitled to "discovery to
support his claim that he was denied the right to a trial before an impartial judge").
23. James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Com-
mon Law to the Hobbs, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815, (1988) [hereinafter Lindgren, Elusive Distinction];
James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1695 (1993) [hereinafter Lindgren, Theory.
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problem raised in Bracy.
2 4
I. A THEORY OF BRIBERY AND EXTORTION
In distinguishing between bribery and extortion, it is useful to distinguish
between procedure and substance. The crudest procedural theory would define
extortion as conspiracies initiated by judges and bribery as conspiracies initiat-
ed by defendants. 25 Of course, one can define words as one likes. But a
defendant's right to a new trial should not turn on who initiated a conversa-
tion. A procedural definition of bribery or extortion might only poorly corre-
late with the clean hands of a defendant. For example, if it becomes generally
known that judges take money, then defendants may feel pressure to initiate
the negotiation.26
Indeed, when intermediaries are involved, it may be very difficult to de-
cide which side initiated the negotiation. In the Titone case, Bruce Roth was
likely the instigator. But in beginning the negotiation, Roth (nominally
Titone's lawyer) might have been acting as Judge Maloney's agent--after all
Roth (who, like Maloney, served time for a pattern of corruption) had an
ongoing illicit relationship with several Cook County judges."
It is, however, possible to develop a substantive theory of bribery and
extortion that more clearly correlates with moral desert. Imagine a defendant
who in a fair trial-given the available evidence and the "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard-would have a 50% chance of conviction." For
such a defendant, a pure bribe would be an agreement to lower the probability
of conviction. As Jim Lindgren has succinctly defined: "Bribery consists of
paying for better than fair treatment."' By contrast, a judge extorting money
would threaten to unfairly increase the probability of conviction unless she
was paid. Under this definition, extortion consists of paying to avoid worse
than fair treatment.
Both extortion and bribery agreements entail payments from a defendant
24. Bracy, 81 F.3d 684. See Greenhouse, supra note 22.
25. In Evans v. United States, the Court held that
(1) there's no requirement of inducement for official extortion; (2) official extortion
doesn't require coercion; (3) bribery isn't a defense to extortion; (4) official extortion
isn't limited to false pretenses; and (5) the Government "need only show that a public
official has obtained a payment to which be was not entitled, knowing that the payment
was made in return for official acts."
Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1708 (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268
(1992)). An inducement requirement could be related to a procedural definition of extortion to the
extent that inducement required the government official to initiate the negotiation.
26. Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 828.
27. United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1383 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989). Bruce Roth, the defendant in this Greylord prosecution, was a crook-
ed lawyer. Id. He made a living bribing crooked judges. Id. Often Roth played the broker's role,
matching lawyers who did not know which judges would take money with judges who did not
know which lawyers would pay it. Id.
28. Titone was such a defendant. Titone had three alibi witness testifying on his behalf.
People v. Titone, 115 ll.2d 413, 425 (1986). The prosecution, in contrast, had only one, severely
impeached witness-an uncharged, admitted accomplice who had fled the jurisdiction-linking
Titone to the crime. People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 300-01 (Ill. 1986).
29. Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 824.
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to a judge, but there is-in the lingo of classical contract theory-a different
substantive consideration. A substantive definition of bribery and extortion
asks whether the defendant was paying to receive better than fair treatment or
paying to avoid worse than fair treatment. The benchmark of expected treat-
ment in the absence of agreement is crucial." When a pure bribe is being
negotiated, the defendant expects in the absence of agreement to receive a fair
trial. When a pure extortion is being negotiated, the defendant expects in the
absence of agreement to receive an unfair trial.3 This substantive definition
is identical to the threat/offer dichotomy which has been so central to the
philosophical discussion of coercion.32
This substantive definition of bribery and extortion illuminates the moral
desert of the payor/defendant. The judge's action in agreeing to receive money
is morally repugnant regardless of whether the agreement is an extortion or a
bribe. But from the payor's perspective, paying to receive better than fair
treatment is clearly more repugnant than paying to avoid unfair treatment. If
we could nicely separate judicial corruption into these two boxes, we might
want to treat more favorably a defendant who paid to avoid injustice than
someone who was purchasing injustice (in her favor).33
30. See Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 889,
900 (1997) (discussing moralized baseline). Fred McChesney has powerfully analyzed the poten-
tial for government shakedowns backed by the threat of unjust treatment. Fred S. McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101
(1987).
31. Jim Lindgren's two articles on bribery and extortion are path-breaking. He clearly sees
the clean, substantive distinction between bribery and extortion, but then needlessly muddies the
listinction by unhelpfully complicating the definition of extortion:
[C]oercive extortion by a public official is the seeking or receiving of a corrupt benefit
paid under an implicit or explicit threat to give the payor worse than fair treatment or to
make the payor worse off than he is now or worse than he expects to be.... Thus,
while bribery has only one baseline (fair treatment), coercive extortion has at least three
baselines (fair treatment, expected treatment, and the status quo).
Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1701. Lindgren's triple benchmark for extortion leads him to
unhelpfully find an "overlap" between bribery and extortion:
Now what about government officials who have a duty to arrest criminals? Here coer-
cive extortion and bribery overlap. If a police officer suggests that he will not arrest a
criminal if he is paid off, this is extortion, because he is threatening to make the crimi-
nal worse off than he is now. But it's also bribery, because the criminal is paying hush
money for more than fair treatment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 827. It seems
more useful to describe this hypothetical as a pure bribe. Fair treatment would be for the official
to arrest the criminal; here, the criminal is purchasing better than fair treatment. The criminal's
actions are no less repugnant because the official was threatening to change the status quo. Indeed,
the status quo was that the criminal was rightfully subject to arrest--so that threatening arrest is
not clearly a change in the status quo. Like Lindgren, I will argue that pure bribery and extortion
are often combined in the same agreement, see infra p. 35, but Lindgren's hypothetical is not a
good example of this blending.
32. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, Moralized Theories of Coercion: A Critical Analysis, 74
DENy. U. L. REV. 907 (1997).
33. There are three types of favorable treatment that might be afforded criminal defendants
that pay an extortion:
1. if they were originally convicted, we might be more willing to grant them a new trial;
2. if they were originally acquitted, we might be less willing to retry them; or
3. we might be less likely to prosecute them for participating in judicial corruption.
The second possibility will be discussed in the acquitted payor section.
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Unfortunately, there are strong structural reasons why we should often
expect to see combinations of bribery and extortion. Just as a consumer could
simultaneously buy a hamburger and a soda, a defendant's payment to a judge
will often be for the purpose of both (1) avoiding worse than fair treatment (if
the payment is not made) and (2) inducing better than fair treatment (if the
payment is made).' Philosophers have already seen the possibility of these
combined "threat" and "offer" and conveniently dubbed them "throffers.
35
But previous authors have not seen that there are strong reasons to suspect
that each side will prefer agreeing to a combination of bribery and extortion
instead of a pure extortion agreement--even if the price to be paid does not
change. It is easy to see that the defendant/payor would prefer to purchase
better than fair treatment for the same price-not only because it is better to
be assured acquittal, but also because structurally it will often be easier for the
defendant to verify whether the judge is performing her side of the bargain.
Under what I have defined as pure extortion, the judge upon payment merely
agrees to judge fairly. But it will often be difficult to objectively assess what
is fair treatment. If a judge after agreeing to pure extortion goes ahead and
convicts in a bench trial, it will often be difficult for the defendant to know
whether the conviction was warranted.
What is somewhat more surprising is that the judge might prefer a combi-
nation of bribery and extortion to simple extortion-even if the size of the
defendant's payment does not change. Assuring the defendant's acquit-
tal--regardless of the evidence-is likely to reduce the chance that an unsatis-
fied customer will complain to the authorities. If the judge merely extorts,
defendants who are fairly convicted are more likely to inform authorities about
the illicit agreements. By gratuitously combining bribery together with extor-
tion, extorting judges reduce the chance that a defendant will testify against
them.
This, however, is not an a priori proof that all extortion agreements will
be combined with bribery. In some cases, an extorting judge would be disinc-
lined to assure acquittal because doing so would tip off investigators. 6 When
the threat that third-parties will uncover judicial corruption is low, there are
strong reasons to suspect that combined agreements will tend to dominate
either pure bribery or pure extortion.37 Extorting judges will tend to overshoot
34. Lindgren clearly saw this possibility. Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1700 ("The
same envelope filled with cash can be both a payment extorted under a threat of unfairly negative
treatment and a bribe obtained under a promise of unfairly positive treatment."); see also Lind-
gren, Elusive Distinction, supra note 23, at 826.
35. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCIoN 204 (1987); MIcHAEL TAYLOR, CoMMuNrrY, AN-
ARCHY, AND IBERTY 12 (1982).
36. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1996). The court stated:
While a corrupt judge might decide to tilt sharply to the prosecution in cases in which
he was not taking bribes-to right the balance as it were--it is equally possible that he
would fear that by doing so he would create a pattern of inconsistent rulings that would
lead people to suspect he was on the take.
Id. Also the foregoing arguments ignore the impact that criminal law of bribery and extortion
itself can have on the parties. For example, if judges and/or defendants were subject to higher
penalties for combination agreements, combined agreements might not dominate extortion agree-
ments.
37. It's harder to say that bribery agreements will tend to throw in extortion elements. My
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in the defendant's favor-providing not just a fair trial but assuring acquittal.
As the threat of third party scrutiny increases however, judges will have
smaller incentives to assure acquittal. For example, when the Operation
Greylord investigation became public, corrupt judges suddenly began to fear
federal scrutiny more than the possibility that defendants would turn them in.
Even judges who had entered into pure bribery agreements might prefer to
overshoot in breaching their agreements-not merely retreating to a fair trial,
but convicting regardless of the evidence. Judge Posner has suggested that
unusually harsh judicial conduct may tip off authorities just as much as unusu-
ally lenient conduct. 3 But with regard to discretionary decisions-such as
whether to convict in a bench tria-a corrupt judge is much more likely to
divert investigative attention by calling close decisions against the defendant.
This analysis of judicial incentives should inform our normative rule-
making. First, we should realize that even when there is evidence of bribery, it
may be part and parcel of a defendant's effort to avoid injustice if money is
not paid. And second, the possibility that an extorting judge could insist on
giving better than fair treatment reduces the defendant's moral culpability for
participating in a combination of bribery and extortion. If paying to avoid
unfair treatment is excusable, the payment becomes no less excusable if the
judge, for her own reasons, wants to make sure that the defendant is acquitted.
Here, I may part company with Jim Lindgren who has suggested that "there is
no reason to let off a briber just because he was also a victim of extortion. 39
Finally, a dramatic increase in the threat of third party detection may lead
judges to convict the very defendants who had paid them money. Many people
ask me why my client would have been unjustly convicted if he had paid the
judge money. The increased threat of federal scrutiny provides the answer.
When judges have more to fear from third-party detection than from a defen-
dant disclosing a payment, they may decide that the safer course is to convict
regardless of the evidence.'
Even if a defendant was morally culpable for entering into a pure bribe,
the slow, public development of Operation Greylord raises the possibility that
she would receive worse than fair treatment from the very judge she paid. It
may be appropriate to separately punish a defendant for agreeing to
bribe-and my previous argument suggested why such pure bribes would be
difficult to identify-but we can no longer be confident that the underlying
convictions of paying defendants are just.
earlier argument was that if the parties were inclined to enter into an extortion agreement, they
would routinely throw in an agreement for assured acquittal if the money were paid. But having
agreed to a bribe (i.e., assured acquittal), it is harder to think what it would mean to combine ele-
ments of extortion.
38. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689-90; see infra text accompanying note 51.
39. Lindgren, Theory, supra note 23, at 1700; see also Lindgren, Elusive Distinction, supra
note 23, at 826. Lindgren, however, was not considering the specific context of judicial corruption
in criminal cases. Given our general constitutional protection for criminal defendants, I imagine
that Lindgren might well agree with the thesis of this paper that defendants who had entered into
combination deals should receive new trials.
40. Indeed, once the first wave of Greylord indictments became public judges could say that
defendants claiming to have paid money were merely concocting stories of judicial corruption.
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A potentially stronger way to distinguish instances of bribery from inst-
ances of extortion--that is to say instances where the defendant/payor is more
culpable for paying a judge-is to independently assess the probability of
conviction at a fair trial. If the probability of conviction at a fair trial was
virtually nil, then we might be confident that the defendant/payor was only
being extorted-for example, paying money to avoid an unfair conviction. On
the other hand, if the probability of conviction (given the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) was virtually certain, we might be confident that
the defendant/payor was only bribing the judge for better than fair treatment.
As the benchmark of uncorrupted treatment tends toward one extreme or the
other (certain acquittal or conviction), there is only "room" to sell one type of
consideration. But such independent assessment amounts to a quasi-retrial.
II. WHEN SHOULD A CONVICTED PAYOR RECEIVE A NEw TRIAL?
Always. Whenever a judge takes money, or negotiates to take money, the
defendant should receive a new trial. The characterization of the agreement as
extortion or bribery should not matter. Unfortunately, this is not the current
state of the law. Courts tend to require that a convicted defendant show not
merely that the judge accepted money, but that the judge's corruption caused
judicial error. This section will argue that this prejudice requirement is an
inappropriate vestige of our concern that bribers not profit from their bribe.
In People v. Titone,1 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a preliminary
claim42 that Titone should be given a new trial because of Judge Maloney's
corruption.43 The Court adopted the dual requirements of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Shaw v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" that:
(1) "petitioner must establish a nexus between the activities being
investigated and the trial judge's conduct at trial"; and
(2) "petitioner must establish actual bias resulting from the trial
judge's extrajudicial conduct."'45
While unartfully drafted and somewhat redundant, the Shaw standard seems to
require a showing that corruption caused error.
This requirement should be rejected because it cannot be squared with a
long line of Supreme Court holdings on judicial bias. For example, in Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,' the Supreme Court held that a justice was
acting as a "judge in his own case:' when he participated in proceedings where
the decision directly affected a case that the justice had independently filed.4'
The Supreme Court made clear that it was not required to decide whether in
41. 600 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. 1992).
42. Titone has renewed his claim based on additional evidence of Judge Maloney's corrup-
tion.
43. People v. Titone, 600 N.E.2d 1160, 1166 (Il. 1992).
44. 580 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
45. Titone, 600 N.E.2d at 1166 (citing Shaw v. Commonwealth of Pa., 580 A.2d 1379, 1381
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
46. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
47. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986).
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fact the justice was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case "would
offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge" leading the judge "not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true." The Due Process Clause "may some-
times bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." 49 But to
perform its high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice."
Judge Posner, with his usual clarity, has elucidated the concept of judicial
bias:
[Jiudicial bias is one of those "structural defects in the constitution of
the trial mechanism," as distinct from mere "trial errors," that auto-
matically entitle a petitioner for habeas corpus to a new trial. What is
bias? Defined broadly enough, it is a synonym for predisposition, and
no one supposes that judges are blank slates. There are prosecution-
minded judges, and defense-minded judges, and both sorts have pre-
dispositions-biases that place an added burden on one side or the
other of the cases that come before them. Yet no one supposes that
the existence of such biases justifies reversal in cases where no harm-
ful errors are committed. The category of judicial bias is ordinarily
limited to those predispositions, real or strongly presumed, that arise
from some connection pecuniary or otherwise between the judge and
one or more of the participants in the litigation .... [F]or bias to be
an automatic ground for the reversal of a criminal conviction the
defendant must show either the actuality, rather than just the appear-
ance, of judicial bias, "or a possible temptation so severe that we
might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased."'
But as argued above, a judge who has taken money may have a substantial
incentive to be biased to convict-to avoid third-party detection or to punish a
defendant who the judge feels has not fully performed (read: paid). This lib-
erty incentive is much stronger than the financial incentives involved in Aetna
or Tumey.
Yet the Shaw standard requires a convicted defendant to prove more in
the case of corruption-induced bias than the Supreme Court's Aetna decision
required in the case of financially induced bias. I believe this disparate treat-
ment is a continuing vestige of the concern that defendants should not benefit
by their bribery.52 The additional requirement in Shaw that corruption cause
48. Id. at 825 (citations omitted), discussed in Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Con-
viction Relief, at 12, People v. Hawkins & People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651 (Cook
County Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 18, 1996) (Dooling, J.).
49. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825.
50. Id.
51. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois
Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
52. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 16, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651 (noting that "those who attempt to corrupt the
judicial system may not later hide behind the very constitution they subvert"); see also Akhil Reed
Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLIJM. L. REv. 1, 55
(1995).
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error cannot be explained by a smaller judicial temptation-if anything, a
judge who has received money has much more at stake. Instead, I believe the
causal error requirement in Shaw and Titone grows out of a misguided sense
that the requirement will distinguish failed extortion deals from failed bribery
deals; a briber who is convicted has nothing to complain about unless she can
show judicial error. Yet, the causal error requirement is unlikely to distinguish
failed bribery and failed extortion agreements. The two types of agrements
will often be combined and judges involved in either pure bribery or extortion
may have incentives to convict regardless of the evidence in order to divert
attention (or punish incomplete defendant performance).
Thus, even for courts that do not explicitly base their analysis on the
distinction between bribery and extortion, the perceived dirty-hands of defen-
dants who pay judges-evidenced in part by the Illinois Supreme Court's
repeated characterization of Titone's claim as a "bribery" conspiracy even
though I repeatedly characterized it as an extortion conspiracy-lead courts to
impose harsher prerequisites for new trial.
Titone and Shaw should be overruled and those jurisdictions should in-
stead follow the Third and Fifth Circuits, which have come closer to giving
per se relief to convicted defendants who have established that they have paid
off judges or jurors. For example, in United States v. Forrest,1
3 the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted a new trial to a defendant who had attempted to tamper with a
jury. And in Zilich v. Reid,54 the Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea where the defendant
alleged he was promised a sentence of probation in exchange for a $4,000
bribe to a trial judge.5 Where surrender of a fundamental constitutional right
is concerned, the court's inquiry should not focus upon the "clean hands of the
defendant.
5 6
My preferred new trial standard would make everything turn on whether a
payment was made, or on whether an unreported payment negotiation oc-
curred. Accordingly, much will turn on what evidence is required to prove that
it is more likely than not that a judge was paid. This should remain an open-
ended (and conventional) question of fact, but Titone has provided sufficient
evidence.
The Titone case is clearly not a "me too" allegation of corrup-
tion-cobbled together only after Judge Maloney was indicted in the Greylord
sweep. Rather, Titone was the first to accuse Judge Maloney of extortion."
Moreover, key facts in our accusation preceded and paralleled the proof be-
yond reasonable doubt that later convicted Judge Maloney of extortion from
other defendants." In 1990, Titone alleged that Judge Maloney had been paid
53. 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 36 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 1994).
55. Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1994).
56. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 18, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651.
57. People v. Titone, Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ind. No. 83-127
(Cook County Ill. Cir. CL, Jan. 25, 1990).
58. Id.
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$10,000 in Titone's murder case, the payment was made through Maloney's
bagman Robert McGee, and Judge Maloney convicted Titone to divert the
attention of federal Greylord investigators. 9 It was not until 1991 that Judge
Maloney was indicted for extortion. The evidence establishing Judge
Maloney's extortion of Earl Hawkins is eerily similar. The government alleged
that Judge Maloney received $10,000 from the defendant in a murder case,
that Robert McGee served as Judge Maloney's bagman, and that Judge
Maloney convicted Hawkins to divert Greylord investigators.'
More important, one of the lead Greylord prosecutors, Scott T. Mendeloff,
has sworn in an affidavit that Titone's father, Salvatore Titone, was the first to
identify Judge Maloney's bagman:
At the time Salvatore Titone gave his proffer in 1990, the
government's investigation had not yet established that McGee acted
as "bagman" for Maloney. It was only two years after Salvatore
Titone first provided information regarding McGee's role as a
"bagman" for Judge Maloney, that William Swano first identified
McGee as Maloney's bagman.6
While a showing of judicial error or trial misconduct should not be a
separate prerequisite for retrial, such judicial misconduct is certainly probative
of judicial corruption. And indeed such misconduct is present in the Titone
case. Strong evidence shows that after convicting Titone, Judge Maloney told
Titone's lawyer, Bruce Roth, not to take a bench trial for the sentencing stage
(of the bifurcated litigation) because Judge Maloney would sentence Titone to
death.62 This admonishment is probative of a prior deal. Judge Maloney, in
effect, was telling Roth that Maloney would have to sentence Titone to death
in order to avoid investigation.63
Yet in the face of all this circumstantial evidence, the Illinois courts have
refused to grant Titone an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery to prove
his allegations. At such a hearing Judge Maloney, Robert McGee and Bruce
Roth would likely invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, allowing a trier of
fact to infer an agreement from their refusal to speak.64
59. Id.
60. Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Thomas J. Maloney, Robert McGee and William A.
Swano, 91 CONG. REC. 477 (June 25, 1991).
61. Affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney, Scott Mendeloff, at 1 5 (Oct. 12, 1994),
appended to Fourth Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, People v. Titone, No. 83-127
(Cook County nIl. Cir. Ct., Oct. 12, 1994).
62. Findings of Circuit Judge Earl Strayhorn, People v. Titone, Ind. No. 83-127 (Cook Coun-
ty Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 7, 1990) (vacating Titone's death sentence).
63. Judge Maloney wanted to avoid deciding; if a jury decided, Judge Maloney could not
be blamed for the result by either Titone or the federal investigators. Trying to induce Titone to
opt for a sentencing jury was Maloney's way of balancing the threat of Titone going public
against the threat of federal scrutiny.
64. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976) (stating that in civil proceedings the
Fifth Amendment does not forbid fact finders from drawing an adverse inference). If state courts
continue to deny an evidentiary hearing, Titone should file a § 1983 or RICO suit against Judge
Maloney-in part to force Judge Maloney in deposition to face the question of whether he or his
bagman received money from Titone. Titone's ability to file a civil action now, however, may be
hampered by the statute of limitations or by qualified judicial immunity.
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II. WHEN SHOULD AN ACQUITrED PAYOR AvoID A NEW TRIAL?
The last section explored how courts should respond when a pay-
or/defendant attacks a conviction because of judicial corruption, but prosecu-
tors may have a parallel incentive to attack acquittals that are the product of
judicial corruption. While the double jeopardy clause normally precludes an
acquitted defendant from being retried for the same offense, Akhil Amar and
Jonathan Marcus have suggested that a defendant who pays for an acquittal
(pursuant to what I have called a pure bribe agreement) may not deserve the
same constitutional protection.' Amar and Marcus consider the hypothetical
of "a defendant on trial for murder bribes his jury and wins acquittal, and in a
subsequent prosecution this bribery is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Judge Maloney's corrupt ways have forced an Illinois court to grapple with a
very similar fact pattern.
In 1977, Thomas J. Maloney was not yet a judge, but he played a crucial
role in brokering a corruption deal between his client Harry Aleman and Judge
Frank Wilson.' Judge Wilson ultimately acquitted Aleman of murder charges
in a bench trial.' Fifteen years later, the State reindicted Aleman for the
same murder. In response to Aleman's motion to dismiss the indictment, the
State argued that double jeopardy was inapplicable because Aleman had paid
Judge Wilson $10,000 to acquit him.'
In this subsequent proceeding, the trial court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Judge Wilson had been bribed during the 1977 trial. The court
refused to dismiss the second indictment and an Illinois appellate court af-
firmed. ° In what it characterized as being an issue of first impression,7' the
appellate court adopted without citation the basic argument of Amar and
Marcus (published a year earlier in the Columbia Law Review) 72-holding
that Aleman could be retried.
Amar and Marcus suggest that a bribery exception to the double jeopardy
clause might be grounded in part on the concept of risk:
If the jury was bribed, the defendant was never truly in jeopardy. The
fix was in, and he ran no risk, suffered no jeopardy-from the
French jeu-perdre, a game that one might lose, and the Middle Eng-
lish iuparti, an uncertain game. On this theory, a second trial would
65. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 54-57.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Maloney was Aleman's counsel when the agreement with Judge Wilson was struck and
Maloney subsequently withdrew from the case at Judge Wilson's request because the two were
such close friends that Judge Wilson did not want to show favoritism in a case in which Maloney
was the defense attorney. Id. at 3.
68. See People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ill. App. CL 1996).
69. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 617.
70. Id. at 627.
71. The court noted: "No case has been cited by Aleman or the State involving the applica-
tion of double jeopardy principles to circumstances presented here: the alleged bribery of a judge
resulting in acquittal of a defendant who the state seeks to retry for the same offense." Id. at 623.
72. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52. Amar tells me that he also informally advised the pros-
ecutor in the case.
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truly put defendant in jeopardy not "twice" but only once, in keeping
with the textual command.73
The Aleman decision similarly emphasized risk: "Of particular importance here
is that '[jJeopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes
the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution."'"4 The
court ultimately concluded:
Given [the defendant's] involvement in the bribery of Judge Wilson
in order to procure an acquittal in his 1977 murder trial, we conclude
that Aleman clearly was not subject to the risk normally associated
with a criminal prosecution. The principles of double jeopardy do not
bar the instant reindictment and reprosecution."
The Court seems to reason that once the judge was paid there was no risk of
conviction.
But this reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, both the appellate
court and Amar and Marcus ignore the possibility of extortion. If the agree-
ment concerned pure extortion, then full performance of the agreement would
have exposed the defendant to exactly the same risk that would have been
"normally associated with a criminal prosecution." Accordingly, there should
not be a double jeopardy exception with regard to pure extortion agreements.
The Aleman opinion cites to enough testimony to suggest that the sub-
stantive consideration for the $10,000 was at least in part bribery (a promise to
acquit regardless of the evidence).76 But as argued previously, there are
strong structural reasons to expect that extortion agreements will often be
combined with bribery agreements. The court's failure to mention the rele-
vance of extortion (in subjecting defendant to risk of conviction) suggests that
they did not consider this possibility in undertaking its fact finding.
Second, the court's (and the authors') risk reasoning is flawed because it
does not consider the defendant's risk of "diverting" or "retaliatory" convic-
tions. Even if the substantive agreement was a pure bribe or a combination of
bribery and extortion, the defendant risked conviction because the judge might
breach the agreement "in order to cover up and conceal original payments of
the bribe" or to retaliate against a perceived breach on the part of the defen-
dant. Judge Maloney's later reaction to the Operation Greylord investigation
vividly illustrates how a judge who has promised (and been paid) to acquit
might nonetheless convict in order to divert third-party scrutiny. These are not
just the allegations of Dino Titone, but parallel allegations were proven be-
73. Id. at 55 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
74. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 624 (emphasis in original) (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528 (1975)). The court similarly concluded for double jeopardy to apply "that a defendant must be
'subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction."' Id. at 624 (quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
75. Id. at 626.
76. For example, before his initial trial, Aleman had told Vincent Rizza (a former Chicago
police officer and bookmaker) that "his murder indictment 'was all taken care of,' and that 'com-
mitting murder in Chicago was okay if you killed the right people."' Id. at 618.
77. Ruling on Petitioners' Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, at 5, People v. Hawkins &
People v. Fields, Nos. 85-C-6555 & 85-C-7651.
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yond a reasonable doubt at Judge Maloney's criminal trial with regard to
Maloney's conviction of Earl Hawkins and Nathson Fields."
Moreover, the risk of a "retaliatory" or "disgruntled" conviction can be
found in the Aleman's decision own description of Judge Wilson's conversa-
tions with Robert Cooley, a lawyer for "the mob in Chicago" who had per-
sonally negotiated the initial $10,000 deal:
On the second day of trial, Judge Wilson and Cooley met. Wilson
was very upset and voiced his concern that the case was not as weak
as Cooley had initially represented.... Cooley met Wilson again.
Wilson was even more upset this time because the prosecutors had
informed him that a witness was receiving $10,000 for testifying
falsely. Wilson was amazed that he was only receiving $10,000 al-
though he was a "full circuit judge." Wilson explained that he may
lose his job and asserted, "that's all I get is ten thousand dollars? I
think I deserve more." Wilson blamed Cooley because he would
receive "all kinds of heat" for this trial. He again requested more
bribe money. Cooley told Wilson he would see what he could do.'
Even though the court found that "Wilson never expressed any intention not to
fulfill his end of the deal," the judge's repeated concern and upset and his
repeated attempts to bargain for more money (especially after learning that a
mere witness was being paid the same amount) created a risk that Wilson
might have convicted the defendant notwithstanding the agreement."
A closer look at the facts suggests that bribery is far from a sure thing.
Even though Amar and Marcus imagine that when the "fix was in, [a defen-
dant] ran no risk,"82 Chicago's unhappy history of corruption teaches, there
are unlikely to be easy "no risk" cases to fit a double jeopardy exception.
Instead, courts will need to grapple with how much risk and what kinds of risk
are sufficient to put a defendant in jeopardy."3
Indeed, Amar and Marcus might respond that the risk of "retaliatory" or
78. Id.; United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1995).
79. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 619.
80. Id.
81. If the agreement had been a sale of goods, there would be a sufficient risk of Wilson's
non-performance that Aleman would have reasonable grounds for seeking additional assurances.
U.C.C. § 2-608 (1994).
82. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 55.
83. David Rudstein has previously argued that bribery does not eliminate the risk of convic-
tion:
[A] judge bribed by the defendant in a bench trial might change his mind after the start
of the trial, return the bribe money, and, after hearing all the evidence, convict her. Or
the judge might double-cross the accused and convict her while keeping the bribe mon-
ey.... In none of these situations can it be argued that, because the defendant paid off
the judge ... prior to her trial, she was never in "jeopardy" at her trial. For she in fact
was convicted.... Thus, even in a case in which the defendant bribed the judge in a
bench trial, one or more jurors, or the prosecutor, she still runs the risk-albeit a re-
duced one-of being convicted.
David S. Rudstein, Double Jeopardy and the Fraudulently Obtained Acquittal, 60 MO. L. REV.
607, 639-40 (1995). Rudstein backs up his analysis, of course, by discussing Judge Maloney's
willingness to convict and sentence to death defendants who had paid him money. Id. at 640
n.136.
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"diverting" conviction does not count as a double jeopardy risk because only
the risk of conviction at a fair trial counts in the constitutional calculus. For
example, in discussing race-stacking, the authors suggest that "a stacked jury
is, constitutionally speaking, no jury; its acquittal, no acquittal; and so defen-
dant ... was never constitutionally in jeopardy."'"
This argument, however, ignores the realities of the last section. Defen-
dants like Aleman not only ran the risk of initial conviction, but they ran the
substantial risk that any conviction would be affirmed on appeal."3 In the cur-
rent world, a convicted defendant in Illinois has virtually no chance of win-
ning even an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery to establish that her
judge had received money. Regardless of what Amar and Marcus have in
mind as minimal requisites for a fair trial, Illinois courts are currently likely to
affirm convictions where a judge has taken money.'
Our assessment of whether Aleman was at risk in this initial trial must
then turn not only on the likelihood of his being convicted at trial, but also on
the likelihood that appellate courts would affirm when confronted with allega-
tions that the judge had taken money. If Illinois changed its current law and
began automatically granting new trials where paying defendants were convict-
ed (as suggested in the previous section), there would be a much stronger case
for a bribery exception to the double jeopardy rule-that is granting new trials
where paying defendants are acquitted.'
The Illinois court's disparate treatment of the "convicted payor" and the
"acquitted payor" problem is dramatically shown in the following passage
from Aleman in which the court asks: "[Was the defendant] not subjected to
'the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution'? The
answer must be in the affirmative considering analogous circumstances.""
The analogous circumstances to which the Aleman court is referring are the
pecuniary interests cases discussed above-including Lavoie and Tumey. s9
84. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 56.
85. It is inconsistent to treat corrupt acquittals as a nullity when corrupt convictions are
treated as being valid.
86. As Rudstein has noted:
[No appellate court would accept the claim by the defendant that her conviction should
be reversed because a crooked judge, a corrupt juror, or a dishonest prosecutor failed to
keep his end of the bargain and acquit her, vote to acquit her, or present a weak case
against her, respectively.
Id. at 640.
87. Defendants would still run the risk that after being convicted they would not be able to
prove that the judge had been paid.
88. A/eman, 667 N.E.2d at 624 (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975)).
89. The analogous circumstances are detailed in this annotated string citation that follows the
passage quoted in the text
See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (invalidating a judgment
of the Alabama Supreme Court because a justice on that court was a party to a similar
case pending in an Alabama trial court and, therefore, the judge's pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case required new proceedings); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528
(1975) (where pecuniary interests of judges have been involved in the cases, the results
must be invalidated); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (recognizing that
"[flaimess of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our sys-
tem of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this
end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where
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Bizarrely, these pro-defendant constitutional holdings are not sufficient to
nullify Titone's conviction (or even assure him an evidentiary hearing) but
they are sufficient to nullify Aleman's acquittal-notwithstanding the double
jeopardy clause to the Illinois and United States constitutions.
Amar and Marcus, however, identify the defendant's malfeasance as a
second possible basis for a bribery exception: "Call it what you
wii--stoppe , frau, unclean hands, waiver, or forfeiture-the basic idea,
rooted in general legal principles, is that defendant's own prior misconduct
bars him from asserting a double jeopardy claim."" The authors admirably
identify what is lurking below the surface of corruption cases. They explain
that this line of argument "never gets to the Double Jeopardy Clause. It simply
prevents a defendant from raising the issue."'
But as a normative matter, a defendant's prior misconduct by itself should
not be sufficient to nullify the effect of an initial acquittal. First, it will often
be difficult to determine the defendant's culpability. As emphasized above,
judges will routinely insist on combining elements of bribery and extortion. A
defendant who agrees to bribe as part and parcel of a deal to avoid unfair
treatment is less culpable than the image of a pure briber that the Aleman
court and Amar and Marcus have in mind. And at times it will be unclear
whether the defendant or a third-party negotiated and paid the judge.'
To clarify the interaction of risk and estoppel, it is useful to consider two
stylized hypotheticals. In the first, imagine that (unbeknownst to a defendant)
the defendant's sibling enters into a pure bribe with a judge who subsequently
acquits the defendant.93 In the second, imagine a defendant who pays his law-
yer to bribe the judge, but unbeknownst to the defendant the lawyer pockets
the money and at a fair trial the defendant is acquitted. In the first case, there
is no risk of conviction, but no defendant misconduct. In the second, there is
defendant misconduct, but the normal risk of conviction. I cannot imagine a
theory that would allow retrial under the second scenario.94 Defendant mis-
conduct may be a necessary condition for a bribery exception but it should not
be a sufficient condition.
he has an interest in the outcome"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 521-32 (1927) (hold-
ing that defendant was entitled to a new trial where the trial judge received $12 by stat-
ute for each case which resulted in a conviction because "officers acting in a judicial...
capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided..
Id. at 625-26 (parallel cites omitted).
90. Amar & Marcus, supra note 52, at 55.
91. Id.
92. In the Aleman case, there is some uncertainty about the extent to which Aleman, himself,
knew about and/or participated in the judicial corruption. The opinion merely says that two "1st
Ward figures Pat Marcy and John D'Arco, Sr." asked Robert Cooley ("a former Chicago police
officer and an attomey") "if he 'had a judge at 26th Street who could handle or take care of a
case."' Aleman, 667 N.E.2d at 618. It was Cooley who negotiated the deal with Judge Wilson.
Even the opinion indicates that Aleman had illegal dealings with Cooley and Aleman bragged that
"his murder indictment 'was all taken care of.'" Id. It is not clear that Aleman instigated the deal
or knew of it in advance.
93. Akhil Amar in private conversation suggested this line of argument.
94. I can imagine, however, prosecuting the defendant for the independent crime of attempt-
ed bribery.
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In sum, like Amar and Marcus, I can imagine a narrow bribery exception
to a defendant's normal double jeopardy protection that turns on a prosecutor
proving not only that money was paid but that (a) the payment virtually elimi-
nated the risk of conviction at the initial trial and that (b) defendant is culpa-
ble for this initial corruption. But corruption Chicago-style teaches that pur-
chasing a judge does not guarantee acquittal. Particularly in jurisdictions that
make it extremely difficult for convicted payors to receive new trials, we
should make it extremely difficult for prosecutors to retry acquitted payors.
Indeed, this section has shown that proving that a judge was paid falls far
short of proving the defendant was culpable or not at risk. Given the grave
difficulties involved in proving these elements, the Double Jeopardy Clause
may be better served without admitting a bribery exception.
The acquitted payor and the convicted payor problems need to be an-
swered together. Giving the convicted payor an absolute right to a new trial,
while subjecting the acquitted payor to a relatively small risk of retrial might
induce more defendants to try to bribe judges. But the social cost of the con-
victed payor rule is relatively small: an absolute right to a new trial will often
only mean an absolute right to be convicted a second time. Barring
reprosecutions of acquitted payors may more substantially increase defendants'
incentives to bribe. Yet a rule making it difficult to reprosecute acquitted
payors might also reduce judges' incentives to extort or accept bribes. An
acquitted payor would have more freedom under such a rule to subsequently
disclose the identity of corrupt judges. This is not to say that these proposed
rules would not have predictable costs. It is only to suggest that the cost in
increased corruption may not be as great as it initially appears.
IV. WHEN SHOULD A CONVICTED NON-PAYOR RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL?
This section analyzes a much more difficult problem created by Judge
Maloney's corruption-a problem with which Judge Posner recently grappled
and for which the United Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. In
Bracy v. Gramley,95 defendants who were convicted and sentenced to death
by Judge Maloney sought a new trial because they did not have (nor did they
ever discuss) a deal with Judge Maloney." The defendants claimed that
Judge Maloney had an incentive to convict defendants who did not pay him in
order to (1) divert the attention of prosecutors and the electorate and (2) to
create a reputation as a tough judge so as to more easily extort money from
defendants who did pay.' At this point, it might be useful to point out that
Judge Maloney sentenced more people to death than any other judge in Cook
County."
95. Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1996).
96. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 688.
97. Id.
98. An Assistant United States Attorney, Scott Mendeloff, described Maloney's reputation for
ruthlessness:
As a judge [Maloney] was tough and hard-nosed.... But one of the things that I have
heard over and over again from lawyers in the community is thai he took it far too far,
that he was ruthless; that he heartlessly meted out sentences without any compassion.
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In one sense, the Bracy defendants' claim is more sympathetic than
Titone's because there is no possibility that they participated in a bribery
conspiracy. The Titone and Aleman decisions show how defendants' miscon-
duct might make courts less likely to grant them a new trial or more likely to
grant the prosecutor a new trial. The Bracy facts put to the test whether a
defendant's clean hands can lead to a more lenient judicial approach.
T1he case is difficult, however, because it leads to an a1--or-nothing result
for a potentially large class of defendants. Indeed, as Judge Posner observed
while rejecting the defendants' claim, a rule of automatic reversal "would thus
require the invalidating of tens of thousands of civil and criminal judgments,
since Judge Maloney alone presided over some 6,000 cases during the course
of his judicial career and he is only one of eighteen Illinois judges who have
been convicted of accepting bribes."
While the case presents a difficult problem, Judge Posner's decision sys-
tematically minimizes the benefits and overstates the cost of granting relief.
His rhetorical strategy makes a hard case seem implausibly easy. Posner mini-
mizes the benefits of granting a new trial by arguing that it is unlikely that
Judge Maloney would have unjustly convicted the defendant: "The fact that
Maloney had an incentive to favor the prosecution in cases in which he was
not bribed does not mean that he did favor the prosecution in such cases more
than he would have done anyway."'"o It is striking to hear one of the parents
of law and economics argue that incentives do not, on the margin, affect be-
havior.
And Judge Posner even questions whether Judge Maloney on net would
have an incentive to unjustly convict:
While a corrupt judge might decide to tilt sharply to the prosecution
in cases in which he was not taking bribes--to right the balance as it
were-it is equally possible that he would fear that by doing so he
would create a pattern of inconsistent rulings that would lead people
to suspect he was on the take."0
The only time there was compassion that we can see has to do with the times in which
money was being passed.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 700 n.1 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Thomas J. Maloney &
Robert McGee, No. 91 CR 477, Sentencing Tr. 559-60 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1994) (remarks of As-
sistant United States Attorney Scott Mendeloff)).
99. Id. at 689. During oral argument, Justice O'Connor echoed this concern: "This judge
handled 6,000 criminal cases. By [defendants') standard, they are all out the window. We're talk-
ing about a lot of cases." Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 18.
100. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
101. Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added). During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice
Scalia has echoed Judge Posner's concern:
Justice Antonin Scalia, who said that Mr. Bracy's case "rests on a series of assumptions
that are not necessarily self-evident."
Addressing Mr. Levy, the inmate's lawyer, Justice Scalia said he thought it just
as likely that rather than punishing those who did not pay bribes, a judge taking bribes
to favor some defendants would be lenient in other cases as well to avoid calling atten-
tion to his behavior.
"He would look worse if he were a hanging judge in most cases and a bleeding
heart in some," Justice Scalia said, adding: 'The fact that he was dishonest when he was
given money doesn't mean he was dishonest when he was not given money."
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This cannot be true. On the margin, it would benefit Judge Maloney (finan-
cially, in avoiding prosecution, and in winning reelection) to decide all close
or discretionary questions against such defendants.'"0
Finally, Judge Posner minimizes the benefits of granting new trials by
assuming that such defendants are guilty: "[T]he automatic rule must be inter-
preted circumspectly, with due recognition of the cost to society of overturning
the convictions of the guilty in order to vindicate an abstract interest in proce-
dural fairness."' 3 But given Judge Maloney's predisposition for corruption,
how can Judge Posner be so sure that he would be "overturning the convic-
tions of the guilty"?
Against the "abstract interests in procedural fairness," Judge Posner sees a
parade of horrible consequences. As earlier quoted, Judge Posner imagines that
thousands of cases would need to be reopened. But his analysis is inflated
because many of the defendants would have served their complete sentence (or
it might be possible to limit new trials to defendants convicted while Judge
Maloney was known to be engaged in a pattern of corruption). 4
Judge Posner also suggests that granting new trials in this case might
require granting new trials for any defendant when the judge is facing reelec-
tion:
The assumption underlying [defendants'] argument is that a judge's
corruption is likely to permeate his judicial conduct rather than be
encapsulated in the particular cases in which he takes bribes. The
assumption is plausible but the consequences are unacceptable. If we
were to inquire into the motives that lead some judges to favor the
prosecution, we might be led, and quickly too, to the radical but not
absurd conclusion that any system of elected judges is inherently
unfair because it contaminates judicial motives with base political
calculations that frequently include a desire to be seen as "tough" on
crime.'05
But as a doctrinal matter, it is easy to distinguish reelection bias from extor-
tion bias. Judge Posner himself notes that courts entertain a general presump-
Greenhouse, supra note 22, at 18.
102. As Judge Rovner observed:
A judge who wishes to be tough on the defendant need not adopt the manner of the
Tasmanian Devil to do it. Maloney was by no account stupid. .... [I]f he wanted to
cultivate a pro-prosecution record to protect his interests as a bribetaker, he had the
ability to do so discretely, without appearing to have abused his discretion as a trial
judge. . . . In this case there were plenty of issues that implicated Judge Maloney's
discretion and thus his ability to influence the case against Bracy and Collins: the credi-
bility questions presented by the petitioners' motion to suppress key evidence; the bol-
stering of prosecution witnesses; the collateral impeachment of defense witnesses; im-
proper prosecution argument to the jury; the denial of a continuance prior to the sen-
tencing hearing; and the refusal to sever the sentencing hearings.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 698-99, 701 n.3 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 689.
104. However, given Maloney's willingness to broker corrupt deals as a lawyer in Aleman,
Maloney's pattern of corruption may have extended through out his judicial tenure.
105. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
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tion that "judicial officers perform their duties faithfully."" Posner admits
that this presumption is "obviously inapplicable" under the facts of Bracy, but
it could still adequately distinguish reelection bias.
A more balanced assessment would admit the difficulty of the problem. It
might be more consistent with general judicial bias precedents to grant new
trials to any defendant convicted while a judge was engaged in a pattern of
rcccivhig money. But at a minimum, courts should vacate the most important
discretionary decisions of Judge Maloney that disfavored defendants-in par-
ticular, sentences and bench trial convictions. Or one might place a burden on
the prosecution to prove that there was such overwhelming evidence of guilt
that any judicial misconduct was harmless. In any event, defendants convicted
by Judge Maloney should automatically be given an evidentiary hearing and a
right to ask Judge Maloney under oath whether his pattern of judicial corrup-
tion affected their case. Sadly, both the Titone and Bracy litigation show that
victims of Judge Maloney's extortion rarely can convince Illinois courts that
they have good cause to be permitted either discovery or an evidentiary hear-
ing.
CONCLUSION
Thomas Maloney's malfeasance in a murder case provides a pragmatic
lens through which to evaluate the three core problems of judicial corruption:
concerning the convicted payor, the acquitted payor and the convicted
nonpayor.1°
In this paper I have presented a theory to substantively distinguish bribery
and extortion, and suggested reasons why bribery will often be combined with
extortion. However, this article's more important insights are not derived from
theory, but from what can be learned from the judicial corruption unearthed by
Operation Greylord: Defendants who paid judges still ran substantial risks of
conviction. Judges used the continuing threat of conviction to renegotiate
higher bribes (as in Aleman) and judges convicted to divert the Operation
Greylord investigation (as in Titone, Hawkins and Fields).
These insights throw new light on the "convicted payor" and the "acquit-
ted payor" problem. Understanding that a paid judge might convict notwith-
standing the evidence diminishes our confidence in such convictions and
strongly argues for granting such defendants new trials. It also suggests that
retrying an acquitted payor does create double jeopardy problems because
there is always some risk that a paid judge will convict notwithstanding the
106. Id. at 688 (citing Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73
(7th Cir. 1994)).
107. The three covered categories suggest a fourth problem of judicial corruption concerning
acquitted non-payors: to wit, when can an acquitted non-payor be reprosecuted notwithstanding
the Double Jeopardy Clause? While it would seem obvious that the correct answer should be
"never," the logic of Judge Posner's Bracy opinion might suggest otherwise. If it is "equally possi-
ble" that a corrupt judge would avoid "creat[ing] a pattern of inconsistent rulings" by acquitting
non-payors, Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689, then Posner might argue that prosecutors should have a right
to attack the validity of acquittals not procured by payment. Hopefully readers can see that the
errors in this argument further undermine the persuasiveness of Posner's original decision.
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payment.
Dino Titone and Thomas Maloney are currently both in prison. Titone is
awaiting resentencing on his murder conviction and has filed a subsequent
post-conviction petition seeking a new trial based on additional compelling
evidence of Judge Maloney's extortion. Judge Maloney is serving a 15-year
sentence for his pattern of bribery and extortion.
In rejecting the claims in Bracy, Judge Posner said that the defendants'
death sentences were legally irrelevant to the question of whether they should
receive new trials: "The fact that this is a death case magnifies the appearance
of impropriety but is irrelevant to an issue that goes to the propriety of con-
viction rather than merely to that of the sentence."'" Should our society be
willing to execute someone where the convicting judge was paid money?
There are strong reasons to believe that (1) there was agreement between
Titone and Maloney; (2) the agreement involved elements of extortion;"°
and (3) Judge Maloney had reasons to convict Titone regardless of the evi-
dence. I cannot fathom a justice system that would deny him an evidentiary
hearing to prove these allegations and, if proven, grant him a new trial.
Judge Maloney is despicable. He repeatedly sold his office in death penal-
ty cases for a pittance. It sickens me that I had to submit myself to his author-
ity. Judge Maloney, where were you born?
108. Bracy, 81 F.3d at 689.
109. Maloney's willingness to extort-backed up by his willingness to convict notwithstand-
ing the evidence if he was not paid-is vividly illustrated in his treatment of lawyer William
Swano. As described by Judge Rovner in her Bracy dissent
mhe notion that Maloney was deliberately tough on defendants who did not bribe him
finds support in the testimony presented at Maloney's trial. Defense attorney William
Swano arranged several of the bribes for which Maloney was prosecuted and was a key
government witness against him. In 1985, Swano represented James Davis, whom the
state had charged with armed robbery. The case was assigned to Maloney for trial. By
this time, Swano had already bribed Maloney on a number of occasions. But after in-
vestigating the prosecution's case against Davis, Swano concluded that it would be un-
necessary to bribe Maloney in order to obtain an acquittal in this case: three witnesses to
the robbery knew the two perpetrators and said that Davis was not one of them; Davis
had an alibi; and the victim of the crime, who had initially identified Davis as one of the
perpetrators, had confessed uncertainty about the identification. Swano was confident
that "the case was a not guilty in any courtroom in the building." United States v.
Thomas J. Maloney and Robert McGee, No. 91 CR 477, Tr. 2528 (N.D. III. March 24,
1993). To Swano's surprise, however, Maloney convicted his client after a bench trial.
Swano took this as a lesson that "to practice in front of Judge Maloney ... we had to
pay." Tr. 2530.... One may infer from Swano's testimony that Maloney saw the Davis
prosecution, in which no bribe was tendered, as an opportunity to teach Swano a lesson
that would ensure bribes in future cases.... [F]ixed cases were a source of illicit profit,
whereas unfixed cases were an opportunity, as Bracy puts it, to "advertise" in the de-
fense bar (Bracy Reply at 1).
Id. at 697 (Rovner, J., dissenting). While Judge Rovner acutely understands that Maloney used the
Davis case to induce Swano to pay in future cases, she insists on referring to these payments as
"bribes" instead of "extortion."
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POSTSCRIPT
Good news. Since drafting the initial essay, subsequent decisions in
Bracy, Titone and Aleman have moved toward more fully protecting
defendants' constitutional right to an impartial judge."'
The Supreme Court reversed Judge Posner's Bracy opinion."' Justice
Rehnquist writing for an unanimous court found Bracy had established "good
cause" for discovery on his claim of actual bias." 2 The opinion left unan-
swered what Bracy would need to prove to win a new trial, but at the very
least the court found the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
establishes a constitutional floor" for "a judge's qualifications to hear a
case.""' Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the petitioner had met his burden
not only because "Maloney was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corrup-
tion," but also because petitioner had provided evidence suggesting "that
Maloney was actually biased in petitioner's own case.""' 4 Thus, the opinion
stops short of creating a per se discovery rule for any defendants convicted
during Maloney's reign of corruption.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bracy, Illinois Circuit
Court Judge Earl Strayhom decided to vacate Tit6ne's murder conviction and
grant a new trial." 5 Judge Strayhorn's decision is remarkable not only proce-
durally-because the judge granted Titone's motion on the papers without an
evidentiary hearing-but also substantively. After quoting Judge Rovner's
eloquent dissent in Bracy,"6 Judge Strayhorn expressed the disquiet the
Titone case had caused him:
I cannot truly articulate the pain that I have borne in listening to the
horrible things that went on in this case in what is supposed to be a
courtroom of law and justice. And no amount of procrastination on
my part, no amount of reluctance on my part can wipe out the fact
that under the circumstances that have been presented here what went
on in that courtroom as to Dino Titone was not justice. And that Dino
Titone did not receive the kind of a fair, impartial trial before a fair,
110. Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997); People v. Titone, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Ind. No. 83 C 127, Report of Proceedings heard before the Honorable Earl E. Strayhom
(July 25, 1997) [hereinafter Titone Proceedings]; United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of
Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. nIl. 1997).
111. Bracy, 117 S. Ct. at 1796. 1 had overnight mailed a draft of this paper to each of the
justices shortly before this opinion was announced.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1797.
114. Id. at 1799.
115. Titone Proceedings, supra note 110.
116. The court in Bracy stated:
No right is more fundamental to the notion of a fair trial than the right to an impartial
judge. "The truth pronounced by Justinian more than a thousand years ago, that 'impar-
tiality is the life of justice,' is just as valid today as it was then." The constitutions of
our nation and of our states, the rules of evidence and of procedure, and 200 years of
case law promise a full panoply of rights to the accused. But ultimately the guarantee of
these rights is no stronger than the integrity and fairness of the judge to whom the trial
is entrusted.
Bracy, 81 F.3d at 696 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 469
(5th Cir. 1976)).
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unbiased, impartial judge that his constitutional right as a citizen
required."'
The State of Illinois in its wisdom has chosen not to appeal this decision and
the parties are preparing for a new trial." 8 Judge Strayhom's words capture
the simple idea that we can no longer have confidence that convictions of paid
judges are the product of the defendant's guilt and not instead some effort to
divert suspicion or bargain for more money.
Finally, Harry Aleman's claim has for the first time been considered by a
federal court. Judge Suzanne Conlan denied Aleman's petition for habeas
corpus, thereby upholding his reprosecution." 9 But in so doing, the court at
least acknowledged that paying a judge does not extinguish the risk of con-
viction:
While Aleman did not completely eliminate the risk of conviction,
Aleman dramatically and illegally altered the playing field on which
the decision would be made. It is sufficient that "Aleman clearly was
not subject to the risk normally associated with a criminal prosecu-
tion." Aleman II, 667 N.E.2d at 626. For that reason alone, jeopardy
did not attach in Aleman's 1977 trial.' 20
While this decision represents an improvement over the previous court's risk
analysis, the decision continues to ignore the possibility of pure extor-
tion--which would have subjected the paying defendant to exactly the same
risk "normally associated with a criminal prosecution." And Maloney's own
response to the evolving Greylord investigation suggests that even bribing
defendants may be subjected to a risk that is not only substantial, but possibly
greater than that of a fair trial. The Aleman decision is much more defensible
in a world where convicted payors, like Titone, are also retried-but still more
attention needs to be given to assess the quantum and quality of risk to which
the acquitted paying defendants are exposed.
The Supreme Court's Bracy opinion avoids the dreaded e-word. Bracy
had explicitly argued that Maloney might have convicted non-payors notwith-
standing the evidence in order both (1) to deflect suspicion that he was taking
money in other cases and (2) to better extort money in other cases.'' But
Rehnquist could not bring himself to consider the second possibility. Even
though there was substantial evidence that Maloney extorted money from
defendants,'22 Rehnquist-like the judges in Titone and Aleman--could not
conceive of the possibility that defendants would pay judges to avoid unfair
treatment. Until we are willing to admit the possibility of extortion as well as
bribery, we are unlikely to respond properly to the multifaceted problems of
judicial corruption.
117. Titone Proceedings, supra note 110, at 12.
118. Conversation with Thomas Geraghty (Sept. 18, 1997).
119. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.
1i. 1997).
120. Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
121. See Bracy, 81 F.3d at 697 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
122. See supra note 109.
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THE "SOPHIE'S CHOICE" PARADOX AND THE




In this Symposium,' Alan Wertheimer weighs some of the standard argu-
ments for and against the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, the agreements
through which women bind themselves to carry, give birth to, and then surren-
der children.2 My response to Wertheimer is twofold. First, I will challenge
what may be an underlying assumption of his argument, that increasing a
person's menu of choices is always desirable. Second, I will challenge his
assertion that a woman's preferences and identity throughout the process of
pregnancy and childbirth are sufficiently static that her agreement to surrender
the child-made prior to pregnancy--can bind her after the child is born.
First, I will address the desirability of choice. In his article on surrogacy,
Wertheimer recites a "familiar response" to claims of coercion: "surrogacy
offers women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and the
addition of options to one's menu of choices is always freedom enhancing
rather than coercive."3 Wertheimer elaborates, "[i]f a woman can reasonably
regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has un-
justly limited her options, it is arguable that it would be adding insult to injury
to deny her that opportunity."4 Thus, Wertheimer may implicitly adopt the as-
sumption that runs through much of contract theory and economic analysis of
law: that more choice is always good, and that increasing people's choices can
never be undesirable. But this assumption may not be well-founded in all
cases. For some people in a specific set of circumstances, choice may be
undesirable. If this is true, the undesirability of choice may present a new and
distinct rationale for restricting freedom of contact.
I will argue that under at least one set of circumstances-circumstances I
will refer to as "Sophie's Choice" preferences-people might prefer one or all
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1982;
J.D., University of Illinois, 1985. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Brian Bix, Wendy Gordon, Linda
Meyer, and Carol Sanger for extremely helpful comments and conversations.
1. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
2. Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 889
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks]; Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surro-
gacy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215 (1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Surrogacy].
3. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1221-22.
4. Id. at 1223.
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of the available alternatives to a choice between those alternatives.5 The possi-
bility. of "Sophie's Choice" preferences represents a distinct rationale for re-
stricting freedom of choice, including freedom of contract.
In the second part of this article, I will respond to the comparison
Wertheimer draws between childbirth and other life transformative processes,
such as plastic surgery, abortion, or marriage. My critique of Wertheimer will
be theoretical and empirical. ,emeticaly, I will argue that Wertheimer him-
self falls prey to what he calls the "fallacy of equivocation" when he discusses
consent in these various contexts. The "consent" one gives to his examples of
transformative processes-abortion, plastic surgery, sterilization, or sex change
surgery-has a fundamentally different effect from that which he would give
consent to surrogacy. In Wertheimer's examples, the consent merely insulates
others from tort liability: even if the patient later regrets an abortion, for ex-
ample, the doctor who performs it will be free of liability if the patient gave
informed consent. But that consent, however well informed, could not be used
to force the patient to go through with the abortion if, just before the proce-
dure began, she had second thoughts. Consent that insulates from tort liability
would not necessarily support an award of specific performance, and yet
Wertheimer seems to argue that the two kinds of consent are not significantly
distinct.
Empirically, I will argue that Wertheimer compares childbirth to inappo-
site examples of life transformative experiences. I will specifically explore the
stability of identity throughout pregnancy and childbirth. It seems almost axi-
omatic that people can be contractually bound only if they or their agents bind
them. I will argue that in the context of surrogacy, this bedrock principle of
contract law may serve as a rationale for the voiding of the surrogacy contract
at the mother's option. The process of carrying and giving birth to a child so
fundamentally changes a woman-physically, emotionally, and socially-that
her very identity may change. The woman who emerges from the labor and
delivery room is in a real way not the same woman who entered the surrogacy
contract ten or more months before. Because of this discontinuity of identity,
the prepregnant woman cannot bind the mother.
II. THE SopHIE's CHOICE PARADox
To explain the dynamic I am labeling "Sophie's Choice," I will describe
the paradox, beginning with its original context, William Styron's Sophie's
Choice. I will explain why the Sophie's Choice paradox is distinguishable
from other rationales for limiting choice. Finally, I will explore potential caus-
es and implications of the paradox.
5. 1 name these situations "Sophie's Choice" in honor of the William Styron novel by that
title. WniIAM STYRON, SoPHm's CuoicE (1966).
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A. Sophie's Choice: The Basic Definition
The classic example of a person for whom choice was not desirable-for
whom, indeed, being given a choice caused continuing agony for the rest of
her life-is the character of Sophie Zawistowska in William Styron's novel,
Sophie's Choice. I could not possibly paraphrase the novel without losing the
power of Styron's insight, and thus I will quote at length the scene which
gives rise to the novel's title. Sophie has just been transported to Auschwitz
with her young children, Jan and Eva. The scene unfolds as she stands with
the children on the train platform undergoing "selection," in which a doctor
will decide whether she and the children should be immediately sent to gas
chambers or kept in the camp for slave labor.
But here she was, and here was the doctor .... She sensed from
his manner, his gaze-the new look in his eye of luminous intensi-
ty-that everything she was saying, far from helping her, from pro-
tecting her, was leading somehow to her swift undoing. She thought:
Let me be struck dumb.
The doctor was a little unsteady on his feet. He leaned over for a
moment to an enlisted underling with a clipboard and murmured
something, meanwhile absorbedly picking his nose. Eva, pressing
heavily against Sophie's leg, began to cry. "So you believe in Christ
the Redeemer?" the doctor said in a thick-tongued but oddly abstract
voice, like that of a lecturer examining the delicately shaded facet of
a proposition in logic. Then he said something which for an instant
was totally mystifying: "Did He not say, 'Suffer the little children to
come unto Me'?" He turned back to her, moving with the twitchy
methodicalness of a drunk.
Sophie, with an inanity poised on her tongue and choked with
fear, was about to attempt a reply when the doctor said, "You may
keep one of your children."
"Bitte?" said Sophie.
"You may keep one of your children," he repeated. "The other
one will have to go. Which one will you keep?"
"You mean, I have to choose?"
"You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a privilege-a
choice."
Her thought processes dwindled, ceased. Then she felt her legs
crumble. "I can't choose! I can't choose!" She began to scream. Oh
how she recalled her own screams! Tormented angels never screeched
so loudly above hell's pandemonium. "Ich Kann nicht wihlen!" she
screamed.
The doctor was aware of unwanted attention. "Shut up!" he or-
dered. "Hurry now and choose. Choose, goddamnit, or I'll send them
both over there. Quick!"
She could not believe any of this. She could not believe that she
was now kneeling on the hurtful, abrading concrete, drawing her
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children toward her so smotheringly tight that she felt that their flesh
might be engrafted to hers even through layers of clothes. Her disbe-
lief was total, deranged. It was disbelief reflected in the eyes of the
gaunt, waxy-skinned young Rottenfihrer, the doctor's aide, to whom
she inexplicably found herself looking upward in supplication. He ap-
peared stunned, and he returned her gaze with a wide-eyed baffled
expression, as if to say: I can't understand this either.
"Don't make me choose," she heard herself plead in a whisper,
"I can't choose."
"Send them both over there, then," the doctor said to the aide,
"nach links."
"Mama!" She heard Eva's thin but soaring cry at the instant that
she thrust the child away from her and rose from the concrete with a
clumsy stumbling motion. "Take the baby!" she called out. "Take my
little girl!"
At this point the aide-with a careful gentleness that Sophie
would try without success to forget-tugged at Eva's hand and led
her away into the waiting legion of the danned. She would forever
retain a dim impression that the child had continued to look back,
beseeching. But because she was now almost completely blinded by
salty, thick, copious tears she was spared whatever expression Eva
wore, and she was always grateful for that. For in the bleakest hon-
esty of her heart she knew that she would never have been able to
tolerate it, driven nearly mad as she was by her last glimpse of that
vanishing small form.6
For purposes of discussion in this article, I will abstract away from the
specific facts of Sophie's fictional choice in an attempt to capture the para-
doxical nature of her situation, a paradox that might be repeated in other
situations presenting a "choice" to contracting parties. Excluding some ele-
ments of Styron's formulation from the analysis might give rise to other per-
versities, and a more general definition of the paradox helps to identify the
core preferences or elements that would justify restricting freedom of contract.
In the novel, Sophie really had three alternatives. She could remain silent,
she could surrender her boy, or she could offer the girl to be killed. The de-
fault was that both children would be killed, so that inaction or silence meant
death for both the boy and girl (see Figure One). This default had a decision-
forcing quality,' because it clearly appeared to be worse than either of the
6. Id. at 482-84.
7. Carol Sanger has suggested that this was not a "choice" at all. See Carol Sanger, Sepa-
rating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 426 (1996) (citing Holocaust historian Lawrence
Langer, who refers to this as a "choiceless choice").
8. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertier would describe this as a "penalty default." They argue that
such penalty defaults can be efficient, because they induce parties to contract for arrangements
that are better tailored to their relationship (than either a penalty or neutral default would be). Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). Algebraically, Ayres & Gertner conceive the order of choices
PD < D < NP where PD is the value of the penalty default to the parties, D is the value that an
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alternatives Sophie was being asked to choose between. In other words,
Sophie would clearly prefer to have only one of her children killed rather than
losing both of them to Birkenau's gas chambers. To begin with let us assume
that she loved her children equally. In such as case, we could present Sophie's
initial preferences as BG < B = G, where BG represents the death of both
children, B is the death of the boy and G is the death of the girl.
FIGURE ONE
ORIGINAL SOPHIE'S CHOICE (INACTION = BG) 9
But so far we have ignored Sophie's preferences about choosing. The
motive force behind the narrative-indeed the element that makes the doctor's
"offer" so evil-is that Sophie wants not to choose between her children. That
choice might prove so painful, in fact, that she would rather someone else
decide which of her children should live or die. Algebraically, one might
express Sophie's preferences as BG < C < B = G, where C is the choice be-
tween children. This arrangement of preferences would give rise to what I will
call a "weak form" Sophie's Choice paradox. In the "weak form" of the para-
dox, Sophie prefers one of the alternatives to having a choice between the
alternatives. Or to put it another way, Sophie values the choice between alter-
natives less than at least one of the alternatives available to her.
If the choice between children proves sufficiently painful, Sophie might
even prefer that the doctor simply kill both of her children rather than force
her to choose between them. She might prefer, in other words, that the deci-
ordinary default might have, and NP is the value of a negotiated provision. Id. When these are the
parties' valuations and the penalty default induces negotiation where an ordinary default would
not, it can be value maximizing. Id. Sophie's Choice may give some basis for questioning Ayres
and Gertner's enthusiasm for penalty defaults, however, because it provides at least one example
in which the equivalent of NP-that is, the exercise of choice-will hold less value than an ordi-
nary default would. The situation created by the penalty default under such circumstances, then,
will not necessarily enhance value, because it may force negotiation/choice in circumstances where
NP < D. If the default were more neutral, exacting no special penalty (e.g., boy or girl dies, but
not both), Sophie might not feel as pressured to choose and would be spared some of the disutility
that accompanies choice.
9. Figure One represents Sophie's choice in game theoretic terms, where Sophie can choose
her son to die ("B"), choose her daughter to die ("G"), or refuse to choose, in which case her
inaction will lead to the death of both children ("BG").
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sion be completely taken from her hands. When a person prefers all of the
proffered alternatives to being given a choice between those alternatives, the
situation gives rise to what I will call a "strong form" Sophie's Choice para-
dox. The algebraic expression of such preference arrangement is as follows: C
<BG < B G.
A slight alteration of Styron's facts eliminates the decision-forcing quality
of the status quo default and might create a strong form Sophie's Choice para-
dox. The altered version demonstrates that the existence of a Sophie's Choice
paradox does not turn on the presentation of a penalty default. In this scenario,
the doctor says that he will kill Sophie's son, but she can save his life if she
allows the doctor instead to kill her daughter (see Figure Two). In this formu-
lation, one child (but only one child) will die either way. Sophie may have no
clear preference as between her children (so that being given the choice to kill
the daughter instead of the son gives her no value).'0 Substantively, then, the
choice is not more valuable than the status quo default. Procedurally, however,
she suffers more if forced to choose than if the doctor simply kills one or the
other of her children. Algebraically, this formulation looks like this: C2 < B =
G.
FIGURE TWO
MODIFIED SOPHIE'S CHOICE (INACTION = B)"
Of course, the choice that Styron writes about and the choice given
Sophie in the altered version are not the same. If we label the Styron version
C, and the altered version C, it may be that C, < C, because silence in the
face of C2 will not result in clearly greater harm than articulating a choice
(thus giving Sophie the chance to avoid responsibility by remaining silent),
while silence in the face of C, will cause greater harm than choosing (silence
will cause both children to die). This makes the abdication of responsibility
through silence a less viable alternative in C,. But the fact that Sophie would
probably prefer C2 to C, certainly does not mean that she would prefer C2 to
the status quo.
10. It is also possible that Sophie does prefer one child over the other, and I explore this
possibility below. See infra Part fI.B.2.
11. Figure Two represents the altered form of Sophie's choice, where Sophie can choose be-
tween inaction, where her son dies (''), or her daughter dies ('N"G).
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I draw the distinction between the strong and weak form Sophie's Choice
paradox because a public policy response to the paradox will be easier with
the strong form than with the weak. In cases where people have strong form
preferences, it will be easy for policymakers to forge- a value-enhancing rule.
Even flipping a coin between the alternatives will increase value, since people
prefer any alternative to choosing between alternatives. If people have weak
form preferences, on the other hand, policymakers face the more difficult task
of determining which among the alternatives is preferred over choice.
Policymakers will improve people's situations only by selecting the right alter-
native as the default, not by simply eliminating the choice. If they choose
badly, policymakers can leave people worse off by eliminating choice. The
distinction between the strong and weak forms of the paradox is also useful
because it suggests minimal requirements for some governmental intervention.
The strong form makes the case for intervention easy. If people have only
weak form preferences in a given situation, governmental intervention might
still be a good idea, but a little trickier.
The altered version of Sophie's Choice allows us to highlight the core of
the paradox: someone may prefer any alternative to actually having a choice
between alternatives. This paradox flies in the face of most economic theory
and upsets the general view that choices are freedom-enhancing and therefore
desirable. 2
B. Other Examples
But does the Sophie's Choice paradox arise in the real world? I will ex-
plore this issue further below, but consider as an initial example the situation
that arose when the state of California began to permit people given the death
penalty to choose the mode of execution. The state gave inmates this choice in
response to claims that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. It
is possible, of course, that giving condemned inmates a choice between pun-
ishments did make the punishment less cruel. 3 But it is also possible that
forcing people to decide the mode of their own killing added another layer of
suffering to the process.
12. There may be a final element of the paradox that requires clarification here. Unlike some
other examples of coercion discussed in this Symposium, see, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of
Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1231 (1997), the person pro-
posing the alternatives should remain constant, and should always be the doctor. We would not
expect to hear Sophie speak first, offering her daughter to be killed if the doctor will only spare
her son. If Sophie were to make such an offer, our intuition likely would not be that she was co-
erced, and the making of such an offer would also dispel the sense that is central to the para-
dox-the conclusion that less choice is better than more. In this sense, Sophie's situation is distin-
guishable from examples in which an extortion victim offers, "please let me pay you $100 to
forego hitting me," and the offer is consistent with the conclusion that the person is nonetheless a
victim of extortion.
13. Robert Alton Harris brought the court challenge that ultimately permitted him to choose
the mode of his execution. This argument that choice can hurt inmates might be in some tension
with a more general sense that inmates (like the Nuremburg defendants) "cheat the executioner"
by committing suicide--exercising the ultimate power over their own deaths. It may be too diffi-
cult to discern whether a particular inmate is one who would be harmed or helped by receiving a
choice about how to die.
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Wertheimer himself suggests another situation in which the Sophie's
Choice paradox might obtain. In "Norplant," a judge tells a convicted defen-
dant that she will receive probation for her drug offense but only if she allows
a doctor to implant the contraceptive Norplant in her arm. 4 The hypothetical
may present a Sophie's Choice situation because the defendant in Norplant
might prefer not to choose between liberty and fertility. 5
In other contexts, courts have certainly recognized that some choices are
simply too painful to be tolerated, even if they do expand the range of options
from an initial status quo. For example, an employer could not legally force
employees to "choose" between job benefits and observing religious regula-
tions, such as the prohibition against work on Saturdays imposed by Seventh
Day Adventists. 6 The concept of "unconstitutional conditions" may also be
based in part upon the underlying premise that some choices ought not to be
given to people. 7
C. What Sophie's Choice is Not
My thesis is that the Sophie's Choice paradox presents a new and inde-
pendent basis for restricting freedom of choice, including freedom of contract.
In this section, I will discuss and distinguish seven other traditional rationales
for restricting freedom of choice.
1. Sophie's Choice does not require the presentation of a penalty default.
Despite the fact that Styron presented it that way, the paradox of Sophie's
Choice does not turn on the existence of a penalty default. As we saw above
in the version of the facts slightly altered from Styron's narrative, Sophie
would prefer not to choose between her children even (perhaps especially) if
the status quo is that only one rather than both of the children must die. Thus,
the paradox does not depend upon an agent making the undesirable choice in
order to avoid a more costly alternative.
2. Sophie's Choice does not require an immoral baseline.
Again, despite the fact that Styron presented it this way, the paradox does
not turn on the status quo being immoral. The novel is particularly dramatic
because the status quo there did not stem from a "moralized baseline," in the
words of Alan Wertheimer. Sophie's moralized baseline would dictate that
neither child should die. In the novel, then, both the status quo and the
14. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 896.
15. For a "real world" case that closely resembles the Norplant hypothetical, see Man Ac-
cused of Missing Vasectomy, NEw HAVEN REG., March 25, 1997, at All (25 year-old defendant
pled guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct because he impregnated a 15 year-old girl; he served a
year in jail and agreed to have a vasectomy within 90 days as a condition of probation; after an
unsuccessful attempt to have the vasectomy agreement dropped, he refused to go through with it
and now faces 17 years in prison if a judge decides he violated the terms of his probation).
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
17. William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The
Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 243 (1989).
18. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 900.
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doctor's proposal are clearly worse than her moralized baseline. But even in
cases where the status quo is moral, a person might still prefer not to choose
between that status quo and a proposed alternative.
For example, in Wertheimer's Norplant example, 9 the judge can legiti-
mately sentence the convicted drug offender to a prison term. The defendant
can avoid incarceration by submitting to the implantation of Norplant. The
Norplant example is distinguishable from Styron's version of Sophie's Choice
because the status quo (imposing a prison term) is moral, but the hypothetical
illustrates that the Sophie's Choice paradox can exist even without an immoral
baseline.
Sometimes a Sophie's Choice situation could be created by nature. Sup-
pose that the Titanic is sinking and that Sophie and her children are passen-
gers. Sophie is needed on a lifeboat because she has certain navigational skills
that her fellow passengers value, but the lifeboat has room for only one more
person, and Sophie is asked to choose which of her children to include. Na-
ture-rather than the law or the humans who write it-has created the situa-
tion presenting this choice. But even when the choice is not created by people,
Sophie might prefer not to choose. Situations giving rise to the Sophie's
Choice paradox can be caused by good, bad, or no law.2
3. Sophie's Choice does not turn on whether the alternative are framed as
gains or losses.
The paradox does not require a choice between unpalatable alternatives.
We might imagine a situation in which a choice between positive, desirable
alternatives might also raise problems. Suppose that a family with two chil-
dren-a boy and a girl-were to receive a grant that would finance one child's
college education, but only at Harvard. At a time when Harvard would admit
only men, it would be clear that the son would receive the money. But when
Harvard becomes coeducational, the situation may present a painful choice.
The parent might prefer the days of single sex education where no choice was
necessary, or she might prefer that a third party simply decide for her.
19. Id. at 896.
20. Wertheimer has suggested that the presence of an immoral benchmark can distinguish
threats from offers. Robert Nozick says that threats and offers can be distinguished by asking
whether the person would choose to have the choice presented:
the crucial difference between acting because of an offer and acting because of a threat
vis a vis whose choice it is, etc., is that in one case (the offer case) the Rational Man is
normally willing to move or be moved from the presituation to the situation itself,
whereas in the other case (the threat case) he is not. Put baldly and too simply, the Ra-
tional Man would normally (be willing to) choose to make the choice among the alterna-
tives facing him in the offer situation, whereas normally be would not (be willing to)
choose to make the choice among the alternatives facing him in the threat situation.
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, ScIENcE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST
NAGEL 459 (1969).
Sophie's Choice defies both of these formulations. The presentation of alternatives may be
coming from a moral benchmark (an offer according to Wertheimer), but the person might prefer
not to have the choice (a threat in Nozick's view). In this way, the Sophie's Choice paradox com-
plicates the distinction between threats and offers.
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4. Sophie's Choice does not require that the choice create externalities.
Although the presence of externalities is a common rationale for restrict-
ing freedom of contract, the Sophie's Choice paradox suggests that we might
want to restrict choice even in the absence of externalities. The alternatives
presented need not hurt others outside the contracting relationship. The para-
dox arises because of the pain of choosing, and those costs are internalized to
the chooser.2'
5. Sophie's Choice does not require that the chooser's preferences be
suspect.
A traditional rationale for restricting freedom of choice is paternalism: a
belief that the government may know better than individuals what is good for
them. But the Sophie's Choice paradox does not require that we fear the offer-
ee will make the wrong choice, that she might choose the proposed alternative
rather than the default despite its lower value to her.
The government might paternalistically choose for people when the out-
comes of various choices are so uncertain that people are disabled from mak-
ing the choices themselves. But the Sophie's Choice paradox can arise even
in situations where outcomes are certain. Even when outcomes are certain and
people's preferences are respectable, they might prefer not to choose between
proffered alternatives.
6. Sophie's Choice does not turn on the existence of unstable
preferences.
Another form of hand-tying occurs in the presence of dynamically unsta-
ble preferences. In the classic (and most literal) case of hand-tying, Ulysses
fears there will be a time in the future when his preferences will change, that
he will be tempted by the Sirens in ways he now knows will be destructive.
His present self wants to tie the hands of the future self because he does not
trust his future self to have his long-term interests at heart. Jon Elster explains
that "binding oneself is a privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness
of will; the main technique for achieving rationality by indirect means."23
But the preferences of Sophie and those who stand in her shoes can be
stable for eternity. The pain of the paradox does not turn on instability of
preferences, but on being forced to choose something. Sophie might want to
tie her own hands, but not to prevent a bad choice by a future self, because
21. This may not be entirely true. It may be the fear of causing such horrible
externalities-harming one or the other child, and knowing that the doomed child can have no say
in the decision-that causes a good bit of Sophie's pain in choosing. Less classic formulations of
the paradox, such as the Norplant example, present fewer if any externalities, because the person
making the choice is the one who will absorb all the costs and benefits of the choice. Here again,
however, some of the pain of choosing may be caused by a recognition of externalities, as might
arise if the defendant were married to someone who badly wanted to have a baby.
22. Gerald Dworkin has argued that "if one is faced with the two doors behind which are the
famous lady and the tiger, one does not want one's choices increased by adding three more doors
behind all of which are tigers. We are only concerned with options, each of which is known to the
chooser." GERALD DwoRIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AuTONOMY 65 (1988).
23. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SmENs 37 (1979).
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she has no reason to think her future self would choose any differently from
her present self. Rather, she might want to tie her hands to avoid having to
make a choice altogether. 4 Sophie's Choice is therefore distinguishable from
regret. In the case of Sophie's Choice, the only regret is that she had to
choose, not the actual choice she made.' This is not the Ulysses problem,
because the chooser's preferences are stable.'
7. Sophie's Choice does turn on the elimination of options as a
precommitment device.
The Sophie's Choice paradox should be distinguished from situations in
which people seek to increase leverage in negotiation by tying their own
hands. Tom Schelling has suggested that negotiators might restrict their own
choices in order to affect the behavior of others.27 By precommitting to third
parties, for example, a negotiator can tie his own hands to prevent deviations
from those outside commitments. Hand-tying in the Schelling sense thus be-
comes a way of making true what the negotiator wants to be true (e.g., that he
cannot pay more than a given amount for something), weakening the other
party's ability to negotiate against this point.
This form of hand-tying-and the way it seeks to disempower the party
from making a future choice-is distinguishable from Sophie's situation be-
cause it is a strategic move designed to elicit concessions from the other side.
In Schelling's model, the negotiator ties her hands by precommitting to some-
thing that she clearly prefers (at least at the point of the hand-tying) to the
concessions she might otherwise be forced to make. In Sophie's case, she
might want to disable herself from making future choices, but she would do
this merely to avoid a choice between the status quo and the proffered alterna-
tive that will be too painful to make, rather than to force concessions from the
other side or to increase the likelihood that she will achieve a result she clear-
ly prefers.
24. But see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of a second order
Sophie's Choice problem.
25. One could therefore say that Sophie's regret is procedural rather than substantive.
26. While either shifting preferences or Sophie's Choice preferences might lead people to
avoid choice, an example might reveal the strong relationship between them. As one story has it,
someone tried once to bribe Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln dismissed the would be briber from his of-
fice, saying, "You're getting close to the price where I might say yes." Lincoln sent the person
away before the offers became too tempting because Lincoln preferred not to have the choice be-
tween his integrity and a truly tempting offer. Perhaps Lincoln's case is merely one of shifting
preferences. It is also possible, however, that Lincoln valued his integrity and the bribe money,
and sending the man out of his office was a way of saying that he valued the choice between
them less than he valued either. As Lincoln did in this story, people may follow a strategy of
hand-tying to avoid Sophie's Choice situations. Such a strategy will not always be effective, how-
ever.
27. The metaphor Schelling presents to illustrate hand tying is of two trucks driving toward
each other on a narrow road. One will have to pull off the road to let the other pass. If one truck
driver-in plain view of the other-removes his steering wheel and throws it out the window, he
sends a message to the other that he is powerless to pull over. Provided the other driver does not
follow the same tactic, this form of hand-tying may be effective to force the other side to make a
concession. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLiCT (1960). In Sophie's Choice situ-
ations, choosing not to choose will not always solve the problem, because inaction will have a
certain substantive outcome that itself becomes a choice. See infra note 40.
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D. Possible Causes of the Sophie's Choice Paradox
The Sophie's Choice paradox could arise from a number of causes. Un-
derstanding the possible causes of the paradox is important because the legal
and nonlegal response could turn on our beliefs about the dynamic underlying
the paradox. The possible causes of the paradox appear to be threefold: first,
the costs of commensurating may be too high for some people, so that choos-
ing between things is prohibitively difficult; second, people may know that
they value alternatives equally and the pain of choosing comes from treating
equals differently; third, choice may be undesirable for people who cannot or
will not take responsibility for their decisions.
1. Incommensurability
Sophie's Choice may be caused by the fact that the chooser does not
know whether she prefers the proposal to the status quo. The costs of com-
mensuration-that is, of comparing the values of the options-are very
high.' The chooser does know, however, that both alternatives are crucially
important and she does not want to give up the more valued thing. Opportuni-
ty costs loom large as she starts to choose either option.'
This difficulty in sorting preferences has also been noted by Gerald
Dworkin.' He in turn quotes at length a passage by Tibor Scitovsky:
If, beginning with a situation in which only one kind of shirt were
available, a man was transposed to another in which ten different
kinds were offered to him, including the old kind, he could of course
continue to buy the old kind of shirt. But it does not follow that, if he
elects to do this, he is no worse off in the new situation. In the first
place, he is aware that he is now rejecting nine different kinds of
shirts whose qualities he has not compared. The decision to ignore
the other nine shirts is itself a cost.'
This overload of alternatives leads, Dworkin argues, to what Kierkegaard
called the "despair of possibility": in it "the soul goes astray in possibility."32
2. Treating Equals Differently
It is also possible that the pain of Sophie's Choice stems from its require-
ment that the chooser treat equals differently. Sophie might recoil from choos-
ing between her children not so much because their relative values are hard to
28. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ. 56
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 799
(1994) (Sophie's dilemma "is tragic partly because the two lives are not fungible").
29. This concept is similar to Guido Calabresi's theory of "tragic choices." GtJDo
CALABRESi & PHInIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-26 (1978).
30. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 72 (stating that "the possibility of increased choices can
affect (for the worse) the original situation").
31. TIBOR SClTOVSKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY 98 (1976) (quoted in DWORKIN, supra note
22, at 72).
32. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 169
(Walter Lowrie trans., 2d ed. 1954) (1843) (quoted in DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 73.
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discern, but because she knows with certainty that she values them equally.
Being forced to choose between them requires disparate treatment of children
she loves and values equally, robbing her of any rational basis for decision.
3. Taking Responsibility
The third possible cause of the Sophie's Choice paradox stems from the
costs of taking responsibility. It may be that Sophie eschews choice not so
much because she is in doubt about her preferences, but because she cannot
stand to be held accountable for her preferences. 33 The fear of accountability
is a terrible trap, of course, because Sophie is in a no-win situation: she will
feel great sadness and guilt whether or not she acts.
Sophie does not want to take responsibility for her choice or for choos-
ing.34 Gerald Dworkin points to responsibility as one of the primary reasons
that some people might prefer fewer choices:
At the most fundamental level, responsibility arises when one acts to
bring about changes in the world as opposed to letting fate or change
or the decisions of other actors determine the future. Indeed, once I
am aware that I have a choice, my failure to choose now counts
against me. I now can be responsible, and be held responsible, for
events that prior to the possibility of choosing were not attributable to
me. And with the fact of responsibility comes the pressure (social and
legal) to make 'responsible' choices.35
"[M]ore choices bring in their train more responsibility," Dworkin argues, and
"these are costs that must be taken into account. ' 36 Avoiding that respon-
sibility is quite desirable to many people.
For example, at least one court has recognized that it is the exercise of
33. It is not clear, however, that fear of responsibility necessarily drives the paradox of
Sophie's Choice. Given the highly coercive context in which Sophie makes her choice, it is hard
to say that she bears the slightest responsibility for it. One might def'ne responsibility in a way
that makes clear that Sophie lacked it. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza say that "moral
responsibility requires the freedom to pursue alternative courses of action" and "an agent is mor-
ally responsible only if he has the power freely to bring about one event, and he has the power
freely to bring about some alternative event." John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Introduction
to PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL REsPONSIBturrl 8 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., Cor-
nell U. Press 1993). Sophie's choice may bring about the saving of her son's life at the expense of
her daughter, but one cannot say that Sophie "freely" brought about those events. One might ar-
gue, then, that the highly immoral baseline at work in Sophie's case should eliminate any sense of
responsibility on her part and thereby remove the Sophie's Choice paradox. But this is apparently
not enough for Sophie.
34. In the situations discussed so far, the doctor has always been the one proposing the
alternatives to Sophie. But suppose that the doctor tells Sophie he will kill her son if Sophie fails
to make a counteroffer (such as "take my daughter instead"). Should Sophie feel responsible for
not offering? As long as she feels some uncertainty about whether the doctor would have accepted
her girl instead of the boy, would Sophie feel responsible for choosing not to offer the girl? Most
Sophies in that circumstance would not feel responsible for the boy's death if they faded to make
the suggested counteroffer. But this lack of responsibility on Sophie's part is not a necessary con-
clusion; it may simply be contingent on the way society is currently organized. Sophie might feel
that she should offer her own life. It is worth considering what distinguishes her own self-sacrifice
from offering to sacrifice the life of her child. See supra note 12.
35. DwoRKIN, supra note 22, at 67.
36. Id. at 68.
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choice that gives rise to responsibility, rather than the particular substantive act
involved. In Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege,3" the court ruled that a Jehovah's Witness could be given a life-saving
blood transfusion without consenting to it. The court reasoned that the decision
did not impair the patient's religious freedom because moral responsibility
could arise only from a choice, which the patient had not exercised.'
A number of philosophers have suggested the hypothesis that action cre-
ates a stronger sense f responsibility for consequences than inaction does,
even when the consequences of inaction are dire.39 They consider two
hypotheticals involving a runaway trolley car. In the first hypothetical, the
trolley's current path will cause it to kill one person. If the subject chooses to
switch the trolley's path to an alternate track, the trolley will kill five people.
Most philosophers assert that it would be moral to keep the trolley on its
present course. In the second hypothetic d, the runaway trolley will kill five
people on its present course. If the subject switches the track, however, the
trolley will kill only one person. Surprisingly, most philosophers say that it
would not be moral to switch tracks. Apparently people's intuition is that
switching the track in Case A would create responsibility for the deaths of five
people, but that failing to switch the track in Case B would not give rise to the
same responsibility, even though the result would be the same--the deaths of
five people.
The crucial point from the trolley example is that people seem to feel less
responsible if they remain inactive and fail to change the status quo than if
they act and move away from the default.' If this is true, and if the avoid-
ance of responsibility is an important cause of the Sophie's Choice paradox,
then Styron's version of the choice (involving a penalty default) was particu-
larly cruel. Inaction-the alternative that would ordinarily make people feel
less responsible for the outcome-would actually result in the deaths of both
Jan and Eva. The doctor made the default so unpalatable that he drove Sophie
to take action--creating in her a greater sense of responsibility.
E. Consequences
Given these possible causes of the Sophie's Choice paradox, strategies to
avoid it will meet varying levels of success. Responses to the paradox will be
both individual and collective. Strategies that work for individuals may require
some governmental support.
37. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
38. See DwoRKIN, supra note 22, at 68 n.10 (stating that "it was the choice of blood, not the
blood itself, that was forbidden") (emphasis added).
39. ERic RAKowsKi, EQUAL JusTicE 344-47 (1991); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley
Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-97 (1985).
40. Again, to the extent people feel less responsible for inaction than they do for action, we
should see such intuitions as social constructs rather than anything inherent. It might be possible
to reframe situations so that people would feel equally responsible for what they do and (in the
words of the Roman Catholic confession) what they "have failed to do."
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1. Individual Responses to the Sophie's Choice Paradox
Individual responses could fall into three categories: coin flipping, refus-
ing to decide, and hand-tying. The effectiveness of such strategies might turn
on which of the three causes discussed above seems to be most at work.
a. Coin Flipping
For some but certainly not all people, coin flipping might be a sufficient
solution. Coin flipping could help the person who avoids choice because she
does not know which alternative she prefers. The coin flip gives such a person
a basis for deciding when her own preferences are unclear. Similarly, coin
flipping could ease the paradox for a person who avoids choice because he
dislikes treating equals differently. By subjecting both alternatives to the coin
flip, he treats them equally, at least procedurally, and the equal treatment of
the coin flip then becomes the basis for disparate substantive treatment."
For the person who knows her preferences but wants not to take responsi-
bility for them, on the other hand, coin flipping would be a less effective
solution. Eventually, such a person would have to take action, and that seems
to be the source of the pain. Even for those who dislike responsibility, how-
ever, the coin flip might be a useful scapegoat. For people who have a prefer-
ence but are afraid to act upon it, a coin flip that comes out the right way
could grant "permission" to follow the true preference. Even if the coin flip
leads away from the person's true preference, the coin flip might help, because
by preventing the person from acting upon her true preference (for which she
does not want to take responsibility) the coin flip might absolve her sense of
responsibility even more completely.
b. Refusing to Decide
Another way to respond to the paradox is to simply refuse to decide.
Sophie attempted this approach before she was coerced into her decision.
Sophie might even have precommitted to this strategy if she had foreseen the
doctor's horrible proposal and been able in some literal way to implement her
internal wish ("Let me be struck dumb"). The problem, however, is that refus-
ing to decide is, in a way, deciding. In the case of the penalty default, it is
deciding to permit that penalty to be exacted. In Sophie's case, refusing to
choose would have been a decision that both children would die. In the altered
version of the case, refusing to choose would have been a decision to forego
the "opportunity" that the doctor's proposal offered-saving her son.
41. Some people might care so much more about substantive treatment than procedure that
they would find the equality of the coin flip somewhat hollow. See Richard Warner, Topic in
Jurisprudence: Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle, 68 Clu.-KENT L. REV. 147
(1992). "It is not even possible for her to rationally decide by, for example, flipping a coin; to do
so is to count saving the life of one as reason to choose that the other should die." Id. at 154.
42. Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 103, 103 (1996) ("Rather than choose one of her children over the other, Sophie
could have rejected such a choice altogether.").
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Refusing to decide in the original version might help the person who
cannot choose because she does not know which she prefers. Because the
penalty default results in the deaths of both children, Sophie avoids a passive
choice between them. In the altered version, however, the refusal to decide
will result in the death of one but not both children. Refusing to decide in
such a case is, in fact, a decision that one child will die, and will not help the
person who avoids choice because she does not know which of the alternatives
she prefers.
Similarly, for the person who knows that she values the alternatives equal-
ly and wishes not to decide between them, refusing to decide might be an
effective solution to the paradox in the original but not the altered version of
the case. In the original case, refusing to decide has an equal impact on the
two children, and thus would assure Sophie that she treated equals the same.
In the altered case, refusing to decide might be a procedurally neutral stance
and might satisfy some who avoid choice because they wish not to treat equals
differently. But for those who value substance more than procedure, refusing
to decide in the altered case will not solve the paradox, because they will
recognize the decision they are passively making by refusing to decide.
For those who dislike choice because they wish to avoid responsibility,
refusing to decide might appear to be an effective solution. Intuitively, it ap-
pears to avoid action and the sense of responsibility that comes with action.
But as suggested above the heightened sense of responsibility that flows from
action as a opposed to inaction may be merely a social construct. For those
who see beyond the construct, refusing to decide will be an ineffective solu-
tion to the problem of responsibility for choice."3
The more certain the result of choosing (or refusing to choose), the great-
er the sense of responsibility that might settle on the chooser. When the de-
fault is clear (when, in Sophie's case for example, refusing to choose means
that both children will certainly die), refusing to choose will be a substantive
as well as a procedural decision. Sophie will know the substantive conse-
quences of refusing to decide. If, on the other hand, the default is not clear,
then refusing to decide may become more like a coin flip, a procedural choice,
not a substantive one.
c. Hand-tying
A third individual response to the Sophie's Choice problem is hand-ty-
ing-a particularly strong refusal to decide which involves precommitments
not to choose. Like the refusal to choose asserted at decision time, hand-tying
may help the person who does not know her preferences and the person who
dislikes treating equals differently." But hand-tying may not be an effective
strategy for those who wish to avoid responsibility, because while hand-tying
appears to be a purely procedural strategy, it cannot completely mask the sub-
43. This will be true in either the original or the altered case, but will be particularly painful
in the presence of the penalty default.
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
1270 [Vol. 74:4
THE "SOPHIE'S CHOICE" PARADOX
stantive choice that will at least passively be made.45
Hand-tying may be a particularly ineffective strategy for people with
"second order" Sophie's Choice preferences. Such people prefer not only to
avoid the substantive choice (son versus daughter), but also the procedural
choice (whether or not to choose). If they have to decide whether or not to tie
their own hands, they will face this second order Sophie's Choice problem,
and that too will cause them significant disutility. It may be difficult, more-
over, to elicit information about whether people have first and second order
Sophie's Choice preferences. When people don't want to make choices, they
probably won't even want to talk about whether or not they want to choose.
For such people, it may be better not to give them a choice about whether to
choose.'
2. Governmental Responses to the Sophie's Choice Paradox
The Sophie's Choice paradox presents no less than a new rationale for
restricting freedom of contract. This raises, then, the thorny problem of policy:
should the government step in to restrict choice, and if so, how? I will address
each of these questions in turn.
Even if Sophie's Choice preferences exist, we might not want government
to respond because we might fear any rationale that would give a bad govern-
ment another basis for restricting freedom. We might legitimately fear that the
Sophie's Choice paradox would supply a pretext for restricting choice even in
cases where Sophie's Choice preferences are absent.
If we were confident that the government was a good one and would
restrict freedom of choice only in cases where Sophie's Choice preferences
seemed really to be at work, we would still face two important questions of
empiricism and methodology. First, how can even a good government know
when Sophie's Choice preferences are at work? And second, once such pref-
erences are detected, how should the government decide between the alterna-
tives so as to relieve the individual of such choice?
a. Detecting Sophie's Choice Preferences
Sophie's Choice preferences may be particularly difficult to smoke out.
As noted above, people who wish not to choose may not even want to discuss
the alternatives, and thus government will have difficulty knowing whether
they prefer one or all of those alternatives to choosing between them. More-
over, if people know that government is exploring the public's preferences to
45. When the default or the substantive consequences of refusing to decide are uncertain,
however, hand-tying takes on a very different character from the role it played in the case of
Ulysses, where the consequences of hand-tying were clear. In such a case the substantive aspects
of the passive choice may fall away.
46. For example, in the case of the crowded lifeboat, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text, it might be better if the Titanic captain simply chooses which child to include in the lifeboat
rather than giving Sophie the choice between her children. It might also be better for the captain
to choose rather than giving Sophie the choice about whether or not she wants to choose between
her children.
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determine whether their freedom of choice should be" restricted, they might
also understand that the retention of a future choice may turn on their re-
sponses. This may cause their responses to become an implicit choice about
whether or not they wish to choose in the future. In other words, asking peo-
ple whether they have Sophie's Choice preferences in effect is asking them
whether they want to choose at some point in the future. If people have sec-
ond order Sophie's Choice preferences, they might not want even to decide
whether to decide, and will resist the government's probing for that reason.
For these reasons, it may be difficult for the government accurately to detect
Sophie's Choice preferences.
b. Responding to Sophie's Choice Preferences
When the government does manage to find Sophie's Choice preferences,
it will have to decide what to do about them. One option, of course, is to
refrain from action altogether, and leave the problem to private, individual
solutions, as outlined above. A second option would be to act only as an en-
forcer. The government might allow for private solutions and step in only to
facilitate those strategies, by, for example, enforcing coin flip results or hand-
tying commitments.' A third response to the Sophie's Choice paradox would
resemble a strategy in certain situations when people cannot contract for them-
selves: government could try to predict what people would choose if forced to
do so and simply make that choice for them.
In Sophie's Choice situations, the governmental choice would become an
immutable rule in order to relieve people of any decision making.' In cases
where individuals have strong form Sophie's Choice preferences, the
government's job would be relatively easy. Any of the alternatives would be
preferable to choosing between them, and government would increase welfare
no matter which alternative were selected. If the Sophie's Choice preferences
are manifest only in weak form, on the other hand, the government's job be-
comes more challenging, because individuals might prefer a choice to at least
one of the alternatives. If the government selects one of the dispreferred alter-
natives, it will make those people worse off.
When the government tries to predict which alternative people would
choose, however, it faces formidable informational problems. Just as people
might be unwilling to discuss their preference not to have a choice, they will
often be unwilling or unable to reveal their preferences among the proffered
alternatives. Sometimes, even if the government accurately predicts people's
choices (if forced to choose) it cannot rely upon those predictions to determine
people's true preferences. To see how this might be true, consider again the
hypothetical in which a parent must decide which of her children to send to
Harvard. Suppose that the parent is an ardent and very public feminist. If
47. If the government chooses this response, it must be aware that coin flipping and hand-
tying will not be effective in all cases, because some causes of Sophie's Choice preferences will
not be addressed by these responses.
48. If the government's choice were merely a default rule that people could contract around,
they would again be faced with a decision and the Sophie's Choice problem would persist.
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forced to choose, she will select her daughter out of concern for her public
image and the message her choice will send. Her preferences with respect to
the alternatives she might choose, then, are as follows: G. > B. where G, is
the girl if chosen by her parent and B. is the boy if chosen by his parent. In
her heart of hearts, however, the parent might actually prefer that her son go
to Harvard. If someone else could choose (and thus absolve her of responsibil-
ity), the parent's preferences might be as follows: B. > G. where B. is the boy
if chosen by someone else (and thus unchosen by the parent) and G. is the girl
if chosen by someone else. The government's task would be uncovering these
underlying preferences, but knowing what the parent would choose if forced to
do so will not necessarily illuminate that question. And of course asking the
parent her true preferences will not work either, because declaring them is the
same as choosing, and would lead back to the girl-not the parent's true pref-
erence.
49
A final governmental response to the possibility of Sophie's Choice pref-
erences would require the government to reconsider the kinds of choices it
presents to its citizens. The Sophie's Choice paradox might expand the range
of cases that are deemed to create unconstitutional conditions. As Bill Mar-
shall has argued, it is the pain caused by choosing between two dearly held
values, as in the case where the employer gave employees a "choice" between
job benefits and the exercise of their religion, that gives rise to unconstitution-
al conditions." The Sophie's Choice paradox may explain a class of uncon-
stitutional condition cases in which the government's right to do a larger thing
(declining to offer employees certain benefits) does not create a right to do the
smaller thing (denying a particular employee benefits based upon his refusal to
work on Saturday). This "smaller" thing the government proposes to do may
impose a choice, and thus actually impose an intolerable burden.
HI. THE FALLACY OF CONSENSUAL EQUIVOCATION
Wertheimer concedes that "a woman's decision to serve as a surrogate
may not be appropriately consensual" if the woman makes a "cognitive error"
and agrees to a transaction she "will regret or would regret if she thought
objectively about its effect on her life."'" But Wertheimer rejects this as a
justification for making surrogacy agreements unenforceable. He says:
[D]o not say that a woman's judgment cannot be appropriately con-
sensual just because she cannot fully anticipate what it will be like to
give up the child. People can voluntarily consent to sterilizations, sex
change operations, abortions, and plastic surgery, and (shall we add?)
marriage-where one cannot or frequently does not have any experi-
49. One might say that the parent is merely the victim of competing preferences in this case;
feelings about her children's college education conflict with feelings about feminism and her pub-
lic stance on women's issues. This may be true, but it does not mean that the parent's choices, if
forced to choose, would be irrational. The ordering of chosen preferences, even if different from
the true preferences, could be rational given the full range of the parent's concerns.
50. Marshall, supra note 17, at 249-51.
51. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1223.
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ence with the consequences of the decision. By comparison with
some such decisions that we do allow, the problem of miscalculation
in surrogacy may be relatively small and more amenable to preventa-
tive measures .. 52
The problems with Wertheimer's assertion are twofold: first, his assertion is
based upon questionable empirics, because pregnancy and childbirth may be
significantly different from the transformative processes he cites; second, by
treating consent monolithically--assuming that various kinds of consent are
comparable-he commits what he calls the "fallacy of equivocation." '
The empirical problems with Wertheimer's argument stem from the fact
that pregnancy and childbirth may be more transformative than the other
processes he discusses. Pregnancy and childbirth alone combine two key
elements of transformation: physical change intertwined with social, relational
change. Marriage brings no bodily changes. Plastic surgery, sterilizations, and
sex change operations do not by definition involve another human being in the
process. Abortions involve another life (whether a person or not is immaterial
for this discussion), but not in an ongoing way, because the abortion causes
that other life to end. Indeed, in my view, pregnancy and childbirth are so
transformative that the person who emerges from the process can in a very
real sense be said to be a different person from the one who entered the pro-
cess.
Pregnancy and childbirth involve dramatic physical changes in the wom-
an.5" Systemic hormonal shifts may change her affect and mood. Her brain
may change in size and perhaps in function." In the course of the pregnancy
and childbirth, she will grow and shed a whole new organ-the placenta.
These same hormonal changes will cause her muscles to relax, her joints to
loosen, and her bones to change calcium content.56 She may increase her
body weight by 30%."
She will change emotionally throughout the pregnancy and post-partum
period. The same hormones that change her body will also alter the way she
thinks and feels about the world. In some women, these changes are so dra-
matic that a disease has been named to embody them: post-partum depression.
Pregnancy and childbirth will leave marks on her body.5" Her pigmenta-
52. Id.
53. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 892.
54. Some physical changes caused by pregnancy are trivial, such as increased growth of hair
and fingernails, but signal the overwhelming alteration of a woman's physical functions.
55. Health Watch I Brain Shrinkage and Pregnancy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 1997, at B32 (re-
porting that a team of British radiologists and anesthetists found that the brains of women they
tested shrank in late pregnancy and took up to six months to regain their full size).
56. All of these changes are cited in ARLENE EISENBERG, Er AL., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN
You'RE EXPECTING 100-255 (1991), the veritable "bible" for pregnancy and childbirth.
57. The usual guidelines for pregnancy weight gain suggest that most women gain 25-40
pounds. Id. at 147-48.
58. These external changes alone would probably not be sufficient transformation to create
discontinuous selves, but the long and almost universal tradition of using outward marking (pierc-
ing, tattooing, cutting, or painting the body) to signal internal change could make these alterations
significant.
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tion may change, causing the so called "pregnancy mask" or a characteristic
dark line that sometimes runs vertically along the woman's abdomen away
from the navel. Whether she delivers vaginally or by a cesarean section, she is
likely to suffer tears, incisions, and/or stitches. She may gain "stretch marks"
as her skin strains to contain her growing uterus.
Most importantly, perhaps, the woman will be changed socially and
relationally. She will be forever redefined in terms of at least one other human
being. She will add mother to the list of many social roles she plays. Even if
she loses or surrenders the child, this change of role will be indelible. She
may think of the child often, especially on his or her birthday. 9 She may be
forced to acknowledge her relationship to the child if she or the child develops
a disease that might be congenital or for which treatment might require blood
or bone marrow from a genetically related person.'
Any one of these physical, emotional, or social changes might not indi-
vidually justify a conclusion that the person undergoing them has been trans-
formed, but in combination they could very well have that effect.
Ordinarily, a person can only be contractually bound if she or her agent
binds her. If the dramatic changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth do
cause some discontinuity of self, then we must seriously question whether the
prepregnant woman is the same as-or even a faithful agent for-the mother.
Wertheimer notes that "[riespect for a person's autonomy sometimes re-
quires that we respect choices that reflect values that she presently accepts,
even if we are rightly worried about the way she acquires those values." '6
This would seem to respond to the argument that a surrogate may have en-
tered the contract for bad reasons, because she is brainwashed, or because she
suffers from some "false consciousness" of her role in the world. Wertheimer
does not tell us what should happen if a brainwashed person enters into a
contract and then, preperformance, comes to her senses. We cannot say, as
Wertheimer does, that at the point the contract is to be enforced the woman
"presently accepts" the values reflected in her earlier choice.
Wertheimer argues that "the ability to enter into a binding agreement is
itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy and.., the 'unenforceable
contract'62 solution will deter" some contracting. "[I1n trying to protect wom-
en from having to surrender a child against her strong maternal desires," he
says, "we do not express the appropriate respect for women as autonomous
and responsible persons."63 Here he cites Carmel Shalev, who disapprovingly
59. I know a woman who bore and gave up a child for adoption. On the child's birthday
each year, a close friend of the woman would send her a rose for every year the child had been
alive.
60. 1 know a woman who was adopted at birth but came to know her biological parents
when her biological father became ill. The biological parents contacted my friend because the
illness could be genetically transmitted and if my friend tested positive for the gene, she would be
advised to take immediate precautionary steps to prevent the disease.
61. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1226.
62. The consequences of declaring the surrogacy agreement an "unenforceable contract" are
not entirely clear. If it is "unenforceable" it could simply be voidable but not void, that is, unen-
forceable at the option of the mother.
63. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1226.
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paraphrases the arguments of her opponents this way: "Her state of mind at
the moment of agreement is not to be taken seriously because it is subject to
change during the performance of her undertaking, due to the nature of preg-
nancy. The insinuation is that it is unreasonable to expect her to keep her
promise because her faculty of reason is suspended by the emotional facets of
her biological constituency."
But to say that the nrenregnant woman cannot bind the mother is not to
denigrate the reasoning of either person. If we see a discontinuity in the self,
we do not view either of the selves as particularly feeble or disabled by emo-
tion. Rather, we recognize that their preference structures are fundamentally
different and respecting the autonomy of the later, post-partum self requires
that we lessen the power of the prepregnancy self. The prepregnant woman
retains autonomy, but only over herself and only for as long as she exists.
With the onset of pregnancy, and certainly in the wake of delivery, she ceases
to exist. To make her agreement binding is to give her more than autonomy; it
actually gives her power over another.
The decision to make the agreement of the prepregnant woman
nonbinding on the mother cannot rest on a belief that pregnancy and childbirth
somehow disable a woman's powers of reason. We would be voiding the
decision of the person who existed prior to pregnancy, so it can't be the preg-
nancy that makes the woman's agreement suspect. Indeed, by allowing preg-
nant or post-partum women to void surrogacy contracts, we would be honoring
their decisions when they occupy the position that is traditionally most vulner-
able, when they are performing their most gender-specific role. Moreover, by
voiding the surrogacy contract we would not declare all of the woman's deci-
sions suspect, but only those that relate specifically to the nature of the rela-
tionship between mother and child.
Also, recognizing a discontinuity of self does not necessarily mean that
rights of parenthood are inalienable. What it suggests, instead, is that when the
surrogacy contract is formed, the mother of the specific child in issue is not
yet present to alienate her parental rights. The woman who enters the surroga-
cy contract is a different person and cannot alienate the rights of another. The
post-partum mother, however, is free to alienate her own rights. This means
only that the woman cannot relinquish her parental rights until after the child
is born.'
64. CARMEL SHALEv, BIRTH POwER 121 (1989).
65. I should say a word about remedies. If discontinuity of self wipes out consent, then a
woman who reneges on a surrogacy contract w "-uld Lfwar i - ....... performance remedies nor
damages. It is curious, perhaps, that specific performance is often sought and awarded in surroga-
cy cases. Standard contract doctrine would not provide specific performance to enforce a contract
for personal services. And if a court will not force someone to sing at the Met, why should it
force a woman to surrender her child? Perhaps the surrogacy contract is viewed more as a contract
for goods than for services. But this commodification of the child seems highly objectionable.
Perhaps- enforcement of the contract would seem less harsh if the mother simply paid damages to
compensate for her breach. This might prevent unjust enrichment when the other party to the
contract has been paying the woman's expenses. Damages might also include "expectation" dam-
ages to try to give the other party the benefit of the bargain, but the calculation of such damages
might prove impossible. Moreover, given the economic straights of many women who enter surro-
gacy contracts, having to pay damages to the other side might be so threatening that they would
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My thesis, then, is that the changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth
might be fundamental enough that they should cause us to question wheth-
er-at least for the purposes of this particular contract-the
prepregnant/precontractual self can be considered the same person as or agent
for the mother. If we see an important discontinuity of identity in a woman
going through pregnancy and childbirth, and we lack a good theory of agency
to-bind the contracting self to the self against whom the contract is to be en-
forced, this could create serious problems for consent, for it seems axiomatic
in contract law that a person must be a party to the contract to be bound by it.
Wertheimer argues that we can address the problem of discontinuity by
allowing only women who have already been pregnant and given birth to serve
as surrogates, because they are more likely to know the likely effects of preg-
nancy and childbirth: "the problem of miscalculation in surrogacy may be
relatively small and more amenable to preventative measures: restricting surro-
gacy to women who have given birth and therefore have personal knowledge
of the bonding process . . ."6 This is not a complete solution to the prob-
lem, however. No two pregnancies or childbirth experiences are exactly the
same, and the transformative effects of a first pregnancy could be more limit-
ed than subsequent pregnancies. Certainly medical evidence abounds that
second or third pregnancies affect women's bodies differently from first preg-
nancies.67 The labor and delivery may proceed very differently, the child that
emerges will be different from the first child, and it may be impossible for a
woman to predict how she will respond to that specific child.' Furthermore,
because the changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth as so importantly
social and relational, we must be sensitive to the differences between first and
subsequent births in this dimension. The birth of the second child affects not
only the woman but also her existing child or children-with whom the wom-
an is so fundamentally connected that changes in their lives will cause changes
in her life as well. Knowing how the first child affected her may reveal little
of how subsequent children will affect her. Thus, Wertheimer's solution (fol-
lowed by some agencies handling these arrangements) that only second-time
mothers be permitted to serve as surrogates is not always going to work. The
transformative impact of pregnancy and childbirth will in many cases under-
mine our confidence in the continuity of self.
The second problem with Wertheimer's argument about surrogacy stems
from a potential inconsistency with his second article in this Symposium. In
Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, Wertheimer describes what he calls
the "fallacy of equivocation":
the meaning of coercion assumed by the major premise is not identi-
feel coerced into giving up the child. In any case, giving damages rather than specific performance
might provide little relief to the woman seeking to avoid the surrogacy agreement.
66. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1223.
67. EISENBERG, Er AL., supra note 56, at 21-22.
68. If I may indulge in a brief autobiographical note, here, I would say that my five week-
old daughter is quite different from her older brother. I felt different during the pregnancy, the
labor and delivery were different, and Anna's behavior from birth has been a contrast to her
brother's. Knowing how it felt to become the mother of my son has turned out to tell me very
little about how it would feel to become the mother of my daughter.
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cal to the meaning of coercion in the minor premise, and thus the
conclusion does not follow even though both the major and minor
premise may be true (given different meanings of the word).'
Similarly, it may be true that women consent to surrogacy contracts. It may
also be true that people consent to marriage, sex change operations, steriliza-
tions and plastic surgery. But the fact that we make consent binding in these
latter contexts does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a woman's
consent to surrogacy should make that contract binding. By arguing that con-
sent to surrogacy is comparable to consent in the context of marriage, surgery,
or abortion, Wertheimer confuses two different normative consequences of
consent, and thus himself unwittingly commits a fallacy of equivocation.
Wertheimer's point is that in many other situations we allow consent to be
binding despite the fact that the consenter lacks experience and does
not/cannot know what life will be like after the event or process has occurred.
That much is true. We do allow people to commit themselves to undertakings
that are great, even though they may have difficulty measuring the change in
their lives that such a commitment will entail. The problem is that consent will
have different effects in different contexts, but Wertheimer groups all kinds of
consent together. One sort of consent, for example, may be sufficient to insu-
late other actors from tort liability. This is the sort of consent involved in the
context of plastic surgery or sex change operations. But, the consent sufficient
to insulate doctors from tort liability would not suffice to bind a patient to un-
dergo the surgery if he or she hesitated at the eleventh hour.
Wertheimer's examples are also inapposite because they are, in the main,
irreversible processes. Once the scalpel hits the skin, consent to the surgery is
irrevocable, at least where the knife cuts. But until that point, the patient can
withdraw consent. In cases of surrogacy, until she actually surrenders her
baby, the surrogate mother is like a patient who has not yet felt the surgeon's
knife. As long as the process is reversible, we do not bind the party or patient
to her earlier consent and force her to go through with it.
And much like marriage and some forms of sterilization," surrogacy is
reversible. After the baby is born the mother could still change her mind to
prevent irrevocable consequences. Just as we allow men to reverse their vasec-
tomies and we allow couples to divorce, so too we should permit women to
escape surrogacy commitments."
IV. CONCLUSION
Of the two responses I have made to Wertheimer, the discontinuous self
may be the less radica. Certainly it presents a less dramatic challenge to free-
dom of contract than Sophie's Choice does. The implications of the discontin-
69. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 892.
70. Some vasectomies may be reversed--consent is not binding for all time.
71. In conversation, Wertheimer has said that consent to join the military might be a better
example. There, a person can't get out, even though the commitment is in theory reversible. But
the government and national security may present special cases. It is difficult to see that a party
seeking enforcement of surrogacy can advance anything like the global security interests that rest
with the military.
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uous self are consistent with standard contract doctrine regarding the identity
of parties to be bound by a contract. Sophie's Choice, on the other hand,
undermines more fundamentally a bedrock assumption of much of contract
doctrine-that more choice is better than less.
On the other hand, the discontinuous self could have implications that are
further reaching than at first appear. The concept could spill over into cases
where parties wishing to be excused from contract have survived any number
of transformative experiences-violent crime, war, serious illness, near-fatal
accident, mass disaster, or addiction (drugs or alcohol). We might find that
"real world" examples of discontinuity are easier to find than examples of
Sophie's Choice. Sophie's Choice preferences are difficult to detect, precisely
because people with such preferences often wish to not discuss their prefer-
ences. If Sophie's Choice arises only in a very narrow set of circumstances, its
deeper challenge may appear only rarely. In conversation, Wertheimer has
suggested that Sophie's Choice may be only a "curioso," and if it is sufficient-
ly rare he may be right. Perhaps we should hope that the Sophie's Choice
paradox is merely a curioso. If it turns out to be more common, it could un-
dermine much of contract and economic theory.72
As I write this conclusion, I am taking breaks to breastfeed my 5 week-
old daughter. I first read the materials for this Symposium when I was well
into the third trimester of this pregnancy. Perhaps I can be forgiven, then, for
bringing to the subject matter some subjectivity. Perhaps my ideas about
Sophie's Choice and the discontinuity of self say more about my own intellec-
tual and emotional state right now than they do about Wertheimer's ideas.
When my hormones return to "normal," whatever that is, and my brain has
expanded to its ordinary size, perhaps I will regret these remarks. 3 But then
I may become Exhibit A in the case for the discontinuous self.
72. For example, Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem posits that given five crucial as-
sumptions, there is no way to nonarbitrarily aggregate preferences. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICES & INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1952). Among the five assumptions is the axiom of the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. The classic example used to illustrate this axiom presents a diner
who is told that dessert can be either chocolate or vanilla ice cream. If the diner chooses chocolate
and is then told by the waiter, "you can also have strawberry," it would violate the axiom if the
diner were then to switch to vanilla. Being given the additional choice of strawberry ice cream
should be "irrelevant" to whether the diner prefers chocolate to vanilla.
But consider Arrow's assumption in the face of strong Sophie's Choice preferences. If the
Nazi doctor initially says that Sophie must choose whether Jan should be killed or whether both
Jan and Eva should be killed, Sophie may say that only Jan should be killed. If the doctor then
presents an additional alternative, "you could also have only Eva killed," it is possible that Sophie
would be so pained by choosing between Jan and Eva that she would actually shift her choice
back to having both Jan and Eva killed. Sophie's Choice preferences may thus undermine the
seemingly innocuous assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
73. See Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1467
n.*, 1521 n.210. In a wonderful sort of anti-cite, Meyer self-deprecatingly writes, "Insofar as I
suggested there were no difficulties with a positivist approach to qualified immunity doctrine in a
previous article-well-I was wrong. Don't see Meyer, supra note 131, at 480-81. Live and
learn." Id. at 1521 n.210.
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CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...
NANCY EHRENREICH"
I. INTRODUCTION
Attitudes towards critical legal thought seem to be changing. When the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies first came on the legal scene in the
1970s, it was the "bad boy" of legal scholarship. Critical legal theory's sharp-
est critics characterized it as pure critique, as containing no substance of its
own but instead merely delighting in the deconstruction of prevailing modes of
legal analysis. In short, they saw it as not a theory at all; it was pure nihil-
ism.' Failing to see the political assumptions that informed their own work,
these writers viewed critical theory as the exact opposite of scholarship: as
biased and self-interested instead of neutral, advocacy instead of analysis,
political diatribe instead of legal reasoning. In short, many law professors saw
it as a discourse outside the academy, not of it. Nevertheless, I would argue
that at the beginning CLS actually reinforced the legitimacy of mainstream
legal thought,2 providing the foil against which such thought could define
itself, the "other" in a self-other binary? If critical theory was nihilist, biased,
* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1974, Yale; J.D., 1979,
L.L.M. 1981, University of Virginia. I would like to thank Alan Chen, Catherine Kemp, and Char-
lie Piot for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as all of the participants in the University of
Denver College of Law Symposium on Coercion for their feedback. Symposium, Coercion: An
Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 875
(1997). I also appreciate the able research assistance provided by Thomas Cincotta.
1. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 226-7 (1984).
2. It is always hazardous to generalize about the views of a large and diverse group of
people, such as "mainstream" law professors. Moreover, most law professors are rather
atheoretical (if not antitheoretical) in their orientation. (Many were trained by legal realists and
have taken from that experience a commitment to empiricism and a profound skepticism about
grand theory; others identify with the practicing bar and are dismissive (if not suspicious) of "ivo-
ry tower" thinking that seems to have little relevance to the world of practice.) Nevertheless, I
would argue that there are definite similarities among most law professors' ideas of how to "do"
law. Those ideas tend to be composed of an amalgam of jurisprudential influences, including: a
realist-styled emphasis on social science and policy analysis, a process theory focus on institution-
al roles, an enduring formalist commitment to the basic (even if not complete) objectivity and
determinacy of language, and a liberal belief in the essential neutrality of law (evinced through
distinctions such as process/substance, facts/beliefs, and law/politics, as well as in the use of sup-
posedly apolitical balancing tests). It is this set of characteristics that I envision when I use the
term, "mainstream legal thought."
3. Of course, this is not unusual. Many recent writers have discussed how the dominant
term in any hierarchical relationship needs the other term to define itself. For a particularly tren-
chant articulation of such an analysis, see EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1994).
At one point Said quotes Sartre: "Mhe European has only been able to become a man through
creating slaves and monsters." Id. at 197 (quoting Jean Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON,
THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 7, 26 (1968)); see also, PATRICIA HiLL CouINs, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT. KNOWLEDGE, CONscIOUsNESS AND THE POLMCS OF EMPowERmENT 68 (1991).
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destructive and totalitarian, then mainstream legal theory must be positive,
neutral, constructive and liberating.4 As long as critical theory was seen as
pure' critique, mainstream theorists could continue to maintain that they, in
contrast, were doing neutral "legal reasoning" (whether they saw the neutrality
as coming from doctrinal or from policy analysis). By viewing CLS as not a
legitimate legal theory at all, they could avoid acknowledging the substantive
assumptions implicit within their own analyses.
Of course, instead of seeing critical legal thought as pure critique, main-
stream legal thinkers could have viewed it as presenting an alternative set of
substantive political preferences upon which to found a legal system-as artic-
ulating, for instance, a preference for the community over the individual, for
substantive over formalist definitions of justice, for participatory over authori-
tarian legal structures, for human values over property values, for contextual
over abstract legal rules, and the like. However, to see CLS in this way would
have required mainstream legal thinkers not only to recognize the substantivity
of their own approach, but also to concede that the debate between themselves
and critical scholars was a debate between equally rational, alternative para-
digms that were founded upon differing political preferences about the order-
ing of society. Such an admission would, of course, have fundamentally chal-
lenged the assumption that mainstream legal analysis was based on logic, not
substantive political judgments. It was easier, therefore-and indeed useful-to
simply dismiss CLS as irresponsible rowdyism.
But times have changed. At least in terms of institutional presence, CLS is
much more accepted now. Most law schools feel the need to have at least one
self-proclaimed "Crit" on their faculty; many panels at conferences include
one or more among the presenters; the newer textbooks frequently cite to crit-
ical authors in the notes and textual material they present;5 jurisprudential
surveys invariably include critical theories in their lists. While such representa-
tion is often mere tokenism, it is still undeniable that many have come to see
critical legal thought as a legitimate approach to legal theorizing.
As a result, one would expect a crisis in confidence to be occurring within
mainstream legal scholarship. That is, it would seem that recognition of the
value of critical theory would necessarily bring with it a concomitant crisis of
legitimacy for mainstream thinking. One would expect, in other words, to see
the entire landscape of legal scholarship changing, to see the foundations of
mainstream legal theory shaking, to see new paradigms overtaking the
field-or, perhaps, a disintegrative splintering of scholarship into a plethora of
approaches, as has happened in other academic fields. And, indeed, on the
4. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 1, at 227. I realize that, in drawing a contrast between
CLS and mainstream legal theory here, I am ignoring a plethora of other jurisprudential schools of
thought, from process theory to law and society to feminist theory, queer theory, and critical race
theory. But if one had to reduce all of the various developments in legal theory during the second
half of the 20th century down to two major trends, I would argue that CLS and mainstream legal
theory best capture the contemporary jurisprudential landscape. Most identity-politics-related theo-
ries (critical race theory, feminism, etc.) have close affinities with CLS (despite their forceful
disagreements on particular points) and law and economics is arguably just a pseudoscientific take
on the liberal legal constructs that undergird mainstream theorizing.
5. See, e.g., JAMcES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTs PROcEsS (4th ed. 1994).
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margins this splintering is exactly what is happening. Within progressive legal
scholarship there has been a luxurious growth of offshoots: queer theory,
intersectionality, feminism, critical race theory, etc. But all of this has taken
place only on the edges of the academic world, while mainstream legal
thought remains essentially unchanged, sailing on placidly like a huge ship
oblivious to the sharks sniping at its bows.
Now, it is not unimportant that critical theory has become an accepted
mode of legal analysis. No longer the "bad boy" of the academy, today it is
seen as a legitimate choice in the smorgasbord of jurisprudential offerings. For
those who recognize the value of working within the system, this new inside
(if still not insider) status brings a certain satisfaction. From the inside one can
affect hiring, rules structure and policies, institutional publications, and the
like. But there is also something very troubling about being inside, about the
notion that one can choose between CLS and law and economics, or feminism
and utilitarianism, in the same way that one chooses between Crest and
Pepsodent, chocolate and vanilla. Like its predecessor, critical realism, critical
legal theory risks being merely absorbed into liberal legal thinking, its insights
reduced to window-dressing-a set of flat and simplified assertions to which
one pays brief obeisance before continuing on with one's analysis, but which
do not change that analysis in any fundamental way. In the past, mainstream
legal theory (and the larger liberal ideology of which it is a part) reduced the
threat posed by critical knowledges such as CLS by rejecting their contribu-
tions as illegitimate obstructionism. Today, it continues to reduce the threat of
CLS, but in a subtler way-by absorbing it through reformist adjustments to
the existing system.6 Moving from outside to inside might thus be merely a
phyrric victory-a move from exclusion to domestication.!
It is from the perspective of these observations that I find it interesting
and elucidating to examine the two articles by Alan Wertheimer in this is-
sue-both of which were presented at the symposium on Choice and Coercion
for which this article was written! Although Professor Wertheimer is a politi-
cal philosopher, not a legal theorist, I believe that his papers may provide us
with a valuable window into the interaction between theoretical perspectives
within our own discipline, and may indirectly illustrate the domesticating
dynamic with which I am concerned here.
6. Political discourse in the United States is arguably still in the first stage of outright rejec-
tion. Thus, this country, in contrast to Europe, lacks an established socialist political presence, still
viewing left political critique as destructive and un-American, rather than as an alternative--and
equally legitimate (even to those who disagree with it)--political perspective. Presumably, inclu-
sion of the left within the world of legitimate activity would have mixed results in the political
arena, just as (I will argue) it has had in law.
7. On the domestication of legal realism, see generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
8. Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 1215
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy]; Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion
and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 889 (1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks]. Professor
Wertheimer has written extensively on subjects relevant to the symposium topic. See, e.g., ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1972); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOrrATION (1996). However, given the
space limitations of this commentary on his symposium presentations, I will confine myself here
to those presentations and will not discuss his other work.
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When I first began reading Wertheimer's work in preparation for my role
as commentator at this symposium, I attempted, as one always does, to catego-
rize his analysis. What type of theorist was he? How was he approaching the
material? Indeed the papers presented at the symposium, especially the one on
exploitation, seemed to invite such categorization, by explicitly addressing the
issue of methodology. As I understood Wertheimer's description of his own
approach, he meant to eschew conceptualism in favor of something different,
which he termed "moral" or "normative" analysis.' But as the argument pro-
ceeded, I became confused, for Wertheimer's "moral" analysis seemed in fact
to be very abstract, categorical, and deductive-in short, it seemed decidedly
conceptual. Thus, I will argue here that Wertheimer's analysis is an example
of a domesticating use of anti-conceptualist theory. While he seems to have
heeded the critique of abstract analytics, he ultimately succumbs to it, present-
ing an analysis that, because of its anticonceptualist window-dressing, appears
at first reading to be something that it is not.
What this suggests is that it is important in our own field of legal academ-
ics to be wary of similar tendencies. In his purported rejection of conceptual-
ism, Wertheimer of course stakes out a position that is consistent with critical
legal theory (and legal realism before it). Yet, like generations of liberal legal
scholars who have claimed to heed antiformalist arguments only to produce
the same old conceptual analyses in new garb,' ° Wertheimer reveals himself
to be (assumedly not intentionally) a wolf in sheep's clothing. As such, his
analysis attests to the resilience of conceptualism (and/or, perhaps, of liberal
ideology), and suggests that recently expressed scholarly receptivity to critical
arguments does not necessarily presage conceptualism's downfall. Thus, while
it may be encouraging to Crits and other progressive legal academics to see
our colleagues apparently listening to what we have to say, it is important that
we not to be so grateful for the open ear that we fail to criticize incomplete or
domesticating uses of our work.
Professor Wertheimer's articles provide a useful context in which to ex-
plore this problem of domestication, for, although he is a political philosopher,
he is writing here about a subject near and dear to mainstream legal categories
of thought: coercion." Moreover, he discusses the concepts of exploitation
and coercion in the context of a number of hypothetical situations that are
exactly like the questions law professors love to pose in classroom discussion,
situations involving such things as offers to buy organs from poor people,
exorbitant charges for sea rescues, sales of lifesaving drugs at high prices, etc.
9. As I will discuss further in Part ILA, Wertheimer does not completely reject conceptual-
ism, but rather conceives of it as having a limited, preliminary, definitional role in his analysis. As
I will also discuss further, he clearly does not see the conceptual aspects as controlling the conclu-
sions he reaches. See infra, Part I.A.
10. While legal thinkers often claim to have escaped conceptualism, they continually fall
prey to its appeal. Thus, process theory has been shown to be fundamentally formalist, see Gary
Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 MICH. J. LEGAL REFORM 561, 617-19 (1988), as has
law and economics. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri-
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
11. His focus is actually on distinguishing coercion from a different phenomenon, which he
calls exploitation.
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In addition, as I will discuss in more detail later, the assumptions informing
Professor Wertheimer's analysis of these types of situations are the same
assumptions that underlie most mainstream legal approaches to such questions.
Thus, his articles for this symposium provide fertile ground for an exploration
of the ways in which mainstream legal analysis might domesticate critical
legal theory.
The following discussion focuses on Professor Wertheimer's discussion of
the issue of contract parenthood, or surrogacy.'2 Just as Wertheimer's purpose
in discussing surrogacy is to highlight his analysis of the concepts of coercion
and exploitation, so my purpose here will be to use the contract parenthood
issue as a vehicle for exploring the nature of the underlying analytical ap-
proach that Wertheimer takes to his subject matter. Thus, while I will be say-
ing many things about surrogacy contracts, articulating a fully-developed posi-
tion on the legality or desirability of such arrangements will not be my goal.
My central point is that, while Wertheimer presents his analysis as a "norma-
tive" approach that relies only minimally upon conceptual reasoning, he ul-
timately reproduces the very mode of analysis that characterizes the perspec-
tive he is attempting to escape.
II. OVERVIEW OF WERTHEIMER'S ANALYSIS OF SURROGACY
Professor Wertheimer's analysis of surrogacy takes off from his broader
conceptualization of coercion and exploitation. For Wertheimer, coercion re-
lates to problems in the formation of a contract between two parties. In con-
trast, exploitation refers to problems in the substance of the agreement
reached, such as unfairness in the pricing arrangement (the price paid by the
buyer for a good or service is too high or the compensation received by the
seller is too low 3) or inappropriateness of the subject matter (the subject of
the contract is something that "should not be exchanged for money""'). I will
refer to the first type of exploitation as reflecting the "just price" concern and
the second type as reflecting the "commodification" concern. Whereas
Wertheimer apparently believes that coercive contracts should not be enforced,
he contends that exploitative agreements are acceptable unless they harm the
offeree."5  Thus, what he calls "mutually advantageous exploita-
tion"-contracts that benefit the offeree but nevertheless violate either just
12. 1 prefer the term "contract parenthood," since "surrogacy" implies the illegitimacy of the
biological (or gestational) mother's connection to the child. Nevertheless, since "surrogacy" is so
widely used, I will employ that term as well.
13. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 897. According to Wertheimer, however, this
does not mean that any transaction in which the parties did not gain roughly equally would be
exploitative. He does not explain how some contract prices could be determined to be too low or
high if not by comparing the benefits obtained by both sides. Instead, he renders the exploitation
question irrelevant, by assuming that surrogacy contracts are exploitative and by arguing that, even
if they are, they are still enforceable as long as they benefit both parties. Wertheimer, Commercial
Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1220-21.
14. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 898.
15. "We do not need to be moral rocket scientists to argue that harmful exploitation may be
legitimately prohibited by the state or that coerced agreements are neither morally nor legally
binding." Id. at 897.
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price or commodification concerns-should be legal. 6
Applying this conceptual framework to surrogacy, Wertheimer begins with
the assumption that such contracts are exploitative, and thus turns immediately
to the question of whether they're mutually advantageous. Here he first con-
siders "nonmoral" harm, asking whether the tangible benefits the surrogate
receives from a surrogacy arrangement outweigh the disadvantages of the con-
tract for her. He concludes that, although it is difficult to say definitively
whether the benefits outweigh the costs, 7 even if they don't that problem can
be simply solved by paying the surrogate more money." Discussions of sur-
rogacy often fail to consider that option, Wertheimer continues, because of
fear of the "moral" harm of surrogacy. It is under the category of moral harm
that he addresses the commodification concern.
Rather than considering the impact that the commodification of reproduc-
tion might have on the condition of women as a group, Wertheimer confines
his discussion at this point to the impact surrogacy has on the actual women
who agree to be surrogates. 9 Defining the harm qf commodification quite
narrowly, he essentially treats it as a loss of respect-either of one's self or of
others." He then dismisses this concern, expressing doubt as to whether ei-
ther the surrogate herself or others in society in fact lose respect for her and
concluding that, even if they do, "it is not clear that [such loss of respect]
represents a basis for condemning the practice [of surrogacy] rather than a
basis for condemning society's reaction" to it." Thus, for Wertheimer, surro-
gacy is probably advantageous to the surrogate, because it causes her neither
16. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1224. Where surrogacy creates
moral harm,
there are reasons... to prefer a political regime that does not regard such wrongness as
a sufficient justification for invoking the coercive powers of the state.
If surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation, then
it certainly does not follow that... we should prohibit A from exploiting B.
Id.
17. Id. at 1217. "In view of our limited factual knowledge and unresolved theoretical contro-
versies over what counts as objective harm, I am inclined to think that we should now remain
agnostic." Id. at 1217-18.
18. Id. at 1218. "If we are operating in the territory of the surrogate's nonmoral interests, I
think it is entirely possible, nay inevitable, that a sufficiently large increase in compensation
would convert a net harm into a net benefit for many women." Id.
19. Wertheimer recognizes that his limited inquiry into whether commodification makes the
contracts exploitative does not end the discussion: "Commodification may better be understood as
a basis for thinking that surrogacy is wrong for reasons unrelated to the interests of the surrogate
and, therefore, unrelated to worries about exploitation of the surrogate." Id. at 1220. But when he
returns to those reasons, they do not prevent him from concluding that surrogacy should be legal.
See infra, text accompanying notes 68-72.
20. For a much richer conceptualization of the harm that commodification of reproductive
functions can produce, see Margaret Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1880-
81(1987).
To speak of personal attributes as fungible objects-alienable 'goods'-is intuitively
wrong... We feel discomfort or even insult, and we fear degradation or even loss of the
value involved, when bodily integrity is conceived of as a fungible object. Systematical-
ly conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to personhood,
because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person.
Id. at 1880-81.
21. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
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nonmoral nor moral harm.'
According to Wertheimer, such a "mutually advantageous" contract should
be allowed, even if it is unfair to the surrogate. Even "if surrogacy is wrong
and exploitative because it commodifies that which should not be
commodified, it does not follow that surrogacy should be prohibited or that
surrogacy contracts should not be enforceable."23 For Wertheimer, exploita-
22. 1 must admit that the structure of Wertheimer's argument is a bit confusing to me here.
It is unclear which of two alternative arguments he means to be presenting. First, he could be
differentiating between the question of whether a contract is exploitative and the question of
whether it is harmful. Under that approach, his analysis would look like this:
Exploitation + Harmfulness
unjust price? ) if yes, contract is ex- nonmoral harm? ) if yes, it's harmful
or ) ploitative; if no, it's not or ) exploitation; if no,
commodification? ) moral harm? ) it's mutually
adv exploitation
The problem with this way of setting up the analysis is that the concept of mutually advantageous
exploitation becomes difficult to comprehend. How can an agreement involve either an unjust
price or commodification and yet not be harmful to either party? In some contexts, the answer
seems easy. If you sell me a glass of water in the desert for a million dollars, I'm still better off
than I would be without it, because without it I'd be dead. The contract, while exploitative
($1,000,000 is an unjust price for a glass of water (or is it, if it's in the desert?)), is still mutually
advantageous (being alive is better than being dead). But in other contexts, and specifically in sur-
rogacy, the distinction between exploitation and harmfulness loses its coherence. How do we
know that an unjust price has been paid for surrogacy services? How do we know whether a sur-
rogate is better off being a surrogate than she would have been had that option not been available?
The only way to judge both exploitativeness and harmfulness is to measure the benefits to her
against the costs; the two inquiries collapse into one.
Alternatively, it could be that Wertheimer in fact intended to collapse the two inquiries
together, in which case his analysis would look like this:
Exploitation
nonmoral harm (unjust price)? ) if yes, then harmful exploitation;
or ) if no, then mutually advantageous
moral harm (commodification)? ) exploitation
Under this approach, however, the concept of exploitation loses all of its substantive content. An
arrangement is seen as mutually advantageous exploitation whenever it involves neither moral nor
nonmoral harm. But there is no indication of why, in such circumstances, it should still be consid-
ered to constitute exploitation at all. The exploitation label loses all significance, and
Wertheimer's argument reduces to the contention that beneficial contracts should not be prohibit-
ed, a rather uncontroversial point. Because I assume that Wertheimer is meaning to say more than
that, I am assuming that the first interpretation is the correct one.
However, an additional comment that Wertheimer makes in his paper suggests that the
second interpretation might actually be what he intends. At one point Wertheimer acknowledges,
and in fact makes light of, the absence of a definition of exploitation in his paper, noting that, if
someone contests his view that a contract can be both exploitative and mutually advantageous,
such agreements can instead be called "cases of mexploitation or shmexploitation or whatever. I
am interested in the moral character of certain sorts of transactions and relationships, whatever we
want to call them." Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 898-99. Thus, he seems to be saying
that he intends for the concept of exploitation to be in some sense extraneous to his analysis.
Under his formulation, then, the fighting issue is apparently whether the agreement is harmful. Yet
Wertheimer treats that question very conceptually, citing little empirical evidence and aiming most
of his discussion at a very abstract, general level. Nor does Wertheimer ultimately explain why it
is necessary to address the notion of exploitation at all if it is in fact irrelevant to his analysis.
23. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1220.
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tion does not justify banning surrogacy so long as the practice is beneficial to
the surrogate. "Mhe surrogate may be exploited even if surrogacy provides a
net benefit to her. On the other hand, if the compensation is (or could be
made) adequate, then we will have to conclude that the surrogate is not (or
would not be) exploited, whatever else we may want to say about surroga-
cy. '2 4 Apparently, then, just price trumps commodification; if the amount
paid is Ige enough, he arr.angement canot be exploi.tive, regardless of its
commodification effects. Whatever disrespect the surrogate might feel can be
salved with money.
Regardless of whether surrogacy is considered exploitative, Wertheimer
nevertheless believes that "[iut will be easier to justify the prohibition or non-
enforcement of surrogacy agreements if they are nonconsensual." He be-
lieves absence of consent is not likely to be a problem, however, for "[o]n any
standard account of coercion, surrogacy is simply not coercive."'26 The offer
made to a surrogate is a "positive good"' because it confers a benefit on her
and does not propose to make her worse off if she refuses it. Moreover, any
sense of compulsion that she might experience dud to the circumstances in
which she finds herself-such as a need for money or a lack of employment
options-does not render the contract coercive because those conditions are
not produced by the offeror. Relying here on an individualist notion of
citizens' responsibilities of the sort that critical scholars often critique,
Wertheimer asserts that the intended parents have no obligation to correct the
unequal background conditions that might cause 'a surrogate to accept a
"nonrefusable offer"--an offer that anyone in her situation would rationally
choose to accept. In such situations, the surrogate should be allowed to choose
between the two evils with which she is presented.'
Having concluded that most surrogacy contracts are mutually advanta-
geous and therefore should probably not be prohibited even if exploitative,
Wertheimer considers whether, as an alternative to banning these arrange-
ments, the government should instead regulate the amount paid to the surro-
gate. However, he concludes that is not necessary either, arguing that a poten-
tial surrogate is likely to be in a strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the in-
tended parents and that any restrictions that discouraged surrogacy would
unacceptably infringe upon the autonomy of women who desire to be surro-
gates. Moreover, even if the surrogacy contract itself could be seen as viola-
tive of a woman's freedom, "it remains an open question whether the right to
choose not to be positively or truly free is itself a crucial dimension of one's
autonomy."'
24. Id. at 1221.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1222.
27. Id. at 1223.
28. Id. In contrast to situations where background conditions influence the surrogate's deci-
sion, if her decision is instead the product of "cognitive error"-a miscalculation as to the effect
that surrogacy will have on her life-Wertheimer is willing to consider her consent involuntary.
Id. For Wertheimer, then, it appears that irrational or unperceptive women might be deserving of
protection, although powerless women are not. He ultimately leaves the question open, however.
29. Id. at 1225 (cites omitted).
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Finally, Wertheimer returns to the question of the impact of contract par-
enthood arrangements on society as a whole-a "justice" concern which he
dismisses rather quickly. First, Wertheimer reiterates his point that societal, as
opposed to individual, effects of surrogacy have nothing to do with exploita-
tion as he defines it. Second, he asserts that, since prohibition of surrogacy
would burden "the least well-off" women to benefit others, it is hard to
justify?' Finally, citing an absence of empirical evidence to indicate that sur-
rogacy would reinforce existing inequalities, Wertheimer concludes that the
practice should not be prohibited.
I. A CRITIQUE OF WERTHEIMER'S ANALYSIS
In his attempt to avoid a conceptualist analysis, Professor Wertheimer
commits the same error as do thbse who domesticate critical legal thought. His
alternative approach reveals a very narrow conception of what is wrong with
the type of thinking that critical realists and Crits have consistently attacked.
Apparently viewing abstract, categorical reasoning as the primary flaw in
conceptualist analyses, he ignores the critical argument that such analyses are
necessarily grounded upon challengeable, but nevertheless invisible, substan-
tive assumptions. Rather than appreciating the more radical implications of the
critical realist attack on formalism, he domesticates that attack, reducing it to
little more than a call to empiricism.
I will limit my comments on Professor Wertheimer's analysis to three
points. First, as stated above, although Wertheimer dismisses conceptualist
analysis, in founding his argument upon an elaborate web of abstractions and
an essentialist view of the individual legal subject, he ultimately reproduces
the metaphysical approach he purports to reject. Second, like his conceptual-
ism, Wertheimer's summary conclusion that negative liberty is the only type
of liberty to consider here reflects a conceptual framework typical of main-
stream legal thought and sharply criticized by the Crits. In endorsing an ab-
stract, decontextualized notion of human liberty, Wertheimer uses as formalis-
tic an argument as that found in Lochner v. New York,3' the
anticonceptualists' favorite whipping boy. Yet his anticonceptualist gloss
makes his analysis seem less dated than it really is. Third, Wertheimer's asser-
tion that background conditions are irrelevant to the enforceability of surroga-
cy agreements ignores the constitutive role of law in creating those back-
ground conditions and thus contributing to the individual choices that respond
to them. This argument, too, adds little to traditional mainstream legal takes on
such issues. Throughout, Wertheimer's argument reproduces, rather than es-
capes, an individualist, conceptual, and formalist approach to questions of
coercion, exploitation, and surrogacy.
30. Id. at 1228.
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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A. Normative in Name Only
Professor Wertheimer describes his approach to exploitation as a "norma-
tive" or "moralized" approach, emphasizing that "[tihe questions as to what
agreements should be treated as invalid and what behaviors should be prohibit-
ed will be settled by moral argument informed by empirical investigation
rather than conceptual analysis."32 He continues:
I do not deny that it is possible to produce a morally neutral or em-
pirical account of coercion .... I do maintain that if we were to
operate with a morally neutral account of coercion, we would have to
go on to ask whether that sort of coercion renders B's agreement
invalid and that we will be unable to answer that question without
introducing substantive moral arguments."
Thus, regardless of whether the moral inquiry is imported at the
definitional level-the determination of "what counts"34 as coercion or
exploitation-or at the justification level-the determination of when
coercion or exploitation is justified-it cannot be avoided.35
In his articles for this Symposium, Wertheimer seems to mean to
limit himself to discussion of the definitional side of the equation,
explaining that such conceptual analysis is not completely useless, but
must be supplemented at some point by moral inquiry. "The concepts
of coercion and exploitation," he argues, "provide important templates
by which we organize many of the moral issues in which we are inter-
ested, but they cannot do much more than that."' Thus, at the same
time that Wertheimer rejects conceptual analysis as inadequate, he en-
dorses it as useful. And, at the same time that he labels his own ap-
proach as normative, he grounds it upon a definitional, conceptual
bottom. Wertheimer apparently believes that conceptual and normative
approaches can coexist, and sees no contradiction in trying to combine
them as he does." But I will argue here that the definitional side of
32. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890.
33. Id. at 892.
34. Id. at 890.
35. The two questions that Wertheimer applies to coercion seem to apply to exploitation as
well, and his discussion of surrogacy reflects a similar bifurcation between definitional and justifi-
catory questions, so I am treating his methodological approaches to coercion and exploitation as
the same.
36. Id. at 890.
37. It is unclear to me exactly what Wertheimer means by "normative" analysis or "substan-
tive moral arguments," but it seems likely that he does not mean the same thing that critical legal
scholars mean when they talk about the moral or value-based element in law. The latter mean to
be referring to the irreducibly political nature of legal decisionmaking, to the fact that the manipu-
lability of legal doctrine means that judicial decisions are based not on the rules but on substantive
visions of how society should be structured and substantive assumptions about the nature of exist-
ing social relations. Wertheimer probably does not intend to go that far. In any event, what is
important for present purposes is that he clearly intends to be contrasting normative with concep-
tal; he clearly believes that purely conceptual analysis is inadequate to the task of resolving prob-
lems involving human choices. And, like mainstream theorists who make allusions to critical in-
sights in their own work, he seems to believe that conceptualism and anticonceptualism can peace-
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his argument, the importance of which he minimizes, is actually central
to his approach. Like many legal theorists who have tried to respond to
critical critiques of conceptualism, Wertheimer ultimately fails at the
task he sets for himself. Despite his protestations to the contrary, the
analytics ultimately drive the analysis.
1. What Counts as Mutually Advantageous Exploitation is What Counts,
Period
As I described above, how surrogacy is categorized determines
Wertheimer's assessment of how it ought to be treated. Wertheimer
thinks exploitation that produces nonmoral harm to the surrogate
should perhaps be restricted, that morally harmful exploitation is a
harder case, and that mutually advantageous and consensual exploita-
tion should probably not be prohibited at all." Thus, for Wertheimer,
the categorization of a type of exploitation determines its treatment.
Once he has decided that surrogacy constitutes mutually advantageous
exploitation, his position on regulation is a foregone conclusion. Al-
though Wertheimer distinguishes between definitional and justificatory
inquiries, and emphasizes that either one or the other must include
moral analysis, his conceptual approach to defining types of exploita-
tion becomes the tail that wags the dog, leaving no room for a moral-
ized account.
In setting out his overall approach to analyzing coercion and ex-
ploitation, Wertheimer clearly sees the definitional inquiry as separate
from and unrelated to the justificatory questions.39 He thinks it is pos-
sible to decide how to defime concepts such as coercion and exploita-
tion without considering the results of those definitions. He treats the
definitional and justificatory questions separately and notes that the
former "are much less important than they first seem," because they
do not tell us whether to prohibit or allow certain agreements. More-
over, Wertheimer believes as well that it is possible to proceed from
the definitional questions to a moral analysis of how a practice ought to
be treated, without having the previously-engaged-in definitional analy-
sis determine one's moral results.
Yet, by separating the definitional from the justificatory questions
fully coexist.
38. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
39. As noted earlier, he states:
The concepts of coercion and exploitation provide important templates by which we
organize many of the moral issues in which we are interested, but they cannot do much
more than that. The questions as to what agreements should be treated as invalid and
what behaviors should be prohibited will be settled by moral argument informed by
empirical investigation rather than by conceptual analysis.
Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890.
40. Id.
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in this way, Wertheimer has painted himself into a box. If the question
of whether a particular agreement ought to be seen as coercive or ex-
ploitative really has no practical ramifications-if it cannot tell us
whether the agreement ought to be regulated or banned-then it is hard
to see why one should care what the agreement is called. We could call
it "coercive," "exploitative," "mutually advantageous," "meditative," or
"car wax," and it would make no difference whatsoever to any conclu-
sions we might draw about its legitimacy. If the definitional inquiry is
not tied to justificatory questions it is pure metaphysics (fine for a
philosopher, perhaps, but rather unsatisfying for a lawyer)."'
On the other hand, if we attempt to tie the definitional question
to the justificatory one-as Wertheimer does in basing the treatment of
a contract on its categorization-then we face a different problem. That
is, it is impossible to decide what counts as coercion or exploitation (or
mutual advantage) without knowing how coercive or exploitative (or
mutually advantageous) agreements will be treated. The definition of a
concept necessarily turns on the purpose for which we are defining it.
To draw on the well-known realist example of this point:42 The defimi-
tion of what constitutes a vehicle under an ordinance prohibiting vehi-
cles in the park will depend upon whether the ordinance is designed to
prevent noise pollution (a war monument with a truck on it will be
OK), assure pedestrian safety (golf carts might be OK), or reduce air
pollution (electric cars will be OK). In other words, Wertheimer has set
up a false dichotomy between definitions and impacts. That is, it is
arguably impossible to define coercion without reference to what one is
attempting to accomplish with the concept. Similarly, it is arguably
impossible to decide when a coercive practice should be prohibited
without knowing what exactly we mean by coercive. Thus, once
Wertheimer tells us that, under his scheme, mutually advantageous
exploitation will probably not be prohibited, the response to the ques-
tion of whether surrogacy constitutes mutually advantageous exploita-
tion resolves as well the question of whether surrogacy should be pro-
hibited. They are two ways of asking the same thing. The conceptual
analysis that (in Wertheimer's terms) does no more than organize the
issues in fact resolves them, leaving no room for moral argument. The
question of what counts as mutually advantageous exploitation is what
41. This may, of course, be a problem of paradigm differences. See generally Catherine
Kemp, The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in Law and Philosophy, 74
DENY. U. L. REV. 877 (1997). Professor Wertheimer is a political philosopher, I am an attorney.
Political philosophy invites the exploration of knotty metaphysical problems for the edification
that such exploration provides; law requires concrete answers. I would suggest instead, however,
that there is a flaw in Wertheimer's argument. If exploitation is irrelevant to his analysis, then it
should have been excluded.
42. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 633 (1958).
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counts, period.
2. Conceptualism and Consent
In addressing the voluntariness of surrogacy agreements, Professor
Wertheimer again raises both a definition question and a justification
question, and again fails in his effort to keep the two separate. He em-
phasizes that the label "coercive" means nothing, but he simultaneously
sets up his analysis so that it means everything.
Wertheimer states that our labeling of a surrogate's contract as
consented or coerced will not resolve the substantive moral question of
whether it ought to be prohibited. "Whatever label we use to describe
her choice, we must still decide whether she should be allowed to
make such a choice. And referring to such choices as 'coerced' will not
resolve that substantive moral question."'43 Here Wertheimer sounds
very much as if he believes that terms like rights, duress, and coercion
should not be understood metaphysically and that conceptual reasoning
relying upon such terms cannot be the basis for judicial conclu-
sions-points that critical scholars frequently make as well. But he
nevertheless ultimately resorts to an approach to coercion that is just as
formalistic as his approach to exploitation, ignoring his earlier indict-
ment of the question-begging nature of such analyses.
Consent is important in two places in Wertheimer's surrogacy
article. First, he notes that, while consensual exploitation is possible, it
is nevertheless easier to justify prohibiting surrogacy contracts if they
are nonconsensual-that is, involuntary. ' Second, he states that, even
if a surrogacy contract could be said to have violated the woman's
rights (for example, her right not to have her reproductive labor
commodified), her consent eliminates any concern we should have for
such a violation. To Wertheimer, the answer to the question, "Was the
surrogate's consent coerced?," directly affects how the contract should
be treated.
Despite having expressed skepticism about the validity of the enter-
prise, Wertheimer does not hesitate to label surrogacy voluntary: "On
any standard account of coercion, surrogacy is simply not coercive."45
This is because coercing someone means threatening to make her worse
off if she does not accept one's offer. Since the intended parents do not
propose to make the surrogate worse off were she to refuse their offer
to pay her for bearing them a child, their offer is not coercive. More-
over, any situational factors that might make the offer
43. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
44. Id. at 1221. Wertheimer also asserts, more definitively, that coerced agreements should
not be legally binding.
45. Id. at 1222.
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"nonrefusable"-difficult to pass up---are irrelevant, because they are
not caused by the intended parents. In such situations, "it is arguable
that it is the background conditions that are the problem and not the
offer that allows [the surrogate] to improve on those background condi-
tions. The offer is still a positive good."'  Even if the surrogate has
been forced by circumstances to agree to sell her reproductive capacity,
she has not been "coerced" because the parties with whom she has
contracted are not responsible for those circumstances. Thus,
Wertheimer concludes, "the intended parents' proposal is an offer, and
offers do not coerce."47
Just as Wertheimer's attempt to combine a conceptual definition of
exploitation with a normative argument as to when it is justified col-
lapses under its own weight, so here the inquiry into voluntariness
ultimately determines the question of enforceability. A surrogacy con-
tract is enforceable, Wertheimer says, only if it is freely entered into.
Yet his inquiry into consent is extremely conceptualist, with definition
piled upon definition. Treating the presence or absence of coercion as a
question susceptible of logical determination, he ignores the mor-
al/political choices involved in the selection of a definition. And since,
under Wertheimer's schema, how coercion is defined determines how
the surrogacy contract is to be treated, this flawed conceptual analysis
becomes the central determinant of the outcome; the normative element
is rendered irrelevant.4
In separating out his conceptual analysis from a subsequent norma-
tive inquiry, Wertheimer not only fails to see that the conceptual analy-
sis will affect what follows, but also erroneously assumes that by sav-
ing the normative dimension for later he can assure the viability of the
conceptual part. But Wertheimer's focus here on whether one of the
parties to the contract has affirmatively acted to harm the other party,
and his treatment of the background conditions as irrelevant, is itself a
value choice-a substantive preference for an individualist, rights-based
inquiry over, for example, a more community-focused perspective that
emphasizes, say, fiduciary duties and security instead of self-protection
and autonomy.49 While it may be that this is what Wertheimer means
46. Id. at 1223.
47. Id. at 1222.
48. Compare, for example, Albert Alschuler's take on coercion: "Most lawyers have known
for a long time that the term coercion cannot be defined, that judges place this label on results for
many diverse reasons, and that the word coercion metamorphoses remarkably with the factual
circumstances in which legal actors press it into service." Albert Alschuler, Constraint and Con-
fession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957, 957 (1997). While some of Wertheimer's language suggests
that he adopts a similar view, the details of his analysis suggest otherwise. For him, the conceptual
inquiry into definition determines the supposedly normative conclusion about application.
49. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer of Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988).
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by the normative element in his analysis, that seems unlikely, for he
neither articulates the basis of that value choice nor defends it in any
way. Rather, it seems more likely that he simply fails to see the sub-
stantive political content residing within what he perceives to be the
initial, purely conceptual, side of his analysis.
Like the legal scholars who treat conceptual and anticonceptual
approaches as equally viable alternatives, Wertheimer here retains a
faith in conceptualism that reveals a failure to comprehend the corro-
siveness of the critique that has been directed against it. Thus, rather
than fully abandon conceptualism, he tries to redeem it by combining it
with a separate "normative" analysis. But this pluralist approach do-
mesticates the anticonceptualist critique and, as a result, fails to escape
reliance upon a set of formalist abstractions.
B. Decommodification and Positive Freedom
In addition to mislabeling his analysis as anticonceptualist,
Wertheimer also relies upon many of the substantive assumptions for
which conceptual thinkers, at least in law, have been repeatedly criti-
cized. In particular, his narrow conceptualization of the autonomy inter-
ests at stake and his implicit reliance upon the public/private dichotomy
are both analytical moves that have characterized formalist legal
thought since the mid-19th century. Yet Wertheimer's rejection of con-
ceptualism apparently does not extend to these elements. Like many
legal theorists who thought the realists' main contribution was to reveal
that legal thinking was divorced from modem social realities,
Wertheimer seems to be centrally concerned with the need to tie analy-
ses of issues like surrogacy to concrete, empirical information. But, just
as many legal theorists who focused on empiricism failed to appreciate
the indeterminacy arguments of the critical realists, so here Wertheimer
has taken only a small piece of the modem critique of formalism into
his analysis, leaving much just as it was before. By thus domesticating
the progressive critique, he opens himself up to repeating many of the
flaws of conceptual analysis.
Wertheimer sees surrogacy as presenting a choice-of-two-evils type
of situation. If the woman would be worse off without being a surro-
gate, then we should not presume to prevent her from choosing that
option, even if surrogacy causes her some harm. "If a woman can rea-
sonably regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that
society has unjustly limited her options, it is arguable that it would be
adding insult to injury to deny her that opportunity."' By assuming
50. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
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that governmental interference with such private choice is illegitimate,
Wertheimer ignores the fact that a number of practices are considered
sufficiently harmful to justify prohibition precisely to prevent individu-
al actors from choosing them. Thus, the pressing question about surro-
gacy is, in a sense, whether a surrogate can reasonably regard the con-
tract as beneficial to her--or whether we want, instead, to say as a
matter of law that it is not. While it is certainly possible to argue that
surrogacy is sufficiently harmful to justify prohibition,5' Wertheimer's
argument precludes that discussion by focusing on the question of gov-
ernment intervention and narrowly defining the harm of surrogacy.
Wertheimer fails to consider, for example, the wide variety of
choice-of-evil situations in which we prohibit a choice that would
arguably benefit someone because we decide that the harm that it
would do, both to that individual and to society at large, is of a type
that we simply do not wish to incur. That harm might come, in fact,
precisely from one's being required to make the decision to engage in
dehumanizing behavior that no rational person in one's position would
resist. As Wertheimer himself acknowledges, in limiting his conception
of harm to the surrogate to negative liberty, he precludes the conclu-
sion that her positive liberty will actually be served by banning or regu-
lating such contracts.
Yet the law has clearly recognized that decommodif-
ication-restraints on people's economic choices (on what can be ex-
changed in the market)-is sometimes necessary to truly protect
people's freedom. And an entire set of legal rules is premised upon the
assumption that "[t]here are ... some things that money cannot
buy."'52 We do not allow people to enter into contracts of slavery, to
sell their organs, to agree to work in substandard industrial workplaces
or for less than the minimum wage, to live in housing that fails to meet
the housing code, etc. At least in some circumstances, we have an-
swered the question Wertheimer poses, as to whether autonomy neces-
sarily includes "the right to choose not to be positively or truly
free,"'53 with a resounding "No." Sometimes, as John Stuart Mill so
aptly put it, such exercises of negative liberty "defeat[] ...the very
purpose which is the justification of allowing" the exercise of freedom
to begin with.54 And Roscoe Pound, commenting on Mill's quote,
adds, "[This principle] applies to any situation where a person by con-
tract imposes substantial restraints upon his liberty. Freedom to impose
51. For an excellent articulation of that argument, see Radin, supra note 20, at 1921, 1928-
33.
52. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (NJ. 1988).
53. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1225 (cites omitted).
54. John Stuart Mill, Liberty, ch. V (discussing selling oneself into slavery) (cited in Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 484 (1909)).
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these restraints, in the hands of the weak and necessitous, defeats the
very end of liberty."55
Now, obviously, there are many choices of evils that we allow
people to make. In fact, we usually do not worry at all about the coer-
cive effect of market exchanges. Thus, we allow people to decide to
work in toxic workplaces, to labor a grueling number of hours each
week (with overtime pay or not, depending upon one's profession), to
work for companies that provide neither day care nor health insurance,
etc. The crucial question to address, therefore, is whether one can artic-
ulate a principled basis for decommodifying certain types of transac-
tions but not others. Why should I be prevented from selling myself
into slavery but not from deciding to be a surrogate? What is it about
the harm of slavery that makes it categorically different from surroga-
cy? If we do not consider the harm of commodifying human beings
through slavery to be remediable by payment of a sufficiently large
amount of money, should we consider the harm of commodifying
human reproductive capacities through surrogacy to be? Questions like
these have been thoughtfully addressed by a number of legal scholars,
most notably Margaret Radin. Wertheimer's analysis, in falling to
raise them at all, is unsatisfying and incomplete.57
In addition, in limiting his notion of autonomy to negative liberty,
Wertheimer implicitly assumes that illegitimate governmental action is
limited to affirmative interference in the surrogate's decisions, rather
than including as well the failure to assure that the circumstances in
which she makes such decisions are adequate. In short, his position on
negative liberty relates to his argument that unjust background condi-
tions are irrelevant to the status of a surrogacy arrangement. My cri-
tique of that argument is the focus of the next section.
C. Bringing the Background to the Foreground
1. Background Conditions and the Social Good: Wertheimer on
Individual and Society
a. Background Conditions and Nonrefusable Offers
At several points in his article, Wertheimer asserts that the social or
economic conditions under which a woman decides to be a surrogate
55. Pound, supra note 54, at 484.
56. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1928-33.
57. My point here is not that Wertheimer needed to engage in a lengthy discussion of such
questions in this symposium, for I realize that he was using surrogacy primarily as a vehicle for
exploring his concept of exploitation. The problem is rather that his approach-including his
cramped definition of harm---allows one to analyze the question of surrogacy without ever having
to acknowledge the importance of these questions.
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are irrelevant to his analysis. First, in considering nonrefusable offers,
he argues that the fact that background conditions may have caused the
woman to accept an offer she otherwise would have refused does not
render her decision involuntary.-" Wertheimer acknowledges the
critical challenge to conceptualist notions of choice, commenting that,
"[i]t may be argued that when background conditions provide an inade-
quate range of oppoMities, the moral quality or significance of one's
choice is diminished."59 But he adds that this can be so "even if the
background conditions do not compromise the 'voluntariness' of the
choice, strictly speaking. ' " Moreover, he proceeds to dismiss the
voluntariness concern in the surrogacy context, asserting that, regard-
less of any unjust background conditions, the contractual father's offer
is still a "positive good" because it allows the surrogate to improve her
welfare over the situation in which society has placed her.6 Thus, he
contends, a woman who finds herself in difficult background conditions
should not be prohibited from making the rational decision to sign a
surrogacy contract. "[I]t would be adding insult to injury," he asserts,
"to deny her that opportunity."
b. Societal Attitudes and Commodification
Similarly, Wertheimer is not willing to use societal reactions to
surrogacy as a reason for prohibiting it. In discussing whether the
commodification of surrogates' reproductive capacities harms them,63
he suggests that, because surrogacy might be regarded by some as "im-
moral" (on the grounds that "it is wrong to commodify procreational
labor""), a woman who engages in this practice might be "degraded"
in her own eyes or those of others.' Because such loss of respect co-
mes from "the way surrogacy is regarded by the society," however,
"it is not clear that it represents a basis for condemning the practice
58. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1222.
59. Id. at 1223.
60. Id.
61. Wertheimer also emphasizes that whether we label the surrogate's consent coerced is
irrelevant anyway, since the coercion question cannot be resolved without substantive moral analy-
sis. As discussed above, however, he never offers that analysis, and the question of coercion turns
out to be crucial to his ultimate conclusions, for he clearly asserts that nonconsensual surrogacy
contracts should probably not be enforced. Id. at 1221.
62. Id. at 1223.
63. Wertheimer does subsequently discuss whether surrogacy harms women as a group,
concluding that it does not. See infra, text accompanying note 71.
64. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
65. Id. For a critique of Wertheimer's rather limited definition of commodification, see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
66. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219. For a discussion of other,
arguably more plausible, societal attitudes that could affect surrogates, see infra, text accompany-
ing notes 73-81.
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rather than a basis for condemning society's reaction." Attitudinal, as
well as economic, background conditions are simply irrelevant to the
legitimacy of surrogacy contracts.
c. Social Good and the Individual
For Wertheimer, societal attitudes are not only an insufficient rea-
son for concluding that surrogacy unacceptably commodifies women,
but are also an inadequate basis upon which to conclude that surrogacy
is unjust. He contends that, because its unjust effects on women as a
group or on society at large are counterbalanced by the positive effects
for the individual surrogate, contract parenthood ought not to be pro-
hibited.
Wertheimer describes three possible bases for concluding that con-
tract parenthood arrangements are unjust: because they "instantiate
unjust distributions," because they "instantiate[] highly asymmetrical
and unjust personal relations," and because they have "harmful effects
on women as a class. ' "e As to the first, he concludes that concern
about the distributive effects of such contracts does not justify state
intervention in the individual's decision to enter into one. The question,
he says, is "whether society can justifiably prevent [the surrogate] from
participating in such a transaction on the grounds that it is unjust. And
it is not clear that it can.' 9
In addressing the second type of justice concern, asymmetrical
and unjust personal relations, Wertheimer again focuses on whether the
government can override the choices of the individual: "[I]t is hard to
see why such transactions should be prohibited on the grounds that the
relation is unjust-at least if the welfare of the potential surrogate is
the focus of our concern."" As to the third concern, the effect on
women as a group--arguably the most relevant to issues of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the society-Wertheimer objects,
as noted above,7' that prohibiting surrogacy would burden a small
group of women (those who would like to be surrogates) at the expense
of a larger group of women (presumably women in general). Appar-
67. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
68. Id. at 1227.
69. Id.
70. Id. It might be objected here that, because Wertheimer is using the surrogacy issue as a
vehicle for exploring and developing his concept of exploitation, his focus on the individual is
appropriate--and does not necessarily indicate an unwillingness to consider other non-individualist
bases for prohibiting surrogacy. However, to the extent that he addresses the ultimate prohibition
question, and includes in his analysis questions such as the impact of surrogacy on women as a
group, he clearly means to go beyond the development of his exploitation thesis. And, to the
extent that he treats the exploitation question as determinative, which he seems to do at points, see
supra, text accompanying notes 38-42, he leaves himself open to the criticism leveled here.
71. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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ently, Wertheimer grounds this argument on the assumption that the
impact of any such group-wide harm on surrogates themselves is out-
weighed by the benefits to them (otherwise they wouldn't be burdened
by the prohibition at all.) He never explicitly states the basis of this
conclusion, however. Perhaps he believes that his discussion of "disre-
spect" of the surrogate adequately resolves the question, but, since that
discussion fails to consider the broad range of possible dehumanizing
effects that commodification could have on women (beyond loss of re-
spect), it is unconvincing.'
It is interesting to note the rhetorical impact of Wertheimer's
concern for surrogates' interests. By suggesting that those interests
ought not to be sacrificed for the benefit of a larger group, he invokes
an image of the need to protect minorities-a concern for the little guy.
But the irony, of course, is that the commodification concern that many
writers have articulated relates directly to the status of women who are
likely to choose to be surrogates. That is, it is precisely the women
who have limited economic resources and hence might choose earning
money through surrogacy whose reproductive capacities are most sus-
ceptible to being seen as a means to individual or societal ends. More-
over, by conceptualizing the problem in this way, Wertheimer portrays
the issue as representing a sort of battle of the interest groups-pitting
the self-interest of potential surrogates against the self-interest of wom-
en unlikely to be surrogates. In so doing, he ignores the general soci-
etal interest in assuring that people are not treated in dehumanizing
ways and that harmful gender roles are not reinforced. Rather than
thinking about the common good in more organic terms, he reduces it
to the preferences of discrete groups.
Wertheimer's analyses of nonrefusable offers, commodification,
and what he calls "justice concerns" reveal a classic liberal individual-
ist approach to the surrogacy issue-an approach which frames the
question as concerning the relationship between the state and the indi-
vidual and assumes that legal rules regulating the contracts do not and
should not implicate broader societal concerns. For Wertheimer, it is
illegitimate for legal rules to burden individuals in order to improve the
community at large. He assumes a radical disjunction between the indi-
vidual, the state, and the society: individual choices and societal atti-
tudes neither are nor should be affected by law; the role Of the state is
to facilitate private freedom, not to change the conditions under which
that freedom is exercised, and the common good is determined by po-
litical struggle among interest groups. As the next subsection will ar-
gue, in rejecting conceptualism, Wertheimer has not moved the ball
72. See Radin, supra note 20.
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very far beyond 19th century formalist analysis. He ignores the more
corrosive aspects of the critical challenge to conceptualism.
2. Choices, Background Conditions, and the Essentialized Legal Subject:
Wertheimer Criticized
Ignoring the extent to which surrogates' decisions are socially
constructed, as well as the role of law in that process, Wertheimer
precludes the recognition of society's, and the legal system's, responsi-
bility for any harm that such arrangements might cause surrogates, as
well as any meaningful discussion of the broader societal impact of the
practice. In conceptualizing economic conditions, societal attitudes, and
individual women's choices as part of a private world in which law
does not and should not interfere, he employs essentially the same
conception of the relationship between society and the individual as is
employed by many mainstream legal thinkers, the public/private dichot-
omy. Like them, he rejects conceptualism while retaining the central
organizing structures that characterize much of formalist thinking in
law.
Wertheimer asserts that the intended parents who sign a surrogacy
contract have no obligation to repair the unjust background conditions
that induce the surrogate to agree to its terms. But this argument fails
to recognize that the invalidation of such contracts would not constitute
an illegitimate governmental intervention in the relationship between
two private actors. The legal system is implicated in the existence of
those background conditions; they are often, themselves, the product of
law. Thus, invalidation of the contracts is merely a change in the al-
ready existing regulatory system, not a turn to regulation where there
has previously been none.
Consider, for example, the surrogate's choice to bear a child for an
infertile couple, which many such women make because they want to
"give the gift of life" to others. 3 (Wertheimer appears to allude to
such altruistic impulses when he mentions the "psychological gratifica-
tion"74 that surrogates get from the practice.) Why do such women
find giving this type of gift gratifying? If it makes them feel like good
people, why does it? To the extent that these women are also motivated
to use surrogacy as a way to earn money, why does the "job" of bear-
ing children appeal to them? It doesn't take an expert on gender rela-
tions to notice that both altruism and motherhood (not to mention self-
less motherhood) are central components of the idealized image of
womanhood that has been imposed upon women in this society for
73. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d, at 1236.
74. Wetheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1217.
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generations. 5
But my point here is not merely that societal attitudes contribute to
surrogates' choices.76 What is important for my argument is rather the
role that law has played in constructing those societal attitudes. Legal
culture, by treating the ideal woman as a creature of the domestic
sphere of children and home and not the public sphere of politics and
work, has helped to create and reinforce the societal attitudes that like-
ly contribute to women's decisions to become surrogates. Legal rules
such as those that prohibited or discouraged women from being trustees
of estates' or serving as jurors7 or continuing to work when preg-
nant79 prevented both privileged and outsider women s° from entering
or staying in the public sphere and, by establishing a domestic ideal of
womanhood, stigmatized those women who continued, whether by
choice or by necessity, to work outside the home. Thus, law is impli-
cated in the societal attitudes that may make the altruistic aspects of
surrogacy appealing to some women. Similarly, judicial rulings that
justify the legal regulation of women's reproductive functions on the
grounds that it furthers the societal interest in producing babies"' legit-
imate instrumental uses of women's bodies and may thereby make it
easier for women themselves to see their reproductive capacities as ve-
hicles for the realization of others' objectives.
Moreover, even if the main appeal of surrogacy is economic, rather
75. While not all women have been stereotyped in accordance with this image---privileged
women have been seen as vulnerable, altruistic, etc, while low income women and women of
color have not---all of them have been subjected to it, in the sense that it has been held up as an
ideal against which all are measured.
76. Nor do I mean to suggest that surrogates' decisions are determined by social forces.
Clearly, individuals themselves make their own choices within the decisional universe constructed
by the surrounding society. And clearly, the relationship between agency and environment is an
extraordinarily complex one. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency & Coercion
in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). (A statement by Karl Marx best cap-
tures, to my mind, the complexity (and truth, if you will) of the relation: A wage worker, he says,
is a "man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free will." KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL.1
766 (1967) (quoted in Jeffrey Reiman, The Marxian Critique of Criminal Justice, in RADICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 119 (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold, eds., 1995)). My only point here
is that Wertheimer fails to recognize this fact, and as a result, produces a cramped and ultimately
unelucidating discussion of the surrogacy issue.
77. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (overturning statute that gave preference to
men over women to serve as trustees of estates).
78. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding statute that excluded women
from jury duty).
79. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal TreatmentlSpecial
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 352 (1984-85).
80. 1 use the term "privileged women" to refer to upper- and middle-income white women,
and "outsider women" to refer to low income white women and women of color of all socioeco-
nomic classes. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKE LJ. 492, 495
(1993) (developing these terms more fully).
81. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-77 (1992) (holding that the
right to reproductive autonomy is not violated by state policies explicitly aimed at encouraging
women to have children).
1302 [Vol. 74:4
CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...
than attitudinal, law still affects women's choices to enter such con-
tracts. As has been frequently pointed out, wealth distribution is greatly
affected by governmental policies, both directly (through tax laws, for
example) and indirectly (through property law, family law, criminal
law, comparable worth law, workplace regulation, and the like).82 The
unjust background conditions that Wertheimer sees as irrelevant to the
legitimacy of the surrogacy arrangement are themselves the product of
legal regulation of society. Even the infertile couple's infertility, as
well as their felt need to surmount it through surrogacy, are not discon-
nected from legal rules and policies. 3
Thus, to ban surrogacy would not necessarily be to make the
intended contractual parents repair the surrogate's unjust background
conditions, as Wertheimer suggests. Such a ban would not necessarily
constitute governmental imposition on the infertile couple of an obliga-
tion to protect surrogates from harmful choices. To see it that way is to
assume that both contracting parties exist in a self-created, extra-legal
condition, and that the surrogacy ban inserts governmental action to
change that otherwise purely private condition. Yet, in recent years,
critical legal scholars have thoroughly dismantled this vision of the
relationship between private freedom and public power84 (not to men-
tion the earlier challenges by the realists85). As Frances Olsen has
pointed out, "[Tihe terms 'intervention' and 'nonintervention' are large-
ly meaningless... and as general principles, 'intervention' and
'nonintervention' are indeterminate .... As long as a state exists and
enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices. The state cannot be
neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do
SO.''i 6 For this reason, a law that prohibited surrogacy need not neces-
sarily be seen as the imposition of a governmental burden on those
82. In the surrogacy context, for example:
From a legally enforced regime of private property that makes most people's survival
depend on wage labor, to a publicly structured wage system that fails to give equal pay
to women for work of comparable worth to that performed by men, to a definition of
wage labor ... that excludes domestic work in one's home, the law establishes a back-
ground that severely constrains women's economic power and choices.
Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy
and Abortion Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1369, 1386 n.62 (1992) (reviewing CARMEL A.
SHALEV, BtRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989)).
83. Causes of infertility that can be affected by legal policies include sexually transmitted
diseases, workplace hazards such as chemicals and radiation, and unconsented sterilization.
Moreover, law's role in elevating biological kinship reinforces the notion that infertility is a trage-
dy. See SHALEV, supra note 82, at 76-77; Ehrenreich, supra note 82, at 1386-87.
84. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
85. See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Robert
L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCl. Q. 470
(1923).
86. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 835-36 (1985).
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citizens who desire to participate in the practice. Rather, it could just as
easily be seen as the removal of a previously-created governmental
subsidy in favor of those individuals-as elimination of the effects of
all the policies that gave the contracting parents the bargaining power
to obtain the surrogate's consent to begin with. .
Thus, by retaining the liberal individualist notion of the
essentialized subject-a self-creating person separate from social con-
text, who responds to culture rather than being constituted by
it-Wertheimer reproduces the same structural categories that usually
inform conceptualist analyses. In so doing, he fails to acknowledge the
alternative, constructivist, understanding of the relation between indi-
vidual and society and hence fails to recognize his own take as chal-
lengeable. Like many conceptualists, he fails to see that his analysis is
grounded on an unarticulated, political choice.8
Surrogacy is a very difficult issue. It is not clear to me that all
surrogacy contracts for pay should necessarily be prohibited, or that all
instrumental uses of women's bodies or reproductive capacities neces-
sarily harm the women who engage in those practices. Like Professor
Wertheimer, I find it somewhat patronizing when academicians pre-
sume to know better than the individuals involved which side of a
choice of evils is the least harmful one to pick. But I also believe that
approaching the contract parenthood question from a perspective like
Wertheimer's is ultimately more harmful than helpful.
IV. CONCLUSION
In surrogacy, as in many legal issues, the devil is in the details. A
process like that which led to Mary Beth Whitehead's pregnancy is
clearly untenable; one where the surrogate picks the couple she is to
work with, where both sides receive an independent mental health ex-
am and the results of all such exams, where the surrogate has her own
independent attorney, where she is allowed to pick her physician,
where the fee is commensurate with the valuable and demanding ser-
vice being provided, and where the costs of medical complications of
the pregnancy (including lost income) are bom by the contracting par-
ents, might not be. Surrogacy might reinforce the damaging reduction
of women to their bodies or it might destabilize traditional notions of
motherhood as selfless and domestic, rather than lucrative and commer-
87. See id. at 852, 860.
88. I should emphasize here that I am not saying the constructivist account is more true or
correct. And in fact, it might be most helpful to conceive of the individual and society as in a
dialectical relationship with each other, so that neither essentialism nor constructivism provides the
full answer. My point here is simply that Wertheimer's analysis, like the conceptualism he at-
tempts to escape, necessarily entails political choices.
1304 [Vol. 74.4
CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...
cial. Its effects will depend on its implementation and, in any event,
they are inevitably difficult to predict.
But, regardless of the ultimate conclusion one reaches about con-
tract parenthood, it is clear that to pose the issue as a question of
whether certain abstract definitions of harm or consent are met, or
whether government can justly override the private choice of a woman
to become a surrogate, or whether it can require the contractual parents
to act altruistically towards her, is to obscure the very real mor-
al/political decisions that must be made. It is to substitute abstract,
individualist analytics for an admittedly more ambitious (and muddy)
inquiry into what kind of kinship system, gender relations, relationship
to our physical bodies, and reproductive roles we want to have in this
society."
Moreover, an argument that retains these structural elements of
liberal thinking, even while explicitly rejecting purely abstract and
deductive analysis, fundamentally misperceives the danger of formalist
approaches to sociolegal issues. It reduces the critical argument to
nothing more than a set of alternative methodological preferences (the
specific over the general, the concrete over the abstract, the empirical
over the metaphysical, etc.) and ignores the more fundamental substan-
tive assumptions that motivate modern critiques. Dangerously domesti-
cating critical thought, it pretends that pluralist combination of contra-
dictory views is possible and that politics can be tamed by law.
89. For a treatment of the surrogacy issue that relies upon the same public/private dichotomy
as does Wertheimer, but nevertheless manages to engage issues of gender role and kinship defi-
nition in a creative and thought-provoking way, see SHALEV, supra note 82. See also, Ehrenreich,
supra note 80 (reviewing Shalev's book).
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